1 Prepared testimony of Vernon A. Walters before a joint meeting of the Subcomms. On Human Rights and International Organizations and on International Operations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, at 3 (Mar. 12, 1986).

2 22 U.S.C. §287e note (1983 Supp.) (Pub. L. No. 98-164, sec. 114, 97 Stat. 1017, 1020, approved Nov. 22, 1983). See also Pub. L. No. 98-473, sec. 529, 98 Stat. 1837, 1900, approved Oct. 12, 1984, and Pub. L. No. 99-83, sec. 403, 99 Stat. 190, 219, approved Aug. 8, 1985, which both require withholding from the U.S. contribution to international organizations the proportionate share for programs to benefit the PLO, SWAPO or “Libya, Iran, or Cuba.” Pub. L. No. 99-190, sec. 528, 99 Stat. 1185, 1307, approved Dec. 19, 1985, adds that the U.S. proportionate share may be withheld, “at the discretion of the President, [for programs to benefit] Communist countries listed in section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.”

3 22 U.S.C. §287e note (West Supp. 1986) (Pub. L. No. 99-93, sec. 144, 99 Stat. 405, 424, approved Aug. 16, 1985).

4 22 U.S.C. §287e note (West Supp. 1986) (Pub. L. No. 99-93, sec. 143, 99 Stat. 405, 424 (1985)).

5 UN Charter art. 2, para. 1.

6 131 Cong. Rec. S7794 (daily ed. June 7, 1985). The conference committee also seemed to recognize a legal obligation: “To the extent that rapid and meaningful progress toward reform in budgetary voting rights is accomplished, the managers intend that the United States fulfill its obligations to the United Nations.” H.R. Rep. No. 240, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1985).

7 Statement by the President after signing H.R. 2068, White House press release, Aug. 17, 1985, at 1.

8 Letter dated Nov. 14, 1985. Rep. Mica chairs the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Operations; Rep. Solomon is ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations. Both were U.S. delegates to the 40th and resumed 40th sessions of the General Assembly.

9 UN Doc. A/40/PV.127, at 58 (1986).

10 The Group of 18 is expected to report to the General Assembly in September 1986. In January and March 1986, UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar put certain savings measures “into immediate effect” on his personal administrative authority. These included a freeze in recruitment, suspension of the promotion process, deferral of cost-of-living adjustments, reductions in travel and overtime costs, deferral of maintenance projects, and controls on documentation. UN Doc. A/40/1102, at 5 (1986). In addition, the Assembly acquiesced to the Secretary-General’s request for adjustments in certain programs already approved, including curtailment of meetings and publications, and deferral of construction of the Addis Ababa and another conference center. See id. at 6; and UN Press Release WS/1284, May 16, 1986, at 2.

11 22 U.S.C. §287e note (West Supp. 1986) (Pub. L. No. 99–93, sec. 151, 99 Stat. 405, 428 (1985)).

12 Statement by the President, supra note 7, at 1.

13 22 U.S.C. §287 note (Supp. 1983) (Pub. L. No. 98–164, sec. 115, 97 Stat. 1017, 1021, approved Nov. 22, 1983), as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-93, sec. 142, 99 Stat. 405, 424 (1985). Presumably, the reduction percentage was designed to give the organization involved 12 months to reconsider or lose all U.S. funding.

14 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037, approved Dec. 12, 1985, codified principally at 2 U.S.C. §901).

15 Prepared testimony of Alan L. Keyes, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, before a joint meeting of the Subcomms. on Human Rights and International Organizations and on International Operations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, at 6 (Mar. 12, 1986). Under this plan, some organizations would be subject to the standard withholding (e.g., the World Health Organization); organizations “most responsive” to U.S. interests would be sequestered at 2.15% (e.g., the International Civil Aviation Organization); and organizations “least responsive” would be sequestered “in excess of 4.3 percent” (e.g., the United Nations, 6.96% withholding requested). This may conflict with the aims of the Act, section 252(e) of which specifies that it shall not be construed to give the Executive authority to “alter the relative priorities” in the budget.

16 See, e.g., Gramm-Rudman Cutting Begins, Wash. Post, July 23, 1986, at A5.

16a But see Population Council v. McPherson, No. 85-6042 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 12,1986) (upholding the authority, under U.S. law, of the executive branch to withhold pledged contributions to the UN Fund for Population Activities based on legislation specifically designed for that purpose).

17 GA Res. 40/248, Dec. 18, 1985. Those 15 countries were assessed some 79% of the regular UN budget.

18 The United States also pays less than a large number of other countries on a per capita income basis. On the other hand, 78 countries are assessed at the rate of only 0.01% each, and some two-thirds of UN members contribute a total of about 1% of the budget. It is this budgetary “disequilibrium” that some in Congress and the administration find most objectionable.

19 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), 1962 ICJ Rep. 151 (Advisory Opinion of July 20).

20 Id. at 167. The United States had asserted that only an “unlawful” expenditure could be challenged. See, e.g., statement of Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to the International Court of Justice, May 21, 1962, reprinted in 47 Dep’t St. Bull. 30, 31 (1962).

21 1962 ICJ Rep. at 168.

22 See, e.g., id. at 239 (Moreno Quintana, J., dissenting).

23 22 U.S.C. §287k (1982) (Pub. L. No. 87-731, sec. 5, 76 Stat. 696, approved Oct. 2, 1962).

24 GA Res. 1854 (Dec. 19, 1962).

25 N.Y. Times, June 8, 1963, at 1.

26 UN Doc. A/5916/Add.1 (1965), reprinted in 53 Dep’t St. Bull. 454–57 (1965).

27 The President of the General Assembly, Jaime de Piniés of Spain, speaking at the resumed 40th session of the Assembly, said: “I wish to re-emphasize that all Members have a contractual obligation under the Charter to pay their duly assessed contributions.” UN Doc. A/40/PV.132, at 7 (1986).

As to U.S. policy, in a letter dated Apr. 25, 1975, characterized as a “statement of U.S. policy . . . as to the legal effect of United Nations General Assembly resolutions,” Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, then Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State, wrote: “General Assembly resolutions passed pursuant to Article 17 of the Charter regarding assessed contributions to the United Nations budget . . . are binding.” Dep’t of State File No. P75 0075-445, reprinted in 1975 Digest of United States Practice in International Law 85.

28 Estimated cumulative withholdings from the UN assessed budget, not including peacekeeping operations, as at Dec. 31, 1985:

UN Doc. A/C.5/40/16 (1985). The amount of U.S. withholdings will be considerably larger—probably larger than that of the USSR—when the final estimates for 1985 are submitted to the 41st session of the General Assembly.

Some 23 members, including the United States and the USSR, also withhold assessed contributions to peacekeeping accounts; the total amount withheld was estimated at over $200 million as at Dec. 31, 1985. Id. The Soviet Union is responsible for the lion’s share of this amount, most of which is owed to troop–contributing countries and therefore does not affect immediate cash flow in the United Nations. On Apr. 18, 1986, in the Security Council, Ambassador Yuri Dubinin said that the USSR “declares its willingness henceforth to take part in the financing of [the UN Interim Force in Lebanon]. Of course, that decision should in no circumstances be regarded as having retroactive effect as recognition of ‘indebtedness’ on our part for past years.” UN Doc. S/PV.2681, at 8–10 (1986).

29 For example: “[T]he norm fell into desuetude.” Franck, T., Nation Against Nation 259 (1985)Google Scholar.

30 In addition, “cogent reasons of national self-interest” may be required. Id.

31 Kassebaum and Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, in Franck’s view, do not satisfy the requirement of ultra vires and are not “surgical excisions” from the UN budget. Franck, , Unnecessary UN-Bashing Should Stop, 80 AJIL 336 (1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 Memorandum to Secretary of State Shultz, Mar. 14, 1986, reprinted in 25 ILM 482 (1986).

33 The other signers were Reps. Dan Mica, Benjamin Gilman, Olympia Snowe, Gerald Solomon and Gus Yatron.

34 “It is settled constitutional doctrine that Congress may nullify, in whole or in part, a treaty commitment.” Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In that case, Congress was explicit: the legislation “was intended to make. . . the United States a certain treaty violator.”

Id. at 466. The same might be said of the Kassebaum amendment on its face and of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings in application, and perhaps of the specific withholdings in view of stated U.S. policy.

35 Sohn, , Remarks, 63 ASIL Proc. 180 (1969)Google Scholar.

36 “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 27, May 22, 1969, UNTS Regis. No. 18,232, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969). The Vienna Convention is “recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice.” Message from Department of State to U.S. Senate, S. Exec. Doc. L, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971).

37 N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1986, at A11.

38 H.R. 5161, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. H4623 (daily ed. July 17, 1986).