¹ I have advocated this idea for many years,first in my lectures at Vienna University, and in book reviews (cf. my review of C. Schmitt, “Die Kernfrage des Völkerbundes” in the Zeitschrift für Sffentliches Recht, Vienna, Vol. V (1926), p. 628; afterwards in articles and books. Cf. my article, “Statisches und dynamisches Völkerrecht” in GeseUschaft, Staat und Recht, ed. by Verdross, Vienna, 1931, pp. 217-251; my book, Die intrasystematische Stellung des Artikels XI des Völkerbundpaktes, Leipzig, 1931; my book, Die Revision der Pariser Friedensvertrdge. Eine völkerrechtliche Untersuchung. Vienna, 1932. The same idea was expressed by Sir John Fischer Williams in his book, Chapters on current international law and the League of Nations, London, 1929, p. 70.

² Cf. the alliance of the four great Powers of Nov. 20,1815: “Considérant que le repos de l’Europe est essentiellement lié k l’affermissement de cet ordre des choses.” Protocol of Aixla-Chapelle, June 15, 1818, point 2: “Que cette union ne peut avoir pour objet que le maintien de la paix générale, fondé sur le respect religieux pour les engagements consignés dans les traitéj.”

³ In the colonial epoch of the Portuguese and Spanish the legal title of a papal grant prevailed, but with the rise of the great Protestant colonial Powers, Holland and England, this title had to give way to the jus primae occupationis; the condition of effective occupation supplanted the alleged title of discovery.

⁴ The “ purchase” in international law, so-called erroneously and by a false analogy with private law, is, of course, a treaty of cession; cf. my article in the Wörterbueh des Völkerrechts, Vol. I, pp. 627-629.

⁵ Congress of Berlin 1878, Art. XXV.

⁶ On the international protectorate, cf. my book, Die Staatenverbindungen, Stuttgart, 1929, pp. 288-350.

⁷ Fauchille (Traité de Droit International Public, Vol. I, 2, 1922, p. 682), clearly indicates this dynamic purpose: “Rien n’est plus naturel pour les Etats que d'dtendre au dehors leur souveraineté. Elle est, en outre, pour eux souvent une necessity.” Buton the next page we read the ideology: “l’occupation est une fagon de faire pénétrer la civilisation chez les peuples sauvages.” But no great Power, up to now, has been willing to take up the white man's burden with regard to the Eskimos. With regard to the mandated territories carved out of the Turkish Empire, the competition was keen for Syria, Palestine and the Irak. But for poor Armenia no mandatory Power could be found.

⁸ The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated in 1899: “Even the law of nations is a law only in name. It has but a moral sanction, and the only tribunal that undertakes to enforce it is the armed hand, the ultima ratio regum.” That international law must be backed by force is correct; but this enforcement exists in so-called war, which is a legal institution.

⁹ The history of the elimination of the Fehde in the old German law offers a good analogy: first a simple restriction of the blood feud; then came the Constitutio Moguntina,, 1235, which did not outlaw it at all, but which made it the duty of conflicting parties first to exhaust all peaceful procedure which had been created in the meantime; only if it was, in spite of that, impossible to come to a solution, was resort to Fehde allowed. Fehde was therefore not outlawed, but was rendered a subsidiary means. Cf. Par. 5: “Ad hoc magistratus et iura sunt prodita, ne quis sui doloris vindex sit. . . Statuimus igitur, ut nullus . . . se ipsum vindicet, nisi prius querelam suam coram suo judice propositam secundum ius usque ad diffinitivam sequentiam prosequatur. §6: Siquis vero coram judicum sicut predictum est in causa processerit, si ius non fuerit consecutus et necessitate cogente oportet eum diffidare inimicum suum.” Only after having reached a stage where the decision and enforcement of all conflicts could be guaranteed, was the blood feud absolutely prohibited and resort to Fehde made a crime. Cf. Ewiger Landfriede, 1495, Par. 2: “Haben wir all ofifen Vechd durch das gantze Reich aufgehabt und abgetan. Par. 3: Zuwiderhandelnde sollen mit der Tat von Recht zusampt anderen Penen in Unser und dea Hailigen Reichs Acht gefalien sein.”

¹⁰ According to the preamble of the Covenant, the members accept “obligations [the French text, which is equally authentic, is much clearer: certaines obligations] not to resort to war.”

¹¹ E.g., in the case of Art. XV, par. 7, of the Covenant. These cases where resort to war is legal under the Covenant are commonly called its gaps. But it is clear that this is nothing else but a critique; and for the reasons given above in the text, not even an immanent, but a transcendent critique.

¹² Cf. the sound reasoning in the note of the German Government concerning the harmonizing of the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact: “Si l’on veut exclure du Covenant la guerre d’une façon absolue, il faut qu’on ne laisse point de lacune dans le domaine du reiglement pacifique des conflits. Car le seul règlement qui puisse offrire des perspectives de success et de durée, c’est un règlement qui garantisse une relation d’équilibre entre l’interdiction de la guerre et la solution pacifique des difterends. C’est sur P6quilibre de ces deux éléments que repose le Covenant.” (League of Nations, Doc. C. 160. M. 69. 1930 V, 1. V. 1930, p. 98.)

¹³ The absence of an obligation lies not so much in the words “ generally suitable,” but in the language of Art. XIII, par. 1, according to which “the members agree that, whenever any dispute shall arise between them, which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement.”

¹⁴ Art. X reads as follows: “The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.”

¹⁵ On Art. X cf: Schücking-Wehberg, Kommentar zur Völkerbundsatzung, 2nd ed., Berlin, 1924, pp. 449-466; Gonsiorowski, Société des Nations et Problème de la Paix, Vol. II, pp. 264-293 Google Scholar; Ray, J. , Commentaire du Pacte, Paris, 1930, pp. 343-371 Google Scholar; Struycken. “La Société des Nations et I’intégrité territoriale” in Bibliotheca Visseriana, Leyden, Vol. I, 1923, pp. 91-157; T. Komamicki, La question de I’integrite, territoriale dans le Pacte de la Société des Nations, Paris, 1923; H. Rolin, “l’article X du Pacte” in Munch, Les origines et Voeuvre de la Société des Nations, Copenhagen, Vol. II, 1924, pp. 453-488; J. C. Baak, Her Inhalt des modernen Völkerrechts und der ursprung des Artikels X der Völkerbundsatzung, Berlin, 1926; my book, Die intrasystematische Stellung des Artikels X I des Völkerbundpaktes, Leipzig, 1931.

¹⁶ Cf. Advisory Opinion No. 4 (Permanent Court of International Justice, pp. 23-26); Report of the Commission of Jurists (Aaland Islands, O. J. Spec. Suppl. Oct. 1920); Report of March 13,1924 (Corfu-Affair); the above-quoted books of Schücking-Wehberg, pp. 589-592, Gonsiorowski, II, pp. 369-378, Ray, pp. 490-498; T. P. Conwell-Evans, The league Council in Action, Oxford, 1929, pp. 214-220; Castberg in Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparte, 1921, pp. 197-200; J. Paulus in Revue de Droit International (Geneva), II, 1924, pp. 123-138; Politis, N. , Le prohlbne des limitations de la souverainete, Paris, 1925, pp. 43-56 Google Scholar; J. L. Brierly in British Yearbook of International Law, 1925, pp. 8-19; A.Verdross, Die Verfassung der Vdlkerrechtsgemeinschaft, Vienna, 1926, pp. 168-177.

¹⁷ The Report of Mr. Struycken on Art. X stated: “l’objet de l’article X n’est pas de perpétuer l’organisation territoriale et politique telle qu’elle a été établie et telle qu’elle existait à l’époque des recents traitfis de paix. Des modifications pourront fitre apportées à cette organisation par divers moyens legitimes. Le pacte admet cette possibility.” (2nd Assembly, 1st Commission, 1921, p. 191).

¹⁸ Art. XI, par. 2, reads: “ It is declared to be the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.”

¹⁹ Art. XIX reads: “The Assembly mayfrom time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of Nations of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international onditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.” In the French original: “ l’Assemble peut, de temps & autre, inviter les Membres de la Société, a procéder & unnouvel examen des traitds devenus inapplicables ainsi que des situations intemationales dont le maintien pourrait mettre en ptfril la paix du monde.”

²⁰ Cf. the commentaries on the Covenant by Schücking-Wehberg, pp. 661-664, Ray, pp. 559-567, Gonsiorowski, II, pp. 294-310; my articles and books quoted in note 1; Livre Rouge Chilien (Delegation du Chile A la Socieété des Nations); José Carrasco, La Bolivie devant la SociUe des Nations, Nancy, 1921; Aladar Goellner, La revision des traitis sous le rfgime de la Société des Nations, Paris, 1925; C. Schmitt, Die Kernfrage des Völkerbundes, 1926; Em. Hasas, La revision du traite de Trianon, Paris, 1928; Sir John Fischer Williams, this Journal Vol. XXII (1928), p. 89 seq; B. Bouffal, “L’Article 19 du Pacte” in Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparee, 1928; Juan Rivera Reyes, La revision de los Tratados, Paris, 1929; R. Flaes, Das Problem der Territorialkonflikte, Amsterdam, 1929; M. Rado’ikovitch, La revision des traites et le Pacte de la Societe des Nations, Paris, 1930; G. E. Villani, La revisione dei trattati e i principi generali del diritto, Modena, 1930; W. Schneider, Die clausula rebus sic stantibus irn Volkerrecht, Berlin, 1931; G. Roux, Reviser les traites? Paris, 1931; E. Catellani, La revisione dei trattati, Venezia, 1931; Sir John Fischer Williams, International Change and International Peace, Oxford, 1932; A. Wigniolle, La Société des Nations et la révision des traites, Paris, 1932.

²¹ Cf. J. L. Brierly: “War has been one of the means whereby from time to time states have revised the established international order. The analogy to war in the domestic sphere is revolution andour safeguard against revolution is our readiness to meet legitimate grievances by ordered change in the established order. . . and we shall not have solved the problem ofpeace until we have devised some ordered process whereby we can satisfy the demand for change which is the mark of any living human society.” (Cambridge Law Journal, IV,1932, pp. 318-319).

²² Temperley, H. W. V., A History of the Peace Conference at Paris, London (6 vols., 1920-1924), Vol. VI, pp. 444-446 Google Scholar; Miller, D. Hunter , The Drafting of the Covenant, New York, London (2 vols. 1928), Vol. II, p. 72 Google Scholar.

²³ Hunter Miller, op. cit., I, p. 42.

²⁴ “ The Assembly may . . . ”

²⁵ “The Assembly may from time to time.”

²⁶ There is an enormous literature on the subject of this dausvla; by far the best that has been written, in my opinion, are the few pages of D. Anzilotti, Corns de Droit International, Paris, 1929, pp. 456-465.

²⁷ This is perhaps the political reason whysome authors defend this theoretically untenable construction. For if we accept the identity of Art. XIX and the clausvla, we are in a position to argue with M. Radolkovitch: “ l’Article ne vise pas les traitls déjé executes (op. cit., p. 237); and on this theory the author concludes that Art. XIX will only seldom be applicable to peace treaties (sc. of 1919) and never to territorial revisions: quod erat demonstrandum.

²⁸ Cf. Wilson, G. Grafton , “ Treaties and status quo,” this Journal, Vol. XXVII (1933), pp. 104-105 Google Scholar.

²⁹ Cf., e. g., G. Roux, op. cit., pp. 176-177: “ Le principe officiel de l’intangibilit6 des trait&s est une th&>rie purement negative. La vie n’est-elle pas une revision continue? La Paix est une creation incessante, sa construction exige une continuelle activity positive.”

³⁰ Long before the League of Nations came into force, my teacher of international law at Vienna University, Heinrich Lammasch, said that the goal of the development of international law must be to find a juridical form for effecting changes based on the evolution of nations. Cf., G. G. Wilson, he. cit.; Sir John Fischer Williams, op. cit., p. 1: “An absolutely rigid framework is bound in the end to collapse and to collapse violently.” Edwin M. Borchard in his address on the Kellogg Pact, at the Williamstown Institute of Politics, Aug. 22, 1928: “ The abolition of war will, therefore, have to be pursued along other lines. Possibly in the elimination of the economic causes of conflict, there lies more hope than in legal efforts to preserve by force the status quo. Other machinery is needed to make changes in existing conditions, when time and circumstances require. To that effect but little attention has yet been paid.” Politis, Les nouveUes tendances du droit international, Paris, 1927, p. 12; J. L. Brierly. I fully agree with Edwin D. Dickinson's statement at the last session of the American Society of International Law at Washington, D. C., April, 1933, that what I call the dynamic law of nations is the problem of the new international law.

³¹ The Italian Prime Minister, B. Mussolini, often expressed this idea. In the famous interview he gave to Lord Rothermere he spoke the much-quoted words: “ I trattati non sono una tomba” (Treaties are no tombs), published in the London Daily Mail of March 28,1928. Again in his expose of foreign affairs, on June 5,1928, he said: “ Treaties cannot be eternal; for this would mean that mankind has become a mummy at a given moment.” Cf. also Prime Minister MacDonald's opening speech at the Lausanne Conference on Reparations, 1932.

³² Cf. The letter to the German Peace Delegation, signed by M. Clemenceau as the President of the Paris Peace Conference: “Le traits crtie l’organe n6cessaire pour trouver les moyens de modifier, de temps k autre, le reglement meme de 1919.”

³³ It is well known that one of the reasons why the United States did not become a member of the League was her unwillingness to guarantee in perpetuum the status quo of 1919. And Canada, a member of the League, proposed at Geneva for the same reasons the complete elimination of Art. X.

³⁴ So ProfRuyssen, Th.: “l’article X IX constitue, sans aucun doute, une des plus audacieuses innovations du droit nouveau.” (Les Cahiers des droits de lșhomme, XXXI, 16, 1931, Paris, p. 362)Google Scholar. And evenMr. Radoïkovitch, who wrongly identifies this article with the clausula rebus sic stantibus, cannot but state: “l’article XIX est peutétre dans les relations internationales une revolution.” (Op. cit., p. 212).

³⁵ The Chinese delegate at Geneva called Art. XIX, “un des articles les plus essentiels du Pacte” (Xth Assembly, 1929,1st Commission, pp. 44-47), and the Hungarian delegate spoke of Art. XIX as “ une des pierres angulaires du Pacte, qui tient compte de la loi de revolution, le complement et le correctif indispensable de 1’article X.” (Ibid., pp. 54-56, 99-100).

³⁶ The Chinese delegation at Geneva asked in 1929 for the creation of a special commission charged to examine the means to render Art. X IX effective. The British League of Na tions Union, London, made in 1929 an excellent report on Art. XIX in which it said: “ In view of the dangers attaching to an international system which does not provide for its own modification, it is important to make Article XIX practically effective. For this article contains the germ of the League's legislative power. But it must be made effective, if the alternative method of war is to be permanently excluded.”

^37-39 By Art. I of the treaty of alliance between France and Czechoslovakia, Paris, Jan. 25, 1924, the two governments bind themselves “ a se concerter sur les questions ext6rieures de nature à porter atteinte k l’ordre établi par les traites de paix.” In the same sense the treaties of alliance between France and Jugoslavia, Paris, Nov. 11, 1927, Art. III , between France and Rumania, Paris, June 10,1926, Art. III. Art. I of the treaty of alliance between Jugoslavia and Rumania, Belgrade, June 7,1921—one of the Little Entente treaties—speaks of an unprovoked attack of Hungary or Bulgaria, “ dans le but de porter atteinte à l’ordre établi par le traité de Trianon ou par celui de Neuilly.” Cf. also the treaties between Italy and Czechoslovakia, July 5, 1924, Art. XXV, between Italy and Rumania, Sept. 16, 1926, Art. I. In the same sense the French proposal for a British-French treaty of guarantee in 1922, Art. IV.

⁴⁰ Geneva Protocol, I, 1922 (Austria); Rhine Pact of Locarno, 1925.

⁴¹ His memorandum of May 17,1930: “Toute possibility de progrfes dans lavoie de l’union foonomique étant rigoureusement déterminde par la question de la sécurité.” The German, Italian, Hungarian and Austrian replies underlined the dynamic problem. Thus, G. Senile could say: “ Mgme avant sa naissance, la future Union européene se trouve à faire face aulitige fondamental entre révisionistes et partisans du statu quo.” (Essai relatif à “l’Union europeenne” in Revue gin&rale de Droit International Public, 1931, pp. 521-563.)

⁴² Conference Balcanique. Documents. Avant projet d’un Pacte Balcanique, elabori au nom du groupe helUnique de la Conference, par J. Spiropoulos. Art. II.

⁴³ E.g., between Poland and Czechoslovakia, April 23, 1925, Art. I.

⁴⁴ Ratification by Greece, Sept. 12,1929: “ k l’exception des differends ayant trait au statut territorial de la Gr’ce” ; atification by Rumania, June 9,1931: “ Sont exceptés toute question de fond ou de procedure pouvant amener directement ou indirectement la discussion de Pintégrité territoriale actuelle et des droits souverains de la Roumanie.”

⁴⁵ Sir John Fischer Williams remarks with good reason: “Arbitration” under the Geneva Protocol means the maintenance of the status quo. (Op. at., p. 42.)

⁴⁶ Sir John Fischer Williams observed that “ the authors of the General Act, like the authors of the Geneva Protocol, “ turn away from the really vital problem of international relationship.” Previously in 1928 the same author said: “ It may be conjectured that the acceptance ofthe General Act as a whole will commend itself mainly, if not solely, to those states who do not expect at any time to be asking for a legislative change in the existing state of things, and who are now, and expect indefinitely to be, contented with the status quo.” (Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1928, p. 411.)

⁴⁷ “ The General Act is not, therefore, an all-inclusive scheme for the settlement of international disputes, though the notion that it is, is probably the reason for whatever support it has received. But if these disputes are not to be “ settled” by the procedure proposed, what are we to regard as the object of submitting them to it?. . . the legal position is often quite clear in this class of disputes” (British Year Book of International Law, 1930, p. 129).

⁴⁸ Cf. the Hungarian note of adhesion to the Kellogg Pact, Oct. 6, 1928: “under the supposition that the signatory Powers will seek to find the means of rendering, if possible, that in the future injustices may be remedied by peaceful means.”

⁴⁹ The refusal of some states in this commission to accept by way of amendment a unanimous report of the Council under Art. XV, par. 6, of the Covenant as legally binding, had its foundation in their fear that the Council could impose upon them, without their consent, which is not necessary under this provision, a revision of treaties. (N. Politis, “l’accord des posideuxPactea” in Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparie, VII, 1931, pp. 637646.)

⁵⁰ The so-called Mussolini Four Power Pact, signed at Rome in the beginning of the month of June, 1933, contains now the following Art. II : “ In respect of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and particularly Articles 10, 16 and 19, the high contracting parties decide to examine between themselves and without prejudice to decisions which can only be taken by the regular organs of the League of Nations, all proposals relating to methods and procedure calculated to give due effect to these articles” (British Command Paper 4342, Miscellaneous No. 3, 1933.)

⁵¹ Text in The New York Times, May 23, 1933, p. 2.

⁵² Thus the French delegate, Mr. de Jouvenel, said at the 5th Assembly of the League: “Les traitfis sont notre loi,” and the Polish delegate at the 6th Assembly stated: “Nous voulons la justice appuyée sur le droit, car la recherche de la justice malgré le droit, o’est la revolution.” But the means to exclude revolution within the states is just to make constitutionally and timely the necessary changes; it is not different within the realm of international law; for war as a dynamic means corresponds in international affairs exactly to revolution in domestic affairs.

⁵³ On the occasion of the Geneva discussions of 1923 concerning the treaty of mutual guarantee, Sweden and Holland indicated that “ toute norme r’glant la mani're dont peut se changer le status quo territorial, quand celui-ci ne serait plus conforme à la justice, fait d’-faut.” In the discussions of the 3rd Commission of the 5th Assembly of the League, concerning the Geneva Protocol, 1924, Mr. Chr. L. Lange (Norway) said: “ II peut y avoir une contradiction entre le droit actuel et la justice. C’est cette contradiction qu'a pr’vue l’article XIX. II sera nécessaire de developper le germe qui se trouve dans l’article X IX.”

⁵⁴ This idea appears in President Wilson's draft of Art. X, containing the above-quoted dynamic provisions, but adding: “ The H. C. P. accept without reservation the principle that the peace of the world is superior in importance to every question of political jurisdiction or boundary.” This argument holds a dominant place within the French school of thought. Cf. Gonsiorowski, op. cit., II, pp. 308-309: “ La cause de la paix exige que le maintien du statu quo prime toute autre considération. Si le maintien de la paix l’exige, il faut sacrifiermême les interêts legitimes des Etats.” Mr. N. Politis at the 8th Assembly of the League, 1927: “ La paix a une sorte de priority; il faut d’abord maintenir la paix, car en dehors d’elleil est vain d’éepérer la justice.” Cf. on the other hand, the declarations, made at the 6^th Assembly by Mr. Galvanauskas (Lithuanian): “ Ce n’est pas la paix tout court qui doit àtre notre idéal, mais la paix établie sur la justice,” and by Mr. R. Fernandes (Brazil): “ Les beati possidentes d’aujourd’hui sont les non possidentes de demain. Les Dations ne subiront le droit que dans la mesure ouilsera juste” ; and Mr. Coppola (Italy) declared, that all efforts up to now, tended to augment rigidity, but there is another system, “ qui consisterait a render la carte politique du monde non plus rigide, mais flexible.” (Cf. Ray, op. cit., pp. 90-92, 564-565).

⁵⁵ Cf. E. Schultze, “Die wettmrtschaflliche Angleichung der Siedlungsdichte als Problem des Vdlkerrechts” in Archivfur Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, Vol. XIX (1925-26), pp. 414426.

⁵⁶ Cf. Schmitt, op. tit., pp. 55-62; R. Flaes, op. cit.

⁵⁷ Cf. J. L. Brierly. “ The Legislative Function in International Relations,” Geneva Institute of International Relations, Problems of Peace, 5th series, pp. 205-229.

⁵⁸ British Year Book of International Law, 1930, p. 130.