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The Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Nato Status of Forces Agreement*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2017

Joseph H. Rouse  and
Gordon B. Baldwin
Joseph H. Rouse
Affiliation:
Office of the Surgeon General
Gordon B. Baldwin
Affiliation:
The Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Va.
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Extract

Concomitant with the stationing of United States armed forces in friendly foreign countries is an increasing concern over, and appreciation of, the legal issues arising from their presence. The most controversial question concerns exercise by the host state of criminal jurisdiction over personnel of the visiting United States force. The House Foreign Affairs Committee after extensive hearings refused to accede to critics’ demands that this exercise of criminal jurisdiction by foreign countries be officially denounced, and by a vote of 19–10 tabled the condemnatory resolutions.1 Congressional concern remains strong, however, and the issue is not dormant.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 51 , Issue 1 , January 1957 , pp. 29 - 62
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1957

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Footnotes

*

The subject of this article is based upon a thesis prepared by Lt. Col. Joseph H. Bouse while in attendance at the Judge Advocate Officer Advanced Course of The Judge Advocate General’s School. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent the views of either the Judge Advocate General’s School or any other governmental agency.

References

1 New York Times, March 9, 1956, p. 16, col. 7; see also 102 Cong. Rec. 8450 (daily edition, May 31, 1956).

2 Non-appropriated fund activities include, for example, officers' clubs, post exchanges, and the Armed Forces Motion Picture Service.

3 That the visiting force is, under international law, immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state is the proposition advanced in King, , “Jurisdiction over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces,” 36 A.J.I.L. 539 (1942)Google Scholar; King, , “Further Developments Concerning Jurisdiction over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces,” 40 A.J.I.L. 257 (1946)Google Scholar; contra, Barton, , “Foreign Armed Forces; Immunity from Criminal Jurisdiction,” 27 British Year Book of Int. Law 186 (1954)Google Scholar; Schwartz, , “International Law and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement,” 53 Col. L. Rev. 1091 (1953)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Re, , “The NATO Status of Forces Agreement and International Law,” 50 N.W.U.L. Rev. 349 (1955)Google Scholar. In this connection the difference between the 7th and 8th editions of Lauterpacht's revision of Oppenheim, International Law, is noteworthy. The 7th edition states (sec. 445, p. 759): “Whenever armed forces are on foreign territory … they are considered exterritorial, and remain, therefore, under [sending state] jurisdiction.” The 8th edition (sec. 445, p. 847) qualified “considered” by the words “by some to be.” Dicta in Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U. S. 470, 479 (1956), support the view of Barton and Schwartz. A petition for rehearing was granted Nov. 5, 1956, 352 U. S. 901, 1 L. Ed. 2d 92, so this authority is now of questionable value.

In Cozart v. Wilson, 236 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir., 1956), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia cited the Krueger case as authority for holding that Japan had jurisdiction to try several servieemen under the Administrative Agreement. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment on the ground that the case was moot, 352 U. S. 884, 1 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1956). Both these decisions indicate that jurisdictional agreements are sometimes construed as ceding jurisdiction from the host state to the visiting force. These agreements in fact refer to the right to exercise jurisdiction rather than to the existence of jurisdiction. Authority to try persons by court-martial must be found in domestic law rather than in international agreements. The inherent good sense in negotiating status of forces agreements is demonstrated in Grabb, , “What About These Status of Forces Agreements?”, 6 Army 34 (1956)Google Scholar.

4 Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951. 4 U.S.T. 1792; T.I.A.S., No. 2846; 48 A.J.I.L. Supp. 83 (1954).

5 Administrative Agreement under Art. III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, Feb. 28, 1952, 3 U.S.T. 3341, T.I.A.S., No. 2492; Protocol to Amend Art. XVII of the Administrative Agreement, Sept. 29, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 1846; T.I.A.S., No. 2848. The status of other United Nations forces in Japan is stated in a virtually identical agreement, Agreement Begarding the Status of United Nations Forces in Japan, Feb. 19, 1954, 5 U.S.T. 1123; T.I.A.S., No. 2995.

6 See note on case of Zerfoss in 81 Journal de Droit International 737 (1954).

7 Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. J. Res. 309, 84th Cong., 1st (and 2d) Sess., Pt. 1 (Pt. 2, 2d Sess.) (1956), p. 160.

5 Note 5 supra.

6 Exchange of Notes Between the United States and the “United Kingdom Modifying Arts. IV and VI of the Agreement of March 27, 1941 (Exec. Agr. Ser., No. 235; 55 Stat., Pt. 2, p. 1560), July 19 and Aug. 1, 1950. 1 U.S.T. 585; T.I.A.S., No. 2105; 45 A.J.I.L. Supp. 97 (1951).

10 Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom Concerning “The Bahamas Long Eange Proving Ground,” July 21, 1950, 1 U.S.T. 545, T.I.A.S., No. 2099; see also Agreement of June 25, 1956, T.I.A.S., No. 3595; also Art. XV, Agreement with the Dominican Republic of Nov. 26, 1951, Concerning the Long Bange Proving Ground, 3 U.S.T. 2569; T.I.A.S., No. 2425.

11 Par. 13 (c) (i), Exchange of Notes Between the United States and Saudi Arabia Concerning an Air Base at Dhahran, June 18, 1951. 2 U.S.T. 1466; T.I.A.S., No. 2290.

12 Arts. VI, XX (1) (b), Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom of Libya, Sept. 9, 1954. 5 U.S.T. 2449; T.I.A.S., No. 3107.

14 Art. XIII, Agreement Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines Concerning Military Bases, March 14, 1947. 61 Stat. (4) 4019; T.I.A.S., No. 1775. This agreement is in the process of renegotiation, but negotiations were suspended on Dec. 5, 1956.

14 Art. VI, Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and Their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954. T.I.A.S., No. 3425.

15 Exchange of Notes Concerning Jurisdiction over Offenses by United States Forces in Korea, July 12, 1950. 5 U.S.T. 1408; T.I.A.S., No. 3012.

16 Art. VIII, Agreement Between the United States and Denmark Concerning the Defense of Greenland, April 27, 1951. 2 U.S.T. 1485; T.I.A.S., No. 2292.

17 Agreement Between the United States and Ethiopia Concerning the Utilization of Defense Installations in Ethiopia, May 22, 1953. 5 U.S.T. 749; T.I.A.S., No. 2964.

18 See Art. VIII, par. 1(b), Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954. T.I.A.S., No. 3425; 49 A.J.I.L. Supp. 57 (1955).

19 Art. XIII, par. 2, note 13 supra.

20 See 22 Dept. of State Bulletin 449 (1950). Signed between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

21 See Anglo-French Agreement of April 19, 1948, G.B.T.S. 44 [1948]. The Soviet Union recently entered into a status of forces agreement with Poland by which certain off-base offenses by members of Russian forces are subject to Polish criminal jurisdiction. In some respects its provisions are strikingly similar to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. For text of agreement, see New York Times, Dec. 19, 1956, p. 8, col. 1.

22 10 U.S.C. 801, et seq.

23 U. S. v. Marker, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 393, 3 C.M.R. 127 (1952).

24 U. S. v. Biagini, 10 C.M.B. 682, 690.

25 U. S. v. Garcia, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 88, 17 C.M.B. 88; cf. U. S. v. Guidry, 7 C.M.B. 305; U. S. v. Patterson, 16 C.M.R. 295.

26 The Polish Labor Service; see U. 8. v. Weiman, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 216, 11 C.M.B. 216.

27 Perlstein v. U. S., 151 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1945); cert, dismissed, 328 U. S. 822 (1946); In re Di Bartolo, 50 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y., 1943).

28 See Agreement Between the United States and the Republic of Turkey Relating to the Implementation of the “Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces,” June 23, 1954, 5 U.S.T. 1465, T.I.A.S., No. 3020, wherein United Services Organization and Red Cross personnel are specifically included within the purview of United States military law.

29 See Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U. S. 470 (1956), note 3 supra; see also Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U. S. 341 (1952); U. S. v. Smith, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 17 C.M.R. 314.

30 Art. “VII, par. 4, NATO Status of Forces Agreement, note 4 supra.

31 Par. E, Agreed Official Minutes Regarding Protocol to Amend Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement, ote 5 supra.

32 See Statement of Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy, Hearings (note 7 supra), p. 162; cf. dicta in Kinsella v. Krueger, note 3 supra.

33 Art. VII, par. 1(b), note 4 supra.

34 Art. I, par. 1(a), ibid.

35 Minutes of the Working Group on the Military Status of the Armed Forces of NATO Countries (1951) (cited hereinafter as Minutes of the Working Group), pars. 4–10, MS-R (51) 13.

36 E.g., The Netherlands, see Hearings, p. 20 (note 63 infra). Panama provides an example where jurisdictional arrangements exist in absence of treaty or formal agreement.

37 Minutes of the Working Group (note 35 supra), par. 5.

38 Ibid., par. 2, MS-R (51) 19.

39 The status of MAAG personnel in the lower ranks who are entitled to no diplomatic privileges whatsoever presents a curious anomaly. For example, under the Mutual Defense Agreement an enlisted man with a MAAG group stationed in London is subject to British criminal jurisdiction, although, if he were on NATO duty, he would not be subjected to the primary right of Great Britain to exercise jurisdiction for offenses arising from the performance of official duty or for offenses against other members of the forces. This unsatisfactory result has not been ameliorated either by directives or formal treaty. The status of MAAG and mission personnel in NATO countries requires more definitive clarification. Personnel attached to the military aid and assistance group usually operate as part of the United States Embassy in that country. In Greece, Ethiopia, Spain, Thailand, and Yugoslavia, MAAG personnel receive full diplomatic immunity, but in Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Saudi Arabia they are subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the United States and the local authorities. On the other hand, in Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Formosa, France, Great Britain, Indochina, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan and the Philippines their status corresponds to that of personnel in the diplomatic mission. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to review for the period Dee. 1, 1954, to Nov. 30, 1955, the operation of Art. VII of the Status of Forces Agreement (1956), pp. 30–31.

40 Minutes of the Working Group (note 35 supra), par. 10, MS-R (51) 18.

41 . U. S. v. Robertson, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 806, 19 C.M.B. 102; McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va., 1943); In re Berne, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S. D. Ohio, 1944).

42 See U. S. v. Robertson, cited above, which is in error insofar as it ignores the provisions of Agreed View No. 31a, Agreed Views of Jurisdiction Sub-Committee, Part II, Exercise of Jurisdiction, FEC Pamphlet 27-1, Criminal Jurisdiction in Japan, January, 1956.

43 T.I.A.S., No. 3020, note 28 supra.

44 Letter AGAC-C (M) 153 (Dee. 13, 1954), Department of the Army, dated Dee. 17, 1954, subject: “Settlement of Claims Arising from Acts or Omissions of Employees of Non-Appropriated Fund Activities in Foreign Countries.”

45 Note 26 supra.

46 Art. 1, par. 7, Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and Their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany. T.I.A.S., No. 3425.

47 Art. I, par. 1(c), NATO Status of Forces Agreement, note 4 supra.

48 Par. 4b, AEZ Cir. Nr. 550-50, April 13, 1956, Criminal Jurisdiction of Foreign Tribunals over Army Personnel, Headquarters, USAREUR Communications Zone.

49 Art. 1(7), note 14 supra.

50 Art. VII, par. 2(a), NATO Status of Forces Agreement, note 4 supra.

51 Art. 134, U.C.M.J. (note 22 supra), provides:

“Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this code may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general or special court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of that court.”

52 S. Rep. 2558, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on the Operation of Art. VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty (1956), p. 3. This policy is also inferred from the terms of Art. VIII. Department of Defense Directive 5525.1, Nov. 3, 1955, “Status of Forces Policies and Information”; reproduced in Hearings (note 7 supra).

53 This is a criminal offense in Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, and France, and most other NATO countries.

54 U. S. v. Kirchner, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 477, 4 C.M.E. 69.

55 U. S. v. Eagleson, 11 C.M.E. 893.

56 U. S. v. Wolverton, 10 C.M.E. 641, 643.

57 Art. VII, par. 3(a) (i), NATO Status of Forces Agreement, note 4 supra.

58 Par. 3(a) (ii), Agreed Official Minutes Regarding Protocol to Amend Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement, Sept. 29, 1953, note 5 supra.

59 Agreed “View No. 43, note 42 supra.

60 “The Working Group had considered that only the authorities of the force could decide in the case of an offence whether or not it had been committed in the performance of official duty. Since Article VII dealt with criminal offences, it was desirable to ensure that punitive action could be taken as promptly as possible, which would rule out the possibility of intervention by an arbitrator.” Par. 8, D. R. (51) 41. Minutes of the Working Group, note 35 supra.

61 Hearings (note 7 supra), p. 302.

62 Hearings before Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., on Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Armed Forces, and Military Headquarters (1953), p. 71.

63 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., to Review the Operation of Art. VII of the Status of Forces Agreement (1955), p. 28.

64 The Visiting Forces Act of 1952, 15 … 16 Geo. VI, and 1 Eliz. II c. 67; 32 Halbury's Statutes of England (2d ed.) 985. The Status of Forces Agreement became effective in Great Britain on June 13, 1954.

65 See Hearings (note 63 supra), p. 30.

66 Ibid.

66a A law of July 16, 1956, brings the Turkish law in this respect into conformity with the practice in other NATO countries.

67 Note 52 supra.

68 Par. 2c, AEZ Cir. Nr. 550-50, April 13, 1956, note 48 supra.

69 The military commanders, however, must specially require that travel to and from work be included within the insurance coverage because in some countries, such as Franee, such travel is not covered in the standard insurance contract.

70 Tignières, Cass. Crim., June 12, 1947, wherein it was determined that travel between the place of duty and the place of residence was “en service commande” and that French military authorities had the power to make final determination of this question.

71 See pars. 6–7 AEZ Cir. Nr. 550-50, note 48 supra.

72 Art. XI, Department of Defense Directive 5525.1, Nov. 3, 1955, note 52 supra.

73 Art. XV, par. 2, of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement provides that in the event of hostilities any provision of the agreement can be suspended unilaterally with 60 days' notice.

74 Art. VII, par. 8, NATO Status of Forces Agreement provides:

75 Where an accused has been tried in accordance with the provisions of this Article by the authorities of one Contracting Party and has been acquitted, or has been convicted and is serving, or has served, his sentence or has been pardoned, he may not be tried again for the same offence within the same territory by the authorities of another Contracting Party. However, nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the military authorities of the sending State from trying a member of its force for any violation of rules of discipline arising from an act or omission which constituted an offence for which he was tried by the authorities of another Contracting Party.”

75 Par. 8a, AEZ Cir. Nr. 550-50, note 48 supra.

76 Par. 8a(4d), ibid.

77 Note 5 supra.

78 Agreed View No. 40, note 42 supra.

79 But see the issue of the Whitley ease, infra.

80 Art. VII, par. 3(c), NATO Status of Forces Agreement, note 4 supra; par. 3(c), Protocol to Amend Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement, note 5 supra.

81 Hearings (note 7 supra), p. 572.

82 Ibid., p. 573.

83 Ibid., p. 608.

84 Ibid., p. 562.

85 Par. 3, Annex to Agreement Between the United States and The Netherlands Concerning Stationing of United States Armed Forces in The Netherlands, Aug. 13, 1954. T.I.A.S., No. 3174. See also Art. II, Agreement between the United States and Greece concerning the Status of United States Forces in Greece, Sept. 17, 1956, T.I.A.S., No. 3649.

86 Hearings (note 7 supra), p. 167.

87 See. V, Circular from French Minister of Justice to the Proeureurs Généraux, Subject: “Allied Forces Stationed in France by Virtue of the North Atlantic Treaty,” translated by Headquarters, United States Army Europe Communications Zone, August, 1953.

88 Note 52 supra.

89 Hearings on H. R. 3744 and H. R. 7646, Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6907; see also Hearings (note 7 supra), pp. 167, 175.

90 Hearings (Ibid.), p. 175.

91 Letter from General Gruenther to Representative Udall, dated March 1, 1956, Hearings (note 7 supra), p. 946; see also the case of Airman Third Class Jose E. Montijo, Newsweek, Feb. 20, 1956; also list of U. S. personnel subject to U. S. military law confined in foreign penal institutions as of May 31, 1955, Hearings (note 7 supra), p. 337. Several years ago a civilian employee of the Army in France killed his wife by what was described as a “physical beating characterized by the utmost savagery.” France, pursuant to the agreement then effective, had primary jurisdiction and accordingly the juge d'instruction intended to send the case to a tribunal correctionnel, which could only impose a sentence of up to five years. A United States Senator interceded in the case, however, and as a result of discussion between the United States Embassy and the French Minister of Justice, a waiver of jurisdiction was obtained. The accused was tried by general court-martial, convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. U. S. v. Grisham, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 694, 16 C.M.R. 268.

92 Arts. 145 and 182, Code d'Instruction Criminelle. The origin of this procedure is examined by Esmein, , A History of Continental Criminal Procedure 143–144 (Boston, 1913)Google Scholar. Somewhat similar procedures exist in Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Italy and Turkey.

93 Copies of these opinions secured from Colonel Howard S. Levie, Washington, D. C. It is understood that the Whitley case is on appeal to the Cour de Cassation. Contra: cases of Zerfoss (see note 6 supra); Saccomandi, Cour d'Appel de Paris, Nov. 23, 1954; Lantagne, Cour d'Appel de Paris, Dec. 13, 1954; Sykes, Cour d'Appel de Bourges, July 1, 1954.

94 Note 74 supra.

95 See U. S. v. Werthman, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 440, 18 C.M.R. 64.

96 The Whitley case is discussed in 43 Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 602 (1954) by Professor Leauté.

97 Sec. V, par. 4, Circular from French Minister of Justice (note 87 supra).

98 See Rafalovitch, Tribunal Correctionnel de Fontainebleau, July 4, 1955.

99 Note 4 supra. NATO Status of Forces claims arising in the United States are processed by the procedure set forth in Army Regulations 25–50, April 20, 1955.

100 10 U.S.C. 2734. Provisions for the settlement of claims in both the Japanese Administrative Agreement and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement are pre-emptive as to the administrative settlement of all claims included therein.

101 18 U.S.C. 283; par. 4, Army Regulations 25-20, March 7, 1956.

102 Par. 4b, Army Regulations 25-20 (supra), which superseded Special Regulations 25-20-1, May 31, 1951.

103 USAREUR regulations only state that no waiver of the United States' right to exercise primary jurisdiction will be granted without the written approval of Headquarters, USAREUR. Par. 5j, AEZ Cir. Nr. 550-50, note 48 supra.

104 Art. VII, par. 9, NATO Status of Forces Agreement, note 4 supra.

105 Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on the Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Agreement (1956), p. 25; Hearings (note 7 supra), pp. 11, 332; Time, Feb. 14, 1955, p. 6.

106 Hearings (note 7 supra), p. 301.

107 See Keedy, , “Preliminary Investigation of Crime in France,” 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 385, 692, 915 (1940)Google Scholar.

108 Par. 8d, AEZ Cir. Nr. 550-50, note 48 supra.

109 Vouin, , “The Protection of the Accused in French Criminal Proceedings,” 5 Int. and Comp. L. Q. 1 (1956)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

110 Sec. IX B, Department of Defense Directive 5525.1, Nov. 3, 1955 (Hearings, Pt. 2, p. 940, note 7 supra), provides:

“Trial observers [who will be lawyers] shall attend and shall prepare formal reports in all cases of trials of United States personnel by foreign courts or tribunals, except minor offenses. …”

111 Par. 9c, AEZ Cir. Nr. 550-50, note 48 supra.

112 Note 3 supra.

113 See Par. 20(c), Manual for Courts-Martial, 1951.

114 Par. 11d, ibid.

115 Par. 8d(3), note 48 supra.

116 Unpublished opinion of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, JAGW 1955/2305, Feb. 25, 1955, which states:

“There is no Federal statute providing for service by military personnel of process issued in a civil action by a domestic or foreign court. Although military authorities ordinarily will assist in facilitating service of process on members of the Army … by permitting process servers … to enter military … installations for the purpose and making military and civilian personnel available for service … the service of such process is not a function of the military … and may not properly be accomplished by the Department of the Army.”

117 MS (j)-R (51) 5, Minutes of the Working Group, note 35 supra.

118 Luxembourg Law and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, Headquarters, United States Army Europe, July 12, 1955, pp. 173–174.

119 Hearings (note 7 supra), pp. 257–258.

120 Several in absentia trials in France and Italy are listed at p. 299, Hearings, note 7 supra.

121 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657 (1892).

122 See. VII (5) SL 1344-3, Allied Forces Stationed in France Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, note 87 supra.

123 Act of July 24, 1956, 70 Stat. 630; implemented by Army Regulations 633-55, Aug. 24, 1956.

124 Advice of Action of the Joint Secretaries, May 17, 1956, Subject: “Policy on Counsel Fees”; see also memorandum from the Secretary of the Army for the Assistant Secretary of the Army (M & R F), Feb. 2, 1956.

125 S. Rep. 2544, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4.

126 Hearings (note 7 supra), pp. 298–299.

127 In opposing the Status of Forces Agreement, Representative Bow of Ohio stated: “[Its] provisions abrogate the basic Constitutional rights of our American soldiers serving on foreign soil.

“This treaty repudiates one of America's oldest and finest traditions—that the American flag and the American Constitution follow our soldiers wherever they go.”

Hearings (note 7 supra), p. 2; contra, cases cited supra, note 3; see also Neely v. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109 (1901); In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, 464 (1891). The Congressional Record contains many criticisms; for example, see extension of remarks by Representative Dodd, 102 Cong. Rec. A 6726, daily ed., Aug. 20, 1956.

128 Department of Defense Directive 5525.1, Nov. 3, 1955. Hearings (note 7 supra), p. 940.

129 See a memorandum prepared by the Interservice Legal Committee convened by Hqs. U. S. European Command, submitted to the House Committee investigating the Status of Forces Agreement by Secretary of the Army Brucker, then General Counsel of the Department of Defense, as a summary of fundamental legal rights and privileges by which the foreign criminal procedures were to be measured. Hearings (note 7 supra), p. 249.

130 Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U. S. 424 (1953); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).

131 Page 56 supra.

132 Art. VII, par. 6(a), NATO Status of Forces Agreement, note 4 supra.

133 Par. 9 MS-R (51) 15, Minutes of the Working Group, note 35 supra.

134 Agreed View Nr. 26, note 42 supra.

135 Act of June 30, 1944, 58 Stat. 645, 22 U.S.C. 703.

136 Proclamation 3107, Aug. 5, 1955; 20 Fed. Reg. 5805; 33 Dept. of State Bulletin 362 (1955).

137 Art. VII, par. 10(b), NATO Status of Forces Agreement, note 4 supra.

138 Note 20 supra.

139 Par. 16 MS (j)-R (51) 5, Minutes of the Working Group, note 35 supra.

140 U. S. v. DeLeo, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 148, 17 C.M.R. 148.

141 Hearings (note 63 supra), p. 19.

142 Hearings (note 7 supra), p. 946.