† N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1991, at A15, col. 6; and id., Aug. 21, 1991, at A9, col. 1.

¹ UN Doc. A/46/L.8/Rev.1 (1991).

² Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti, OEA/Ser.F/V.1/MRE/RES.1/91, corr.1, paras. 5, 6(1991).

³ Id., preamble.

⁴ This enumeration was compiled by reference to reports in the New York Times and the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990, infra note 10, submitted by the Department of State to the appropriate committees of Congress. States that currently make legal provision for determining their governments by recourse to multiparty, secret-ballot elections are: Albania, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Byelorussia, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, the Comoros, Congo, the Cook Islands, Costa Rica, the Côte d’lvoire, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Hungary, Honduras, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Korea (Republic of), Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, the Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, the Micronesian Federation, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, São Tomé, Senegal, Singapore, the Solomon Islands, the Soviet Union, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Sweden, Switzerland, Tonga, Trinidad, Tunisia, Turkey, the Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Western Samoa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Several more states, such as Nigeria and Ethiopia, are committed to free, multiparty elections but have not yet enacted the necessary constitutional or legislative fiat. It must also be conceded that there are borderline cases, such as Morocco (included) and Jordan (not included), in which the elections are not necessarily decisive, depending on various factors, including the disposition of a monarch with substantial residual powers. In the large majority of cases, however, the decision to include or exclude is not seriously in doubt—though it should be recalled that the test for inclusion is whether the legal system establishes free and secret elections. Whether these are conducted fairly is another question.

⁵ Austin defined law as the enforced command of a sovereign to a subject. J. Austin, The Prov Ince of Jurisprudence Determined 201 (I. Berlin, S. Hampshire & R. Wollheim eds. 1954) (1832).

⁶ See, e.g., Theses on the Role of the Communist Party in the Proletarian Revolution Adopted by the Second Congress, in 1 The Communist International: 1919–1943 Documents 127 (J. Degras ed. 1971).

In 1920 Trotsky offered this response to a suggestion that the dictatorship of the Communist Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat were not identical:

Today we received peace proposals from the Polish Government. Who decides this question? We have the Council of People’s Commissars, but that too must be subject to a certain control. Whose control? That of the working class as a formless, chaotic mass? No. So we convened the central committee of the party to discuss the proposal and decide on the answer. … The same is true of the agrarian question, the food question, and all other questions.

Id. at 127–28.

⁷ Cf. D. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (1965).

⁸ Plato’s effort, in the Statesman, the Laws and the Republic, to define the extent to which a ruler’s legitimacy is validated by wisdom, on the one hand, and by his subordination to the laws, on the other, is analyzed in G. Sabine, A History of Political Theory 67–105 (rev. ed. 1953).

⁹ See J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government 119–20, 164–66 (W. Carpenter ed. 1955) (1690).

¹⁰ U.S. Department of State, 102D Cong., 1st Sess., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990: Report Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House Of Representatives 322–23 (Comm. Print 1991).

¹¹ Legitimacy, in this as in all other contexts, is a matter of degree. Some rules and institutions enjoy more legitimacy than others.

¹² T. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations 19 (1990).

¹³ Id. at 50–194.

¹⁴ Id. at 91.

¹⁵ Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 Asil Proc. 101, 110 (1981).

¹⁶ Exodus 1:2.

¹⁷ The author is indebted to Fr. Robert Crouse, Professor of Classics at Dalhousie University and King’s College, for this approximation, one carefully hedged with caveats appropriate to so risky an enterprise.

¹⁸ See H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination 20–31 (1990). The use of self-determination at Versailles and subsequently is also discussed more fully in Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AJIL 705, 743–48 (1988).

¹⁹ “[T]he phrase [self-determination] is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized.” R. Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, a Personal Narrative 97 (1921). See Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 Yale J. Int’l L. 177 (1991).

²⁰ 1 R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement 109 (1922).

²¹ 1 S. Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War 13 (1933).

²² 1 R. S. Baker, supra note 20, at 188.

²³ 2 A History of the Peace Conference of Paris 203 (H. W. V. Temperley ed. 1920).

²⁴ id. at 261.

²⁵ Id. at 262.

²⁶ 4 The Intimate Papers of Colonel House 334–35, 345 (C. Seymour ed. 1928).

²⁷ 1 S. Wambaugh, supra note 21, at 16.

²⁸ M. Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice 4 (1982); D. Fleming, The United States and World Organization 152–55 (1938). For example, Czechoslovakia ended up with defensible boundaries only by denying self-determination to a large Sudeten-German minority.

²⁹ L. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination 71 (1978).

³⁰ UN Charter Art. 76(b).

³¹ Note, however, the decision of the political leaders of imperial India to partition the country, in effect permitting Pakistan to secede. On “territorial integrity,” see Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res. 1514, 15 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, UN Doc. A/4684 (1960); and Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Annex to GA Res. 2625, 25 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970), reprinted in 9 ILM 1292 (1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration]. Note also GA Res. 1654 of 1961, in which, without dissent, the Assembly expressed itself as “[d]eeply concerned that, contrary to the provisions of paragraph 6 of the Declaration, acts aimed at the partial or total disruption of national unity and territorial integrity are still being carried out in certain countries in the process of decolonization.” 16 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 65, UN Doc. A/5100 (1961).

³² See Franck, The Stealing of the Sahara, 70 AJIL 694 (1976).

³³ As part of the cease-fire package, UNAVEM, the UN observer mission in Angola, oversaw the withdrawal of Cuban troops. The mission will culminate in the observance of elections in 1992. See N.Y. Times, May 26, 1991, §1, at 9, col. 1; and id., June 1, 1991, at Al, col. 3.

³⁴ Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, UN Doc. A/46/608-S/23177, Annex (1991).

³⁵ T. Franck, supra note 12, at 52–55.

³⁶ Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 283 (1989).

³⁷ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in United Nations, Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index, UN Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983), 21 ILM 1261 (1982). For the Court’s interpretation of Article 83(1), see Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 ICJ Rep. 18 (Judgment of Feb. 24); Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 1985 ICJ Rep. 13 (Judgment of June 3).

³⁸ See Passage through the Great Belt, 1991 ICJ Rep. 12 (Order of July 29).

³⁹ GA Res. 1541, 15 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16), supra note 31, at 29.

⁴⁰ Annex to GA Res. 2625, supra note 31, principle 4.

⁴¹ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171, reprinted in 6 ILM 368 (1967) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. The same provision is stated as Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3, reprinted in 6 ILM 360 (1967) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).

⁴² T. Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law 80–81 (1989); Sohn, Generally Accepted International Rules, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1073, 1077–78 (1986); Schachter, International Law Implications of U.S. Human Rights Policies, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 63, 68 (1978).

⁴³ D. Mcgoldrick, The Human Rights Committee 14 (1991).

⁴⁴ Id.

⁴⁵ Id. at 15.

⁴⁶ For a different view as to the legal status of the right to secede, see Brilmayer, supra note 19.

⁴⁷ GA Res. 1541, supra note 39.

⁴⁸ ICCPR, supra note 41, Art. 40(1).

⁴⁹ Id., Arts. 28, 30.

⁵⁰ Id., Art. 32.

⁵¹ For a discussion of this procedure, see D. McGoldrick, supra note 43, at 62–119.

⁵² ICCPR, supra note 41, Art. 41. For a discussion of this procedure, see D. McGoldrlck, supra note 43, at 120–246.

⁵³ ICCPR, supra note 41, Optional Protocol, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, Art. 1, 999 UNTS 302; see also D. McGoldrick, supra note 43, at 127.

⁵⁴ D. McGoldrick, supra note 43, at 45.

⁵⁵ Human Rights Committee, Provisional Rules of Procedure, Rule 78(1), UN Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev.2 (1989). See Report of the Human Rights Committee, 44 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 179–82, UN Doc. A/44/40 (1989).

⁵⁶ D. McGoldrick, supra note 43, at 127.

⁵⁷ Id. at 48.

⁵⁸ A.D. v. Canada, Report of the Human Rights Committee, 39 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 200, UN Doc. A/39/40 (1984). See also Ominayak and Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Report of the Human Rights Committee, 45 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 40), vol. 2, App. A, UN Doc. A/45/40 (1990). See discussion in D. McGoldrick, supra note 43, at 254–56; and McGoldrick, Canadian Indians, Cultural Rights and the Human Rights Committee, 40 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 658 (1991).

⁵⁹ General Comments of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1, at 10–11 (1989). See also D. McGoldrick, supra note 43, at 247–48.

⁶⁰ GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).

⁶¹ ICCPR, supra note 41.

⁶² Id., Art. 19(3).

⁶³ See D. McGoldrick, supra note 43, at 461.

⁶⁴ Report of the Human Rights Committee, 36 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 42–43, UN Doc. A/36/40 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Report].

⁶⁵ Id. at 50–51.

⁶⁶ Id. at 56–57.

⁶⁷ D. McGoldrick, supra note 43, at 469–70.

⁶⁸ Alba Pietroroia v. Uruguay, Communication R.10/44, 1981 Report, supra note 64, at 153–59.

⁶⁹ Report of the Human Rights Committee, 35 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 111, UN Doc. A/35/40 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Report].

⁷⁰ Id. See also Grille Motta v. Uruguay, Communication R.2/11, 1980 Report, supra note 69, at 132; Weinberg Weisz v. Uruguay, Communication R.7/28, 1981 Report, supra note 64, at 114; Hertzberg v. Finland, Communication R.14/61, Report of the Human Rights Committee, 37 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 161, UN Doc. A/37/40 (1982).

⁷¹ Central America: Efforts Towards Peace: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/22494 and Corr.1 (1991); see also N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1991, at A8, col. 3.

⁷² European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 UNTS 221, Europ. TS No. 5 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention].

⁷³ Id., Art. 19, establishing the European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. See also Arts. 20–55.

⁷⁴ The Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).

⁷⁵ Handyside Case, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976); Case of Muller and Others, 133 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).

⁷⁶ Lingens Case, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986).

⁷⁷ American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, OEA/Ser.K/XVI.1.1, doc. 70, rev.1, corr.1 (1970), reprinted in 1 The Inter-American System, pt. II at 51 (F. V. García-Amador ed. 1983), 9 ILM 673 (1970) (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention].

⁷⁸ Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. See Current State of Conventions and Protocols on Human Rights, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V.II.79, doc. 12, rev.1, Ann. A (1991).

⁷⁹ ICCPR, supra note 41.

⁸⁰ Case 34/1979, 1981 Report, supra note 64, at 130; Case 44/1979, id., Ann. XVI, at 153.

⁸¹ Supra note 53.

⁸² GA Res. 45/150 (Feb. 21, 1991).

⁸³ Id., para. 2.

⁸⁴ Id.,, para. 3.

⁸⁵ Id., para. 8.

⁸⁶ Id., paras. 10, 11. The Secretary-General’s report to the Assembly is UN Doc. A/46/609 (1991).

⁸⁷ OEA/Ser.F/II.17, doc. 40, rev.2 (1979).

⁸⁸ OEA/Ser.G/CP/RES.489, doc. 720 (1987).

⁸⁹ OEA/Ser.F/II.21, doc. 8, rev.2 (1989); see also OEA/Ser.F/II.21, doc. 45 (1989).

⁹⁰ Representative Democracy, OEA/Ser.P/AG/RES.1080 (XXI–0/91), para. 1.

⁹¹ Id., para. 2.

⁹² Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti, supra note 2.

⁹³ Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.77, doc. 7, rev.1, at 97 (1990) (Mexico Report).

⁹⁴ Protocol 1 to the European Convention, supra note 72, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 UNTS 262, entered into force May 18, 1954, and, as of June 1991, had been ratified by all but one party to the Convention (Liechtenstein).

⁹⁵ The Greek Case, 12 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on Hum. Rts. 179 (1969); see also Case of Mathieu-Mohin, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1987).

⁹⁶ Application 7140/75, 7 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 95, 97 (1977).

⁹⁷ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 73 Dep’t St. Bull. 323 (1975), reprinted in 14 ILM 1292 (1975).

⁹⁸ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, June 29, 1990, reprinted in 29 ILM 1305, 1308, para. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Copenhagen Document].

⁹⁹ Id., para. 5.

¹⁰⁰ Id. at 1309, para. 6.

¹⁰¹ Meron, Democracy and the Rule of Law, 153 World Aff. 23, 24 (1990). See also Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 Harv. Hum. Rts. Y.B. 77 (1988).

¹⁰² Copenhagen Document, supra note 98, at 1310, para. 7.

¹⁰³ Buergenthal, The Copenhagen CSCE Meeting: A New Public Order for Europe, 11 Hum. Rts. L.J. 217, 221–22 (1990).

¹⁰⁴ Copenhagen Document, supra note 98, at 1310, para. 8.

¹⁰⁵ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a New Europe and Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter, Nov. 21, 1990, Preamble, reprinted in 30 ILM 190, 193 (1991) [hereinafter Paris Charter].

¹⁰⁶ Paris Charter, supra note 105, at 193.

¹⁰⁷ Id. at 194.

¹⁰⁸ Id. at 195.

¹⁰⁹ Buergenthal, CSCE Human Dimension: The Birth of a System, 1 Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, No. 2, at 3, 42–43 (forthcoming).

¹¹⁰ Paris Charter, supra note 105, at 206.

¹¹¹ Id. at 207.

¹¹² Id.

¹¹³ Id. at 214–15.

¹¹⁴ Id. at 214.

¹¹⁵ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Oct. 3, 1991, Preamble, at 2 (unofficial text of the U.S. delegation), reprinted in 30 ILM 1670 (1991). [hereinafter Moscow Document].

¹¹⁶ Moscow Document, supra note 115, para. 17, at 9.

¹¹⁷ Report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner for the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration, UN Doc. T/1258 and Add.1 (1956).

¹¹⁸ See GA Res. 1350, 13 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 18A) at 2, UN Doc. A/4090/Add.1 (1959) (whether the Northern Cameroons wished “to be part of the Northern Region of Nigeria when the Federation of Nigeria becomes independent”); GA Res. 1352, 14 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 26, UN Doc. A/4354 (1959) (whether the Southern Cameroons wished to achieve independence by “joining the independent Federation of Nigeria [or] the independent Republic of Cameroons”); GA Res. 1473, id. at 38 (putting the questions posed in the GA Res. 1352 plebiscite before the Northern Cameroons); see also Report of United Nations Commissioner for the Supervision of the Plebiscites in the Southern and Northern Parts of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, UN Doc. T/1556 and app. (1961).

¹¹⁹ GA Res. 1579, 15 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16), supra note 31, at 34 (elections); GA Res. 1605, 15 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16A) at 8, UN Doc. A/4684/Add.1 (1961) (referendum).

¹²⁰ GA Res. 1569, 15 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16), supra note 31, at 33 (whether the inhabitants of the territory accepted “the Constitution adopted by the Constitutional Convention on 28 October 1960” and endorsed “that on 1 January 1962 Western Samoa should become an independent State on the basis of that Constitution”); see also Report of United Nations Commissioner for the Supervision of the Plebiscite in Western Samoa, UN Doc. T/1564 and Add.1 (1961).

¹²¹ Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Northern Mariana Islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 43 UN TCOR Supp. (No. 2) at 24, UN Doc. T/1771 (1976).

¹²² See Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Federated States of Micronesia, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 51 UN TCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 14, UN Doc. T/1860 (1984) (June 21, 1983 plebiscite for the islands of Truk, Yap, Kosrae and Ponape); Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Marshall Islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, id. (No. 2) at 12–13, UN Doc. T/1865 (1984) (Sept. 7, 1983 plebiscite); Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in Palau, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 53 UN TCOR Supp. (No. 2) at 14, UN Doc. T/1885 (1986) (Feb. 21, 1986 plebiscite).

¹²³ 24 UN TCOR Annex 1 (Agenda Item 3) at 21, UN Doc. T/L.928 (1959).

¹²⁴ GA Res. 2005, 19 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 7, UN Doc. A/5815 (1965); Report of the United Nations Representatives for the Supervision of the Elections in the Cook Islands, UN Doc. A/5962 and Corr.1 (1965).

¹²⁵ GA Res. 2355, 22 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 54, UN Doc. A/6716 (1967); United Nations Mission for the Supervision of the Referendum and the Elections in Equatorial Guinea, UN Doc. A/7200/Add.4, Anns. V, VI (1968). Independence was formally achieved on October 12, 1968.

¹²⁶ GA Res. 1752, 17 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 70, UN Doc. A/5217 (1962); Report of the Secretary-General regarding the Act of Self-determination in West Irian, UN Doc. A/7641 (1969).

¹²⁷ GA Res. 34/10, 34 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 199, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1979); Report of the United Nations Mission to Observe the Elections in the New Hebrides, UN Doc. A/34/852 (1979).

¹²⁸ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 ICJ Rep. 16 (Advisory Opinion of June 21).

¹²⁹ SC Res. 435, 33 UN SCOR (Res. & Dec.) at 13, UN Doc. S/INF/34 (1978). It did not authorize the sending of UNTAG until 1989. SC Res. 628, 44 UN SCOR (Res. & Dec.) at 2, UN Doc. S/INF/45 (1989); SC Res. 629, id.

¹³⁰ Namibia, Independence at Last, UN Chron., June 1990, at 4. Namibia formally achieved independence on March 21, 1990. Id.

¹³¹ SC Res. 690 (Apr. 29, 1991).

¹³² The Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/22464 (1991).

¹³³ See The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and Security and Peace Initiatives, UN Doc. A/44/642, at 2 (1989) [hereinafter First Nicaragua Report].

¹³⁴ GA Res. 43/24, 43 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 27, UN Doc. A/43/49 (1988).

¹³⁵ UN Doc. A/44/304, at 2 (1989).

¹³⁶ UN Doc. A/44/375 (1989).

¹³⁷ SC Res. 637, 44 UN SCOR, supra note 129, at 19.

¹³⁸ See, e.g., The Situation in Central America: Threat to International Peace and Security and Peace Initiatives, UN Doc. A/44/927 (1990) [hereinafter Fifth Nicaragua Report]. See also First Nicaragua Report, supra note 133; UN Doc. A/44/834 (1990) (Second Report); UN Doc. A/44/917 (1990) (Third Report); UN Doc. A/44/921 (1990) (Fourth Report).

¹³⁹ Fifth Nicaragua Report, supra note 138.

¹⁴⁰ Id. at 3.

¹⁴¹ UN Doc. A/44/965 (1990).

¹⁴² GA Res. 45/2 (Oct. 12, 1990).

¹⁴³ First Report of the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti, UN Doc. A/45/870, at 9–10 (1990).

¹⁴⁴ GA Res. 45/2, supra note 142, para. 1(d).

¹⁴⁵ United Nations Electoral Assistance to Haiti, UN Doc. DPI/1120 (1991).

¹⁴⁶ Electoral Assistance to Haiti: Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/45/870/Add.1, at 23 (1991).

¹⁴⁷ GA Res. A/46/L.8/Rev.1, paras. 1, 2, 4 (Oct. 11, 1991) (italics omitted).

¹⁴⁸ The “secondary” role of the General Assembly in recommending collective measures by the members has been controversial, but was found to be justified by Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter. See Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), 1962 ICJ Rep. 151, 163 (Advisory Opinion of July 20).

¹⁴⁹ N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1990, at A3, col. 4.

¹⁵⁰ OEA/Ser.G/CP/RES.537, doc. 805 (1990).

¹⁵¹ Report of the Secretary General on the Assistance the Organization Is Giving to the Provisional Government of Haiti in its Electoral Process, OEA/Ser.G/CP/doc.2108/90, at 1.

¹⁵² N.Y. Times, June 9, 1991, §4, at 2, col. 1.

¹⁵³ See, e.g., the OAS condemnation of General Manuel Noriega’s usurpation of democratic electoral process in Panama’s election of May 7, 1989, supra note 89. See also N.Y. Times, May 18, 1989, at A8, col. 3; id., Aug. 16, 1989, at A9, col. 1.

¹⁵⁴ N.Y. Times, June 9, 1991, §4, at 2, col. 1. Cuba is not a member.

¹⁵⁵ N.Y. Times, June 6, 1990, at A10, col. 3.

¹⁵⁶ See Kahn, Bulgaria’s Different Pathway, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 22, 1990, at 18. Helsinki Watch also sent monitors. N.Y. Times, June 11, 1990, at A1, col. 1.

¹⁵⁷ N.Y. Times, June 10, 1990, §1, at 31, col. 1.

¹⁵⁸ N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1989, at A13, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1991, at A3, col. 1.

¹⁵⁹ National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Response to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 45/150: Developing a United Nations Elections Assistance Capability 2 (1991) (memorandum submitted to the Secretary-General).

¹⁶⁰ N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1991, at A5, col. 4.

¹⁶¹ N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1991, at A11, col. 1.

¹⁶² Fin. Times (London), Mar. 4, 1991, at 14.

¹⁶³ Fifth Nicaragua Report, supra note 138, at 3.

¹⁶⁴ Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AJIL 866, 868–69 (1990).

¹⁶⁵ N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1990, at A12, col. 1.

¹⁶⁶ N.Y. Times, May 29, 1991, at A6, col. 5.

¹⁶⁷ N.Y. Times, June 22, 1991, at 3, col. 1.

¹⁶⁸ Principles for United Nations Observance of Elections, Confidential Memorandum (June 6, 1989) (in the possession of the author).

¹⁶⁹ OEA/Ser.G/CP/RES.421, doc. 606 (1985).

¹⁷⁰ See U.N. Says It Won’t Monitor Romanian Elections (NEXIS, CURRNT Library, Reuters, Jan. 25, 1990).

¹⁷¹ Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/46/609, para. 79, at 25 (1991). See also Gelb, The Free Elections Trap, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1991, at A23, col. 1.

¹⁷² Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs (H. van den Broek) to the Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy (June 20, 1990), reprinted in Netherlands Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy, Democracy and Human Rights in Eastern Europe 30–31 (1990).

¹⁷³ See T. Franck, supra note 12, at 150–82.

¹⁷⁴ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).

¹⁷⁵ International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 UNTS 195, reprinted in 5 ILM 352 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Racial Convention].

¹⁷⁶ GA Res. 217A (III), supra note 60.

¹⁷⁷ ICCPR, supra note 41.

¹⁷⁸ Racial Convention, supra note 175.

¹⁷⁹ GA Res. 3068, 28 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, UN Doc. A/9030 (1973), reprinted in 13 ILM 56 (1974) (entered into force July 18, 1976) [hereinafter Apartheid Convention].

¹⁸⁰ GA Res. 36/55, 36 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 51)at 171, UN Doc. A/36/51 (1981), reprinted in 21 ILM 205 (1982).

¹⁸¹ GA Res. 34/180, 34 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1979), reprinted in 19 ILM 33 (1980) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).

¹⁸² European Convention, supra note 72.

¹⁸³ American Convention, supra note 77.

¹⁸⁴ African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, reprinted in 21 ILM 58 (1982) [hereinafter Banjul Charter].

¹⁸⁵ Copenhagen Document, supra note 98.

¹⁸⁶ Paris Charter, supra note 105.

¹⁸⁷ UN Doc. A/44/210, at 2 (1989).

¹⁸⁸ Central America: Efforts Towards Peace, supra note 71.

¹⁸⁹ ONUSAL, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, will monitor the “release of individuals who have been imprisoned for political reasons … , the right of all persons to associate freely with others for ideological … political … or other purposes … , freedom of expression and of the press” and “freedom of movement.” Agreement on Human Rights, Annex to Note verbale dated 14 August 1990 from the Charge d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of El Salvador to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/44/971–S/21541, ann. at 4–5 (1990). For the March 1991 elections in El Salvador, however, the United Nations declined to mount an observer operation, dedicating its strained resources to other aspects of the peacemaking and monitoring process while letting the OAS take the lead, supported by nongovernmental organizations, in observing those elections. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, supra note 159, at 14.

¹⁹⁰ The Security Council failed to reach consensus on the issue, with China threatening to veto. In the General Assembly, Cuba and Colombia argued that election monitoring in an independent state, unrelated to a threat to the peace, constituted a violation of Article 2(7) of the Charter. See UN Doc. A/45/PV.29 (1990).

¹⁹¹ Id. at 62.

¹⁹² Id. at 59–60.

¹⁹³ Id. at 64–65.

¹⁹⁴ Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ Rep. 14, 131 (Judgment of June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua opinion].

¹⁹⁵ See supra text at and notes 82–86.

¹⁹⁶ GA Res. 45/151, para. 2 (Dec. 18, 1990).

¹⁹⁷ Id., para. 4.

¹⁹⁸ 3 J. S. Mill, Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical and Historical 238–63 (1873).

¹⁹⁹ UN Doc. A/34/PV.14, at 4–6 (1979).

²⁰⁰ N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1991, at A13, col. 5.

²⁰¹ N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1991, at 5, col. 3.

²⁰² Resolution on Representative Democracy, supra note 90.

²⁰³ Paris Charter, supra note 105.

²⁰⁴ Moscow Document, supra note 116.

²⁰⁵ See supra text at and notes 196–97.

²⁰⁶ GA Res. 45/151, supra note 196, para. 7.

²⁰⁷ N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1991, at A14, col. 1.

²⁰⁸ Buergenthal, supra note 109, at 43.

²⁰⁹ The General Assembly, in the case of the 1991 Haitian military coup, appears to have concluded that it is empowered to recommend action of an economic and diplomatic kind to its members. In approving regional military action under Article 53, the Security Council appears not to be limited to cases in which international peace has been threatened or breached.

²¹⁰ Sec Apartheid Convention, supra note 179. See also R. Bissell, Apartheid and International Organizations 156–59 (1977).

²¹¹ SC Res. 253, 23 UN SCOR (Res. & Dec.) at 5, UN Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.1 (1968).

²¹² See Arend, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in Paradigms, 27 Stan. J. Int’l L. 1, 40–45 (1991).

²¹³ While it is true that General Assembly resolutions, state practice or even a subsequent treaty cannot vitiate a specific rule of the UN Charter, all three can affect a Charter rule’s interpretation. See Czaplinski & Danilenko, Conflicts of Norms in International Law, 21 Neth. Y.B. Int’l L. 3, 35–41 (1990).

²¹⁴ See T. Franck, Nation Against Nation 224–45 (1985).

²¹⁵ D. Mcgoldrick, supra note 43, at 459–79. Under the procedure for review of country reports, the Committee has sought to

examine, comment, and request clarification in respect of the different aspects of freedom of expression revealed in the State reports. This has involved, for example, such matters as general and specific banning or censorship, registration or notification requirements, governmental control and direction in its various forms, limitations applicable to particular groups, for example, armed forces, civil servants, prior restraints or subsequent penal responsibility for publications, rights of reply or correction, the applicable limitations embodied in the criminal law or penal codes for offences such as blasphemy or blasphemous libel, sedition, subversive propaganda, anti-State or anti-ideological propaganda, and the effective remedies demanded by … an individual who claims that his rights under article 19 have been violated.

Id. at 461.

²¹⁶ The Commission is established by part II of the Banjul Charter, supra note 184.

²¹⁷ European Convention, supra note 72, Arts. 9, 10, 11.

²¹⁸ American Convention, supra note 77, Arts. 13, 14, 15, 16.

²¹⁹ Banjul Charter, supra note 184, Arts. 8, 9, 10, 11.

²²⁰ T. Franck, supra note 12, at 184.

²²¹ UN Charter, Art. 2(4). See also Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, Art. 1, 46 Stat. 2343, TS No. 796, 94 LNTS 57 (Kellogg-Briand Pact).

²²² See Nicaragua opinion, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14.

²²³ The customary law is well summarized in the Court’s Nicaragua opinion, id. at 98–105. See, especially, Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 31; Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314, 29 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 13 ILM 710 (1974).

²²⁴ SC Res. 660 (Aug. 2, 1990), reprinted in 29 ILM 1325 (1990), and subsequent resolutions. See Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AJIL 452 (1991).

²²⁵ Mearsheimer, Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War, Atlantic Monthly, August 1990, at 35, 46.

²²⁶ T. Smith, Democracy Resurgent, in Sea Changes 152, 157 (N. Rizopoulos ed. 1990).

²²⁷ I. Kant, Perpetual Peace 107–39 (T. Humphrey rev. ed. 1983) (1795).

²²⁸ See Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1151 (1986).

²²⁹ Note, however, that the notion of human rights operates to limit not only totalitarian, but also democratic, excess. Thomas Jefferson underscored this with his oft-quoted observation that “an elective despotism was not the government we fought for.” T. Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 120 (W. Peden ed. 1954).

²³⁰ The point is well developed by Doyle, An International Liberal Community, in Rethinking America’s Security (G. Allison ed., forthcoming).

²³¹ Copenhagen Document, supra note 98, Preamble, at 1307.

²³² SC Res. 253, supra note 211.

²³³ OEA/Ser.F/II.17, doc. 40/79, rev.2.

²³⁴ OEA/Ser.F/II.21, doc. 8/89, rev.2.

²³⁵ Central America: Efforts Toward Peace, supra note 71.

²³⁶ Reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, 1949 ICJ Rep. 174, 179–80 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 11).

²³⁷ European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Doc. SN 151/2/91 (Ann. V) at 27 (1991).

²³⁸ To limit collective security measures to cases of attack against democratic states is a change in the system’s rules that is unlikely to come about in the near future. Yet it is worth contemplating. Would it help Kuwait to establish a democratic internal order if its future protection by UN-authorized collective measures depended upon such a transformation?