1 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIX, No. 482 (Sept. 26, 1948), p. 408.

2 For a convenient summary of both the Kasenkina and Samarin cases, based primarily upon press reports, see Current Developments in United States Foreign Policy: Summary of Events During July-August 1948 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1948), Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 3–6.

The present article does not deal specifically with the case of Mikhail I. Samarin, his wife and three children. Mr. Samarin, also a Soviet teacher in the United States, had appeared at the New York office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and stated that he was unwilling to return to the Soviet Union. See the statement made by Mr. Samarin to the New York Times, Aug. 10, 1948, and reprinted in the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIX, No. 478 (Aug. 29, 1948), p. 251, note 1. See also note 8, below.

3 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIX, No. 478 (Aug. 29, 1948), p. 253.

4 The Department of State on Aug. 19 demanded a photostatic copy of this letter, lack of which had hampered the investigation by the United States authorities of the charge that Mrs. Kasenkina had been kidnapped by the members of the Tolstoy Foundation. Ibid., p. 253. A copy was received from the Soviet Embassy, but was not made public. Ibid., Vol. XIX, No. 482 (Sept. 26, 1948), p. 408.

5 Ibid., Vol. XIX, No. 478 (Aug. 29, 1948), pp. 254–255.

6 Ambassador Panyushkin asserted that Mrs. Kasenkina in her letter to Mr. Lomakin had “implored him to snatch her from the hands of the [Tolstoy] organization,” members of which “attempted to detain Kasenkina by force in spite of her categorical statement that she wished to leave with the Consul General and did not want to remain at the farm.” Ibid., p. 254.

7 For the text of the exchange of communications between President Boosevelt and People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov, ibid., p. 257 ff.; also, this Journal, Supp., Vol. 28 (1934), p. 2 ff.

8 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIX, No. 478 (Aug. 29, 1948), p. 256. Mr. Molotov further charged that Alexandra Tolstoy had admitted to the press that her organization had participated also in the “abduction” of Mr. Samarin and his family, and that the F.B.I., having taken his statement, “thus is found to be connected with the organization which kidnapped Samarin, his wife and three children.” He also charged that two members of the Tolstoy organization had exerted pressure upon Mrs. Kasenkina to induce her not to return to the Soviet Union, and that one of them had “resorted to violently administering a narcotic substance” to her, “clearly with the purpose of weakening her will to oppose him.” The same charge was repeated by Consul General Lomakin in his press statement of Aug. 16. New York Times, Aug. 17, 1948, p. 1:6.

9 Ibid., Aug. 14, p. 3:6. See also Secretary of State George C. Marshall’s statement, ibid., Aug. 12, 1948, p. 5:1.

10 Ibid., Aug. 12, 1948, p. 1:6. In referring to the issuance and service of the writ, a Tass despatch from New York, broadcast from Moscow, stated that: “A judge decided to join his efforts to the provocational actions of the intelligence agents [of the United States, disguised as New York police officers] and unlawfully, in violation of consular immunity, sent a notice to the Soviet Consul General, Mr. Lomakin, demanding that Mrs. Kasenkina be delivered to court for interrogation on the morning of Aug. 12. The Soviet Consul General naturally rejected this absurd demand of the insolent court official, which contradicts elementary international regulations.” Ibid., Aug. 15, 1948, p. 3:2.

11 Ibid., Aug. 13, 1948, p. 1:8.

12 Ibid., p. 3:2.

13 Ibid., p. 3:8.

14 Ibid., Aug. 16, 1948, p. 1:7. A photostatic copy of this letter was also furnished by the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State at the request of the latter, but its contents were not made public. See note 4, above.

15 Ambassador Panyushkin to the Department of State, Aug. 14, 1948, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIX, No. 478 (Aug. 29, 1948), p. 255.

16 Ibid., p. 253.

17 See the Tass despatch of Aug. 14, cited, note 10, above, and Mr. Chepurnykh’s report of Aug. 17. New York Times, Aug. 18, 1948, p. 4:5.

18 Ibid., Aug. 14, 1948, p. 1:8. Mrs. Kasenkina also stated that she had been visited at the Consulate General by the Soviet Ambassador, who had promised her immunity from punishment upon condition that she sign an affidavit to the effect that she was not being detained against her will. Ambassador Panyushkin later acknowledged that he had seen Mrs. Kasenkina on Aug. 7, but denied that he had tried to obtain an affidavit. Ibid., Aug. 15, 1948, p. 3:1. Mrs. Kasenkina explained to the police that her letter to Mr. Lomakin (ibid., Aug. 27, 1948, p. 1:7, and note 4, above) had expressed a desire to talk with the Soviet authorities “as human beings’’ concerning her unwillingness to retain her position or to return to the Soviet Union. Instead, she declared, Lomakin and his associates had “perfunctorily arrested her” upon their arrival at Reed Farm. Mrs. Kasenkina’s explanation of her motive for leaping through the window was reported by an interpreter in a press interview on Aug, 25 in the following words: “She said that when they returned to the consulate she knew since they did not permit her to leave the consulate that she would not escape in Moscow either. Therefore, she jumped out of the window [pause] in an attempt to escape. She did not want to kill herself. She wanted to escape.” Ibid., Aug. 26, p. 3:6.

19 For several days after Aug. 12 Soviet spokesmen insisted that Mrs. Kasenkina had “fallen” from the window. It was only on Aug. 16 that Consul General Lomakin issued a press statement in which he charged that her action was brought about by acute mental depression resulting from the constant gathering of hostile and obtrusive crowds and by the “continuous flow of hostile and malicious fabrications of the United States press and radio” concerning her future. She had, Mr. Lomakin stated, repeatedly asked the consulate employees: “Is it possible that I may not be assisted in returning home? I want to go home as soon as possible because I am afraid of being caught again by those white-guard fiends.” Finally, “the official statement of Judge Dickstein of the New York State Supreme Court in which he demanded her appearance before the court, sharply aggravated her depressed mind.” When on Aug. 12 she saw “a crowd running from the Hotel Pierre” [apparently some newspaper photographers who had been waiting across the street] she “ran away with horror from the window and cried: ‘It looks as if they are coming to get me.’ Then losing control of herself she rushed into the next room and there leaped from a third-floor window.” In conclusion, Mr. Lomakin said, “it is clear that the responsibility for everything that had occurred lies with those who organized the kidnapping and committed violence toward Mrs. Kasenkina, a Soviet citizen, as well as with those American officials who by their actions and statements have thus caused the nervous breakdown of Mrs. Kasenkina which has driven her in her despair to the attempt of suicide.” Ibid., Aug. 17, 1948, p. 3:5.

20 Cited, note 17, above. Mr. Chepurnykh in the same statement alleged that the police interpreter, Mr. W. Dyczko, had “undoubtedly coached the patient to be ready for our visit,” and that she was “kept under strong outside influence and watch by police agents, detectives and leaders of the White Guard organization.” Somewhat inconsistently, he denied in a press interview that Mrs. Kasenkina had in fact made the accusation ascribed to her by the interpreter. Ibid., Aug. 17, 1948, p. 1:3.

21 Ibid., Aug. 15, 1948, p. 1:8.

22 The Soviet Embassy to the Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIX, No. 478 (Aug. 29, 1948), p. 255.

23 New York Times, Aug. 15, 1948, p. 1:8.

24 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIX, No. 478 (Aug. 29, 1948), p. 253.

25 The Legal Adviser of the Department of State on Aug. 18 advised Justice Dickstein of the position of the United States Government concerning the status of Mrs. Kasenkina in the proceedings pending before his court. “… there is no basis under international law or under any law of the United States for considering that Mrs. Kasenkina is in any manner subject to the control or authority of the Soviet Government so long as she remains in this country. The Department of State already has advised the Soviet Embassy that Mrs. Kosenkina will not be placed under control of any person against her own will. The Department has also advised the Soviet Embassy that although it recognizes the right of the Soviet Government, through its officials abroad to extend all proper assistance and protection to Soviet nationals, this right does not include authority to take charge of Soviet citizens in this country irrespective of their wishes.” Ibid., pp. 261–262. On Aug. 20, Justice Dickstein, with consent of the attorney for the applicant, dismissed the writ of habeas corpus in stating that “the matter has become academic in view of Mrs. Kasenkina’s presence in a hospital, outside the control of the Soviet Consul.” New York Times, Aug. 21, 1948, p. 2:4.

26 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIX, No. 478 (Aug. 29, 1948), pp. 251–253.

27 Current Developments in United States Foreign Policy, op. cit., cited, note 2, above.

28 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIX, No. 482 (Sept. 26, 1948), pp. 408–409.

29 President Roosevelt to Foreign Commissar Litvinov, Nov. 16, 1933. Correspondence cited, note 7, above.

30 See Preuss, L., “International Responsibility for Hostile Propaganda against Foreign States,” this Journal, Vol. 28 (1934)Google Scholar, p. 649 ff.; and compare Charles Cheney Hyde, “Concerning a Russian Pledge,” ibid., Vol. 29 (1935), pp. 656–662.

31 See Frend v. United States, 100 F. (2d) 691 (C.A.D.C., 1938); and Preuss, L., “Protection of Foreign Diplomatic and Consular Premises against Picketing,” this Journal, Vol. 31 (1937), pp. 705–713 Google Scholar.

32 See Harvard Research in International Law, Legal Position and Functions of Consuls (this Journal, Supp., Vol. 26 (1932), Part II), Article 11 of which provides: “A receiving state shall permit a consul to perform any act authorized by a treaty in force between the sending state and the receiving state or authorized by local custom; … provided such exercise does not involve the use of compulsion by the sending state within the territory of the receiving state; this … shall not preclude the exercise by a consul of any other function conferred upon him by the sending state and not forbidden by the law or the practice of the receiving state . “The Comment continues (pp. 253–254): “It seems clear in principle that in time of peace and in the absence of special treaty provision the authorities of one state are not entitled to use any form of compulsion in the territory of another state… . In authorizing particular consular functions such as service of process, treaties generally expressly forbid any use of compulsion… . If compulsion is necessary it is recognized that requests must be made to the local authorities. Such requests have been authorized by treaties for the return of deserting seamen, extradition of fugitives from justice, service of letters rogatory, etc… . It is to be observed that the paragraph [quoted above] does not absolutely prohibit the use of compulsion. It leaves open the question of extraordinary exigencies which may justify extraordinary action and it merely states that the receiving state is under no duty to permit the use of compulsion… .”

Compare, however, Art. 40 of the Consular Law of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, Jan. 8, 1926 (A. H. Feller and Manley O. Hudson, A Collection of the Diplomatic and Consular Laws and Regulations of Various Countries (Washington, 1933), Vol. II, p. 1203), which provides: “A consul must see that the citizens of the U.S.S.E. residing in his consular district … execute all legitimate orders. In case of non-observance of the orders, the consul shall report to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and request further instructions in this matter.” But this broad right of supervision does not justify, even under Soviet law, such an assertion of police and control as that which was attempted in the Kasenkina case, for Art. 41 continues: “I n case of extreme necessity a consul has the power, with the consent of the plenipotentiary representative, to make an offer to the citizen of the U.S.S.B. to return to the territory of the U.S.S.E. before the expiration of his mission. In case of non-acceptance of this offer, the consul has the right, through the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to raise the question of the forfeiture of civil rights of the above-mentioned person before the Government of the U.S.S.E.”

33 See cases collected in Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. V, pp. 729–735, and for earlier cases and national legislation, Irvin Stewart, Consular Privileges and Immunities (New York, 1926), pp. 147–155. As to the limits of consular immunities for official acts in courts of the United States, see Lyders v. Lund, 32 F. (2d) 308 (N.D. Cal., 1929), and Landley v. Republic of Panama, 31 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y., 1940).

34 Art. 11 of the Regulations concerning Diplomatic Missions and Consular Institutions of Foreign States in the Territory of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, Jan. 14, 1927 (Feller and Hudson, op. cit., p. 1220), provides that: “The consular representatives of foreign states enjoy on the basis of reciprocity the rights and privileges attached to their functions in conformity with the rules of international law. In particular the consular representatives: … (c) Are not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial institutions of the U.S.S.E. and of the Federated Republics because of offenses committed in the discharge of their office; …”

35 For a full review of cases, treaty provisions and official statements relating to immunity for official consular acts, see Beckett, W. E., “Consular Immunities,” British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 21 (1944), pp. 38–48 Google Scholar.

36 Art. 21 of the Harvard Research Draft (cited above, note 32) formulates the generally accepted rule as follows: “A receiving state shall exempt a person from liability and from its judicial and administrative jurisdiction for an act done by him while he was consul in the performance of consular functions which he was entitled to exercise; the receiving state decides, subject to diplomatic recourse by the sending state, whether the act was done in the performance of such functions.’’

37 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 678, 42 L. Ed. 890 (1898).

38 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, “Vol. IV, p. 699.

39 Regulations … etc., Jan. 14, 1927 (cited, note 34, above), Arts. 2(a-b), 11(c).

40 The Soviet Consul General, although not entitled in the present ease under international law to immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, might properly have challenged the jurisdiction of the courts of New York. Section 24 (18) of the Judicial Code provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction … of all suits against consuls and vice consuls.” 36 Stat. 1093 (1911), 28 U.S.C. $41 (18). It is further provided by §256 (8) of the Judicial Code that the jurisdiction vested in the courts of the United States “shall be exclusive of the courts of the several states” in “all suits and proceedings … against consuls or vice consuls.” 36 Stat. 1160 (1911), 28 U.S.C. $371 (8).

41 Stewart, , Consular Privileges and Immunities (New York, 1926), p. 81 Google Scholar.

42 The Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Hackworth) to the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, Apr. 17, 1939, Hackworth, , Digest of International Law, Vol. IV, p. 737 Google Scholar.

43 See The Lonsdale Shop, Inc. v. Bibily, 126 Misc. 445, 213 N. Y. 170 (N. Y. Mun. Ct., 1925), in which a motion by the defendant to vacate a judgment against him after personal service of summons in the office of the French Consulate General at New York was granted, but without prejudice to service upon the defendant anew outside of consular premises. The decision in this case was governed by Art. III of the Convention with France of Feb. 23, 1853 (Malloy, Treaties, etc. (1910), Vol. I, p. 528; 10 Stat. 992), which provides that consular premises should be “inviolable.” The defendant, not belonging to one of the grades of consular officers benefiting from this convention, had no personal immunity, and therefore no challenge to the jurisdiction of the court could be raised. See also Moracehini v. Moraechini, 213 N. Y. 168 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term, N. Y. County, 1925). In Tailored Woman, Inc. v. Bibily, 212 N. Y. Supp. 704 (N. Y. Mun. Ct., 1925), motion by the defendant to vacate process was denied, process not having been served upon him on consular premises. See United States v. Tarcuanu, 10 F. Supp. 445 (D.C.S.D.N.Y., 1935), in which a motion for an order vacating service of summons upon the defendant, vice consul of Rumania in New York, was denied, but “Without prejudice, however, to the defendant’s right to question the service of the summons in his dwelling… . The defendant not having raised this question, the court refrains from acting thereon in view of the suggestion by the authorities that consuls should not take advantage of this immunity to deprive the local courts of jurisdiction… .”

44 See for example, Art. VI of the Consular Treaty with Sweden, June 1, 1910 (Malloy, Treaties, etc. (1923), Vol. III , p. 2846, 37 Stat. 1479).

45 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. IV, p. 719, and cases collected, ibid., p. 718 ff.

46 See, for example, the Tourgée case, U. S.-France, 1909, Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. V, pp. 53–54; also the protest of the Greek Legation in March, 1916, against the use of force by local police officials in executing a court order to levy on the goods of a Greek consular officer in the consular offices. In this case the treaty in force provided for the “inviolability’’ of the consular premises. The Secretary of State, in reply, said that he could not “escape the conclusion that the action of the local authorities constituted a deplorable violation of international law and of treaty stipulations.…” Hackworth, op. tit., Vol. IV, p. 717.

47 The Tass despatch of Aug. 14 (cited, note 10, above) charged that “American Intelligence agents in the guise of American police violated its [the Consulate General’s] recognized diplomatic immunity… .”

48 See L. Preuss, “Capacity for Legation and the Theoretical Basis of Diplomatic Immunities,” New York University Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 10 (1932–1933), pp. 170–187.

49 Compare the case of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. In 1896 Dr. Sun, then a political refugee, was seized while passing the Chinese Legation in London, and detained therein, with the apparent intention of executing him or transporting him to China. His detention having become known, friends applied for a writ of habeas corpus, which Wright, J., denied on the ground that he doubted “the propriety of making any order or granting any summons against a foreign legation.” In re Sun Yat (1896), 11 Mew’s Digest (2d ed., 1925) 306. An appeal having been made to the Foreign Office, Lord Salisbury made a formal demand for the prisoner’s release, having first taken the precaution of having police stationed outside the Legation. Dr. Sun was released on the following day. Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. IV, p. 555; and note by Politis, N., Revue générale de droit international public, Vol. 3 (1896), pp. 693–696 Google Scholar.

50 This Journal, Supp., Vol. 26 (1932), Part I, pp. 52–53.

51 Ibid., Part II, p. 327.

52 Regulations, etc., Jan. 14, 1927 (cited, note 34, above), Arts. 4, 11.

53 See Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. V, p. 40 ff.

54 Mr. Seward to Mr. Bates, Nov. 21, 1863, ibid., pp. 70–71. For discussion of the background of the case, see H. Ex. Doc. No. 39, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.

55 Commonwealth v. Kosloff, 5 S. & R. 545 (1816). The Russian Government at first protested the arrest and prosecution, and demanded reparation from the United States, which was refused. After the indictment was quashed, the Russian diplomatic representative in the United States demanded that proceedings be taken in the Federal courts to vindicate Mr. Kosloff. The Attorney General of the United States, however, advised that the Federal courts would not have jurisdiction in a case brought by a foreign consul, and referred Mr. Kosloff to the State courts. Moore, op. cit., Vol. V, pp. 65–67.

In discussing the contention that the Federal courts would also lack jurisdiction in the Kosloff case on the ground that Congress had enacted no statute defining the crime or providing for the punishment of rape, Chief Justice Tilghman raised the query: “May a person convicted in a court of the United States, of a crime of the highest grade, concerning which congress has made no provision, be punished … on the principles of the common law ? Or is the constitution to be so construed, as to exclude the jurisdiction of all inferior courts, and yet suffer the authority of the supreme court to remain dormant, until called into action by a law which shall form a criminal code on the subject of consuls? These are questions which may embarrass those who have to answer them, but are not necessary to be answered here. No embarrassment, however, could equal that into which this court would be thrown, should it determine, that no court of the United States has jurisdiction, in a case which affects a consul in every thing short of life, when the constitution declares, that the supreme court shall have jurisdiction in all cases affecting him.” 5 S. & R. 545, 551–552. The court here overlooked the fact that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. III was not exclusive of that of the inferior Federal courts, which were vested with original jurisdiction of suits against consuls by Art. 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.

After the indictment had been quashed in the Kosloff case by the State court, there were no further judicial proceedings, the Attorney General of the United States having given an opinion that rape, not being then a crime by Federal statute, was not cognizable by the Federal courts. Moore, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 66. See note 58, below.

56 Valarino v. Thompson, 7 N. Y. 756 (1853); Davis v. Packard, 7 Peters (U. S.) 276 (1833); Bors v. Preston, 111 U. S. 252 (1884).

57 Valarino v. Thompson, 7 N. Y. 756 (1853).

58 The dictum of Chief Justice Tilghman in the Kosloff case was disapproved in a communication of Feb. 24, 1914, from the Department of Justice to the Department of State concerning a prosecution for a statutory crime instituted against a foreign consul in the courts of California. It was said: “From a careful investigation of the authorities it would seem that there is no way to reach the Consul by criminal proceedings. It is settled that the State courts have no jurisdiction, and apparently the United States courts would have none, since the offense referred to is not made a crime by any law of the United States. It is true that in the case of In re Iasigi, 79 Fed., 751, 753, there is a dictum of Judge Brown to the effect that the Federal courts would have exclusive jurisdiction of offenses by consuls, whether at common law or under State or United States statutes. There does not appear to be, however, any authority upholding this view, and a manuscript opinion of the Attorney General to the contrary in the Kosloff Case is referred to in Moore’s Digest, Vol. 5, p. 66. On the whole I am of the opinion that there is no jurisdiction in the Federal courts to proceed against a consul except where he has offended against some specific criminal law of the United States.” Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. IV, p. 747. A like view is expressed in a letter from the Assistant Attorney General to the Secretary of State, Nov. 13, 1934. Ibid., p. 751.

But see, contra, a memorandum from the Assistant Attorney General to the Secretary of State, Sept. 24, 1928, relating to a case in which the conviction of a foreign consul in a State court on criminal charges under State law had been reversed on appeal on the ground that State courts have no jurisdiction over offenses against consuls. The Assistant Attorney General pointed out that if the State courts did not have jurisdiction over offenses by such officers, and that if the Federal courts had jurisdiction only of offenses against Federal laws, consular officers would be exempt from prosecution for a large number of the most serious crimes. Since consuls are admittedly subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state by international law, it was extremely doubtful that Congress had any intention to exempt them from jurisdiction which the United States could rightfully exercise. The contrary view would create a wide area of impunity in a field in which jurisdiction had been expressly conferred, by the Constitution and by statute, upon the Federal courts. The Department of State concurred in this opinion, but expressed the hope that prosecution would not be undertaken in the Federal courts, since the ambassador of the sending state had promised that the consul would be removed. Ibid., pp. 749–750.

59 190 N. Y. Supp. 759, 116 Misc. 531 (1921). If a foreign consul were indicted in a State court, the subsequent revocation of his exequatur would not validate the proceeding, since the latter would be void ab initio. See Naylor v. Hoffman, 22 How. Pr. 510 (N. Y. 1862).

60 To Baron de Wetterstedt, Apr. 23, 1866. Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. V, p. 23. See incidents and cases collected in Harvard Draft on The Legal Position and Functions of Consuls (loc. cit., note 32, above), pp. 243–245; and Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. IV, p. 673 ff.

The legal principles involved in the revocation of consular exequaturs have been summarized as follows: “… . It is now definitely settled that the President has the power, in his discretion, to withdraw the exequatur of any foreign consul, for personal reasons, or for illegal or improper conduct, as for overstepping the limits for publishing articles derogatory to the general government. To justify the exercise of this power, the President does not need the fact of a technical violation of law judicially proved. He may exercise it for any reasonable cause, whenever in his judgment it is required by the interests or the honor of the United States. The revocation may occur without assigning any reason for it. If the President voluntarily assigns cause for removal, he invites discussion of the sufficiency thereof, and defensive evidence can be offered, with a request for reconsideration.” Julius I. Puente, “The Nature of the Consular Establishment,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 78 (1929–1930), pp. 339–340.

Revocation of a consular exequatur is for the courts a political act. See Savie v. City of New York, 193 N. Y. Supp. 577, 118 Misc. 156 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Cy., spec, term, 1922), aff’d, 203 App. Div. 81, 196 N. Y. Supp. 442 (App. Div., 1st Dept., 1922), in which the defendant, Consul General of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in New York, contended that notwithstanding revocation of his exequatur by the President, his appointment by his own Government was still in force, and that he was therefore still a consul general, and protected against indictment, arrest and holding to bail in a State court. In dismissing the plaintiff’s action, the court (at p. 579) stated: “Such action by the President in revoking plaintiff’s exequatur is a final and conclusive determination, which precludes the courts from adjudicating otherwise… . The letters patent revoking plaintiff’s exequatur are the best evidence of his official standing and of his powers and privileges… . The word ‘consul’ used in section 256 [of the Judicial Code] clearly refers to persons fully endowed with power to act as consul within the jurisdiction to which they are sent by their government. They are not consuls until they have been recognized as such by the President, usually evidenced by an exequatur, and likewise they cease to be consuls when by his letters patent the President revokes the exequatur. Consular status does not exist in the absence of the President’s recognition of the person accredited by the foreign state.”

61 Commonwealth v. Kosloff, 5 S. & R. 545, 548.

62 Compare the breach of consular relations between the United States and Germany and Italy, in June 1941. Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 680–683. Note also the new restrictions placed by the Soviet Government upon the movement of foreign diplomatic and consular officers within the territory of the U.S.S.E., whereby travel by members of foreign missions was virtually restricted to the City of Moscow. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIX, No. 486 (Oct. 24, 1948), p. 525.