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The Governance of Kosovo: Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Establishment and Functioning of eulex

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Erika de Wet*
Affiliation:
University of Amsterdam; NorthWest University, Potchefstroom campus, and University of Pretoria, South Africa

Extract

On February 4,2008, shortly before Kosovo's controversial unilateral secession from Serbia on February 17 of that year, the Council of the European Union (EU) adopted a Joint Action creating the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo/EULEX (hereinafter EULEX), the largest and most important mission thus far undertaken within the common European foreign and defense policy. Although EULEX is first and foremost a European undertaking, it is also strongly backed by the United States, which agreed to shoulder 25 percent of the operating costs while the remaining costs would be shared by European and other states. In October 2008, the U.S. Department of State further agreed to provide EULEX with eighty police officers and up to eight judges and prosecutors.

Type
Current Developments
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2009

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References

1 Kosovo Declaration of Independence (Feb. 17, 2008), 47 ILM 461 (2008), available at <http://www.assemblykosova. org/common/docs/declaration_indipendence.pdf Google Scholar; J. Borgen, Christopher Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self–Determination, Secession and Recognition , ASIL Insights, Feb. 29, 2008, at <http://www.asil.org Google Scholar. The position of the United Nations with respect to the status of Kosovo is one of strict neutrality. By November 2008, Kosovo had been recognized by fifty–two states. Report of the Secretary–General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, para. 2, UN Doc. S/2008/692 (Nov. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Nov. S–G Report]; see also Fried, Daniel Signing of European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) Agreement (Oct. 22, 2008), at <http://2001–2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/111171. htm.Google Scholar

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3 Article 13 of the Joint Action, supra note 2, explicitly provides for the participation of third states in EULEX.

4 Fried, supra note 2.

5 SC Res. 1244, paras. 5–6, 10–11 & Annex 2, paras. 3, 5 (June 10, 1999).

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7 Id. at 79; see also Perriello, Tom & Wierda, Marieke Lessons from the Deployment of International Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo 9 (International Center for Transitional Justice, Apr. 2006), at <http://www.ictj.org/en/news/pubs/index.html.Google Scholar

8 Matheson, supra note 6, at 80.

9 Id. at 79.

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11 Neth. Pari, 2d Chamber, Inzet Nederlandse Politie en Koninklijke Marechaussee bij Internationale Civiele Politie–Operaties [Letter of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Internal Affairs, and Justice to the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament], Kamerstukken II, 2007/08, Doc. 27476, No. 8, at 3 (Mar. 20, 2008), at <http://ikregeer.nl/static/pdf/KST116780.pdf.

12 The issue of coordinating the coexisting mandates is taken up in the text preceding and following note 67 infra.

13 Nov. S–G Report, supra note 1, para. 21.

14 Report of the Secretary–General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, para. 291, UN Doc. S/2008/211 (Mar. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Mar. S–G Report]; Report of the Secretary–General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, paras. 14, 20, UN Doc. S/2008/354 (June 12, 2008) [hereinafter June S–G Report]; Neth. Parl., 2d Chamber, Inzet Nederlandse Politie en Koninklijke Marechaussee bij Internationale Civiele Politie–Operaties [Responses by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense to Questions of the Standing Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament], Kamerstukken II, 2007/08, Doc. 27476, No. 9, at 2 (May 15, 2008), at <http://ikregeer.nl/document/KST118346.

15 EurActiv, EU Kosovo Mission up in the Air , Euractiv, Apr. 16, 2008, at <http://www.euractiv.com.Google Scholar

16 During debates in the Dutch Parliament, the government indicated that the negative attitude of Russia would have no direct effect on the deployment of eulex. In making this prediction, the Dutch government proved to be overconfident. See Kamerstukken II, supra note 14, at 2.

17 Patrick, Moore Analysis: Are UN, EU Part of the Problem in Kosovo? Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, May 28, 2008, at <http://www.rferl.org.Google Scholar

18 By May 15, 2008, only three hundred officials had been deployed. See Kamerstukken II, supra note 14, at 2.

19 June S–G Report, supra note 14, para. 4.

20 By December 2008, Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain still refused to recognize Kosovo.

21 See EurActiv, supra note 15; Koning, Petra de Russen Voorspellen Nieuw Geweld: Kosovo Patstelling Rond Rol Europese Missie in Onafhankelijkheid [Russians Predicting New Violence: Kosovo Deadlock Concerning the Role of the European Mission After Independence], NRC Handelsblad, June 12, 2008, at 7Google Scholar, available at <http:// archief.nrc.nl/index.php/2008/Juni/12/Overig/07/ (by subscription).

22 Nov. S–G Report, supra note 1, para. 4; see also Cunhs, André., EULEX Inside UNMIK, Too Late? (Apr. 23, 2008), at <http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org/article/articleview/9463/l/216 Google Scholar; Moore, supra note 17.

23 June S–G Report, supra note 14, para. 7.

24 Nov. S–G Report, supra note 1, Annex 1, para. 1; see also June S–G Report, supra note 14, para. 9.

25 June S–G Report, supra note 14, paras. 12–13, 16.

26 By February 2008, UNMIK had reduced its police personnel from a peak of 3300 persons in 2001 to just under 1500. The remaining United Nations staff members amounted to 462. About UNMIK, at <http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm. See also Ian, Bancroft Confusion in Kosovo , Guardian.co.uk, Nov. 17, 2008, at <http://www.guardian.co.uk Google Scholar; European Union, European Security and Defense Policy, eulex kosovo: EU Rule of Law Mission for Kosovo, Doc. EULEX/03 (Oct. 2008), attached to EU Council, Joint Press Statement by the United States of America and the European Union on US Participation in the EULEX Mission in Kosovo, No. 14619/08 (Presse 295) (Oct. 22, 2008).

27 This line of argument was also followed with respect to the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT–94–1–AR72(Oct. 2,1995), available at <http://www.icty.org.

28 UN Charter Art. 98. The first sentence of Article 98 reads as follows: “The Secretary–General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs.”

29 SC Res. 1244, supra note 5, paras. 5–6 & Annex 2, paras. 3–4.

30 SC Res. 1483, paras. 4, 8 (May 22, 2003).

31 See Christian, Walter Vereinte Nationen Und Regionalorganisationen: Eine Untersuchung zu Kapitel VIII der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen 276 (1996)Google Scholar; see also Wet, Erika de The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council 29193 (2004)Google Scholar.

32 Walter, supra note 31, at 276.

33 F. Dekker, Ige & P.J. Myjer, Eric Air Strikes on Bosnian Positions: Is NATO Also Legally the Proper Instrument of the UN? 9 Leiden J. Int’l L. 411, 413 (1996)Google Scholar; see also Walter, supra note 31, at 276.

34 Walter, supra note 31, at 40.

35 Id. at 40–41. The distinctive geographic factor can also be accompanied by cultural and historical ties such as those between the members of the British Commonwealth.

36 Although the legal personality of the European Union was not explicitly provided for in the founding treaties, it developed through practice. Henry G. Schermers & Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law 992 (2003); see also Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Art. 46A, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, available at <http://www.eurlex. europa.eu.

37 For a discussion on whether Article 41, combined with Article 48 of the UN Charter, can serve as an alternative basis for territorial administration by regional organizations, see Walter, supra note 31, at 277.

38 SC Res. 1244, supra note 5, paras. 5–6 & Annex 2, paras. 3, 5.

39 Joint Action, supra note 2.

40 Secretary–General in Security Council Statement Says UN Aim in Kosovo Stable Political, Security Situation, Protection of Population, Minorities, UN Press Release SG/SM/11426–SC/9253 (Feb. 18, 2008); see also Kamerstukken II, supra note 14, at 2.

41 Kamerstukken II, supra note 14, at 2; see also Mar. S–G Report, supra note 14, paras. 30, 32.

42 June S–G Report, supra note 14, para. 16 & Annex 1. On August 18, 2008, the special representative of the UN secretary–general and representatives of eulex signed a technical arrangement on the handover of unmik assets to eulex. Technical Arrangement Signed: UN and EU Agree on Handover of Assets Between unmik and eulex, eulex kosovo Press Release 1/2008 (Aug. 19, 2008), available at <http://www.eulex–kosovo.eu.

43 Report of the Secretary–General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, para. 3, UN Doc. S/2008/458 (July 15, 2008) [hereinafter July S–G Report]; see also June S–G Report, supra note 14, para. 19; id., Annex 1, Letter Dated 12 June 2008 from the Secretary–General to His Excellency, Mr. Boris Tadić.

44 See UN Doc. S/PV.5917, at 5, 17, 19 (June 20, 2008). While the secretary–general’s position attracted support from the United Kingdom, id. at 17, and the United States, id. at 19, it was criticized by Serbia, id. at 5.

45 Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2001/27 (Oct. 5, 2001).

46 Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2002/4 (Feb. 13, 2002).

47 Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2003/1 (Feb. 6, 2003).

48 Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2008/44 (Nov. 26, 2008).

49 Nov. S–G Report, supra note 1, para. 50; see also June S–G Report, supra note 14, para. 16 & Annex 1.

50 This requirement was confirmed in relation to the delegation of military mandates in the Behrami decision of the European Court of Human Rights. Behrami & Behrami v. France; Saramati v. France, Joint App. Nos. 71412/01 & 78166/01, Admissibility Decision, para. 132 (May 31, 2007), available at <http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc.

51 1 Danesh Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the UN Security Council of Its Chapter VII Powers 5, 33 (1999).Google Scholar

52 For a discussion of the power of the delegator to override decisions of the delegate, see Case 9/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpAv. High Auth. of Eur. Coal & Steel Cmty., 1958 ECR 133. The underlying principles in this case, although developed in the context of EU law, were also affirmed in relation to United Nations mandates, see Behrami & Behrami, supra note 50, para. 132. See also de Wet, supra note 31, at 267–68; M. Blokker, Niels Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the United Nations Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by ‘Coalitions of the Able and Willing,’ 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 541, 553 (2000).Google Scholar

53 SC Res. 1244, supra note 5, para. 6. See also the statement by the United Kingdom in UN Doc. S/PV.6025, at 19 (Nov. 26, 2008), that the executive authority of the special representative was not derived from Resolution 1244, but from the subsequent constitutional framework, which is not correct. This interpretation ignores not only the wording of the resolution, but also the fact that the constitutional framework was itself a product of an executive act of the special representative, namely, UNMIK Regulation 2001/9, On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self–Government in Kosovo, UN Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (May 15, 2001), available at <http://www.unmikonline.org.

54 Joint Action, supra note 2, Art. 7; EU Council, Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, Welcomes the Appointments of Pieter Feith as EU Special Representative in Kosovo and Yves de Kermabon as Head of Mission of eulex kosovo, Doc. S060/08 (Feb. 16, 2008); see also Kamerstukken II, supra note 14, at 7.

55 EU Council, Summary of the Intervention of Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Before the Meeting of International Organisations Active on the Ground in Kosovo (EU, NATO, UN, OSCE), Doc. S257/08 (July 18, 2008).

56 Security Council Resolution 1244, supra note 5, para. 20, requested that the secretary–general report regularly to the Council on the implementation of the civil and military presences authorized by this resolution.

57 Perriello & Wierda, supra note 7.

58 Human Rights Watch, No. 4(D), 2006, Not on the Agenda: the Continuing Failure to Address Accountability on Kosovo Post–March 2004, at 6, available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/05/29/not–agenda–0.Google Scholar

59 Id. at 6.

60 Id. at 38; Perriello & Wierda, supra note 7, at 9.

61 UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, UN Doc. UNMIK/ REG/1/1999 §§1–2 (July 23, 1999), available at <http://www.unmikonline.org; see also Report of the Secretary– General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 39, UN Doc. S/1999/779 (July 12, 1999).

62 Formally speaking, the special representative could also nullify the 2008 Kushtetuta E Kosoves [Constitution of Kosovo], available at <http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info. However, in practice this is not likely to happen.

63 Nov. S–G Report, supra note 1, paras. 21, 25; see also Bancroft, supra note 26.

64 Nov. S–G Report, supra note 1, para. 52.

65 Kamerstukken II, supra note 11, at 4. In addition, EULEX had to oversee the implementation of the 2007 “Ahtisaari Plan,” which Kosovo accepted unilaterally upon independence. This plan contained, inter alia, safeguards for minorities, a program for the decentralization of government, constitutional guarantees for all citizens, and measures for the protection and promotion of cultural heritage. Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary– General on Kosovo’s Future Status, UN Doc. S/2007/168, paras. 1–3 (Mar. 26, 2007). The status of the Ahtisaari Plan is uncertain in light of the compromise reached in December 2008 in accordance with which EULEX will function within the status–neutral framework of UNMIK.

66 An estimated fourteen hundred EULEX police officers, forty judges, twenty prosecutors, and seventy prison workers are to be deployed throughout Kosovo. Joint Action, supra note 2, Art. 3(b); Kamerstukken II, supra note 14, at 4; see also Kamerstukken II, supra note 11, at 4.

67 Human Rights Watch, supra note 58, at 11.

68 Id. at 38; see also July S–G Report, supra note 43, Annex 1, para. 25.

69 Human Rights Watch, supra note 58, at 38.

70 Id. at 9.

71 Id. at 44.

72 Nov. S–G Report, supra note 1, para. 51. It will also involve the cooperation of the OSCE, which will remain involved in institution building in the territory. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 58, at 48, 67.

73 Nov. S–G Report, supra note 1, para. 52.

74 June S–G Report, supra note 14, para. 5.

75 Nov. S–G Report, supra note 1, para. 8. In Zubin Potok, the municipal and minor offenses courts are not operational at all, while the court liaison office of the Kosovo Ministry of Justice—which facilitates legal aid for Kosovar Serbs—is functioning at a minimal level because of security concerns.

76 Some Serb–dominated municipalities also apply the Serbian law of self–governance. See Nov. S–G Report, supra note 1, para. 4.

77 Joint Action, supra note 2, para. 20; see also Kamerstukken II, supra note 11, at 7.

78 Im Versuchslabor Kosovo beginnt eine weitere Etappe , N[eue]Z[Üricher]Z[eitung] online, Nov. 28, 2008, at <http://www.nzz.ch.Google Scholar

79 June S–G Report, supra note 14, para. 16.

80 Behrami & Behrami v. France, supra note 50.

81 For an analysis of this decision, see Pierre Bodeau–Livinec, Gionata P. Buzzini, & Santiago Villalpando, Case Report: Agim Behrami & Bekir Behrami v. France; Ruzhdi Saramati v. France, Germany & Norway, in 102 AJIL 323 (2008). See also Larsen, K. M. Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The “Ultimate Authority and Control” Test , 19 Eur. J. Int’l L. 509 (2008)Google Scholar.

82 De Wet, supra note 31, at 265.

83 Fredrik, Naert Accountability for Violations of Human Rights Law by EU Forces, in The European Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects 375, 379 (Blockmark, S. ed., 2008)Google Scholar.

84 In any event, the United Nations is not bound by a decision of the European Court, as it is not a party to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. TS No. 5,213 UNTS221.

85 The matter might be different if in future Kosovo became a party to the European Convention on Human Rights and the issue of extraterritorial application did not arise. See Behrami & Behrami v. France, supra note 50, para. 150; see also Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, 2005–VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, available at <http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc.

86 Naert, supra note 83, at 379.

87 SC Res. 1244, supra note 5, paras. 5–6.

88 Bancroft, supra note 26.