1 Continued from the January, 1917, number, p. 46.

2 See this Journal for January, 1917, p. 70, note 56.

3 Proofs for this assertion will be adduced in a subsequent article.

4 After the constitutional régime inaugurated in France by the Charter of 1814, a controversy arose between the two political parties of the time, namely, the Royalists and the Liberals, tht^former contending that the Charter should be applied literally, the latter on the contrary asserting that it should be carried out according to its spirit. It was then that Thiers laid down the principle that the King reigns but does not govern. See on this point the learned treatise of Professor J. Barthélémy entitled l'Introduction du Bégime Parlementaire en France (1914), p. 78. Barthélény, however, tells us that the majority of the writers indorse the other maxim, — which does not differ much in substance from the former — that “the King does not govern; but he influences the government.” Ibid. p. 80.

5 E. Freeman, The Growth of the English Constitution (1898), pp. 18-19; Bryce, Studies in the History of Jurisprudence, p. 125; Gladstone, Gleamings of Past Years (1879), Vol. I, p. 228; Sir Henry Maine, Popular Government (1897), pp. 9-14; Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, Vol. 1, pp. 1-7; Hearn, The Government of England (1867), p. 2; Guizot, Histoire des Origines du Gouvernement Réprésentalif en Europe (1851), première leçon, p. 11; E. Boutmy, Studies in Constitutional Law, tr. by E. M. Dicey (1891), p. 3; Glasson, Histoire du droit et des Institutions politiques, civiles et judiciaires de l'Angleterre, Vol. VI, p. 8; A. Esmein, Elements de droit Constitutionnel Françis et comparé (1906), pp. 45 et seq.; Duguit, Traité de droit Constitutionnel, Vol. I, pp. 411, 421-422.

6 P. Matter, La dissolution des Assemblées Parlementaires, pp. 217-218; see also Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (1914) p. 704.

7 Sidney Low, Governance of England (1904), pp. 44-47.

8 Freeman, ibid., pp. 112-119. The same views are expressed in his Historical Essays (1892), Fourth Series, pp. 483-484.

9 Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1915), pp. 416-418, 422-426.

10 The Law and Custom of the Constitution (1911), p. 383.

Jellinek observes that Hatschek, the German author on the English Constitution (Englisches Staatsrecht, Vol. I, pp. 542 et seq.) has in a very suggestive way undertaken to show that part of these so-called conventions or rules are really legal maxims. "For us," adds Jellinek, "it is yet an open question how far these Constitutional or political ethics contain customary rights or legal maxims." (Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (1914), p. 703.)

A French writer on British political institutions, using rather allegorical language, says, "These usages, conventions or better understandings are the most invisible and most important elements of the Constitution. They do not create or destroy; they do not change the better of the law, but they distort its spirit. They are born one day and suddenly disappear the next. One may think that they are dead, but they only slumber until the time when there is occasion to bring them to life." (Comte de Franqueville, Le Gouvernement et le Parlement Britannuques, Vol. I, 1887, p. 73.)

11 A notable example of comparatively recent times is that of Charles X (King of France), who was compelled to abdicate because he transgressed the constitutional understandings.

12 H. Chardon, L'Administration de La France (1908), pp. 86-93.

13 L. Duguit, Traité de Droit Constitutimnel (1911), Vol. II, p. 435. Also A. Esmein, EUmenta de Droit Constitutionnel Francois et cortvpari (1906).

14 Duguit, ibid., II, p. 439; Chardon, ibid., p. 94.

15 Esmein, ibid., p. 604, note 8.

16 James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, Vol. I (1910), p. 383.

17 Ibid., p. 386. See also on the same point, James Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, p. 124.

18 Dicey, ibid., p. 29; also Anson, I, ibid., p. 7.

19 L. Lowell, The Government of England, Vol. I (1912), pp. 9, 10, 11, 12.

20 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, pp. 242-243.

20a Paul Errera, Traité de droit Public Belge (ed. 1909), pp. 5 and 208.

21 G. N Philaretos, an article entitled “Form of Hellenic Government” in Political and Parliamentary Monthly Review (in the Greek language), ed. by G. Cafandaris, Book II, April, 1916, p. 140.

21a N. N. Saripolos, Das Staatsrecht des Königreichs Griecherdand in Das Öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart, Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48.

22 Quoted by Hallam, The Constitutional History of England (1897), Vol. I, p. 275.

23 Atlantis of May 16,1916; also Keryx (of Athens, May 13,1916).

24 Quoted by Atlantis of May 12, 1916.

25 From an interview given to Mr. John Bass of the Chicago Daily News, January 24, 1917, reprinted in the Figaro of January 26, 1917.

26 “The doctrine,” says Macaulay, “that the sovereign is not responsible is doubtless as old as any part of our Constitution. The doctrine that his Ministers are responsible is also of immemorial antiquity." (History of England, 1907. Vol. IV, p. 122.)

27 Quoted by Dicey, ibid., p. 417.

28 Macaulay, ibid., IV, p. 542.

29 L. Courtney, The Working of the Constitution (1907), pp. 125, 126.

30 William Hearn, The Government of England (1867), pp. 115, 149. See also Anson, ibid., Vol. II (1891), p. 290, who indorses the view that foreign affairs are “subject always to the collective advice of the Cabinet. The same writer (Anson), referring to the right of the King to dismiss his Ministers, says, “They have, it is true, been summoned, and continue to hold office by the pleasure of the Crown, but it is to the majority of the House of Commons and not to the will of the Crown that they look to enable them to retain their power.” {Ibid., Vol. I, p. 43.)

31 A. L. Lowell, The Government of England (1912), Vol. I, p. 31.

32 Fifty Years of the English Constitution (1880), pp. 316, 317.

33 The Edinburgh Review of January-April, 1862, Vol. CXV, p. 229.

33a For the Belgian Constitution, See Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, Vol. I, p. 77 et seq.; for the Greek Constitution, See Diplomatic and Consular Guide of Greece (in Greek, 1911), pp. 2 et seq.

34 Orban, Le Droit Constitutionnel de la Belgique, Vol. II, p. 277; see also J. J. Thonissen, La Constitution Belge (1879), pp. 109 et seq.

35 Giron, Le Droit Public de la Belgique (1884), p. 94.

36 Vautier, Das Staatsrecht des Königreichs Belgien (1892), in Marguardsen's Handbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts, Vierter Band, Erstes Half-Band, pp. 17, 19.

37 Orban, ibid., II, pp. 253-254.

38 It may not be amis^to reproduce here a specimen of the conception of Prussian royalty. Professor Bornhak, comparing the Constitution of Belgium with that of Prussia, says that the former was the product of a revolution. Therefore, he says, by virtue of the principle of national sovereignty the Belgian Constitution delegated the various powers to the Chamber, the King and the courts; whilst, on the other hand, Prussia is the creature of the Dynasty, and [therefore] all rights of state power are united in the person of the sovereign. (Conrad Bornhak, Preussische Stoats und Rechts Geschichte (1903), p. 466.)

39 Philaretos, ibid., pp. 136-137, 141. Philaretos gives us the further information that the late King George I (father of the present King of Greece), for whom he had acted, he says, as legal adviser, in a confidential talk with him expressed freely his views on the progress made in our age for political freedom. “The wisdom of ages,” once said the King to Mr. Philaretos, “has definitely and irrevocably condemned the tyrannical and backward monarchism. Progressive humanity has settled in the royal democracy for a more complete political education. No one could now seriously contest that in the far future it will tend more generally towards democracy.” (Philaretos, ibid., p. 150, note 80.)

39a Saripolos, ibid., pp. 13-15, 19-20.

39b J. Aravantinos, Hellenikon Sintagmatikon Dikaion (i.e., Greek Constitutional law), Vol. I, pp. 177-78; see also, observations on same point, p. 203, note 10.

39c Aravantinos, ibid, p. 178, note 155; also Saripolos, ibid., p. 82.

39d Quoted by Aravantinos, ibid., p. 203; note 10.

39d N. J Saripolos, Pragmaieia Sintagmatikou Dikaiou, Vol. I, pp. I l l and 173; quoted by Aravantinos, ibid, p. 217, note 8.

39f Quoted by Aravantinos, ibid. p. 203, note 10.

40 Debates of Boulé in supplement of newspaper Patris, p. 47.

41 Ibid., sup. Patris, pp. 71, 72 and 73.

42 Le Temps, October 16, 1916.

43 Heam, ibid., p. 114.

44 Hallam, The Constitutional History of England (1897), Vol. I, pp. 411, 412.

45 A. Todd, Parliamentary Government in England, Vol. II (1869), p. 405 et seq.

46 Freeman, ibid., p. 116 and p. 210, note 2.

47 Hearn, ibid., pp. 151, 154 and 156; see also May, ibid., p. 91, and for examples of dissolutions of Parliament, pp. 88 and 91.

48 Courtney, ibid., PP 13, 14; see also the judicious observations on this point of W. Bagehot, The English Constitution (1877), pp. 295 et seq.

The Liberal Party at one time contested the right of a Cabinet formed from a minority in the House of Commons to obtain from the Crown a dissolution of the Parliament. For debates on this point in the House of Commons and speeches of Gladstone and Disraeli, see Hansard, third series (1867-8), cxci, pp. 1687-1702-1712.

49 Anson, ibid., Vol. 1, p. 304.

50 Dicey, ibid., pp. 428-434; see also John W. Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, 1902, Vol. II, p. 214.

51 A. Esmein, Éliments du droit Constitutionnd (1906), p. 351, note 2.

52 L. Duguit, Traité de droit Constitutionnd (1911), Vol. II, p. 424; see also Barthélemy, ibid., pp. 81-82.

53 P. Matter, La Dissolution des Assemblies Parlementaires (1898), pp. 10, 11, 193.

54 Matter, ibid., pp. 274, 275.

54 Prevost-Paradol, La France Nouvelle (1868), pp. 144, 145-149.

Matter is, however, of opinion that the newly elected legislature may again be dissolved if a new question arises different from the one at issue during the elections. Matter, ibid., p. 27.

56 L. Palma, Corso di Diritto Costituzionale, Vol. II, p. 529; also Nuova Antologia, 2d ser., Vol. XII, 1878, pp. 623 et seq.

57 A. Giron, ibid., p. 111.

58 J. J. Thonissen, ibid., p. 227.

The King of Norway is the only constitutional sovereign who does not have the right to dissolve Parliament. J. Morgenstiere, Das Staatsrecht des Königreichs Norwegen (1911), pp. 59, 69, quoted by Jellinek in Allgemeine Staatslehre (1914), p. 683, note 2; also by Matter, ibid., p. 236.

59 Philaretos, ibid., pp. 148-149.

60 Supplement to Patris, ibid., pp. 72, 73.

61 Times, December 7, 1915.

62 Keryx, of Athens, May 7 (old style), 1916.

63 Keryx, May 29 (old style), 1916.

64 Gladstone, Gleanings of Past Years, Vol. I, pp. 227-228.

65 History of Greece (1877), Vol. VII, p. 326.

66 Prevost-Paradol, ibid., pp. 150, 151. “It is said,” wrote Freeman, “that the heathen Swedes when their public affairs went wrong … offered their King in sacrifice to God.” (Ibid., pp. 28, 29.) This idea may possibly appeal to some of the European nations after the present war in order to prevent national calamities attributed to their kings.

67 Gladstone, Gleanings of Past Years, Vol. I, pp. 229- 230.

68 Gladstone, ibid., 233.

69 Keryx (of Athens), May 1 (old style), 1916.