* Director, War-Peace Transitions Project, New America Foundation, Washington D.C.; and former counsel to the United States delegation to the United Nations (1981-1985). This article draws on work done by the author at the Council on Foreign Relations and is the subject of a forthcoming book, Privatizing Peace: Responding to the Changing Face of Armed Conflict (with Nat Colletta).

1 Economic losses from the Guatemalan civil war, for example, are estimated at $10 billion for the period 1980- 1989, even without considering the cost of lost lives and physical injuries, and the loss of potential foreign investment. See Guatemala Historic Clarification Commission, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Letter Dated 23 April 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the General Assembly, annex, UN Doc. A/53/928, at 19, para. 72 (Apr. 27, 1999), obtainable from <http://hrdata.aaas.org/ceh/>. The costs of conflicts currently raging in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Congo, and those which have come to an uncertain end in Rwanda, the Balkans, East Timor, and the Palestinian territories, have not begun to be quantified.

2 See Elbadawi, Ibrahim A., Civil Wars and Poverty: The Role of External Interventions, Political Rights and Economic Growth, Paper presented at a conference of the World Bank’s Development Economic Research Group (Feb. 22-23, 1999) <http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/war000.pdf>>Google Scholar (study of 138 conflicts since World War II, linking civil wars and poverty and demonstrating that “poverty... influences the probability of a civil war”); see also Collier, Paul, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy (June 15, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/civilconflict.pdf>>Google Scholar.

3 Disregard of the politics of target countries was said to be required by the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 UNTS 134, as amended, 16 UST 1942,606 UNTS 294. Article IV, section 10 states that” [o]nly economic considerations shall be relevant” in the Bank’s dealings—and a narrow interpretation has taken this to preclude the Bank from considering a state’s political conduct in its lending decisions, including repression at home or aggression abroad. In the early 1990s, this view began to change, especially with regard to World Bank activity in the West Bank and Gaza, and section 10 was construed more liberally to conclude that “ [violation of political rights may . . . reach such proportions [as] to become a Bank concern due to significant direct economic effects or if it results in international obligations.” John Stremlau & Francisco Sagasti, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Does the World Bank Have A Role? ch. 3.3 (Carnegie Corp. 1988) <http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/world/world.htm> (quoting Ibrahim Shihata, Memorandum: Issues of ‘Governance’ in Borrowing Members 35-36 (1990)); see also Ciorciari, John D., A Prospective Enlargement of the Roles of the Bretton Woods Financial Institutions in International Peace Operations, 22 Fordham Int’l L.J. 292 (1998)Google Scholar (discussing evolution of legal interpretations of the Articles of Agreement and the resulting limitation on the Bank’s activity in postconflict situations—still crucial in debates about expanding the Bank’s role).

4 See Guatemala Historic Clarification Commission, supra note 1, at 19, paras. 74-75 (citing the abandonment of social development as a factor responsible for continuation of Guatemala’s civil war).

5 The case for World Bank engagement in the prevention and resolution of civil wars is also argued in Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3.

6 See United Nations Millennium Declaration, GA Res. 55/2, para. 9 (Sept. 18, 2000) (issued on behalf of the heads of state and government gathered at the UN Millennium General Assembly).

7 Id., para. 30.

8 UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi was commissioned by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to recommend ways to improve UN peacekeeping, after the shocks of Rwanda and Bosnia. See Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Identical Letters Dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, annex (Aug. 21, 2000).

9 Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Report of the [Brahimi] Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/502, para. 7(i) (Oct. 20, 2000). The same advice was tendered by the General Assembly’s standing peacekeeping review committee and endorsed by the Non-Aligned Movement. See Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects: Reports of the General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, UN Docs. A/54/839, para. 53 (Mar. 20, 2000), and A/54/87, para. 50 (June 23, 1999); Final Document, XIII Ministerial Conference of the Movement of die Non- Aligned Countries, para. 41 (Cartagena, Apr. 8-9, 2000) <http://www.un.int/colombia/Int%20Enero-Agosto%202000/NOAL-%20DOC%20FINAL.htm>.

10 The United Nations Millennium Declaration, supra note 6, para. 30, resolves “ [t]o give greater opportunities to the private sector, non-governmental organizations and civil society, in general, to contribute to the realization of the Organization’s goals and programmes.”

11 An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, UN Doc. A/47/277- S/24111, at 22 (1992), UN Sales No. E.95.I.15 (1995).

12 Id., para. 44. On the continuing implications for international organizations of Boutros-Ghali’s pioneering suggestions, see Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 1.1:

For a critique of the concept of nation building and its expansion into a norm of humanitarian intervention, see Luttwak, Edward, Kofi’s Rule: Humanitarian Intervention and Neocolonialism, Nat’l Interest, Winter 1999-2000, at 57 Google Scholar.

13 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 ICJ Rep. 151 (July 20).

14 See generally Colletta, Nat J., Kostner, Markus, & Wiederhofer, Ingo, The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 1996) <http://www.worIdbank.org/html/extpb/warpeace/transit.htm>CrossRef>Google Scholar.

15 de Soto, Alvaro & del Castillo, Graciana, Obstacles to Peace Building, 94 Foreign Pol’y, Spring 1994, at 69 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 Kofi Annan, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, para. 48, UN Doc. A/54/2000*. UN Sales No. E.00.I.16 (2000) <http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm>, at 14. Integration of functions becomes critical “to transfer the momentum of crisis response to recovery, rehabilitation and development activities.” United Nations Development Programme, Bridging the Gap: A Report on Behalf of the IASC Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration (Aug., 1999) <http://www.reliefweb.int/iasc/Documents/wg38_2.doc>.

17 See Secretary-General Proposes Global Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to World Economic Forum in Davos, UN Press Release SG/SM/6881/Rev.1 (Feb. 1, 1999) <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990201.sgsm6881.rl.html>; see also Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, UN GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 1, paras. 136-39, UN Doc. A/54/1 (1999) <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/Report99/toc.htm>.

18 Kofi Annan, Message to the Business Humanitarian Forum, Geneva (Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.bhforum.ch/report/mesage.htm>.

19 James D. Wolfensohn, A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework (A Discussion Draft), pt. II§4 (Jan. 21,1999) <http://www.worldbank.org/cdf/cdf.pdf>; see also Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3 (calling for further examination of the World Bank’s interactions with private-sector groups through two modalities: existing private-sector-oriented affiliates, such as the International Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency; and the Bank’s encouragement of foreign investment by the business community). Stremlau and Sagasti note that

Id., ch. 4.5.

20 See Annan, supra note 16, para. 48 & p. 14 (“Greater consistency must be achieved among macroeconomic, trade, aid, financial and environmental policies, so that all support our common aim of expanding the benefits of globalization”); see also Jane Nelson, The Business of Peace: The Private Sector As A Partner in Conflict Prevention and Resolution 20 (Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, 2000) <http://www.internationalalert.org/corporate/Pubs.htm> and <http://www.pwblf.org/csr/csrwebassist.nsf/content/fld2a3a4b5.html>. Nelson details the involvement of multinationals like Microsoft, British Telecom, Dell, Oracle, and IBM, among others, in mobilizing information and communications technology for humanitarian purposes in Kosovo and elsewhere. Id. at 108.

21 See id. at 20.

22 See id. at 44.

23 See Jonathan Berman, Boardrooms and Bombs: Strategies of Multinational Corporations in Conflict Areas, Harv. Int’l Rev., Fall 2000, at 28; see also Nelson, supra note 20, at 75-87 (discussing corporate decisions to maintain or withdraw investments when dealing with repressive regimes, and arguing, with a focus on Burma, Angola, and the Sudan, that companies are now more likely to stay and improve a situation than to leave or work in concert with corrupt regimes).

24 See Robert Zoellick, Strategic Philanthropy for Business, Keynote Address to the Business-Humanitarian Forum (Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.csis.org/html/sp990127rbz.html>; see also Nelson, supra note 20, at 111-15 (discussing individual and collective business efforts at peacemaking in South Africa, Zambia, the Philippines, and Northern Ireland).

25 See Mozambique: Insider View, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4,2000, at A6 (advertising supplement noting “swiftly advancing liberal economic reforms” and “a government keen to cooperate with the private sector and woo foreign investment”).

26 On the Mozambique peace process, see generally Ajello, Aldo, Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement, in Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World 615 (Crocker, Chester A., Osier Hampson, Fen, & Aall, Pamela eds., 1999)Google Scholar; Hume, Cameron, Ending Mozambique’s War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices (1994)Google Scholar; Synge, Richard, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94 (1997)Google Scholar.

27 See generally 3 Directory of American Firms Operating In Foreign Countries (1999); World Investment Report 1998: Trends and Determinants (UN Conference on Trade and Development, 1998) <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir98ove.pdf>; Katherine Marshall, From War and Resettlement to Peace Development: Some Lessons from Mozambique and UNHCR and World Bank Collaboration (Harvard Institute for International Development, Development Discussion Paper No. 633, April 1998) <http://www.hiid.harvard.edu/pub/pdfs/633.pdf>; Benefits of Peace, Economist, Mar. 12,1997, at 44; Better Times for a Battered Country, Economist, Dec. 5, 1998, at 42; Gary Younge, City with a Poetic Edge: Mozambique Attempts to Put a Decade Long Civil War Behind It, GUARDIAN, June 12, 1999. For additional material, see Joint Statement by Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands, High Level Meeting on the Special Initiative for Africa and the Education Sector Strategy for Mozambique (UNESCO July 7-8,1997) <http://www.unsia.org/cluster/educ/mozal.htm>; War-to-Peace Transition in Mozambique: The Provincial Reintegration Support Program, Findings Africa Region No. 90, July 1997 <http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings/english/find90.htm>; UNDP: Country Cooperation Frameworks and Related Matters: First Country Cooperation Framework for Mozambique (1998-2001), UN Doc. DP/CCF/MOZ/1 (Nov. 7, 1997) <http://www.undp.org/rba/country/ccf/9730548e.htm>; War-Torn Societies Project, WSP in Mozambique (UN Research Institute for Social Development, Sept. 1998), obtainable from <http://www.unrisd.org/wsp/moza/toc.htm>; Mozambique: Country Implementation Review, The World Bank Participation Sourcebook (1996), obtainable from <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/sourcebook/sb0211.htm>; World Bank Group, Mission of the Africa Region’s Partnerships Group—Regions: Sub-Saharan Africa <http://www.worldbank.org/afr/index/partnrs.htm> (visited Nov. 21, 2000).

28 According to the Directory of American Firms Operating in Foreign Countries (15th ed., 1998), the following American companies have operated in Mozambique: Air Express International Corp.; Louis Berger International, Inc.; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International; DHL Worldwide Express; Enron Corp.; Ernst & Young, LLP; Johnson & Johnson; KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP; McCann-Erickson Worldwide; Pfizer Inc.; Wackenhut Corp.; and Xerox Corp. The following companies also have (or had) a presence in Mozambique, according to various business news sources: Coca-Cola (U.S.), Flour Daniel GTI Inc. (U.S.), Atlantic Richfield Co. (U.S.), Cabot Corp. (U.S.), Scimitar Hydrocarbons Corp. (Can.), Banco Mello (Port.), Billiton PLC (UK), Commonwealth Development Corp. (UK), Marubeni Corp. (Japan), Mitsubishi Corp. (Japan). See also Mozambique: Insider View, supra note 25.

29 See generally Brynen, Rex, A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and GAZA (2000)Google Scholar. See also Clark, John D. & Balaj, Barbara S., NGOS in the West Bank and GAZA (World Bank Feb. 1996)Google Scholar. For a comprehensive report on the Palestinian economy covering developments in the first half of 1999 as compared to the first half of 1998, including a special focus on donor disbursements and public and private investment, see Palestinian National Authority, Building the State of Palestine (UNESCO Report on Palestinian Economy) <http://www.pna.net/building_state/macro_l.htm> (visited Dec. 15,2000). On U.S. efforts to promote economic growth and access to markets for Palestinian firms, see especially U.S. Agency for International Development, West Bank and Gaza Mission, The Gaza Industrial Estate (May 16, 2000) <http://www.usaidwbg.org/gie.html>. The report documents both the growth of the Gaza Industrial Estate project aimed at promoting 20,000 jobs on-site and many more jobs in nearby feeder industries, as developed by a private-sector investment company, the Palestinian Industrial Estate Development and Management Corporation, and the assistance of the U.S. government in overcoming political and bureaucratic obstacles to the development of the estate, especially the lack of Palestinian-Israeli agreement on security and access procedures. Like other entrepreneurial projects in the Palestinian territories, this one has been stalled by the unrest in the region that began in late September 2000. In light of the economic setbacks caused by die unrest, the World Bank made a $12 million grant to the Palestinian Authority. “This is a highly unusual move for the World Bank,” said Joseph Saba, World Bank director for the West Bank and Gaza, “since the Bank usually provides loans rather than grants.” The Bank said it wanted the grant to serve as a catalyst for other donors. See Palestinians Given $12 Million World Bank Grant, Reuters, Dec. 6, 2000 <http://www.icg.org/globalpolicy/socecon/bwi-wto/wbank/2000/1206rt.htm>.

30 See, for example, the experience of Bosnia, where corruption and inefficiencies born of failed Communistera policies have contributed to the failure to sustain private-sector entry despite $1.5 billion in postwar public funds for reconstruction. Sec International Crisis Group, Why Will No One Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina? (Apr. 21, 1999), obtainable from <http://www.crisisweb.org/>.

31 Moss Kanter, Rosabeth, From Spare Change to Real Change: The Social Sector as Beta Site for Business Innovation, Harv. Bus. Rev., May-June 1999, at 122 Google Scholar. Kanter cites IBM’s Reinventing Education Program as a key example of business innovation, using the corporation’s best talents to develop tools and solutions for systematic change at 21 sites in the United States and four other countries.

32 The recent recommendations of the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department, for example, focus on renewed efforts at macroeconomic stabilization with practically no reference to other concerns of the business community. See Kreimer, Alcira, Eriksson, John, Muscat, Robert, Arnold, Margaret, & Scott, Colin, The World Bank’s Experience With Post-Conflict Reconstruction (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 East Timor presents the most concerted effort at UN-World Bank coordination, unhampered by the type of self-imposed legal restrictions hindering the Bank’s engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo (in the latter, Serbia nominally retains sovereignty and was not a member of the World Bank). The East Timor effort has been undertaken pursuant to the East Timor Joint Assessment Mission Draft Terms of Reference of November 3, 1999, as amended, which provide, among other functions, for the development of accountable judicial institutions and processes. See Strohmeyer, Hansjörg, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AJIL 46 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34 On UN outreach to the private sector through UNOPS, see Press Briefing by United Nations Office for Project Services (Apr. 6,2000) <http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2000/20000406.unops.doc.html>. UNOPS Director Reinhart Helmke argues that the new UN-business partnerships “recogni[ze] that the magnitude of moving into a conflict situation and relaunching a shattered economy [is] of such proportions that even with double or triple contributions from governments, the job could not be done by the United Nations alone.” Since 1995 when UNOPS was established, it has created a project portfolio of $4 billion, an annual turnaround of about $800 million, and an income of $50 million, which covers all costs.

35 See Good Intentions: Pledges for Post-Conflict Recovery (Shepard Forman & Stewart Patrick eds., 2000).

36 See Strohmeyer, supra note 33.

37 See, e.g., Chris Hedges, Leaders in Bosnia Are Said to Steal up to $1 Billion, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1999, at Al. Corruption in Bosnia has thwarted business entry as well as international donor support. The problem is compounded by the fact that “[e]ven when laws are passed to try to contain the fraud, politicians have blocked or ignored them.” Id. Judges fearing retribution are afraid to enforce the law. The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia has recommended an intensified effort against corruption, while disputing the magnitude of the loss from corruption claimed in the New York Times. See Office of the High Representative, Press Release, Fighting Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Aug. 18, 1999) <http://www.ohr.int/press/p990818a.htm>. But die rule of law has not been made operational in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords. See Crime and Corruption in Bosnia: Hearing Before the House Comm. on International Relations, 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Harold Johnson, associate director of international relations and trade, U.S. General Accounting Office) (arguing for a broad-based anticorruption strategy and calling on Congress to require that the State Department certify that the Bosnian national and entity governments have taken concrete steps to fight corruption as a condition of further available in LEXIS, News Group File, Most Recent Two Years. The State Department has disagreed with the GAO recommendations, but Johnson noted that there is “no evidence that [the State Department’s] reassessment or its current strategy address [es] the underlying causes of corruption and the lack of reform.” Id. See also Steil, Benn & Woodward, Susan L., A European ‘New Deal’ for the Balkans, Foreign Aff., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 95 Google Scholar, 96. They observe:

To remedy the situation, Steil and Woodward recommend that” [d]evelopment assistance should... be extended directly to private local institutions or be used to leverage private Western financing of Balkan projects.... [T]he West should make equity investments in Balkan business a priority.” Id. at 103.

38 In contrast to Bosnia, where international civilian authorities chose to exercise little more than the power of persuasion, in Kosovo a UN administration—backed by more than 50,000 NATO-led troops—is authorized to take control of the territory’s institutions with a view toward creating democratic self-government based on the rule of law. Perhaps as a result of this security gap, “the international investment needed for a successful transformation of Bosnia would be much greater than file already considerable investments currently in place there and in Kosovo.” Daalder, Ivo H. & Froman, Michael B. G., Dayton’s Incomplete Peace, Foreign Aff., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 106, 112.Google Scholar

89 See Nelson, supra note 20; Foreword to Reinicke, Wolfgang H. & Deng, Francis, Critical Choices: The United Nations, Networks, and The Future of Global Governance at vii (2000)Google Scholar.

40 The Business-Humanitarian Forum is one example, but it has dealt largely with emergency relief rather than reconstruction. The forum was first convened in Geneva on January 27,1999, under the cochairmanship of Sadako Ogata, the United Nations high commissioner for refugees, John C. Whitehead, chairman of the board of the International Rescue Committee, and John F. Imle, Jr., president of the Unocal Corporation—stressing that” [a]t present, only limited channels of communication exist between multinational corporations and humanitarian organizations.” See Business-Humanitarian Forum, Executive Summary (Jan. 27,1999) <http://www.bhforum.ch/report/index.htm> Other business associations contributing to humanitarian and peace-related activities include Business for Social Responsibility, the Businessman’s Forum, the Business Roundtable, the Stanley Foundation, and various local chambers of commerce, particularly the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Washington, D.C. They are joined by smaller groups worldwide such as the Business for Global Stability Initiative, led by Israeli businessman Haim Roet. None claim any involvement with international organizations beyond the first stage of improving dialogue and opening channels of communication. In the United Kingdom, matters have progressed somewhat further than in the United States, with the Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum’s coordination between business, government, and the NGO community, but there are no active partnership arrangements with international organizations.

41 United Nations Development Programme, supra note 16.

42 For example, the confusion of international agencies in the Bosnia reconstruction effort has been notorious, allowing opponents of the peace process to attempt to set one against the other, and permitting continued prosecution of ethnic war by other means.

43 Agenda 21, the framework for action adopted at the Rio Conference, called for the limitation of greenhouse-gas emissions through the decreased use of fossil fuels and coal. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda21, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992) <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/agenda21text.htm>. Toward this end, the United Nations Environment Programme is authorized to facilitate the transfer of environmentally sound technologies to the developing countries and assist in their effective application. Id., paras. 38.21-.23; see also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, Art. 4(5), S. Treaty Doc. NO. 102-38 (1992), 31 ILM 849 (1992). The transfer provision has been interpreted by some UN officials as including privately owned technologies. Although the transfer is to be accomplished on a voluntary basis, the U.S. coal industry has raised concerns that the “transfer” provision will be used to demand the sale of technology at less than market rates. See Robert Reinstein, Understanding the Global Decisionmaker, Coal Voice, Winter 1994, at 23.

44 On the growing power and prominence of NGOs in advancing peace processes, see Aall, Pamela, Nongovernmental Organizations and Peacemaking, in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict 433 (Crocker, Chester A. & Hampson, Fen Osier, with Aall, Pamela eds., 1996)Google Scholar; Gordenker, Leon & Weiss, Thomas G., Devolving Responsibilities: A Framework for Analysing NGOs and Services, in Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task-Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs 30 (Weiss, Thomas G. ed., 1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wedgwood, Ruth, Legal Personality and the Role of Non-Governmental Organizations and Non-State Political Entities in the United Nations System, in Non-State Actors as New Subjects of International Law 21 (Hofmann, Rainer & Geissler, Nils eds., 1999)Google Scholar.

45 See Perlas, Nicanor, Shaping Globalization: Civil Society, Cultural Power and Threefolding 1 (2000)Google Scholar. He contends that

Be that as it may, the scars between business and the NGO community from the “Battle of Seattle” during the 1999 summit meeting of the World Trade Organization have yet to heal.

46 Forman, Shepard, Patrick, Stewart, & Salomons, Dirk, Recovering From Conflict: Strategy for an International Response (Center on International Cooperation, New York University, 2000) <http://www.nyu.edu/pages/cic/pubs/PayingEssentials02.11.html>>Google Scholar. See also their companion volume, Good Intentions, supra note 34, especially the essay by John Boyce, Beyond Good Intentions: External Assistance and Peace-Building. On the urgent need for “far better coordination and discipline” among aid agencies, see also Lancaster, Carol, Redesigning Foreign Aid, Foreign Aff., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 74, 80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

47 Forman, Patrick, & Salomons, supra note 46, at 11.

48 See Steil & Woodward, supra note 37.

49 See Hedges, supra note 37.

50 Current international initiatives against corruption include the standards of the Organisation for Co-operation and Development denying the tax deductibility of bribes and calling on member countries to criminalize international bribes, and the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. See [OECD] Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17,1997, 37ILM 1 (1998) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/20novle.htm>; Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 37 ILM 8 (1998) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/20nov2e.htm>; Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials, annexed to Update on the Implementation of the OECD Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials (Apr. 28,1998) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/tax.HTM#annex>; Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 ILM 724 (1996) <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html>.

51 The problem of local security has been addressed only through the advisory functions of the UN Civil Police Administration. But CivPol has limited effect when local police agencies are corrupt or are committed to nationalist conflict. The High Commissioner for Refugees has faced the dilemma of the intermingling of armed nationalist militias with civilians in refugee camps, in conflict areas such as East and West Timor, and the Great Lakes—without any Security Council mandate for UN peacekeepers to provide an alternative source of order in the camps. The privatization of security services in the pursuit of civil peace need not, however, be limited to developed economies. Nor should the experience of well-known private security firms like Executive Outcomes and Sandline in Africa be considered indicative of the prospects for successful deployment of “privatized” guards and security services operating under UN auspices in a regulated framework. See discussion of the case for and against the privatization of security in civil conflict in Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatization of Security in War-Torn African Societies (Jakkie Cilliers & Peggy Mason eds., 1999); Herbert M. Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States (2000).