¹ Over 100 of the 440 articles of the Treaty of Versailles contemplated or specified changes in the future. These articles set forth procedures for changing the status quo through the League of Nations in regard to armaments (Arts. 8, 164, 213), the preservation of peace (Art. 11), disputes threatening a rupture (Art. 15), inapplicable treaties and conditions threatening the peace (Art. 10), mandated territories (Art. 22), social and economic reform (Art. 23), amendment of the Covenant (Art. 26), Austrian independence (Art. 80), Danzig (Arts. 102,103), economic restrictions upon Germany (Arts. 377, 378, 379); procedures for promoting social justice through the International Labor Organization (Arts. 387, 424); procedures for regulating international rivers through permanent commissions: Elbe, Oder, Niemen (Arts. 340–343), Danube (Arts. 346–347), Rhine (Arts. 354, 355); procedures for regulating through transitory commissions or tribunals, German armaments (Art. 203), German reparations and expropriations (Arts. 233, 234, 260), international private debts and contracts (Arts. 296, 304), repatriation of prisoners of war (Art. 215), war graves (Art. 225), and war crimes (Arts. 227–229); provisions specifying periods of time for instituting boundary commissions, withdrawing troops, handing over ceded territory, repatriating prisoners of war: “as soon as possible” (Art. 214), “as soon as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall think the moment suitable” (Art. 433), 10 or 15 days (Arts. 30, 35, 87, 101, 111), 3 months (Art. 158), 5,10, or 15 years (Arts. 428, 429); provisions specifying the time for holding plebiscites: 15 days (Arts. 34, 88, Annexes I, VI, 95, 06, 07), 3 months (Art. 109), 15 years (Art. 49); provisions specifying the period in which options may be exercised with respect to: nationality, 2 years (Arts 37, 79, 85, 01,106, 113), continuation of treaties and contracts, 6 months (Art. 289), 3 months (Art. 303), initiation of proceedings (Art. 307); provisions limiting the duration of restrictions on Germany’s financial, economic and political autonomy, 3 months (Art. 197), 6 months (Art. 269), 5, 10, 12, or 15 years (Arts. 31, 50, Annex II, 65, 68,69,90,259,268,280,366,373,378,379), 25 years (Art. 361), 09 years (Art. 363), “until January 1, 1923” (Art. 320), “until May 1, 1921” (Art. 248), “until Germany is admitted to the League of Nations” (Art. 164), “so long as the present treaty is in force” (Art. 213), “whenever requested by Switzerland with consent of Italy” (Art. 374); provisions specifying the time for the accomplishment of German disarmament, 2 or 3 months (Arts. 163,168,169,172,176,180,181,182, 185, 188, 192, 196, 199, 211), 6 months (Art. 201), 1 year (Art. 131), “before March 31,1920” (Art. 160), “within periods to be determined by governments” (Art. 115), and German reparation payments and restorations of property, “without delay” (Art. 223), 2 or 3 months (Annexes III and IV following Art. 244), 3 or 6 months (Arts. 245, 246, 247, 298, Annex X, Arts. 299, 339, 357), 10 years (Annex V after Art. 244), 30 years (Art. 233), “before Jan. 1,1925” (Annex VI, Sec. 2, after Art. 244); provisions specifying the time within which treaties are to be made or ratifications deposited: “as soon as possible” (Art. 440), one year (Art. 98), no time specified (Art. 104). The other peace treaties ending the World War were equally rich in provisions looking to future change. Most of these provisions have been carried out according to specifications, though some important ones have not.

² The payment of reparations might be extended over 30 years from May 1, 1921 (Art. 233). Germany was obliged for a period of 25 years to cooperate in her territory in case Belgium desired to construct a Rhine-Meuse canal (Art. 361), and was also obliged for 99 years to maintain free ports in the interest of Czechoslovakia in Hamburg and Stettin (Art. 363). The mandatory regime was to continue over any territory to which it was applied until the people under it were able to stand by themselves (Art. 22), the League of Nations (Arts. 1–26), the International Labor Organization (Arts. 387–427), the minority regimes in Poland (Art. 93) and Czechoslovakia (Art. 86), the regime of Danzig (Art. 102), and the demilitarization of the left bank of the Rhine (Arts. 42–44), were designed to be permanent. None of these could be called "transitory regimes." The only transitory regime which might extend over 15 years was the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine (Art. 430), but this was permissible only in unanticipated contingencies.

³ Art. 428.

⁴ Art. 49.

⁵ Art. 90.

⁶ Arts. 87, 88.

⁷ For text of documents see H. W. V. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris (London, 1924), Vol. 6, p. 623

⁸ Art. 2, Temperley, op. cit., p. 624 ff.

⁹ Art. 3, op. cit., p. 629.

¹⁰ Art. 2, op. cit., p. 629, and infra, note 37.

¹¹ For French text of the convention see, Martens, N.R.G., 3rd Ben, Vol. 16, pp. 645–875, and League of Nations print circulated with circular letter C. 396, M. 243, June 9, 1922, referred to in League of Nations Treaty Series, 1922, Vol. 9, p. 468. An English translation of the articles dealing with minority protection and related subjects is printed in Julius Stone, Regional Guarantees of Minority Rights, New York, 1933, p. 213 ff. This reproduces the English translation of Part III (protection of minorities) from League of Nations Doc. C. L., 110, 1927 I. For account of negotiations, see A. J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1920–1923, London, 1927, p. 267 ff. By Art. 606 the convention will “enter into force as soon as the interallied commission of the government and plebiscite of Upper Silesia shall have given the contracting powers the notification specified in pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 6 of the annex to Art. 88 of the Treaty of Peace of Versailles.” This notification was to state when Poland and Germany were free to take over their respective portions of Upper Silesia, and was given, in accord with Art. IV of the award of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, on June 15, 1922 (British Year Book of Int. Law, 1923–24, p. 247).

¹² Article 24 of the final protocol on signing the convention provided “if, according to the terms of the convention the point for beginning a period of time is the date of the transfer of sovereignty, this period, apart from contrary stipulations of the convention, will begin to run one month after the entry into force of the convention.” Most of the transitory provisions (see Art. 1, par. 1, Art. 64, Art. 606, par. 1) therefore lasted until July 15, 1937.

¹³ Remarks by M. Calonder on signature of the Upper Silesian convention, quoted in Toynbee, op. cit., p. 269.

¹⁴ Toynbee (op. cit., p. 269) expressed some doubts in 1924 whether the transitional period would be adequate, especially in view of the aggravation of the difficulties of economic readjustment by the Ruhr occupation of 1923.

¹⁵ See discussion of the Bernheim petition concerning the Jewish minority in Upper Silesia, League of Nations Official Journal, 1933, pp. 798,933. The procedure for protecting minority rights in Upper Silesia is discussed in great detail by Julius Stone, Regional Guarantees of Minority Rights, New York, 1933, supplementing his book, International Guarantees of Minority Rights, London, 1932.

¹⁶ Infra, note 34. Stone (Regional Guarantees, etc., p. 12) prints English translations of the treaty provisions concerning the commission and tribunal and the rules of procedure of the latter.

¹⁷ League of Nations Official Journal, Oct. 1921, pp. 1224–32, reprinted in Temperley, op. cit., p. 621.

¹⁸ The supplied italics indicate the provision apparently intended to be temporary.

¹⁹ Temperley (op. cit., p. 623) prints the text of the award with indication of the variations from the Council’s recommendation.

²⁰ Temperley, op. cit., p. 629 (italics supplied).

²¹ Art. 64; preamble to part 3, div. 1, par. 2; preamble to part 3, div. 2.

²² Supra, note 12. This is Stone’s conclusion, op. cit., pp. 6, 9.

²³ Kraus and Rodiger, Urkunden sum Frialenavertragen, pp. 457, 584; Stone, op. cit., p. 9; M. Paul Boncour in League Council discussion of Bernheim petition, May 30, 1933, League of Nations Official Journal, 1933, p. 841.

²⁴ The award provided “without prejudice to Article 256 of the Treaty of Peace [providing for transfer to successor states of German public property in ceded areas and allowance to Germany of reparation credit therefor, except in case of Alsace-Lorraine and territory ceded to Belgium] the two countries shall recognize and respect, in the territory which shall be allotted to them, rights of all kinds—in particular, concessions, and privileges acquired at the date of the partition by individuals, companies or other legal entities.” (Temperley, op. cit., p. 628.) Art. 4, Sec. 1 of the convention repeats this with the addition that the protection must be “in accordance with the laws relating to the said rights” and with the proviso that Poland may during a period of 6 months withdraw concessions granted after Oct. 20,1921, “where the beneficiary can not demonstrate on the request of the competent Polish authorities that they were granted under conditions administratively regular.” Art. 4, Sec. 2 provides: “The recognition and respect for vested rights implies in particular the observance of the following principles.” These principles forbid discrimination and withdrawal of rights of action and specify certain concessionary and professional rights to be respected. Sec. 3 provides for the execution of judgments. Sec. 4 provides that juridical persons whose seat is in transferred territory will retain their status. Secs. 5 and 6 concern insurances and mortgages, and Art. 5 gives the Arbitral Tribunal jurisdiction over claims for compensation in case vested rights are expropriated.

²⁵ Supra,Art. 22. “It is clear that if in any case arising under part iii of the convention, there exists also the violation of an acquired right within article 4, the member of a minority will be entitled to proceed before the Arbitral Tribunal under article 5. Here again, however, the remedy is not limited to persons belonging to the minority, nor to rights protected under the minority provisions of the convention.” Stone, op. cit., pp. 12–13.

²⁶ Kaeckenbeeck, G.,“The Protection of Vested Rights in International Law,” British Year Book of Int. Law, 1936, p. 2 ff.Google Scholar

²⁷ Infra, note 39. The rule is usually stated that states must not “deny justice” to aliens, but “denial of justice” means a procedure disrespectful of vested rights. See E. M. Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, New York, 1922, p. 336 ff.; C., Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law, New York, 1928, p. 110 ff.Google Scholar; Draft Code on Responsibility of States for Damage done in their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, this JOURNAL, Spl. Supp., Vol. 23 (1929), pp. 161, 173 ff., 186.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 8 ff. “The modern usage of nations which has become law would be violated; that sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be outraged if property should be generally confiscated and private rights annulled. The people change their allegiance; their relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their relation to each other, and their rights of property remain undisturbed.” (Marshall, C. J., U. S. v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51, 1833.) “Even those who contest the existence in international law of a general principle of state succession do not go so far as to maintain that private rights including those acquired from the state as the owner of the property are invalid as against a successor in sovereignty.” (Case of German Settlers in Poland, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 6, 1923, p. 36; 1 Hudson, World Court Reports, 227.)

²⁹ It has been contended in Mexico, Rumania and other countries that the very grave political consequences to be anticipated if agrarian reform were delayed would justify extensive expropriations with only nominal compensation. Infra, note 39; this JOURNAL, Spl Supp., Vol. 23 (1929), p. 161. American jurisprudence, interpreting the 5th and 14th amendments of the Federal Constitution, seems to sanction state and federal legislation impairing property rights without compensation when the public need is so great as to permit an exercise of “the police power”, but when the public need is less impelling, although property may be taken under the right of “eminent domain”, fair compensation must be paid. ( W., W..Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States, 2nd ed., New York, 1930, Secs. 817, 822, 823, 849; C. K. Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution, New York, 1922, Sec. 267.) It has been generally recognized that a succeeding state is not bound to respect in annexed territory private rights of a type denounced by its fundamental law, especially if that attitude is common to the fundamental law of many civilized states, as in the case of slavery and peonage.Google Scholar

³⁰ For discussion of these distinctions, see J. W. Salmond, Jurisprudence. Titles to tangible property are usually given a higher degree of protection than claims to concessions or contracts. Unliquidated claims for damages for torts or breaches of contract have been held not to be good against the successor state, though such claims between individuals ought to continue enforceable, i.e., the general body of private law in the transferred area ought not to be changed. (Oppenheim, op. cit., pp. 169, 464.) The interest of a person in retaining a power or capacity, accorded him by existing law, to acquire rights in the future is not itself a vested right, but his interest in retaining procedural powers for protecting his present rights is so closely related to those rights that its impairment may, in fact, impair a vested right. All systems of law, however, permit considerable modification of procedures and remedies. See Willoughby, op. cit., Secs. 774, 782.

³¹ Kaeckenbeeck writes : “The words `vested’ or ’acquired,” acquis,” erworben,” quaseitum’ cannot be dispensed with whenever the time or place of acquisition, i.e., of the coming into concrete existence of the right is to be determined or alluded to.” (Op. cit., p. 2.) French law defines a vested right (droit acquis) in internal law as “a right which the judge can not infrings in applying a new law,” and in private international law as “a right which can produce its effect anywhere under reserve of public order.” This condition is often said to attach to every “subjective right” defined as “a prerogative belonging to a person and permitting him to demand of another either some act or some abstention (droit personnel) or respect for a situation in which he profits (droit reel). These “subjective rights” are distinguished from “objective rights” which include the “totality of rules assured by sanction regulating the relation of men living in society.” (Henri Capitant, ed., Vocabulaire Juridigue, Paris, 1936.) This general conception of “vested rights” is less precisely developed in common law. W. J. Byrne (A Dictionary of English Law, London, 1923), after giving several specific uses of the term “vested”, writes: “Vested is also applied in a semi-popular sense to rights, interests and expectancies with which it is considered the legislature ought not to interfere without giving compensation.” Because of the judicial control of legislation in the United States, the term is more commonly used in American jurisprudence in connection with the “due process of law” clauses in the 5th and 14th amendments to the Federal Constitution.

³² Art. 4, Sec. 1, of convention, supra, note 24.

³³ Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt, 1922, II, p. 237, Nos. 10, 27; 1923, II, Nos. 25, 42; Stone, op. cit., p. 28.

³⁴ Art. 606, pars. 1, 2, 3, Arts. 147, 149, and supra, note 12.

³⁵ On the assumption that any party to a treaty has a legal interest in the execution of all provisions of the treaty, even of stipulations for the benefit of individuals who are not its nationals. This proposition is not universally accepted. There has been doubt whether the obligatory jurisdiction dame of the mandates extends the competence of the Permanent Court of International Justice to an action by a member of the League with no direct interest of its own or its national, merely to compel the mandatory faithfully to interpret and apply the mandate. See A. D. McNair, “Mandates,” Cambridge Law Journal, London, 1928, p. 11, note 8; N., Feinberg, La juridiction de la tour permanents de justice internationals dans le systeme des mandate, Paris, 1930, p. 202 ff.; Some Problems of the Palestine Mandate, Telaviv, 1936, p. 99 Google Scholar; Q. Wright, Mandates under the League of Nations, Chicago, 1930, pp. 158, 475. There is, on the other hand, no doubt but that the obligatory jurisdiction clauses in the minority treaties and in Art. 72 of the Upper Silesian convention extend the competence of the court to cases brought by a member of the League Council with no direct interest, though this may arise from the special wording of these clauses. See N. Feinberg, La juridiction de is sour permanente de justice dans is systime de is protection internationale des minorites, Paris, 1931, p. 57 ff.; A. P. Fachiri, The Permanent Court of International Justice, London, 1925, p. 54; Case of Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 15; 2 Hudson, World Court Reports, 303), especially dissenting opinion of Judge Huber. The intention of the Upper Silesian convention to recognize an interest of both parties in the maintenance of the conventional regime for all inhabitants of the area (not merely an interest in the application of that regime to their own nationals in the area) seems clear from the League Council’s recommendation which led up to the convention, that these provisions were “necessary in order to ensure the continuance of the economic and social existence of Upper Silesia.” Supra, note 17.

³⁶ This is clearly true in regard to the boundary (Art. 87 of Treaty of Versailles). The competence of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to extend the award to other subjects is not so clearly established by the Treaty of Versailles. It is difficult to see how the final paragraph of Art. 92 (referred to in the award, Art. 2, “Further agreements will regulate all questions arising out of the cession of the above territory which are not regulated by the present treaty”) could give the Principal Allied Powers authority to make an award specifying the terms of such agreements.

³⁷ This provision of the award was quoted in the Upper Silesian convention only in the minorities section (Part III, preamble, par. 3). The League Council formally undertook the guarantee in resolutions of May 16 and July 20, 1922, L.N.O.J., 1922, pp. 542, 806; Stone, op. cit., pp. 7, 8.

³⁸ The special character of treaty provisions of “superior and permanent interest”, of “general concern”, “establishing public law”, or “international settlements”, is discussed by H. J. Tobin (The Termination of Multipartite Treaties, New York, 1933, pp. 52 ff., 137 ff., 195 ff., 211 ff., 253 ff.), and R. F. Roxburgh (International Conventions and Third States, London, 1917, p. 56 ff.). That the Upper Silesian convention does not have this character is suggested further by the provision of the award authorizing the two parties “by common agreement to modify or annul any of the provisions of the temporary regime” (Art. 2, J). Roxburgh (op. cit., p. 62) points out that the parties cannot modify the stipulations of a treaty under which third parties have rights. This competence to modify the treaty does not, however, apply explicitly to permanent provisions such as those relating to vested rights, perhaps because they are in the main declaratory of general international law. It also appears that the parties could not modify the minority provisions, even though they were in the temporary regime, without consent of the League Council which had guaranteed these provisions. Stone, op. cit., p. 8.

³⁹ For extent to which general international law protects vested rights of aliens, see supra, note 27. A. P. Fachiri and Sir John Fischer Williams conducted a debate with a wealth of learning and citation on this subject in the British Year Book of International Law, 1925, p. 158 ff.; 1928, p. 1 ff.; 1929, p. 32 ff.

⁴⁰ Supra, notes 8, 9, 10.