¹ Eagleton, Forces That Shape Our Future (1945), pp. 122–123.

² See, however, Royal Institute of International Affairs, International Sanctions (1938), pp. 135–136.

³ Cf. the proposal of the Norwegian Government on an improved application of the principles of the Covenant, League of Nations Official Journal, Spec. Supp. 154 (1936. VII. 9; Off. No. A.31.1936. VII), p. 13.

⁴ Art. 47, par. 4; Report of Commission III/3 on Ch. VIII B, UNCIO, Vol. 12, p. 512; see further, ibid., p. 561.

⁵ Art. 43, par. 3; see also UNCIO, Vol. 12, p. 511.

⁶ UNCIO, Vol. 12, pp. 402–403.

⁷ For a general discussion of European organizations see Bindschedler, Rechtsfragen der europäschen Einigung (1954); Robertson, , “The Council of Europe 1949–1953,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 3 (1954), pp. 235–255 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 404–420; Sørensen, , “The Council of Europe,” Yearbook of World Affairs, Vol. 6 (1952), pp. 75–97 Google Scholar.

⁸ Szuldrzynski, , “Legal Aspects of OEEC,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 2 (1953), pp. 579–595 Google Scholar; Adam, L’Orgcmisation Europèenne de Co-opération Économique (1949).

⁹ Bebr, , “The European Coal and Steel Community: A Political and Legal Innovation,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 63 (1953), pp. 1–43 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bebr, , “Labor and the Schuman Plan,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 52 (1954), pp. 1007–1022 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ McDougal, , “Law and Power,” this Journal , Vol. 46 (1952), pp. 102–114 Google Scholar; also his “International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception,” in Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 82 (1953), pp. 137–258.

¹¹ Scelle, Une Crise de la Société des Nations (1927), pp. 166–171; Yepes, , “ Les accords régionaux et le droit international ,” Hague Academy, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 71 (1947), p. 257 Google Scholar.

¹² For comments, see Schücking-Wehberg, Die Satzung des Völkerbundes (2nd ed., 1924), pp. 669–680; Ray, Commentaire du Pacte de la Société des Nations (1930), pp. 568–589; Silva, Yepes-da, Commentaire Théorique et Pratique du Pacte de la Société des Nations, Vol. III (1939), pp. 97–171 Google Scholar.

¹³ League of Nations, Report to the Second Assembly on the Work of the Council and on the Measures Taken to Execute the Decisions of the First Assembly (A.9.1921), p. 66.

¹⁴ For the argument of the Czechoslovak proposal, see League of Nations, Record of the Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Oct. 2, 1921, p. 707; cf. also Scelle, op. cit., pp. 183–188.

¹⁵ League of Nations Official Journal, Spec. Supp. No. 6 (Oct. 21, 1921), p. 15.

¹⁶ Proposal of Cuba, UNCIO, Vol. 12, p. 772, and of New Zealand, ibid., p. 779. See further Joint Draft Amendment to Chapter VIII C of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals submitted by Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Peru, ibid., p. 771.

¹⁷ Liang, , “Regional Arrangements and International Security,” Grotius Society, Transactions, Vol. 31 (1946), p. 221 Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Kelsen, , “The North Atlantic Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations,” Acta Scandinavia Iuris Gentium, Vol. 19 (1949), p. 42 Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Art. 53(1). It is suggested that not a mere admission of an ex-enemy state to the United Nations but assumption of responsibilities by the Organization toward such a state would end the exception. Cf. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (1950), p. 813. Similarly Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on the United Nations Charter (79th Cong., 1 Sess., 1945), p. 303. See, however, Bentwich-Martin, A Commentary on the Charter of the United Nations (1950), p. 114, taking an opposite view.

²⁰ Bentwich-Martin, op. cit., p. 115, interpret this provision broadly. Similarly, Beckett, The North Atlantic Treaty, the Brussels Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations (1950), pp. 16–18. See also Austin’s statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty (81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949), pp. 137–138, discussing Art. 54: “Now then, can this reasonably be interpreted that we turn over to the Security Council at any time, under any pretext, information that would convert and reverse this into self-injury and mutual damage? No. That would be a very unreasonable interpretation.”

²¹ Kunz, , “Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter,” this Journal , Vol. 41 (1947), pp. 872–874 Google Scholar.

²² UNCIO, Vol. 12, p. 767.

²³ Evatt, The United Nations (1948), pp. 22–26; see also Evatt’s statement in Commission III, UNCIO, Vol. 11, pp. 121–129.

²⁴ UNCIO, Vol. 12, p. 766; see also the proposal of Venezuela, ibid., p. 784.

²⁵ UNCIO, Vol. 12, p. 766; Evatt, op. cit., pp. 28–29. Cf. also The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report by the Australian Delegates on the United Nations Conference on International Organization (1945, No. 24), pp. 26–27.

²⁶ UNCIO, Vol. 12, p. 777.

²⁷ League of Nations, Report of Special Committee Set up to Study the Application of the Principles of the Covenant, with Annexes adopted by the Committee on Feb. 2, 1938 (Off. No. A. 7. 1938. VII), p. 123. Emphasis added.

²⁸ UNCIO, Vol. 11, p. 59.

²⁹ Evatt, op. cit., p. 29.

³⁰ UNCIO, Vol. 11, p. 53.

³¹ Despite the proposal of Committee III/4, the Coordinating Committee, upon the recommendation of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, placed Art. 51 at the end of Chapter VII, arguing: “… the article should not be placed after Chapter VIII, as a separate section as Committee III/4 had proposed, because it might have the effect there of limiting the right of self-defense only to regional arrangements, thus depriving a state which was not a party to such arrangements of that right. Such a conclusion was clearly not to be permitted.” Cited in Memorandum of the State Department, “Participation in the North Atlantic Treaty of States Not Members of the United Nations,” included in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on North Atlantic Treaty (81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949), p. 107.

³² UNCIO, Vol. 12, p. 858. Emphasis added.

³³ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on the Charter of the United Nations (79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945), p. 304.

³⁴ Austin assumes that “the authority recognized in article 51 is not limited to regional arrangements…. the phrase ‘collective self-defense’ contained in article 51 not only relates to regional but also to any group action that may be taken for purposes of collective self-defense.” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty (cited above, note 20), p. 95. Dinh, , “ La léitime défense d’après la Charte des Nations Unies ,” in Revue Générale de Droit International Public, Vol. 52 (1948), p. 245 Google Scholar.

Fox, in his article “Collective Enforcement of Peace and Security,” in American Political Science Review, Vol. 39 (1945), p. 979, goes so far as to state that “the authorization in Article 51 of ‘collective self-defense’ would even permit the formation, without contravening the provisions of the Charter, of a world-wide coalition against a great-power violator of the peace.” Sir Alexander Cadogan made a similar prescient statement before the Security Council: “As the Charter now stands … any one of the permanent members of the Council, by exercising its vote, could arrest the movement of the United Nations Forces. There is, unfortunately, no way out of that. The only answer—and it is admittedly only a partial answer—is provided by Article 51 of the Charter. If any one of the permanent members, guilty of a breach of the peace or of an act of aggression, were to call a halt to the United Nations force, the remainder of the United Nations would be entitled, under that Article, to take action against that Menrber.” Security Council, 2nd Year, Official Records (1947), p. 995.

³⁵ For a general discussion of the right of self-defense, see Giraud, , “ La théorie de la légitime défense ,” Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 49 (1934), pp. 691–865 Google Scholar.

³⁶ Summary Report of the Fourth Meeting of Committee III/4 in UNCIO, Vol. 12, p. 680.

³⁷ For discussion of collective self-defense, see Kelsen, , “Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense under the Charter of the United Nations,” this Journal , Vol. 42 (1948), p. 792 Google Scholar.

³⁸ Art. 5(c) of the Japanese Peace Treaty recognizes that “Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter….” Full text of the treaty in Dept. of State, Conference for the Conclusion of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Record of Proceedings (Pub. 4392) ; also in this Journal, Supp., Vol. 46 (1952), p. 71.

³⁹ Kelsen, , “The North Atlantic Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations,” in Acta Scandinavica Iuris Gentium, Vol. 19 (1949), p. 43 Google Scholar, bases his argument on Art. 2 (6) of the Charter; similarly Beckett, op. cit., p. 31.

⁴⁰ Soviet Memorandum of March 13, 1949. Full text in U.S.S.R. Information Bulletin, April 8, 1949, pp. 205–206.

⁴¹ See, however, Schick, , “The North Atlantic Treaty and the Problem of Peace,” in The Juridical Review, Vol. 62 (1950), p. 49 Google Scholar, taking an opposite view.

⁴² Dept. of State, International Control of Atomic Energy, Growth of a Policy (Pub. 2702), p. 164.

⁴³ Kelsen, , “Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense under the Charter of the United Nations,” this Journal , Vol. 42 (1948), p. 785 Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Cf. for example Thomas-Douglas Resolution (Senate Res. 52, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.). See also Armstrong, , “Coalition for Peace,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 27 (1948/49), pp. 1–16 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and his “Regional Pacts: Strong Points or Storm Cellars?”, ibid., pp. 351–368; similarly the United States note to the Soviet Union on the Japanese Treaty, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 24 (1951), p. 66.

⁴⁵ Senator Vandenberg’s remark in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty (cited above, note 20), p. 143.

⁴⁶ Res. 377 (V) A, General Assembly, 5th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 20 (1950), p. 10; this Journal, Supp., Vol. 45 (1951), p. 1.

⁴⁷ Schachter, “Problems of Law and Justice,” in Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1951 (Eagleton and Swift eds.), pp. 198–200; Sloan, , “The Binding Force of a ‘Recommendation’ of the General Assembly of the United Nations,” in British Year Book of International Law, Vol. 25 (1948), pp. 25–33 Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Text in U.N. Treaty Series, Vol. 9 (1947), No. 132, p. 187.

⁴⁹ Beckett, op. cit., pp. 18–19.

⁵⁰ Dept. of State, London and Paris Agreements, September–October, 1954, p. 15.

⁵¹ Text in this Journal, Supp., Vol. 43 (1949), pp. 53–58.

⁵² Beckett, op. cit., p. 21. Cf. also Senator Vandenberg’s statement in Cong. Rec, Vol. 93 (1947), p. 11122.

See, however, Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict (1954), p. 259, who maintains that the Rio Treaty “based itself squarely on Article 51” without sub-stantiating his view.

⁵³ Department of State, Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, Report of U. S. Delegation (1948), pp. 4, 7.

⁵⁴ New York Times, Sept. 8, 1949, p. 11.

⁵⁵ Goodrich and Hambro, Charter of the United Nations (1949), p. 306, erroneously base the Rio Treaty on Art. 51: “… the parties to the Treaty undertake immediately to send to the Security Council information concerning activities undertaken or in contemplation in the exercise of the right of self-defense under Art. 51.” The reference to reports on measures merely contemplated ought to be properly related to Art. 54. See, however, Beckett, op. cit., pp. 20–21. The Chairman of the Organization of American States, when requesting the Secretary General of the United Nations to transmit the copies of the Rio Treaty to the Security Council for its information, explicitly referred to this requirement as being in compliance with Art. 54 of the Charter, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 20 (1949), p. 316.

⁵⁶ Cf., however, Jessup’s address, “The Atlantic Community and the United Nations,” in Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 20 (1949), p. 489.

⁵⁷ Text in this Journal, Supp., Vol. 46 (1952), pp. 43–66.

⁵⁸ Ibid., Art. 25.

⁵⁹ U.N. Doc. S/3232.

⁶⁰ U.N. Doc. S/3238.

⁶¹ United Nations Security Council, 9th Year, Official Records (1954), 675th Meeting, pp. 29, 32; New Zealand, ibid., p. 19; France, ibid., p. 16; Colombia, ibid., p. 15; Brazil, ibid., pp. 14–15.

⁶² Ibid., p. 24. For further Soviet arguments see ibid., pp. 27, 28, 35.

⁶³ Security Council, 9th Year, Official Records (1954), 675th Meeting, p. 38. For details of the handling of the matter by the Inter-American Peace Committee of the Organization of American States, see its Report to the Security Council of July 13, 1954, published as U.N. Doc. S/3267.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 676th Meeting, pp. 28–29.

⁶⁵ Text in this Journal, Supp., Vol. 43 (1949), pp. 59–63.

⁶⁶ Art. VIII.

⁶⁷ Text in this Journal, Supp., Vol. 43 (1949), pp. 159–162. Protocol regarding the Accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, Cmd. 8407.

⁶⁸ Heindel-Kalijarvi-Wilcox, , “The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate,” this Journal , Vol. 43 (1949), p. 639 Google Scholar. Even a cursory analysis of the North Atlantic Treaty will disclose that there is no counterpart to a provision such as that of Art. 5 of the Rio Treaty and will refute the assumption that “the Bio Pact … established a precedent which has been used in developing the North Atlantic Pact….” Cf. Key, , “The Organization of American States and the United Nations: Rivals or Partners?”, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 31 (1954), p. 117 Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ Art. 5, par. 1. Emphasis added.

⁷⁰ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Report on the North Atlantic Treaty (Exec. Rep. No. 8, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949), especially p. 15; see also ibid., pp. 7, 13, 21 and 22.

⁷¹ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty, op. cit., p. 31.

⁷² Ibid., p. 138.

⁷³ 464 H. C. Deb. 5s., col. 2018.

⁷⁴ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Report on the Revision of the United Nations Charter … (No. 2501, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950).

⁷⁵ This objection was raised by the Soviets; cf. its Memorandum reproduced in U.S.S.R. Information Bulletin, April 8, 1949, p. 206.

⁷⁶ Goodhart, , “The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949,” Hague Academy, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 79 (1949), p. 233 Google Scholar. See, however, Kelsen, , “Is the North Atlantic Treaty a Regional Arrangement?”, in this Journal , Vol. 45 (1951), pp. 162–164 Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ Text in Revue Egyptienne de Droit International, Vol. 6 (1950), pp. 344–348; see also Supp. to this Journal, below, p. 51.

⁷⁸ Art. 2.

⁷⁹ Arts. 4, 5.

⁸⁰ Text in Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 25 (1951), pp. 148–149; this Journal, Supp., Vol. 46 (1952), p. 93.

⁸¹ Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 31 (1954), pp. 393–396.

⁸² ANZUS Treaty, Art. 4, par. 2. Cf. also statement of Secretary Dulles before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on the Japanese Peace Treaty (82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952), pp. 61–62. SEATO Treaty, Art. 4(2). See also Secretary Dulles’ statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954), pp. 20–21.

⁸³ ANZUS Treaty, Art. 4, par. 2; SEATO Treaty, Art. 4(1). Secretary Dulles before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, loc. cit., p. 17.

⁸⁴ Art. 4.

⁸⁵ Art. 4, par. 2.

⁸⁶ Unofficial English translation reprinted in Supp. to this Journal, below, p. 47.

⁸⁷ Ibid., Art. 2, par. 2.

⁸⁸ Ibid., Art. 7, par. 1.

⁸⁹ Art. 7, par. 2. For the text of General Assembly Res. 378 (V), see 5th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 20 (1950), pp. 12–13.

⁹⁰ Gromyko’s statement, General Assembly, 3rd Sess., Part II, Official Records, Plenary Meetings, Summary Record, 1949, p. 62.

⁹¹ The following satellite treaties avoid any reference to the principles of the Charter: Czechoslovak-Hungarian Treaty (1949), Bulgarian-Hungarian Treaty (1949). For their text, see Department of State, Documents and State Papers, 1948, No. 4, and 1949, Nos. 12–13.

⁹² Soviet-Rumanian Treaty, Art. 2; Soviet-Hungarian Treaty, Art. 1; Soviet-Bulgarian Treaty, Art. 2; Polish-Hungarian Treaty, Art. 1; Czechoslovak-Hungarian Treaty, Art. 2; Czechoslovak-Bulgarian Treaty, Art. 3; Hungarian-Bulgarian Treaty, Art. 3. See Schapiro’s comment, “The Post-War Treaties of the Soviet Union,” in Yearbook of World Affairs, Vol. 4 (1950), pp. 139–140.

⁹³ Kulski, , “The Soviet System of Collective Security Compared with the Western System,” this Journal , Vol. 44 (1950), p. 462 Google Scholar.

⁹⁴ For a detailed analysis of the Soviet treaty system, see Kulski, loc. cit.

⁹⁵ Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning (1950), p. 75.