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Dispute Settlement and Countermeasures in the International Law Commission

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Oscar Schachter
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Editorial Comments
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American Journal of International Law , Volume 88 , Issue 3 , July 1994 , pp. 471 - 477
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Copyright © American Society of International Law 1994

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References

1 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fifth session, UN GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/48/10 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 ILC Report]. The discussion of countermeasures and dispute settlement in the context of state responsibility is at 79–103, paras. 202–82.

2 See Robert Rosenstock, The Forty-fifth Session of the International Law Commission, 88 AJIL 134, 136 (1994).

3 The 1992 Report of the ILC is UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/47/10 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 ILC Report]. Countermeasures are discussed at 39–93, paras. 117–276.

4 This definition of countermeasures excludes acts of retorsion and reciprocity measures, which (although “unfriendly” retaliatory actions) do not, in principle, involve violations of legal obligations. For ILC discussion, see id. at 50–51, paras. 140–51.

5 Countermeasures are discussed in the following writings: Derek W. Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 Va. J. Int’l L. 108 (1972); Lori Fisler Damrosch, Retaliation or Arbitration—or Both? The 1978 United States-France Aviation Dispute, 74 AJIL 785 (1980); Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimbkrly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (2d ed. 1990); Andreas F. Lowknfeld, Trade Controls for Political Ends 539–78 (2d ed. 1983); Oscar Schachtkr, International Law in Treory and Practice 184–200 (1991), also in 178 Recueil des Cours 9, 167–87 (1982 V); Elisabeth Zoller, Quelques Réflexions sur les contre-mesures en droit international public, in Droit et liberiés à la fin du XXe Siécle: Etudes offertes à Claude-Albert Colliard 361–81 (1984); idem, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies (1984); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §905 (1987).

6 38 Institut de droit International, Annuaire 708–11 (1934). Article 5 of the resolution declares, “Les représailles mêrae non armées sont interdites quand le respect du droit peut être effectivement assuré par des procédures de règlement pacifique.”

The rapporteur of the commission that produced the resolution was M. N. Politis. Members included such eminent authorities as Bourquin, H. Rolin, Strupp, Unden, Ch. De Visscher, and Winiarski. For comments of commission members, see id. at 1–161.

7 1993 ILC Report, supra note 1, at 88, para. 228.

8 The following summary of the limits and conditions of countermeasures shows that disputes as to their application are almost certain to arise in particular cases.

a. There must be a violation of an international obligation causing injury to a state (or at least a good faith belief to that effect by the allegedly injured state).

b. A countermeasure cannot be taken until the injured state has demanded cessation of the wrong and redress for the injury.

c. The countermeasure must be directed to ending the violation and obtaining redress for the wrong and not to an outcome extraneous to the violation.

d. The countermeasure must not be disproportionate to the violation and the injury suffered.

e. The countermeasure must not involve the use or threat of force contrary to the UN Charter.

f. The countermeasure must not violate international law obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights or peremptory norms of international law.

The special rapporteur has also proposed that the countermeasures must “not be seriously prejudicial to the normal operation of bilateral or multilateral diplomacy.” He has, in addition, recommended that the prohibition against the threat of force should be construed to extend to “extreme measures of political or economic coercion jeopardizing the territorial integrity or political independence of the State against which they are taken.” Draft Art. 14(2), 1992 ILC Report, supra note 3, at 74 n.48.

9 See 1993 ILC Report, supra note 1, at 87, para. 227, & 88–89, para. 229.

10 Id. at 90, para. 232.

11 Id. at 99, para. 258, & 92, para. 238.

12 Id. at 90, para. 231, & 97, para. 253.

13 Id. at 82, paras. 209–11.

14 Draft Art. 11, 1992 ILC Report, supra note 3, at 55 n.42. See comments, id. at 58–59, paras. 171–76.

15 Draft Art. 12(‘)(a), id. at 61 n.44.

16 The exceptions are in draft Article 12(2)(a),(b),(c), id. at 62 n.44.

17 Id. at 65, paras. 189–90.

18 Id., para. 189. See Damrosch, supra note 5. For the award, see Case concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the United States of America and France, 18 R.I.A.A. 417 (1978).

19 See statement of Chairman of 1993 ILC Drafting Committee in UN Doc. A/CN.4/2318 (1993).

20 Art. 12(2), see supra note 16.

21 Six articles were proposed as “Part Three of the draft articles on State responsibility and dispute settlement procedures.” Fifth Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/453, at 39–45 and Add.1 (1993).

22 See explanation of special rapporteur, 1993 ILC Report, supra note 1, at 80–83, paras. 206–20.

23 Id. at 83, para. 214. See also Fifth Report on State Responsibility, supra note 21, at 46–47, paras. 73–74.

24 1993 ILC Report, supra note 1, at 86, para. 223, 87, para. 227, & 88, para. 229.

25 Id. at 85, para. 222.

26 Statute of the International Law Commission, Art. 2, GA Res. 174 (II) (Nov. 21, 1947).

27 For discussion of the history and application of Article 2 of the statute, see Herbert Briggs, The International Law Commission 29–44 (1964).

28 Statute of the ILC, supra note 26, Art. 8.

29 See Hersch Lauterpacht, Codification and Development of International Law, 49 AJIL 16, 35 (1955).

30 Statute of the ILC, supra note 26, Arts. 16–20.

31 See Lauterpacht, supra note 29, at 35.

32 The debates in the Sixth Committee evidenced considerable support for strengthening dispute settlement procedures in regard to countermeasures. In 1992 such supportive statements were made by representatives of Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic countries), Egypt, Japan, Poland, the Russian Federation and Switzerland. See Fifth Report on State Responsibility, supra note 23, at 32, para. 46 & n.75.

33 See Air Services Agreement arbitration, supra note 18; Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Ice.), Merits, 1974 ICJ Rep. 3 (Judgment of July 25); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 ICJ REP. 3 (Judgment of May 24).

34 Karl Zemanek, Codification of International Law: Salvation or Dead End?, in 1 Le Droit International à l’Heure de sa Codification 581, 601 (1987). See also Roberto Ago, Nouvelles réflexions sur la codification du droit international, in International law at a Time of Perplexity 1 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1988); Oscar Schachter, Recent Trends in International Law Making, 12 Austl. Y.B. Int’l L. 1, 12–17 (1992).