¹ As to this tendency, see Lancelot, Hogben, The Retreat from Reason (Conway Memorial Lecture, London, 1936)Google Scholar; Lynd, Knowledge for What? (Princeton, 1939).

² See Wild, “What Is the Trouble with International Law?” Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., Vol. XXXII (1938), p. 479: “Too often in the past he has assumed the attitude that the world is out of step with his law, and too seldom has he considered the point that perhaps his science is partly to blame.”

³ Professor Quincy Wright could report in 1930 (Research in International Law since the War, p. 25): “Of the twenty jurists with whom the writer has corresponded, only two betrayed a note of pessimism at the prospects, and that in both cases was qualified.”

⁴ Such reëxamination is called for by many writers; see, for instance, Philip Marshall Brown, this Journal, Vol. 33 (1939), p. 149; Djuvara, Recueil des Cours de VAcad&mie de Droit International (cited hereafter as Hague Recueil), Vol. 64 (1938), p. 485; Hudson, Proceedings of the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Conferences of Teachers of International Law (Washington, 1925, 1928,1933), pp. 86 et seq., 72, 94, 95, respectively; MacKenzie, Proceedings of the 6th Conference of Teachers of International Law (Washington, 1938), p. 109; Friedman, “The Disintegration of European Civilization and the Future of International Law,” Modern Law Review, Vol. 2 (1938), p. 213.

⁵ For the characteristics of positivist philosophy, see Comte, Discours sur I’esprit positif(Paris, 1844), p. 41 et seq.; Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism (London, 1866), p. 6 et seq.; see especially, the excellent article, “Positivism,” by Ruggiero in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12, p. 260.

The most penetrating contemporaneous criticism of positivist science is to be found in Adler, Mortimer J., What Man Has Made of Man (New York, 1937), especially pp. 28, 87, 97, 131, 132, 158Google Scholar et seq., 192, 233, 238 et seq.

⁶ For the characteristics of juridic positivism, see Finch, Hague Recueil, Vol. 53 (1935), p. 557, and The Sources of Modern International Law (Washington, 1937), p. 20; Oppenheim, “The Science of International Law: Its Task and Methods,” this Journal, Vol. 2 (1908), p. 333 et seq.; Bergbohm, , Staatsvertraege und Gesetee als Quellen des Voelkerrechts (Dorpat, 1876), p. 40 Google Scholar et seq.; and Jurisprudenz und Voelkerrecht (Leipzig, 1892), pp. 51, 52; Kelsen, Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Naturrecktslehre und des Rechtspositivismus (Berlin, 1928); Pound, “Mechanical Jurisprudence,” Columbia Law Rev., Vol. 8 (1908), p. 605; Morris Cohen, “The Concepts of Juridical and Scientific Law,” Politico,, Vol. 4 (1939), p. 8 et seq.; Ripert, ”Droit naturel et positivisme juridique,” Annales de la Faculté de Droit d’Aix, nouvelle séie, No. 1 (Marseilles, 1918), pp. 19, 20, 32 et seq.; Anzilotti, Corns de Droit International, Vol. 1 (Paris, 1929), p. 18 et seq.; Waline, “Positivisme philosophiqve, juridique et sociotogique,” Mélanges Carré de Malberg (Paris, 1936), p. 519; Géiy, Science et Technique en Droit privé positif (Paris, 1915), Vol. 2, pp. 15 et seq., 31, 37, 38. A good survey is to be found in Erim, Le Positivisme juridique et le Droit International (Paris, 1939).

⁷ An excellent analysis of this development is to be found in Bonnecase’s history of the French “École de l’ Exégèse.” La Pensée juridique française de 1804 à I’heure présente, Vol. 1 (Bordeaux, 1933).

⁸ Pound, Roscoe, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (New Haven, 1937), p. 57 Google Scholar.

⁹ Cavaglieri could write in 1911 (“La Conception positive de la société internationale,” Revue gén. dr. pub., Vol. 18 (1911), p. 260): “Parmi ceux qui s’adonnent aux études de droit international, il n’est aujourd’hui personne qui ne fasse pas solennellement profession d’adhérer à la nouvelle conception positive du droit….” Some years later Ripert could say (.Annales, hoc. cit., p. 18): “…cette géiéation professe un positivisme juridique absolu.”

¹⁰ Professor Lauterpacht (Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (London, 1927), p. 27, note 5; p. 58, note 7; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol. 1 (1937, p. 100) defends the opinion that positivism no longer dominates the science of international law, but has been replaced by a new doctrine of moderate natural law. It is difficult to share this opinion. Natural law and the post-war science of international law have only this in common, that they overstep the limits of experience. However, one would do injustice to the great metaphysical systems of natural law by identifying them with the post-war science of international law. Whereas Suarez and Grotius were fully aware of the aprioristic, metaphysical character of their propositions and had good philosophical reasons for adhering to them, post-war positivism helplessly confuses reality and imagination, wish and fact, because no longer does it possess the scientific means of distinguishing between both. Cf., also, Laski, The State in Theory and Practice (New York, 1935), p. 198; Wild, loc. cit., p. 483 et seq.

¹¹ See, especially, Das Problem der Souveraenitaet und die Theorie des Voelkerrechts (1928).

¹² See, especially, Huber, Max, Die soziologischen Grundlagen des Voelkerrechts (Berlin, 1928)Google Scholar; Ray, Hague Recueil, Vol. 48 (1934), p. 631 et seq.; Schindler, ibid., Vol. 46 (1933), p. 229 et seq.; Morgenthau, La Notion du “‘politique” et la th&orie des différends internationaux(Paris, 1933), pp. 37 et seq., 65 et seq., and La Réalité des normes, en particulier des normes du droit international (Paris, 1934), pp. 139, 140, 215.

¹³ 208 U. S. 412 (1908). An excellent appraisal of the theoretical importance of this case is to be found in Frankfurter, “Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law,” Harvard Law Rev., Vol. 29 (1916), p. 353.

¹⁴ See the reference to Cardozo’s opinion in Techt v. Hughes, 229 N. Y. 222, 241 (1920), in Hudson, “International Law in the Twentieth Century,” Cornell Law Quarterly, Vol. 10 (1925), p. 435, note 75.

¹⁵ For criticism of post-war international law, see especially, Beckett, “International Law in England,” Law Quarterly Rev., Vol. 55 (1939), pp. 261, 262, 266; Borchard, this Journal, Vol. 27 (1933), p. 518, Vol. 28 (1934), p. 108; Hill, ibid., Vol. 23 (1929), p. 617; Moore, John Bassett, ibid., Vol. 27 (1933), p. 607 Google Scholar; the same, International Law and Some Current Illusions (New York, 1924); the same, “An Appeal to Reason,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 11 (1933), see especially pp. 548, 585; the same, “Post-War International Law,” Columbia Law Rev., Vol. 27 (1927), see especially p. 412.

¹⁶ See Morgenthau, , La Rialite des Normes, p. 106 Google Scholar et seq.; cf. also, the rather analytical than critical remarks by Dickinson, Edwin D., Hague Recueil, Vol. 40 (1932), pp. 337, 344Google Scholar; Siotto-Pintor, ibid., Vol. 41 (1932), pp. 265, 266; Verdross, ibid., Vol. 30 (1929), p. 276.

¹⁷ To the following discussion, see Morgenthau, “Positivisme mal compris et théorie réaliste du Droit international,” Melanges AUamira (Madrid, 1936), p. 3 et seq.; see also, Affolter, “Der Bechtspositivismus in der Rechtswissenschaft,” Archiv fuer oeffentliches Recht,Vol. 12 (1896/97), pp. 40, 41.

¹⁸ System der subjektiven oeffentlicken Rechte (Tuebingen, 1905), p. 321; see also the even stronger criticism by Bergbohm, Staatsvertraege, p. 8.

¹⁹ The Future of International Law (Oxford, 1921; first in German, 1911), pp. 58, 59; see also, The Science of International Law, pp. 315, 334.

²⁰ Nature and Sources of the Law (New York, 1927; first edition, 1909), p. 127.

²¹ Cf., for instance, Schwarzenberger, in The New Commonwealth Quarterly, Vol. 3 (1937/38), pp. 263, 360 et seq.; ibid., Vol. 4 (1938/39), p. 60 et seq.; for an excellent statement of the problem, see Kunz, id., p. 131, and this Journal, Vol. 33 (1939), p. 33.

²² An excellent contribution to the understanding of this problem is to be found in Baty, “The Trend of International Law,” this Journal, Vol. 33 (1939), p. 653 et seq., and “The Abuse of Terms,” ibid., Vol. 30 (1936), p. 377.

²³ This absence of any scientific test for the validity of the rules of international law is responsible for the perplexity into which some of the foremost representatives of the international law of Geneva have fallen in recent years. Professor Scelle, who had founded a whole system of “positive” international law upon “international solidarity,” “international federalism,” and like “social facts,” in 1937 arrives at the conclusion that there is no such thing as international law at all. “II n’y a plus en Europe de droit des gens,” he writes in the Journal des Nations (No. 1665, Feb. 28 and March 1, 1937). “II n’y a plus des trait6s.” “The conclusion seems unescapable,” says Professor Zimmern (“The Decline of International Standards,” International Affairs, Vol. 17 (1938), p. 12), “that positive international law, so called, has no claim to the name of law.” (See also the same, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law 1918–1935 (London, 1936), p. 94.) These scholars, who never cared for such “abstract” problems as the criterion of the validity of a rule of law, now fall from one error into the other. First, they accepted the assumed validity of post-war international law without question; now, since it is obvious that the main bulk of this so-called international law never has been valid law at all, they identify this product of their imagination with the main bulk of pre-war international law, which today is as valid as it has ever been, and declare that international law simply does not exist!

²⁴ “Can we even understand English law without going beyond the actual rules themselves?” asks Paton in his interesting paper, “Whither Jurisprudence,” Politica, Vol. 4 (1939), p. 16.

²⁵ To the following discussion, see Pound, “The Part of Philosophy in International Law,” Proceedings of the 6th International Congresss of Philosophy (New York, 1927), p. 374 et seq.; Bentwich, The Religious Foundations of Internationalism (London, 1933), especially p. 262 et seq.; Zimmern, “International Law and Social Consciousness,” Transactions of the Grotius Society, Vol. 20 (1934), p. 25 et seq.; cf., particularly, the brilliant paper by Schwarzenberger, “The Rule of Law and the Disintegration of the International Society,” this Journal, Vol. 33 (1939), p. 56.

²⁶ We have dealt with this problem in La Réalité des Normes, p. 155.

²⁷ For this point, see Liard, La Science positive et la métaphysique (4th ed., Paris, 1898), pp. 38, 57, 72. See also Ruggiero, loc. cit., p. 261: “Not only the extreme difficulty of maintaining itself on a level strictly positive and not exceeding the limits of experience but also the tendency … to identify objectivity with materiality, have often caused positivism to range over into materialism, that is, into metaphysics, in contradiction to its own premises.” As to the specific legal phenomenon of “positivism ending in disregard of positive law,” see Lauterpacht, in Modern Theories of Law (London, 1933), pp. 132,133; and Morgenthau, Positivisms mal Compris, pp. 3, 4.

²⁸ Strupp, , Hague Recueil, Vol. 47 (1934), p. 298 Google Scholar; Brierly, The Law of Nations (London, 1936), p. 45.

²⁹ Brierly, The Shortcomings of International Law, p. 4 et seq.; Morgenthau, “The Problem of Neutrality,” University of Kansas City Law Rev., Vol. VII (1939), p. 110; Wild, loc. cit., p. 478 et seq.

³⁰ For this point, see Brierly, op. cit., pp. 5, 16; Kenneth Colegrove, Proceedings of the 5th Conference of Teachers of International Law, p. 97; Ray, Annales Sociologiques, série C, No. 3, p. 14 et seq.; cf. especially, the excellent remarks by Friedman, Modern Law Review, Vol. 2 (1938), p. 194; and review, ibid., p. 81.

³¹ For the influence of Roman law upon international law, see Pound, loc. cit., pp. 376, 377; Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources, p. 23 et seq.; Alvarez, Nouvelle Conception des Études juridiques, p. 47 et seq.

³² Reeves, Proceedings of the 2nd Conference of Teachers of International Law, pp. 72, 73.

³³ This high degree of individualization is clearly recognized by Brierly, Hague Recueil, Vol. 58, p. 16; Ray, ibid., Vol. 48, p. 699; Schindler, ibid., Vol. 46, p. 265.

³⁴ The same phenomenon with regard to municipal social legislation has been excellently described by Frankfurter, loc. cit., pp. 369, 370: “It is now clearly enough recognized that each case presents a distinct issue; that each case must be determined by the facts relevant to it; that we are dealing, in truth, not with a question of law but the application of an undisputed formula to a constantly changing and growing variety of economic and social facts. Each case, therefore, calls for a new and distinct consideration, not only of the general facts of industry but the specific facts in regard to the employment in question and the specific exigencies which called for the specific statute.”

³⁵ See Morgenthau, , “Thiorie des Sanctions internationales,” Revue de Droit Int. et de Ltg. Comp., Vol. 16 (1935), p. 832 Google Scholar.

³⁶ See Morgenthau, , “The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe,” Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., Vol. 33 (1939), p. 473 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁷ Leresche, “La Crise du Droit des Gens,’’ Rev. int. Frangaise du Droit des Gens, Vol. 6 (1938), p. 303.

³⁸ See the excellent criticism by Barandon, Das System der politischen Staatsvertraege seit 1918 (Handbuch des Voelkerrechts, Vol. 4), p. 1.

³⁹ See author’s analysis of arbitration treaties concluded under different political circumstances, in International Jurisdiction, its Nature and its Limits (in German, 1929), p. 131 et seq.

⁴⁰ La Réalité des Normes, p. 89 et seq.; for criticism of the doctrine of customary international law, see also, Brierly, Hague Recueil, Vol. 58, p. 29; Ray, ibid., Vol. 48, pp. 697, 698.

⁴¹ See, for instance, Kaufmann, Hague Recueil, Vol. 54 (1935), pp. 319, 320; Scelle, ibid.,Vol. 46 (1933), p. 691; Verdross, ibid., Vol. 30 (1929), p. 277; Le Fur, in Revue de Droit International, Vol. 17 (1936), p. 7—authors who have certainly not very much in common besides the claim of being “realists.” Cf. also, Lundstedt who, according to Pound, loc. cit.,p. 145, qualifies Pound, Kelsen, and Duguit as “realists”!

⁴² Although the doctrine developed in the text is undoubtedly of a sociological nature, we would rather prefer to avoid the term; for sociological jurisprudence, through the influence of Professor Pound’s writings, is associated with the idea of “social engineering,” which is, from the standpoint of the contemporaneous legal science, a very premature proposition; see, infra VI under.

⁴³ The principles of functional jurisprudence, as understood in this paper, have been admirably formulated by Llewellyn, “Legal Tradition and Social Science Method—a Realist’s Critic,” Essays on Research in the Social Sciences (Brookings Institution, 1931); and “Some Realism about Realism,” Harvard Law Rev., Vol. 44 (1930/31), p. 1236 et seq. The transition from positivism to functionalism is excellently described by Pound, “Fifty Years of Jurisprudence,” ibid., Vol. 51 (1937/38), pp. 446, 447: “The determining impetus came from positivism and the direction was sociology, leading to functional study of legal institutions in the light of all the social sciences, and tends to consideration of the legal order as a social institution rather than exclusive consideration of the legal materials with which tribunals work in upholding that order.” See also, Hudson, Cornell Law Rev., Vol. 10, p. 434. The functional viewpoint is excellently developed also by Alex, P., Du Droit et du Positivisme (Paris, 1876), see especially pp. 12 Google Scholar et seq., 26 et seq., 39, 118. This work, completely forgotten today, endeavors to apply the principles of a well-understood positivism to jurisprudence, and thus puts by implication the subsequent aberrations of juridic positivism in the right light. See also, the penetrating article by Cohen, Felix S., “ The Problems of Functional Jurisprudence,” Modern Law Review, Vol. 1 (1937/38), p. 5 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Malinowski, , “The Group and the Individual in Functional Analysis,” Am. Jour, of Sociology, Vol. 44 (1938/39), p. 951 Google Scholar: “I would like to add that the science of modern jurisprudence could become inspired by anthropology in treating legal phenomena within the context of social life and in conjunction with other norms of conduct.” For the philosophical background, see Kallen, “Functionalism,” Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 6, p. 523.

⁴⁴ These consequences can be stated within the limits of this paper only in very general terms, and other consequences may be revealed through application of the principles developed in the text to special problems; see the enumeration of possible further consequences, in Positivisme mal compris, p. 20.

⁴⁵ This relationship is clearly recognized by Huber, op. cit., p. 9 et seq.; Schindler, loc. cit.,p. 237 et seq.; see also, La Rialitt des Normes, pp. 139, 140, 215.

⁴⁶ This problem, which refers to the validity of international law and its dynamic aspects, should be clearly distinguished from the problem discussed supra, under par. 2. There we had to do with the question as to how in the international field the particular characteristics of the social context are represented in the material concepts of the legal rules.

⁴⁷ On the theory of international “tensions,” see Morgenthau, , International Jurisdiction, p. 59 Google Scholar et seq.; and La Notion du “Politique,” p. 37 et seq. This theory has been thoroughly discussed by Ray, Annales sodologiques, série C, No. 1 (1935), p. 163 et seq.

⁴⁸ As to the problem of the validity of international law, see Morgenthau, La Rialitt dee Normes, pp. 28 et seq., 212 et seq. Professor Timasheff, An Introduction to the Sociology of Law (Cambridge, 1939), p. 271, calls the theory developed there an “artificial construction.” However, it seems to us that the artificiality of this theory is only the reflex of the artificial character of international law itself; as to this theory of validity in general, see his remarks, ibid., pp. 142,166, 299, 300. The psychological mechanism underlying the validity of international law is well described by Baty in this Journal, Vol. 33 (1939), p. 653.

⁴⁹ For the relationship between sanctions and validity, see also, “ Théorie des Sanctions Internationales,” loc. cit., pp. 474 et seq., 809 et seq.

⁵⁰ Wharton, International Law Digest, Vol. 2 (Washington, 1881), p. 34, makes, in connection with Jones v. Walker, 2 Paine 688, a very interesting distinction between necessary, that is, juridic, and voluntary, that is, political validity.

⁵¹ The classical concept of jus necessarium (see Morgenthau, Positivisme mal compris, pp. 16, 17) and Huber’s distinction between territorial and extraterritorial rules (loc. cit., p. 45 et seq.) refer to related but not identical differentiations. See also, Starke, “Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law,” British Year Book of International Law, Vol. 17 (1936), p. 78 et seq.

⁵² This problem is clearly seen by Whitehead, “An Appeal to Reason,” Atlantic Monthly (March, 1939), p. 311: “Obligation, in European foreign policy, arises from the immediate situation and from duty to the future. Formal law can refer only to situations sufficiently stable.” See also, Hudson, loc. cit., p. 435: “Where the nineteenth century sought the vindication of natural rights, it must be our task to ascertain and evaluate interests.”

⁵³ In German, Helsingfors, 1907.

⁵⁴ The Permanent Court of International Justice (New York, 1934), p. 567; see also p. 552 et seq., and Proceedings of the 2nd Conference of Teachers of International Law, p. 40, with Fenwick, ibid., p. 69, and this Journal, Vol. 33 (1939), p. 107, agreeing. In the same direction points the remark by McNair, Hague Recueil, Vol. 43 (1933), pp. 251 and 252: “Nous appartenons à l’éeole de ces juristes qui pensent que la science du droit international a besom aujourd’hui des matéiaux à mettre en oeuvre plus que des thèses et des monographies.”

⁵⁵ Research in International Law under the Auspices of the Faculty of the Harvard Law School, this Journal, Supp., Vol. 29 (1935), p. 953; see also pp. 937, 938, 947.

⁵⁶ Proceedings of the 3rd Conference of Teachers of International Law, p. 134 et seq.

⁵⁷ Am. Pol. Sei. Rev., loc. cit.

⁵⁸ As to the defectiveness of the majority decision from the functional standpoint, see Hudson, “The World Court and the Austro-German Customs Régime,” American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 17 (1931), p. 793: “In our national courts, a refusal to take account of the social and political conditions to which law must be applied, has produced some of the sharpest criticism of our legal systems. … An international court might similarly build a law in disregard of the political factors which condition its application, but it would almost certainly lack both the appearance and the substance of reality.”

⁵⁹ La Réalité des Normes, pp. 76 et seq., 174 et seq., 216 et seq.

⁶⁰ To this “cumulative” relationship, see ibid., p. 185 et seq. To the following discussion see the general theoretical explanations, ibid., p. 155 et seq.; and the remarks referring to them by Timasheff, op. cit., pp. 62, 83, 84, 272, 324.

⁶¹ The aforementioned papers by Friedman and Schwarzenberger (supra, notes 4, 25) are a promising beginning in this direction.

⁶² “Democracy and Responsible Government,” in The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays (New Haven, 1914), pp. 245, 246.

⁶³ The Mind and Society, Vol. 1 (New York, 1935), p. 185.

⁶⁴ “Speculative Legislation,” op. cit., p. 219.

⁶⁵ For the relationship between theory and practice in the natural sciences, see Meyerson, La Déduction relativiste (Paris, 1925), p. 333 et seq.; Identité et Réalité (Paris, 1926), pp. 36, 37; Du Cheminement de la Pensée, Vol. 1 (Paris, 1931), p. 3 et seq.; Flexner, “The Usefulness of Useless Knowledge,” Harpers (October, 1939), p. 544.

⁶⁶ A highly illuminating discussion of the problem, only hinted at in the text, is to be found in Professor Hankin’s paper, “Social Science and Social Action,” American Sociological Rev., Vol. 4 (1939), p. 1; see also, Professor Lundberg, “Contemporary Positivism in Sociology,” ibid., p. 52 et seq. The problem is stated with intuitive insight by Lincoln Steffens in his letter of June 18,1919, to Laura Suggett (The Letters of Lincoln Steffens (New York, 1938), Vol. 1, p. 472), picturing Wilson in Paris: “He is righteous. If only he were intelligent, scientific! But the unmoral, scientific, intellectual type is for the next generation to produce. Our part is to use the transition period to raise the questions, point away from all persons and individual guilt to the physical and economic enemies of Man.”