1 See, e.g., Boak, A. E. R., Greek Interstate Associations and the League of Nations, 15 AJIL 375 (1921)Google Scholar; see also Ober, Josiah, Classical Greek Times, in The Law of War (Howard, Michael et al. eds., 1994)Google Scholar (discussing, among other things, the Amphictyonic League, an organization of Greek peoples that regulated the affairs of Delphi); Sheppard, Steve, The Laws of War in the Pre-Dawn Light: Institutions and Obligations in Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War, 43 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 905 (2005)Google Scholar (semble). But Boak, who points out that the Greek leagues “were only created and held together under the leadership of one state more powerful than the rest,” concludes his article with a prescient query: he wonders whether the nascent League of Nations would fail for lack of a comparably powerful state or group of states capable of coercive enforcement. Boak, supra, at 383.

2 See, e.g., Koskenniemi, Martti, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960 (2002)Google Scholar; Kennedy, David, The Move to Institutions, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 841 (1987)Google Scholar; David, J. Bederman, Appraising a Century of Scholarship in the American Journal of International Law, 100 AJIL 20 (2006)Google Scholar; see also Barnett, Michael & Finnemore, Martha, The Power of Liberal International Organizations, in Power in Global Governance 161, 163–71 (Barnett, Michael & Duvall, Raymond eds., 2005)Google Scholar (describing the prevailing liberalism dominating IO thinking in scholarly and policy circles).

3 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 848, 859.

4 Id. at 858; see also Bowett, D. W., The Law of International Institutions 1–9 (4th ed. 1982)Google Scholar.

5 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 849, 866. Despite the U.S. decision not to participate, the Journal closely followed subsequent League developments. See, e.g., Charles Gregory, Noble, The First Assembly of the League of Nations, 15 AJIL 240 (1921)Google Scholar.

6 See Note, Current, The League of Nations, 13 AJIL 570, 572–75 (1919)Google Scholar. President Wilson’s address was particularly prescient given current concerns over the “democratic deficits” of IOs, see infra at notes 99-107 and corresponding text. He noted that since it is “impossible to conceive a method or an assembly so large and various as to be really representative of the great body of the peoples of the world,” the best alternative was to have each government be represented by two or three representatives, though only a single vote, so that a number of voices would speak from time to time for each government. Id. at 572.

7 For a backward-looking view of the UN Charter as correcting the perceived flaws of the League of Nations Covenant, see Bowett, supra note 4, at 17-22. For discussion of the turn to institutions in the international economic area, see, for example, the centennial essays by John, H. Jackson, International Economic Law—A Growing, Powerful Sub-Subject of International Law, 100 AJIL Google Scholar, and Detlev, F. Vagts, International Economic Law and the American Society of International Law, 100 AJIL (both forthcoming July 2006)Google Scholar.

8 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 984-85.

9 For descriptions of existing IOs, see Henry, G. Schermers & Niels, M. Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity (4th rev. ed. 2003)Google Scholar; Sands, Philippe & Klein, Pierre, Bowett’s Law Of International Institutions (5th ed. 2001)Google Scholar. Note that a substantial proportion of new IOs are today created not by governments but by other IOs and that traditional IOs created by treaty declined from 394 in 1982 to 339 in 1992, while “emanations” from other IOs increased from 669 to 808. Stein, Eric, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AJIL 489, 489 - 90 n.2 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a listing of international dispute settlers, see Project on International Courts and Tribunals, Synoptic Chart: The International Judiciary in Context (Nov. 2004), at <http://www.pict-pcti.org>.

10 For one attempt to measure the “degree” of legalization, see Kenneth, W. Abbott, Robert, O. Keohane, Moravcsik, Andrew, Anne-Marie, Slaughter, & Snidal, Duncan, The Concept of Legalization, 54 Int’l Org. 401 (2000)Google Scholar (measuring legalization in accordance with three variables: obligation, precision, and delegation).

11 Compare Simmons, Beth, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the Public International Law of Money? 25 Yale J. Int’l L. 323 (2000)Google Scholar (empirical analysis of relatively high levels of compliance with certain rules of the International Monetary Fund), with Hathaway, Oona, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 Yale L.J. 1935 (2002)Google Scholar (empirical analysis of relatively low levels of compliance with institutionalized human rights regimes). For a survey of contemporary approaches to compliance, many of which consider the relevancy of institutional factors, see generally Raustiala, Kal & Anne-Marie, Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in Handbook of International Relations 538 (Calnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas, & Simmons, Beth eds., 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Work on the institutionalization of compliance has often been grounded in drawing from or contrasting the experiences of the European Union, see, e.g., Jeffrey, T. Checkel, Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change, 55 Int’l Org. 553 (2001)Google Scholar, and especially that regime’s reliance on judicialized lawmaking, see generally Shapiro, Martin & Alec, Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, And Judicialization (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Lauterpacht, Hersch, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 1946 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 1 Google Scholar.

13 Id. at 19-51.

14 For a book-length treatment of this thesis, see José, E. Alvarez, International Organizations As Law-Makers (2005)Google Scholar.

15 Shelton, Dinah, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AJIL 291 (2006)Google Scholar.

16 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Art. 53, 1155 UNTS 331.

17 See generally Cassese, Antonio, International Law in a Divided World 176-77 (1986)Google Scholar (describing the evolution of the rules in the Vienna Convention). The term “package deal” may mean either provisions of a treaty negotiated, on the basis of consensus, that appeal to different groups of states, or treaty provisions subject to an express limitation on reservations or severability designed to prevent the dismantling of the “package” at the time of ratification. 5rc Caminos, Hugo & Michael, R. Molitor, Progressive Development of International Law and the Package Deal, 79 AJIL 871 (1985)Google Scholar. According to Cassese’s description of the negotiating dynamics of the Vienna Convention, the insertion of jus cogens appears to fit both descriptions of a “package deal,” at least to some degree, since the concept was favored by developing countries especially and its inclusion seems to have played a role in securing their acceptance of a package that did not include some of their other preferred “progressive” changes. In addition, although the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not prohibit reservations, the terms of Article 53 (barring any derogation from a “peremptory norm”) attempt to achieve the second purpose of some “package deals,” at least with respect to jus cogens.

18 Compare Simma, Bruno, Consent: Strains in the Treaty System, in The Structure and Process of International Law 487, 494 (Ronald, St. J. Macdonald & Douglas, M. Johnston eds., 1983)Google Scholar (contending that when IO forums produce a treaty, the “lowest common denominator” provisions deemed necessary to facilitate its conclusion in global venues, or to encourage the widespread ratification that is often regarded as the indicator of success, may devalue the entire exercise).

19 Shelton, supra note 15, at 301 n.63 (citing commentary at 1986 UN conference).

20 An abundant literature derives from this premise that the UN Charter constitutes a kind of “constitution” for the world. See, e.g., Erika de, Wet, The International Constitutional Order (2005)Google Scholar; Sloan, Blaine, The United Nations Charter as a Constitution, 1989 Pace Y.B. Int’l L. 61 Google Scholar; White, N., The United Nations System: Conference, Contract, or Constitutional Order? 4 Sing. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 281 (2000)Google Scholar.

21 See Fundamental ILO Conventions, at <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/whatare/fundam/index.htm> (last modified Oct. 20, 2000). This is not the ILO’s sole attempt to suggest a hierarchy within international labor law. The ILO’s Constitution has also been read to imply members’ commitment to certain “core” obligations, such as the right to form labor unions, and to include a sub silentio commitment to respond to complaints alleging the violation of such rights. See Frederic L. Kirgis Jr., International Organizations In Their Legal Setting 413-25 (2d ed. 1993). As Shelton suggests, other IOs have done the same. Shelton, supra note 15, at 314-15 (discussing hierarchically superior norms, as found by the Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).

22 See, e.g., Raustiala, Kal & David, G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 Int’l Org. 277, 279–80 (2004)Google Scholar (describing the consequences of the rising density of international institutions as “regime complexes” consisting of partially overlapping rules evincing path dependence, forum shopping, norms to handle issues at the “joints” between regimes, and delegations of authority to various interpreters or enforcers). For descriptions of various forms of Comission creep” among IOs and its consequences on relationships between IOs, see, for example, The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to The 21st Century 1-1 15 (David, M. Malone ed., 2004)Google Scholar; Einhorn, Jessica, The World Bank’s Mission Creep, Foreign Aff., Sept/Oct. 2001, at 22 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Newburg, Andre, The Changing Roles of the Bretton Woods Institutions: Evolving Concepts of Conditionality, in International Monetary Law: Issues for the New Millennium 81 (Giovanoli, Mario ed., 2000)Google Scholar; Paul, C. Szasz, The World Bank and Tobacco, in Liber Amicorum Ibrahim F. I. Shihata 793 (Sabine, Schlemmer-Schulte & Ko-yung, Tung eds., 2001)Google Scholar; Vines, David, The WTO in Relation to the Fund and the Bank: Competencies, Agendas, and Linkages, in The WTO as an International Organization 59 (Anne, O. Krueger ed., 1998)Google Scholar. See generally Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO, % AJIL 1 (2002).

23 See generally Darrow, Mac, Between Light And Shadow: The World Bank, The International Monetary Fund And International Human Rights Law (2003)Google Scholar.

24 For a discussion of how the interpretation of IO charters has been “constitutionalized” through teleological interpretation, see Alvarez, supra note 14, at 65-108. See, e.g., Hannes, L. Schloemann & Ohlhoff, Stefan, “Constitutionalization “and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AJIL 424, 424 (1999)Google Scholar (“Constitutional structures are developing much faster in international trade law than in any other area of international law. . .”). For a thoughtful review and critique of such views with respect to the WTO, see Deborah, Z. Cass, The Constitutionalization of The World Trade Organization (2005)Google Scholar.

25 See Ronald, Charles Wolf, Trade, Aid, and Arbitrate 101–10 (2004)Google Scholar; David, F. Fidler, A Kinder, Gentler System of Capitulations? International Law, Structural Adjustment Policies and the Standards of Liberal, Globalized Civilization, 35 Tex. Int’l L.J. 387 (2000)Google Scholar; Kingsbury, Benedict, Operational Policies of International Institutions as Part of the Law-making Process: The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples, in The Reality of International Law 323 Google Scholar ( Guy, S. Goodwin-Gill & Talmon, Stefan eds., 1999)Google Scholar; see also Kalderimis, Daniel, IMF Conditionality as Investment Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis, 13 Soc. & Legal Stud. 103 (2004)Google Scholar.

26 Christine Chinkin has enumerated six definitions of “soft” law; namely, norms that (1) have been articulated in nonbinding form; (2) contain vague or imprecise terms; (3) emanate from bodies lacking international lawmaking authority; (4) are directed at nonstate actors whose practice cannot constitute custom; (5) lack any corresponding theory of responsibility; and (6) are based solely upon voluntary adherence. Chinkin, Christine, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in The International Legal System 21, 30 (Shelton, Dinah ed., 2000)Google Scholar.

27 See generally Alvarez, supra note 14, at 458-520, 545-66.

28 See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 17, at 185 (contending that the “duty to cooperate” emerges naturally from the universal participation of states in modern lawmaking settings since it makes negotiations between diverse and often conflicting groups of states possible); Pierre- Dupuy, Marie, The Place and Role of Unilateralism in Contemporary International Law, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 19, 22–25 (2000)Google Scholar (arguing that the “law of coexistence” brought about by the UN system is the “basis for the whole post-war international legal order” and requires states to “choose the path of compromise and negotiated settlement”).

29 See, e.g., Simma, Bruno & Andreas, L. Paulus, The ‘International Community’: Facing the Challenge of Globalization, 9 Eur. J. Int’l L. 266, 266 (1998)Google Scholar (claiming that the Lotus principle “is giving way to a more communitarian, more highly institutionalized international law, in which states ‘channel’ the pursuit of most of their individual interests through multilateral institutions”).

30 See Frederic, L. Kirgis Jr., Prior Consultation In International Law: A Study Of State Practice (1983)Google Scholar; Christopher, D. Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AJIL 276 (2004)Google Scholar.

31 See generally Alvarez, supra note 14, at 273-337; Paul, C. Szasz, General Law-making Processes, in The United Nations and International Law 27 (Christopher, C. Joyner ed., 1997)Google Scholar; Frederic, L. Kirgisjr., Specialized Law-making Processes, in id. at 65 Google Scholar.

32 International organizations’ deployment of their implied powers and reliance on the principle of effectiveness have contributed to postmodern doubts about relying on state consent as the basis for all international obligations. See generally Koskenniemi, Martti, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 270–91 (1989)Google Scholar.

33 There is a large literature on how IOs are formed by states to overcome collective problems, produce Pareto improving outcomes, and enable efficient solutions to contracting problems, incomplete information, and other market imperfections. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 14, at 338-65; Kenneth, W. Abbott & Snidal, Duncan, Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. Conflict Resol. 3 (1998)Google Scholar; William, J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Scholarship, 12 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 227, 242–56 (1997)Google Scholar.

34 See generally Roy, S. Lee, Multilateral Treaty-making and Negotiation Techniques: An Appraisal, in Contemporary Problems of International Law: Essays in Honour of Georg Schwarzenberger on His Eightieth Birthday 157 (Cheng, Bin & Brown, E. D. eds., 1998)Google Scholar. For a detailed look at the contribution of IOs to the procedural rules governing multilateral treaty making, see Sabel, Robbie, Procedures at International Conferences: A Study of The Rules of Procedure at Conferences and Assemblies of International Inter-Governmental Organizations (1997)Google Scholar.

35 See generally Kenneth, W. Abbott, Rule-Making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and Corruption, 4 J. Int’l Econ. L. 275 (2001)Google Scholar; Laurence, R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and the New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 1 (2004)Google Scholar.

36 See Heifer, supra note 35.

37 See, e.g., Kirgis, supra note 21, at 426-31 (describing role of International Labour Office in the interpretation of labor conventions); Joel, P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 Harv. Int’l L J. 333 (1999)Google Scholar (describing the gap-filling function of WTO adjudicators).

38 See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 ICJ Rep. 15 (May 28); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 16, Arts. 20-21. For discussion of how the content of the Vienna Convention reflected the universal venue in which it was negotiated, see Cassese, supra note 17, at 187-91.

39 See generally Goodman, Ryan, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 AJIL 531 (2002)Google Scholar.

40 Palitha, T. B. Kohona, Some Notable Developments in the Practice of the UN Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties: Reservations and Declarations, 99 AJIL 433, 435–39 (2005)Google Scholar.

41 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).

42 Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Thus, even the generally conservative U.S. Restatement of Foreign Relations Law recognized the possibility that some General Assembly resolutions could have an impact on customary law. Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of The United States § 103 reporters’ note 2 (1987)Google Scholar.

43 For an early recognition of the impact of UN political organs on such fundamental concepts as the “domaine réservé” of states, see Higgins, Rosalyn, The Development of International Law Through The Political Organs of The United Nations (1963)Google Scholar. For a critical look at judges’ reliance on unratified treaties, see W. Reisman, Michael, Unratified Treaties and Other Unperfected Acts in International Law: Constitutional Functions, 35 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 729 (2002)Google Scholar.

44 See, e.g., Jonathan, I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AJIL 529 (1993)Google Scholar; Hiram, E. Chodesh, Neither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of Declaratory International Law, 26 Tex. J. Int’l L. 87 (1991)Google Scholar; Delbriick, Jost, Prospects for a “World (Internal) Law’?) Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 401 (2002)Google Scholar; John, W. Head, Supranational Law: How the Move Toward Multilateral Solutions Is Changing the Character of International Law, 42 U. Kan. L. Rev. 605 (1994)Google Scholar; Kingsbury, Benedict, Krisch, Nico, & Richard, B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 15 (2005)Google Scholar; see also Kingsbury, Benedict, Sovereignty and Inequality, 9 Eur. J. Int’l L. 599, 611 (1998)Google Scholar (describing the emergence of “world law” through “mimesis, or world culture, or regulatory competition—from which most states are not free to depart except at intolerable cost”). But see Curtis, A. Bradley & Jack, L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815 (1997)Google Scholar (contending that the qualities of the new forms of customary law provide reasons for not according it the status of U.S. federal law); Curtis, A. Bradley & Jack, L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 319 (1997)Google Scholar (semble).

45 See, e.g., Kingsbury, Krisch, & Stewart, supra note 44.

46 Charnovitz, Steve, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AJIL 348 (2006)Google Scholar (centennial essay in this issue).

47 See generally David, M. Leive, International Regulatory Regimes: Case Studies In Health, Meteorology, And Food (1976)Google Scholar; Naomi, Roht-Arriaza, ‘Soft Law ‘in a ‘Hybrid’Organization: The International Organization for Standardization, in Commitment and Compliance, supra note 26, at 263 Google Scholar. Note that even some instruments not produced within IOs, such as the international standards of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and soft codes produced by some IOs, may come to be “hardened” (or enforced) through the actions of other IOs. See David, A. Wirth, Commentary, in id. at 330, 338–41 Google Scholar (describing the use of ISO standards under the WTO’s Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade); see also Alvarez, supra note 14, at 217-35.

48 See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 ICJ Rep. 174 (Apr. 11) (finding that the attributes of the United Nations as an international legal person can be derived from a “principle of effectiveness” that implies the existence of certain powers even when these are not otherwise stated in its charter [such as the power to conclude treaties, nowhere mentioned in the UN Charter, or to bring an international claim for injuries], if these are necessary to enable that organization to fulfill its purposes).

49 But see Charnovitz, Steve, The Relevance of Non-State Actors to International Law, in Developments of International Law in Treaty Making 543, 544–48 (Rüdiger, Wolfrum & Volker, Röben eds., 2005)Google Scholar (arguing that the UN Security Council, NATO, the Financial Action Task Force, and the WTO “are not themselves actors, but rather are arenas for utilizing persuasion and applying power”; id. at 546).

50 See generally Kingsbury, Krisch, & Stewart, supra note 44. For a description of the evolving powers of the Security Council, see The UN Security Council, supra note 22.

51 Compare Daniel, L. Nielson & Michael, J. Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform, 57 Int’l Org. 241 (2003)Google Scholar (describing IOs in principal/agent terms but also discussing the possibility of “agency slippage” through which an IO’s collective principals may lose control over their IO “agents”), with Karen, J. Alter, Agents or Trustees:? International Courts in Their Political Context (TranState Working Paper No. 8, Nov. 15, 2004)Google Scholar, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=622222> (critiquing Nielson and Tierney’s principal/agent theory as applied to international courts valued for their autonomy).

52 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 2, at 169-75.

53 Id. at 174-81 (citing as examples the IMF’s coercion of states to get on the “right track,” IO “shaming” techniques, establishment of “best practices,” strategic use of information, agenda-setting activities, and other “constitutive” activities; the latter relate, for example, to defining what constitutes “development” or even a legitimate state (as in determining the proper scope of peacekeepers regarding the maintenance of a free market, a working democracy, and the “rule of law”). For a survey of UN contributions to development thinking and practice, see, for example, Jolly, Richard, Emmerij, Louis, & Thomas, G. Weiss, The Power Of UN Ideas: Lessons From The First 60 Years (2005)Google Scholar.

54 Thus, some scholars and policymakers have proposed creating new interstate organizations to handle environmental issues, refugees, counterterrorism, or international investment. For examples of the continuing proliferation of subentities within existing IOs, see Paul, C. Szasz, The Complexification of the United Nations System, 1999 Max Planck Y.B. UN L. 3 Google Scholar.

55 See, e.g., id. To date, the Security Council has created at least three distinct sub-bodies in connection with its efforts since the events of September 11, 2001, to combat terrorism. See generally Rosand, Eric, Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AJIL 333 (2003)Google Scholar; Rosand, Eric, The Security Council’s Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of Al Qaedal Taliban Sanctions, 98 AJIL 745 (2004)Google Scholar.

56 Compare Sands & Klein, supra note 9, at 16-19 (defining IOs and the “nature of international institutional law”), 115-19 (describing “other autonomous organizations,” including environmental COPs/MOPs and commodity agreements).

57 See Robin, R. Churchill & Ulfstein, Geir, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law, 94 AJIL 623 (2000)Google Scholar.

58 Chayes, Abram & Antonia, Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty 27 (1995)Google Scholar; see also Raustiala, Kal, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, 6 J. Int’l Econ. L. 841, 853, 860–61 (2003)Google Scholar (arguing that IOs are sovereignty-enhancing instruments if “sovereignty” is redefined to mean something other than the ability to take autonomous action). For an argument that sovereignty under the UN Charter is being redefined to mean “conditional” sovereignty such that the right of a state to have its sovereignty respected is now dependent on its fulfilling its Charter obligations, see Anne- Slaughter, Marie, Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform, 99 AJIL 619, 627–30 (2005)Google Scholar.

59 See, e.g., SC Res. 1540 (Apr. 28, 2004); SC Res. 1483 (May 22, 2003), 42 ILM 1016 (2003); SC Res. 1390 (Jan. 28, 2002); SC Res. 1373 (Sept. 29, 2001).

60 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn.-Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) (Int’l Ct. Justice, pending); Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. UK; Libya v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1992 ICJ Rep. 3, 114 (Apr. 14); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14 (June 27); see also Hurd, Ian, The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1992-2003, 59 Int’l Org. 495 (2005)Google Scholar; Johnstone, Ian, The Power of Interpretive Communities, in Power in Global Governance, supra note 2, at 185 Google Scholar.

61 For instances of the impact of IOs on the internal structures of states, see, for example, Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society 34-66 (1996) (discussing UNESCO’s impact on national science policies). Note that IOs’ impact on national laws and institutions is not dependent on whether their rules are “self-executing” as a matter of national law. Thus, WTO decisions have had an impact on the practices of both the executive and the legislative branches in the United States notwithstanding that WTO law is not “self-executing.” See, e.g., United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Doc. WT/DS152/R (adopted Jan. 27, 2000) (holding the United States to its word that it would not unilaterally enforce trade remedies inconsistently with its WTO obligations).

62 See, e.g., David, A. Wirth, Trade Union Rights in the Workers’ State: Poland and the ILO, 13 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 269 (1984)Google Scholar (describing how the ILO both legitimated Solidarity within Poland and discredited that country’s nonindependently licensed labor union).

63 See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, The New World Order (2004); Cassese, Sabino, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 109 (2005)Google Scholar.

64 See, e.g., Wirth, supra note 62. See generally Slaughter, supra note 63.

65 Bederman, supra note 2, at 21. For a survey of how IOs have influenced, and in some cases may have inspired, the methods of international law surveyed in this Journal’s Symposium on Method, 93 AJIL 291 (1999)Google Scholar, see José, E. Alvarez, International Legal Perspectives, in Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws, The Oxford Handbook on The United Nations (forthcoming 2006)Google Scholar.

66 Richard, H. Steinberg & Jonathan, M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AJIL 64 (2006)Google Scholar. See generally Alvarez, supra note 14, at 17-57; Louis, B. Sohn, The Growth of the Science of International Organizations, in The Relevance of International Law 251 (Karl, W. Deutsch & Hoffmann, Stanley eds., 1968)Google Scholar.

67 Compare Mearsheimer, John, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 Int’l Security, Winter 1994/95, at 5 Google Scholar, with Inis, L. Claude Jr., Swords into Plowshares: the Problems and Progress of International Organization (1971)Google Scholar.

68 Gruber, Lloyd, Ruling the World (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Power in Global Governance, supra note 2; notes 127–30 Google Scholar infra and corresponding text.

69 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 58.

70 Robert, O. Keohane, After Hegemony (1984)Google Scholar; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 33.

71 Thomas, M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium, 100 AJIL 88 (2006)Google Scholar.

72 Id. As the debate over the legality of Operation Iraqi Freedom suggests, even within the United States the public debate is not limited to determining whether the U.S. Congress authorized that operation but extends to whether the UN Security Council implicitly did so. See, e.g., William, H. Taft IV & Todd, F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AJIL 557 (2003)Google Scholar. As this debate also implies, the participation of a state in IOs changes the dynamics between its branches of government (executive, judicial, and legislative) and, if it is a federal state, may also alter the dynamics between the federal and state levels. See generally Alvarez, supra note 14, at 617-20.

73 Jeffrey, L. Dunoff & Joel, P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 37, 49–53 (1999)Google Scholar (adapting Coase). The authors contend that, for example, the “best” organization is “the one that maximizes the positive sum of transaction gains, transaction losses, and transaction costs.” Id. at 39.

74 Id. at 41. For these authors, an “asset specific investment” is one that can realize its full value only in the context of continued relations with another party or that requires binding another person over time.

75 Moravcsik, Andrew, Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe, 1 Eur. J. Int’l Rel. 157 (1995)Google Scholar.

76 See generally Slaughter, supra note 63. At the same time, Slaughter apparently no longer claims that transnational networks are displacing IOs; her more recent work acknowledges that these networks often work alongside and in tandem with IOs. Compare Anne- Slaughter, Marie, The Real New World Order, Foreign Aff., Sept./Oct. 1997, at 183 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, with Slaughter, supra.

77 See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 63 (discussing the impact of the WTO both on subunits within governments and in changing government’s perceived interests).

78 Jutta, Brunnée & Stephen, J. Toope, Persuasion and Enforcement: Explaining Compliance with International Law, 2002 Finnish Y.B. Int’l L. 273, 276 Google Scholar.

79 Id. at 277.

80 See, e.g., Brunnée & Toope, supra note 78; Goodman, Ryan & Jinks, Derek, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 Duke L.J. 621 (2004)Google Scholar.

81 Compare Lobel, Orly, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342 (2004)Google Scholar (describing “bottom-up” approaches for implementing or enforcing national law), with Brunnée & Toope, supra note 78 (describing international mechanisms for inducing compliance), and Janet Levit, Koven, A Bottom-up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 Yale J. Int’l L. 125 (2005)Google Scholar (describing lawmaking aspects of the ICC Banking Commission, the Berne Union, and the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits).

82 Brunnée & Toope, supra note 78, at 276.

83 See, e.g., id. at 292 (“interactional law generates self-bindingness and adherence to norms, even in the absence of material incentives or sanctioning mechanisms”).

84 See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 63, at 65-103; Paul Berman, Schiff, Judges as Cosmopolitan Transnational Actors, 12 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 109 (2004)Google Scholar.

85 John, H. Jackson, William, J. Davey, & Alan, O. Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations 254 (4th ed. 2002)Google Scholar; see also Jackson, supra note 7; cf Kennedy, supra note 2, at 982 (noting how the League of Nations proponents sought to decontextualize wars by turning them into “disputes”).

86 See, e.g., Report Of The Commission On Global Governance, Our Global Neighborhood (1995); Ernst- Petersmann, Ulrich, Constitutionalism and International Adjudication: How to Constitutionalize the UN’Dispute Settlement System’: 31 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 753 (1999)Google Scholar. For a more limited proposal to expand the domain of the WTO, see Andrew, T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 303 (2004)Google Scholar; Andrew, T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 Geo. L. J. 883 (2002)Google Scholar.

87 Barnett, Michael & Duvall, Raymond, Power in Global Governance, in Power in Global Governance, supra note 2, at 1, 1 Google Scholar.

88 There is a clear and unmistakable connection between today’s self-identified “progressive” developers of international law and early advocates of international organization in this journal. See, e.g., Kocourek, Albert, Some Reflections on the Problem of a Society of Nations, 12 AJIL 508 (1918)Google Scholar; John Bassett, Moore, International Law: Its Present and Future, 1 AJIL 12 (1907)Google Scholar; Paul, S. Reinsch, International Unions and Their Administration, 1 AJIL 604 Google Scholar.

89 Barnett & Duvall, supra note 87, at 1.

90 See, e.g., Hurd, supra note 60; Johnstone, supra note 60.

91 See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Carden, Richard, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 407(2000)Google Scholar.

92 See e.g., Romano, Cesare, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. &Pol. 709 (1999)Google Scholar. For a critique of such views, see Jose, E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half Truths and Consequences, 38 Tex. Int’l L.J. 405 (2003)Google Scholar.

93 Barnett & Duvall, supra note 87, at 5 (citing Doyle, Zacher & Matthews, Keohane, and Deudney &c Ikenberry). For a recent rearticulation of such views, see, for example, Slaughter, supra note 58. See generally Lauterpacht, supra note 12, at 19-53.

94 See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 86.

95 See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 63.

96 See, e.g., Claire, R. Kelly, Enmeshment as a Theory of Compliance, 37 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 303 (2005)Google Scholar; Anne-Marie, Slaughter & Laurence, R. Heifer, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale L.J. 273 (1997)Google Scholar. See generally 96 ASIL Proc. (2002) (entitled “The Legalization of International Relations/The Internationalization of Legal Relations”).

97 As Laurence Heifer has noted, today’s scholars attempt to resolve the potential conflicts brought about by the proliferation of IOs (as through proposals for normative and institutional hierarchies between institutionalized regimes), seek to improve compliance with IO-generated norms, attempt to deter states’ attempts to enter and exit institutionalized regimes, and generally try to buttress the legitimacy of IOs. Laurence, R. Heifer, Constitutional Analogies in the International legal System, 37 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 193 (2003)Google Scholar.

98 Chesterman, Simon, The United Nations and the Law of War: Power and Sensibility in International Law, 28 Fordham Int’l L.J. 531, 532 (2005)Google Scholar.

99 See, e.g., Koskenniemi, Martti, What Should International Lawyers Learn from Karl Marx?’ 17 Leiden J. Int’l L. 229, 240 (2004) (describing how some see a “new struggle between an unmediated foreign policy moralism advocated by a single superpower and an anti-imperial formalism insisting on mediation through law and international institutions”). See generally Unilateralism in International Law: Its Role and Limits: A United States—European Symposium , 11 Eur. J. Int’l L., Nos. 1, 2 (2000)Google Scholar; Paul, W. Kahn, The Question of Sovereignty, 40 Stan. J. Int’l L. 259 (2004)Google Scholar; Rubenfeld, Jeb, The Two World Orders, Wilson Q., Sept. 2003, at 22. For an early recognition of comparable U.S.-Europe divides, see David Jayne Hill, Editorial Comment, The Third Assembly of the League of Nations , 17 AJIL 77, 79 (1923)Google Scholar.

100 For an overview of these challenges, see, for example, Alfred, C. Aman Jr., The Democracy Deficit (2004)Google Scholar; Paul, B. Stephan, International Governance and American Democracy, 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 237 (2000)Google Scholar; Stein, supra note 9; Gréinne de Búrca, Democratizing Transnational Governance: Lessons from the EU Experience (Columbia Law School Young Scholars Workshop, 2004-05), at <http://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/fac_resources/faculty_lunch/>. U.S. scholars tend to focus on the “representational” failings of IOs, see, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 99, whereas European scholars tend to focus on the failures of IOs to respect the international legal rights of individuals and of states, see, e.g., Erika De, Wet, The Chapter Vii Powers Of The United Nations Security Council (2004)Google Scholar.

101 This is not a new concern. See, e.g., Denys, P. Myers, Representation in Public International Unions, 8 AJIL 81 (1914)Google Scholar (discussing, among other things, the tendency of powerful nations to use the votes of their nonsovereign colonies to enhance their voting prowess, to the detriment of sovereign equality, in administrative unions).

102 For a general critique of the “Americanized” turn to institutionalized international adjudication, see Mattei, Ugo, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 Ind.J. Global Legal Stud. 383, 416–24 (2003)Google Scholar.

103 See, e.g., Kingsbury, supra note 44. For an entirely different defense of sovereignty that is nonetheless grounded in perceived threats posed by IOs, see Jeremy, A. Rabkin, The Case For Sovereignty (2004)Google Scholar.

104 See Stein, supra note 9.

105 These ideological concerns range from the mildly critical, see, e.g., Kingsbury, Benedict, First Amendment Liberalism as Global Legal Architecture: Ascriptive Groups and the Problems of the Liberal NGO Model of International Civil Society, 3 Chi. J. Int’l L. 183 (2002)Google Scholar (suggesting the narrowing effects of conceptions of “First Amendment” rights in the United States and Western states), to the all-embracing, see, e.g., Mattei, supra note 102, at 383 (criticizing the turn to “imperial” law through the vehicle of “predatory economic globalization”). Notably, today’s critiques have gone beyond the international financial institutions. See, e.g., Boon, Kristen, Legislative Reform in Post conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the Contemporary Occupant’s Law-making Powers , 50 McGill L J. 285 (2005)Google Scholar (discussing attempts at market reform in the guise of UN peacekeeping). See generally Marks, Susan, The Riddle Of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, And The Critique Of Ideology (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

106 See, e.g., José, E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AJIL 873 (2003)Google Scholar; Gruber, Lloyd, Power Politics and the Institutionalization of International Relations, in Power in Global Governance, supra note 2, at 125 Google Scholar; Krisch, Nico, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 369 (2005)Google Scholar; Mattei, supra note 102; see also Humanizing Our Global Order: Essays in Honour of Ivan Head (Obiora, Chinedu Okafor & Aginam, Obijiofor eds., 2003)Google Scholar.

107 See, e.g., Charlesworth, Hilary & Chinkin, Christine, The Boundaries Of International Law 171–200 (2000)Google Scholar; Howse, Robert, From Politics to Technocracy—and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AJIL 94 (2002)Google Scholar; see also Alvarez, supra note 14, at 640-45.

108 For discussion of these reform proposals, see, for example, Accountability of International Organisations, in International Law Association, Berlin Conference (Final Report of Comm. on Accountability of International Organizations, 2004), available at <http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/Accountability/Final%20Report%202004.pdf> ; Stein, supra note 9, at 531-34. See also the ongoing discussions within the International Law Commission in connection with the topic of responsibility of international organizations, for example, in Giorgio Gaja, Second Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/541 (2004). But others have denied that a “democratic deficit” truly exists at the international level, defending the legitimacy of IOs either on the basis that they are technocratic or regulatory organizations already subject to parliamentary and executive approval or on the premise that IOs are subject to adiverse set of unique accountability mechanisms. See, e.g., Gráinne de Búrca, supra note 100; Ruth, W. Grant & Robert, O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 29 (2005)Google Scholar. For contrasting views on the viability of establishing an international parliamentary assembly as a remedy for the UN democratic deficit, compare Falk, Richard & Strauss, Andrew, Toward Global Parliament, Foreign Aff., Jan./Feb. 2001, at 21 Google Scholar (advocating an elected world assembly), with Robert, A. Dahl, Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View, in Democracy’s Edges 19 (Shapiro, Ian & Casiano, Hacker-Cordon eds., 1999)Google Scholar (arguing that such an assembly is infeasible).

109 See Kingsbury, Krisch, & Stewart, supra note 44 (identifying a need for “global administrative space” characterized by enhanced procedural participation, adherence to substantive standards, reliance on reasoned decisions, and forms of review).

110 See Koskenniemi, supra note 99, at 231.

111 See, e.g., De Wet, supra note 100; August Reinisch, International Organizations Before National Courts (2000); Chesterman, supra note 98.

112 See generally Benvenisti, Eysi, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 167 (1999)Google Scholar; Richard, H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AJIL 247 (2004)Google Scholar.

113 But see Laurence, R. Heifer, Exiting Treaties, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1579 (2005)Google Scholar (explaining when and why states abandon their treaty commitments).

114 For an example of the former critique, see Anderson, Kenneth, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1255, 1296 n.67 (2005)Google Scholar (book review) (contending that the United Nations is “almost by definition a corrupt network because its doors are open to the wicked as well as the good”). For an example of the latter, see Hurrell, Andrew, Power, Institutions, and the Production of Inequality, in Power in Global Governance, supra note 2, at 33, 51 Google Scholar (suggesting that the stability of hegemonic power “depends on consensus as well as coercion and on the capacity to engender collaboration”).

115 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 114.

116 See, e.g., Kahler, Miles, Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization, 54 Int’l Org. 661 (2000)Google Scholar; see also Atik, Jeffery, Identifying Antidemocratic Outcomes: Authenticity, Self-Sacrifice, and International Trade, 19 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 229 (1998)Google Scholar (describing how WTO processes limit democratic choices); Stephan, supra note 100 (arguing that IOs are undemocratic to the extent that they strengthen the powers of the executive branch, enhance the power of certain interest groups over others, or bolster the power of IO bureaucrats).

117 See, e.g., Anderson, Kenneth, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 91 (2000)Google Scholar. For a critique of the WTO on the basis of which interests it empowers within the North, see, for example, Shaffer, Gregory, Power, Governance, and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional Approach, in Power in Global Governance, supra note 2, at 130, 135 Google Scholar (contending that while powerful constituencies within the United States and the European Union, such as large multinationals and trade associations, harness state power in the WTO to promote their interests, business and NGOs in smaller countries cannot). Even with respect to the United States, the WTO’s impact on democratic processes and domestic interest groups has divided commentators. Compare John O. McGinnis & Mark, L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 511 (2000)Google Scholar (praising the WTO for “correcting” the flaws in the U.S. democratic process that give rise to trade protectionism), with Goldstein, Judith & Lisa, L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 Int’l Org. 603 (2000)Google Scholar (suggesting that WTO legalization may have mobilized antitrade groups while discouraging exporters from mobilizing in defense of free trade) and Paul, B. Stephan, Accountability and International Law making: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 681, 713 (1996-97)Google Scholar (suggesting that what passes for WTO-induced trade liberalization “may turn out to be special interest legislation”). For a critique of the WTO on constructivist grounds, that is, for helping to create and sustain a “club” atmosphere for a narrow-minded epistemic community of free traders, see Howse, supra note 107.

118 For a critical view of the “rent seeking” by nonstate interest groups that are given access to IO lawmaking processes, see, for example, Stephan, supra note 117. (Rent seeking has been defined as efforts to obtain quota rents, or the using up of real resources in an effort to secure rights to economic rents arising from government policies.) See also Jonathan, R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory Competition, 52 Emory L.J. 1353 (2003)Google Scholar (explaining the impetus for international regulation as stemming from the perceived self-interests of the regulators themselves); Colombatto, Enrico & Jonathan, R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 925 (1996)Google Scholar (semble).

119 See generally Alvarez, supra note 14, at 365-94. For a description of the “pathological” features of IO bureaucracies, see Michael, N. Barnett & Finnemore, Martha, The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations, 53 Int’l Org. 699 (1999)Google Scholar.

120 See generally Stephan, supra note 117. For a critique of the assumptions that international lawyers make about the desirability of judicial “independence” at the international level, see Eric, A. Posner & John, C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2005)Google Scholar.

121 See, e.g., Anghie, Anthony, Imperialism, Sovereignty And The Making Of International Law 190-95, 263–68 (2005)Google Scholar; Rodrik, Dani, Growth Strategies (Aug. 2004)Google Scholar, at <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/growthstrat10.pdf> .

122 Stephan, supra note 100.

123 See, e.g., Shapiro, Martin, A Deliberative, “Independent” Technocracy v. Democratic Politics: Will the Globe Echo the E. U.? (IILJ Working Paper 2004/5)Google Scholar, at <http://www.iilj.org/global_adlaw/> (critiquing transnational governance processes, including within the European Union, as forms for deliberative democracy); Jürgen Neyer & Michael Schröter, Deliberative Europe and the Rejected Constitution, Paper presented at conference on law and democracy in Europe, European University Institute (Sept. 22-24, 2005) (critiquing deliberative practices within the European Union), at <http://www.iue.it/LAW/ResearchTeaching/Cidel/Index.shtml>.

124 See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 11; see also Andrew, T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1823, 1885 (2002)Google Scholar (concluding that, given the ineffectiveness of certain international regimes, international lawyers should devote their efforts to economic regulation rather than concern themselves with war, arms control, territorial limits, neutrality, or human rights).

125 Laffey, Mark & Weldes, Jutta, Policingand Global Governance, in Power in Global Governance, supra note 2, at 59 Google Scholar, 65; see also Hurrell, supra note 114, at 52 (describing those who believe “socialization” “derives either from great power imposition or from the competing dynamics of the state system”); Krisch, supra note 106, at 375 (discussing the prospects for “hegemonic” socialization); Krisch, Nico, Imperial International Law 58 (Global Law Working Paper 01/04)Google Scholar, at <http://www.nyulawglobaliorg/workingpapers/detail/documents/KrischFinal0904.pdf> [hereinafter Krisch, Imperial IL] (criticizing some IOs’ reliance on the market as a tool for hegemonic compliance—as through use of Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s ratings for countries).

126 Cf. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 33 (describing the benefits of IO-based forms of centralization and independence) .

127 See, e.g., Andrew, T. Guzman & Beth, A. Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes, 34 J. Legal Stud. 557 (2005)Google Scholar (empirical study concluding that the lack of financial, human, and institutional capital explains LDCs’ continuing inability to participate fully in international dispute settlement); Shaffer, supra note 117 (describing the embedded inequities of WTO dispute settlement with respect to poorer states); see also Gruber, supra note 106.

128 Compare Alec Sweet, Stone, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, 32 Comp. Pol. Stud. 147 (1999)Google Scholar (describing how granting private parties access to international dispute settlement contributes to legalization), with Howse, Robert & Nicolaidis, Kalypso, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutional or Global Subsidiarity? 16 Governance 73 (2003)Google Scholar (questioning the value of proposals to grant private causes of action in order to constitutionalize the WTO). For a synthesis of anticonstitutional views within the WTO literature, see CASS, supra note 24, at 207-37.

129 See, e.g., Krisch, Imperial IL, supra note 125, at 55; see also Chimni, B. S., International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1 (2004)Google Scholar.

130 See, e.g., Hurrell, supra note 114, at 57-58 (agreeing that “conditional sovereignty” exists but suggesting that it is mostly conditional for the weak).

131 See, e.g., Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 2, at 182.

132 On “bureaucratic sclerosis,” see id. For the suggestion that we are now in a “post-institutionalist” period dominated by continued proliferation of NGOs but a more restrained stance toward establishing new IOs, see Ku, Charlotte, Global Governance and the Changing Face of International Law 26–34 (ACUNS Rep. & Papers No. 2, 2001)Google Scholar, available at <http://www.acuns.org/public/research_library/>. For an account of the resistance to certain forms of “legalization” in Asia and the Pacific, see Kahler, Miles, Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case, 54 Int’l Org. 549 (2000)Google Scholar.

133 See generally Stephan, supra note 117. At the extreme, some democratic sovereigntists question whether IOs are truly necessary, while reviving old doubts about the binding force of international law. See, e.g., John, R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs? 10 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2000)Google Scholar (arguing that treaties are “politically” but not “legally” binding); John, R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously? 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 205 (2000)Google Scholar. Even some of those who presumably disagree with Bolton as to the legal nature of treaties contend that some forms of IO lawmaking are useless or pernicious. See, e.g., Stephan, supra.

134 See, e.g., Curtis, A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 15 57 (2003)Google Scholar; Klabbers, Jan, The Changing lmage of International Organizations, in The Legitimacy of International Organizations 221, 231–32 (Jean-Marc, Coicaud & Heiskanen, Veijo eds., 2001)Google Scholar.

135 See, e.g., Patrick Kelly, J, Judicial Activism at the World Trade Organization: Developing Principles of Self-Restraint, 22 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 353 (2002)Google Scholar; Perez, Antonio, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-dialogic Abstention by the International Court of Justice, 18 Mich. J. Int’l L. 399 (1997)Google Scholar. For the Lotus case, see 1927 PCIJ (ser.A)No. 10.

136 See, e.g., Klabbers, supra note 134, at 238.

137 Koskenniemi, supra note 99, at 230.

138 Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 511.

139 Robert, O. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 Int’l Stud. Q. 379, 380 (1988)Google Scholar.