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The Problem of Aggression and the Prevention of War
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 April 2017
Extract
It is not surprising that works on aggression have abounded during the past several years. As the author of a recent noteworthy contribution to the subject has said: “The problem of aggression is … intimately connected with that of international security.” Our present-day society, which seeks above all to stabilize its precarious security, is therefore compelled to preoccupy itself with the problem of aggression. It may, perhaps, seem unprofitable to add to the numerous pages which have already been devoted to this problem. We propose to do so only because we believe that we have established the existence of serious gaps in the doctrine of the subject, and, what is of greater importance, in its practice. Everyone admits, more or less explicitly, that the problem of aggression is inseparable from that of the prevention of war. However, when it is a question of defining the relations of the two or of showing how the solution of the former influences the practical construction of the latter, we find either a complete silence or fragmentary and empirical solutions which lack even the merit of leading to satisfactory positive results.
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- Copyright © American Society of International Law 1937
References
1 Diamandesco, J. Le Problems De Pagression Dans Le Droit International Public Actuel (Paris,1936), p. 1. Google Scholar
2 Ibid., p. 15.
3 We here refer to the Disarmament Conference, to the collaboration of the United States with the League during the Sino-Japanese conflict, to the relations between the League and the Pan American Union, to the Soviet pacts on non-aggression concluded before the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League, etc.
4 Diamandesco,op. cit., pp. 77 ff., 123 ff., and 87 ff.; Hertz, W. G. Das Problem Des Welkerreehtlichen Angriffes (Leyden, 1935),pp. 93 ff., 107 ff., and 119 ff.Google Scholar
5 Thus, the violation of a demilitarized zone has been assimilated to aggression. Done for the purpose of attaching sanctions to such a violation, this assimilation results only in creating an illusory feeling of security. It is hoped thereby that the application of sanctions by other states may be evoked by the magic word “aggression”. The tragic events through which we have just lived show us clearly that on the crucial day, when one wishes to put the machine into operation, governments begin to quibble,suddenly discovering, after more than ten years, that a violation of conventional obligations is not an aggression in the material sense of the word.
6 Documents de la Commission Preparatoire du Desarmement, aerie III, p. 93 ff.
7 See Kopelmanas, L. “L’article XI du Pacte de la S. D. N.,” 42 Revue generale de droit international public(1935),p. 559ff., and esp. p. 588 ff.Google Scholar
8 Ibid., pp. 561 ff., 598 ff., and 615 ff.
9 Ibid., p. 607 ff.
10 io journal Officiel, Societe des Nations, 1933, suppl. spéc. n° 112, pp.22, 56 ff.
11 Ibid., 1935, suppl.spéc. n° 133, p. 49.
12 Cf., Ray, J.,Commentaire du Pacte de la S. D. N.(4th supp.,1935)Google Scholar. p. 89 ff.
13 Resolution of Oct.7, 1935, J. O., S. D. N. 1935, p. 1223 ff.
14 Diamandeseo,op. cit., p. 144ff.
15 Ibid., pp. 34 ff., 231ff.
16 Ibid., p.207ff.
17 See the writer’s review of Diamandesco, op. cit., 43 Rev. gen. de droit int. pub.(1936), p.223
18 le Op. cit., p.234.
19 Cf. Quincy Wright, “The Test of Aggression in the Italo-Ethiopian War,”this JOURNAL, Vol. 30(1936), p.53.
20 Op. cit., pp. 220ff., 234ff.
21 Bourquin, M.,“Le probleme de la securito internationale,”Recvoil des Coura de l’ Academie de Droit International(1934-111), p. 534ff.Google Scholar
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21 Cf. the Rutgers memorandum on Art. 11, Documents de la Commission Preparatoire du Desarmement, genieVI, n° 156, p. 149. See also, H. Wehberg, International Policing (London, 1935), p. 82 ff.; de Brouckere, “La prevention de la guerre,” Recueil des Cours de l’Academie de Droit International(1934-IV), p. 63 ff.
24 Du droit de la pain(The Hague, 1932), p. 199 ff.
25 Cohn, G. Kriegsverhutung and Schuldfrage(Leipzig,1931), pp. 92 ff., 45 ff., and 96 ff.; Rapport sur is systeme des sanctions de Particle XVI du Pacte et le role futur de la neutralite(present() b. laConference de securite collective), pp. 4 ff., 12 ff.Google Scholar
26 Bourquin, M. Rapport general sur les Memoires preparatoires(presente i1 laConference de securite collective), p.39,note 1.Google Scholar
27 Rapport sur is system des sanctions, id.,p. 13.
28 The following, among others, affirm the penal character of Art. 16: Wehberg, H. “Le probleme de la mise de la guerre hors la loi,” Reeueil Des Cours De L’ Academie De Droit International(1928-IV),p.166ff.Google Scholar; Bourquin, M. “Regles generales du droit de la paix,” ibid.(1931-I), p.180 Google Scholar; Barandon, P. Le systeme juridique de la S. D. N. pour la prevention de la guerre(Paris,1933), p.305 Google Scholar;and N., Politis Documents de la Commission Preparatoire de la Conference du Desarmement,aerie IV, p.67 Google Scholar. According-to Guggenheim, P.Art. 16Regulates Forced Execution Against a Violator of the Covenant.Der VOlkerbund in seiner politisthen and rechtlichenWirldichkeit(Berlin-Leipzig,1932), p.146.Schucking and Wehberg speak at times of “Strafsanlctionen,”and at others of “Zwangsvollstreckung.” Die Satzung des Volkerbundes(2d ed.,Berlin,1924),pp.608,618,602ff.Google Scholar
29 Teitgen, P.H. La police municipale(Paris,1934),p.339ff.Google Scholar
30 Our appeal to general principles has nothing in common with “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” to which reference is made in Art. 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. We have shown elsewhere that one cannot admit their character as a formal sourceof law. We are able to invoke them only as a legislative ideal, or, in other words, as a material source. L. Kopelmanas, “Quelques rdflexions au sujet de l’article 38, 30 du Statut de la C. P. J. I.,” 43 Rev. gen. de droit int. pub. (1936), p. 285 ff.
31 Teitgen, op.cit., p.80 ff. See Toroczanyi, “Polizeidiskretionitre Verftlgungen—gerichtlicher Rechtschutz,” 3 ZeitschriftftZr auslandisches 5ffentliches Becht and Vollcerrecht(1933), p. 228 ff.
32 Teitgen, op. cit.,p. 500 ff.; Kopelmanas, L., in 42 Rev. gen. de droit int. pub.(1935), p. 621 ff., and esp. p. 621, n. 3Google Scholar.
33 The rules which we have just developed have been based upon French administrative law. At first view, it would seem that German law provides a somewhat different solution. In fact, the German police may only intervene against those who have caused the disorder. See paragraph 18, Prussian law upon the administrative police of June 1, 1931; W. Jellinek, Verwaltungsrecht, p. 428 ff.; Fleiner, Les prineipes general du droit administratif allemand(Paris, 1933), p. 245 ff. The difference, however, is only superficial. Paragraph 21 of the Prussian law cited above permits the police to act in case of necessity even against persons who have not caused the disorder. The state of necessity arises in every case in which the police are obliged to act under the threat of grave disorder, and without being able to ascertain the guilty person or persons. From this point of view, there is no difference between the French and the German solutions. We believe that the French system is the more logical, for, in our opinion, the “exceptional” case envisaged in the Prussian law will present itself more frequently than that envisaged in paragraph 18.
34 The experience of the sanctions imposed upon Italy during the Halo-Ethiopian conflict seems to confirm our thesis rather than to contradict it. It cannot be doubted that the failure of the sanctions was the result, in large part, of the inaction of the Council following the Wal-Wal incident. Cf. G. Scelle, “Theorie et pratique de la fonction executive en droit international,” Recueil des Cours de l’Academie de Droit International(t. 55, 1936), p. 152 ff. Account must be taken of the fact that this inaction was rendered inevitable by the desire of the Council to act only against the aggressor. How could one determine the aggressor without deciding to whom Wal-Wal belonged? See Ch. Rousseau, “Le conflit italo-ethiopien,” 44 Rev. gen. de droit int. pub. (1937), p. 5 ff. The difficulty in determining the aggressor resulted in delaying action against the war. When the aggression became evident, it was already too late to act effectively. Would one wish better proof of the impossibility of basing a solid system of war prevention upon the notion of aggression?
35 See Kopelmanas, L. , in 42 Rev. gen. de droit int. pub. (1935), p. 636 ff.Google Scholar
36 See Kopelmanas, L. , in 42 Rev. girt. de droit int. pub. (1935), p. 621 ff.Google Scholar
37 We see very clear proof of this in the manner in which sanctions were applied against Italy. They were in no way intended to punish her, but to render war more difficult and to lead to the conclusion of peace. In no other way can one comprehend the various plans of conciliation, all of which in fact acknowledged and accepted the Italian victories.
38 See especially the first Wilson plan, Arts. 6, 7 and 10. D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. II (New York-London, 1928), p. 14 ff.; and the “British Draft Convention” of Jan. 20, 1919, Ch. II, Art. 13, par. 3. Ibid., p. 112.
The present construction of Art. 16 recalls the solutions of the problem of police organization in undeveloped societies. The central power, incapable of organizing an effective police, delegates this task to its component groups. The members of the group are held collectively responsible for the repression of offenses. It is in this indirect fashion that the central power hopes to force the members of the group to punish the guilty persons themselves, and thus to maintain order. It is very possible that the framers of the Covenant had unconsciously the same idea. It must be noted that this type of responsibility, semi-administrative and semi-penal, disappears from the moment that the central power itself becomes capable of assuring material order within the entire society. One may therefore presume that an effective and rational organization of the powers of the League of Nations in virtue of Art. 11 will relegate Art. 16 to the realm of historical memories.