1 For histories of the question, see Appleton, The Eternal Triangle (1961), and Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations 131-166 (1963). See also the text below, at notes 16-47.

2 Past “representation” resolutions have invariably forced a choice between (1) seating the Communist Chinese and excluding the Nationalist Chinese, and (2) retaining the Nationalist Chinese and excluding the Communist Chinese. Proposals for compromise have been rare, and seldom formally put before the General Assembly. Delegates have, nevertheless, suggested that a special study committee be created, that provisional arrangements be worked out if the “representation” resolution is passed in principle, that the interested parties hold negotiations, that the two claimants be seated in different organs, and that the solution of the participation question be tied in with a general political settlement. See, e.g., remarks of Colombia, U.N. General Assembly, 16th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting 952 (A/P.V. 1073) (1961); Sweden, ibid., Plenary Meeting 913 (A/P.V. 1070) (1961); Ireland, ibid., Plenary Meeting 974 (A/P.V. 1075) (1961); Sierra Leone, ibid., Plenary Meeting 998 (A/P.V. 1076) (1961); Spain, ibid., Plenary Meeting 1009 (A/P.V. 1076) (1961). Scholars have generally taken somewhat limited views of the problem. The sources are collected in the bibliography of Appleton, note 1 above, at 274-275. See also Boyer and Akra, “The United Nations and the Admission of Communist China,” 76 Pol. Sci. Q. 332 (1961); Brohl, , “Five Lectures on Asia and the United Nations,” 102 Hague Academy Recueil des Cours 125, 194 (1961);Google Scholar Petrov, What China Policy? Part II (1961); Schick, , “The Question of China in the United Nations,” 12 Int. And Comp. Law Q. 1232 (1963)Google Scholar; Singh, Termination of Membership in International Organizations (1958).

3 E.g., French recognition of the People's Republic of China (see Erasmus, “General de Gaulle's Recognition of Peking,” 18 China Quarterly 195 (1964) and the Communist Chinese atomic tests (see Halperin, China and the Bomb (1965)).

4 A Security Council member may also strikingly influence Council decisions on the “procedural” or “substantive” quality of a particular issue. See, generally, Gross, , “The Question of Laos and the Double Veto in the Security Council,” 54 A.J.I.L. 118 (1960)Google Scholar

5 Cf.,e.g., the remarks of the delegate from Costa Rica, U.N. General Assembly, 17th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting 630 (A/P>V. 1161) (1962), and the speech of Mr. Cazet (Congo, Brazzaville) who believed it necessary for the Peking Government to evince a desire for admission to membership in the United Nations, and to comply with the Organization's rules. 1&., Plenary Meeting 597 (A/P.V. 1161) (1962).

6 The ‘ ‘ credentials school'’ has for many years been headed by the Soviet Union. With the increasing deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations, Albania has become a principal advocate of Communist Chinese participation in the United Nations.

7 The United States, until 1961 a member of the “membership” school, has in past years been an articulate spokesman of the “representation” school.

8 1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. 2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

9 A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

10 A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

11 The relevant Rules of Procedure for the Assembly read as follows: Rule 27. The credentials of representatives and the names of members of a delegation shall be submitted to the Secretary-General if possible not less than one week before the date fixed for the opening of the session. The credentials shall be issued either by the Head of the State or Government or by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rule 28. A Credentials Committee shall be appointed at the beginning of each session. It shall consist of nine members, who shall be appointed by the General Assembly on the proposal of the President. The Committee shall elect its own officers. It shall examine the credentials of representatives and report without delay. Rule 29. Any representative to whose admission a Member has made objection shall be seated provisionally with the same rights as other representatives, until the Credentials Committee has reported and the General Assembly has given its decision. (Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly. U.N. Doc. A/520/Rev. 7 (1964).) The comparable rules for the Security Council follow: Rule 13. Each member of the Security Council shall be represented at the meetings of the Security Council by an accredited representative. The credentials of a representative on the Security Council shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before he takes his seat on the Security Council. The credentials shall be issued either by the Head of the State or Government concerned or by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Head of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs of each member of the Security Council shall be entitled to sit on the Security Council without submitting credentials. Rule 14. Any member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council and any State not a member of the United Nations, if invited to participate in a meeting or meetings of the Security Council, shall submit credentials for the representative appointed by it for this purpose. The credentials of such a representative shall be communicated to the Security Council not less than twenty-four hours before the first meeting which he is invited to attend. Rule 15. The credentials of representatives on the Security Council and of any representatives appointed in accordance with Rule 14 shall be examined by the Secretary General who shall submit a report to the Security Council for approval. Rule 16. Pending the approval of the credentials of a representative on the Security Council in accordance with Rule 15, such representative shall be seated provisionally with the same rights as other representatives. Rule 17. Any representative on the Security Council, to whose credentials objection has been made within the Security Council, shall continue to sit with the same rights as other representatives until the Security Council has decided the matter. (Sohn, Editor, Basic Documents of the United Nations 70 (1956).)

12 General Assembly Resolution 396 (V) reads thus: The General Assembly, Considering that difficulties may arise regarding the representation of a Member State in the United Nations and that there is a risk that conflicting decisions may be reached by its various organs, Considering that it is in the interest of the proper functioning of the Organization that there should be uniformity in the procedure applicable whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations, and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, Considering that, in virtue of its composition, the General Assembly is the organ of the United Nations in which consideration can best be given to the views of all Member States in matters affecting the functioning of the Organization as a whole, 1. Recommends that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes a subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case; 3. Recommends that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or its Interim Committee concerning any such question should be taken into account in other organs of. the United Nations and in the Specialized Agencies …

13 General Assembly Resolution 1668 (XVI) reads as follows: The General Assembly, Noting that a serious divergence of views exists among Member States concerning the representation of a founder Member who is named in the Charter of the United Nations, Recalling that this matter has been described repeatedly in the General Assembly by all segments of opinion as vital and crucial and that on numerous occasions its inclusion in the agenda has been requested under rule 15 of the Assembly's rules of procedure as an item of an important and urgent character, Recalling further the recommendation contained in its resolution 396 (V) of 14 December 1950 that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case, Decides, in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations, that any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question.

14 E.g., Ambassador Stevenson's argument before the 17th Assembly rested on three propositions: 1. The government of the People's Republic of China does not represent the Chinese people. 2. The Communist Chinese are both past and present aggressors. 1* 3. The Communist Chinese have purposes antithetical to those of the United Nations, e.g., they seek liberation of Taiwan by force. (TJ.N. General Assembly, 17th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meetings 552-554 (A/P.V. 1156) (1962).)

15 One notable example is India which, when ‘ ‘ a raw and naked war, premeditated in plan, (was) being committed by the Peoples Republic of China against (India),” paid tribute to the principle of universality, mentioned the need to bring Communist China into disarmament negotiations, and supported in 1962 a Soviet proposal which would exclude the Nationalist Chinese and seat the Communist Chinese. U.N. General Assembly, 17th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting 597 (A/P.V. 1159) (1962).

16 It does not escape us that the problem with which we deal could be formulated in much more comprehensive terms. The problem could be formulated as one of how the organized general community can best deal with renegade states which challenge its policies of minimum and optimum order, and effect the changes in the predispositions of the elites in such states in a way necessary to bring them to responsible participation in a common public order. The important question, we would emphasize, extends beyond that of whether Communist China “should” be seated in the United Nations to that of what are the probable constitutive and public order consequences of choice, whether of seating or denial of seat. The basic difficulties might not, further, be resolved by either choice. An inquiry designed to be more effective might include, in addition to appraisal of strategies about granting or denying access to arenas of authority, a comprehensive review of all the potential sanctioning devices available to the general community.

17 It may be emphasized that the position we take is not incompatible with the many demands recently expressed in the United States for a fundamental rethinking of attitudes toward Communist China. Our purpose is merely to outline, as comprehensively and realistically as possible, the legal bases—the contemporary expectations about the requirements of future decision-4-upon which any successful negotiations for a different future must depend. - For a broad spectrum of the more important recent demands for a new approach to the problems of Chinese participation, see U. S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1966). A measured response to some of these demands is offered by Secretary of State Rusk in his statement before the Far East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the text of which may be found in The New York Times, April 17, 1966, p. 34, cols. 1-8.

18 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Doc. A/1123 (Nov. 18, 1949).

19 U.N. Security Council, 6th Year, Official Records, 458th Meeting (S/P.V. 458) (1949).

20 U.N. Security Council, 6th Year, Official Records, 459th Meeting, S/1443 (1950) ; three in favor (India, Yugoslavia, U.S.S.R.) ; six against (China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, United States); two abstaining (Norway, United Kingdom). U.N. Security Council, 6th Year, Official Records, 461st Meeting 3 (S/P.V. 461) (1950).

21 See Lie, In the Cause of Peace 252-273 (1952).

22 Ibid. at 261.

23 Secretary General Lie spoke with diplomats on both sides of the Iron Curtain, urged the committed delegates to pressure those yet undecided, and even suggested to the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow that the Communist Chinese send delegations to UNESCO and WHO conferences of 1950, which the Nationalist Chinese were not planning to attend. Ibid, at 252-273.

24 “Armed with this memorandum” Secretary General Lie “proceeded to discuss (the Chinese participation question) with all the members of the Council.” “On the basis of the above, an immediate and practical conclusion was that France, Egypt, Ecuador and Cuba—members of the Council who did not recognize the Communist regime in China—might vote for the representation of the Peking government in the Security Council, while still withholding recognition. Five members of the Council already recognized Peking… . “ Ibid, at 257. The memorandum, we note, distinguished sharply between recognition and representation, and concluded that a Member state could legally vote to seat the delegation of a government which it did not recognize.

25 Doc. S/1466, “Legal Aspects of Problems of Representation in the United Nations,” in U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Supp., 1950, at 18.

26 In its entirety the argument was as follows: “Article 4 requires that an applicant for membership must be able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership. The obligations of membership can be carried out only by governments which in fact possess the power to do so. Where a revolutionary government presents itself as representing a State, in rivalry to an existing government, the question at issue should be which of these two governments in fact is in a position to employ the resources and direct the people of the State in fulfillment of the obligations of membership. In essence, this means an inquiry as to whether the new government exercises effective authority within the territory of the State and is habitually obeyed by the bulk of the population. “ If so, it would seem to be appropriate for the United Nations organs, through their collective action, to accord it the right to represent the State in the Organization, even though individual Members of the Organization refuse, and may continue to refuse, to accord it recognition… . “ Ibid, at 22.

27 Lie, op. cit. note 21 above, at 274.

28 Cf. 1950 U.N. Yearbook 425 (1951).

29 The vote was eight to three (India, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia).

30 Ibid, at 425.

31 By a vote of five to five (China, Cuba, Ecuador, France, United States) with one abstention (Egypt).

32 Doc. A/1364; of. 1950 U.N. Yearbook 428 (1951).

33 U.N. General Assembly, 5th Sess., Official Records, Doc. A/1365 (1950).

34 Ibid .,Docs. A/1369, A/1370 (1950).

35 Ibid., Doc. A/1386 (1950).

36 Ibid., Plenary Meeting 16 (A/P.V. 277) (1950).

37 Ibid .,Doc. A/1923 (1950).

38 Ibid., Ad Hoc Political Committee (Docs. A/AC. 38/SE. 18-24, 57-60) (1950).

39 Ibid., 38th Meeting (Doc. A/AC. 38/L.6) (1950).

40 Ibid., 38th Meeting (Doc. A/AC. 38/L.21) (1950).

41 See the summary in Higgins, op. cit. note 1 above, at 148-149.

42 U.N. General Assembly, 6th Sess., Official Records (Doc. A/1941) (1951).

43 This was an oral proposal to the Assembly's General Committee. Cf. 1951 U.N. Yearbook 265 (1952).

44 Detailed statistics on U.N. voting on this question may be found in Halpern, Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents, Appendix B, pp. 503-507 (1965), with charts indicating both aggregate annual votes as well as specific state behaviour through time.

45 U.N. General Assembly, 16th Sess., Official Records (Doc. A/4873) (1961).

46 Ibid., Doc. A/L. 372.

47 Ibid., Doc. A/L. 360; cf. Doc. A/4874.

48 General Assembly Res. 1668 (XVI) was adopted by a vote of 61:34:7.

49 The vote was 48:36:20.

50 See, generally, Liang, ‘ ‘ Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations,” 43 A.J.I.L. 288 (1949); idem, “ Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State: Criteria and Procedure,” 45 ibid. 689 (1951) ; Bowett, The Law of International Institutions at 311-323 (1963); and Cohen, “The Concept of Statehood in United Nations Practice,” 109 U. Pa. Law Rev. 1127 (1961).

51 For a statistical record, see Halpern, op. cit. note 44 above, at 503-508.

52 See, in this regard, 0 ‘Connell, ‘ ‘ State Succession and Problems of Treaty Interpretation,” 58 A.J.I.L. 41 (1964); Young, “The State of Syria: Old or New?” 56 A.J.I.L. 482 (1962); O'Connell “Independence and Succession to Treaties,” 38 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 84 (1962). Compare with the highly flexible procedures in GATT: Kunugi, “State Succession in the Framework of GATT,” 59 A.J.I.L. 268 (1965). Comprehensive treatment of earlier trends may be found in O'Connell, The Law of State Succession (1956).

53 See, generally, Green, ‘ ‘ Membership in the United Nations,'’ 2 Current Legal Problems 258 (1949); Higgins, note 1 above, at 55-57 (1963); Schwarzenberger, The League of Nations and World Order (1936).

54 See, e.g., Higgins, note 1 above, at 56: “ … a mechanical addition of members does not always add to the strength of the association; differing ideologies within one family may accentuate mistrust, and frequent conflicts within an organization may weaken or paralyse its functions.“

55 See, generally, McDougal, Lasswell and Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space 910- 923 (1963).

56 Ibid. at 923-929.

57 Ibid, at 929-934.

58 Ibid at 943-953.

59 U.N. Charter, Art. 4.

60 Ibid., Arts. 5, 6.

61 Ibid., Arts. 33-51.

62 Ibid., Art. 27.

63 See, generally, Goodrich and Hambro, The Charter of the United Nations 6-9, 112-139 (1949); Russell and Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter 349- 362, 843-851 (1958).

64 Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, Chap. 3; 39 A.J.I.L. Supp. 47 (1945).

65 Proposed qualifications for membership included the following: (1) the applicant's political institutions must insure that the state is a servant of its citizens. (2) the applicant must observe the principle of pacta sunt servanda or the doctrine of the inviolability of obligations. Doc. No. 202 1-2-9, 7 U.N. Conf. Int. Org. Docs. 18 (1945), henceforth cited as “UNCIO.” (3) the applicant must not be a neutral. Ibid, at 19. (4) the applicant must “love … the democratic system.” 7 UNCIO 284 (1945). (5) the applicant must repudiate the use of force. 3 UNCIO 557-558 (1945). (6) the applicant must respect human rights. 1 UNCIO 304 (1945). (7) the applicant must be freedom-loving. Ibid.

66 U.N. Charter, Art. 4.

67 Report of the Rapporteur of Committee 1/2 on Chapter III (Membership), 7 UNCIO 324, 326 (1945). This phrase was omitted from the report of the Rapporteur of Committee I. Cf. 6 ibid. 248 (1945).

68 Some description and citation of factors deemed relevant for admission may be found in the text and footnotes at notes 63, 69-77. For general treatment, see Cohen, loc. cit., and Liang, loc. cit., note 50 above.

69 These characteristics are exhaustively surveyed in Cohen, loc. cit. note 50 above, and in Prudente, Admission to the United Nations as a Diplomatic Instrument (June, 1959) (unpublished thesis in U.N. Library and Univ. of Southern Calif. Library).

70 Telegram from the Acting Secretary General, in U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Supp. No. 4, at 123-124 (1946); Letter from the Chairman of the Committee on the Admission of New Members … , ibid, at 143.

71 Telegram from the Acting Secretary General. Ibid, at 124.

72 At both San Francisco (7 UNCIO 326) and Potsdam (13 Dept. of State Bulletin 159 (1945)), it was stated that states whose regimes had been established by the Axis were ineligible for membership. In the first three years of activity, nine of the eleven applicants who were rejected had either been under the control of, associated with or neutral to the Axis Powers during the war. Among the numerous examples of subsequent practice, see the remarks of Barnes of Liberia regarding Tanganyika's “deep consciousness of the importance of civil liberties and political rights“: Security Council, 16th Year, Official Records, 986th Meeting 3 (1961); of Rerard of France, ibid, at 6; of Stevenson of the United States, ibid, at 8-9. See remarks of Loutfi of the United Arab Republic on Kuwait: Security Council, 16th Year, Official Records, 984th Meeting, at 2-3 (1961).

73 See remarks of Sir Patrick Dean in regard to Tanganyika, Security Council, 16th Year, Official Records, 986th Meeting 2 (1961; of Barnes of Liberia, ibid, at 3-4; of Malasekera of Ceylon, ibid, at 4; of Rerard of Prance, ibid, at 6; but see remarks of Zorin, ibid, at 12-13. See remarks of Loutfi of U.A.R, on Kuwait, ibid., 984th Meeting, at 2-3 (1961).

74 This factor was of particular concern in the Mongolian application: see Security Council, 1st Year, Official Records, Supp. No. 4, at 65, for Russian contention that Mongolian independence was a result of a democratic plebiscite, and Security Council, 2nd Year, Official Records, Spec. Supp. No. 3, at 13, for “the Committee on Admissions” negative conclusion. In the case of the Jordanian application, Poland contended that unilateral action by the United Kingdom (the former Mandatory) was an inadequate mode of establishing independence: ibid., Supp. No. 4, at 70. For an analysis of the modality of transition to statehood as a factor in admission, see Higgins, op. cit. note 1 above, at 27-31.

75 See remarks of Sir Patrick Dean regarding Tanganyika, loo. cit. note 73 above, at 1-2.

76 Thus, the representative of Ceylon noted, in the debate on Tanganyika's membership, that the applicant was a member of the Commonwealth. U.N. Security Council, 16th Year, Official Records, 986th Meeting 4 (1961). In the debate on Kuwait's application, the U.A.R. noted that the applicant was a member of the Arab League, IMCO, UPU, ITU, ICAO, WHO, FAO, UNESCO, OPEC and the ILO, and that such participation indicated its recognition as a state. U.N. Security Council, 16th Year, Official Records, 984th Meeting, at 3 (1961).

77 In 1946 t he U.S.S.R. opposed the applications of Ireland, Portugal and Trans- Jordan, inter alia, because of the absence of diplomatic relations between the applicants and Russia. Security Council, 2nd Year, Official Records, Spec. Supp. No. 3, a t 15. In the debate on Kuwait's application, the United Arab Republic noted that sixty-two states in Europe, Asia and Africa had recognized the applicant. Security Council, 16th Year, Official Records, 984th Meeting, at 3 (1961).

78 Thus M. Rerard of France in regard to Tanganyika's application noted that the application had been approved by the former mandatory government. Security Council, 16th Year, Official Records, 986th Meeting 6 (1961); the U.A.R. in the debate on Kuwait noted that the applicant had been recognized by 62 states, the majority of the community. Ibid. 984th Meeting, at 3 (1961).

79 The community's concern in application procedures with colorable compliance with the basic norms of international law is nowhere better demonstrated than in the rejection in 1947 of Albania's application. The Committee on Admission of New Members considered it significant, if not decisive, that Albania had refused to reaffirm prewar bilateral treaties, had conducted itself inappropriately in the Corfu Channel case, had not paid proper respect to the Security Council's recommendation and had not cooperated with the organization in the Greek case. Cf. Security Council, 2nd Tear, Official Records, Spec. Supp. No. 3, at 3-8 (1947).

80 E.g., General Assembly Resolutions 35 (I); 113 (II); 197 (III); 296 (IV); 450 (VI); 620 (VII).

81 E.g., Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Jordan, Libya, Nepal, Outer Mongolia, Portugal and Rumania were non-Members in 1954 and Members in 1955.

82 When Nepal applied for membership in the United Nations, the Security Council routed its application to the Committee on New Members. Initially the Soviet Union moved that the question of Nepalese admission be postponed for lack of information. In response, the delegates suggested either that Nepalese be brought before the Committee for questioning or that specific questions be asked of the Katmandu government. The Soviet delegate objected to this proposal, presumably because he thought information might be forthcoming even if the question of Nepalese admission were postponed. Delegates then proposed a resolution that provided for special machinery to gather the information requested by the Soviet delegate. The Soviet Union, however, objected to this resolution. It also faulted an Argentine compromise amendment that would have postponed the consideration of the Nepalese application for two weeks to “enable the government of Nepal to submit the (necessary) information.” The amendment allegedly would have impaired Nepalese sovereignty. Eventually the Chairman of the Committee wrote the Nepalese authorities for more specific information. When received, the data was distributed to the delegates on Aug. 10. The Committee met again on Aug. 16; yet the Ukrainian delegate still thought he needed additional time to study the documents. The committee postponed decision for one week, and when it met again the delegate from the Soviet Union had this to say: “(The delegation of the USSR) while not opposed to acceptance of the application of Nepal, would not vote for it, as it would be unfair to accept Nepal while the applications of a number of other governments had been systematically rejected.” U.N. Security Council, 4th Year, Official Records, Committee on New Members, Meetings 31-34 (Doc. S/C.2/SR. 34 at 2) (1949). (The summary above is based on Meetings 31-34 of the Committee on New Members.)

83 In 1946 the Soviet Union vetoed the application of Portugal and Ireland without mentioning their wartime affiliations. That same year the Soviet Union voted for the admission of Siam, which had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with Japan and then had declared war on Great Britain and the United States. In 1947 the Soviet Union charged that Ireland and Portugal had been sympathetic to the Fascist Powers, and had not offered justification for their wartime behavior. It again vetoed the two applications. In 1946 the Soviet Union vetoed the applications of Ireland and Portugal and Jordan on the sole ground that these nations had not established ‘ ‘ diplomatic relations'’ with the Soviet Union. That same year the Soviet Union voted for the admission of Siam, though it is not at all clear that that nation had recognized the Soviet Union or had exchanged diplomatic representatives with it at that time1; See, generally, U.N. Security Council, Official Records, 55th-58th Meetings (Docs. S/P.V. 55-58) (1946); ibid., 186th, 190th Meetings (Docs. S/P.V. 186, 190) (1947).

84 E.g., in 1946 the Soviet Union vetoed three membership applications on grounds that the applicants did not have “diplomatic relations” with a permanent Member of the United Nations, although this is not a criterion mentioned in Art. 4. More importantly, the Soviet Union did not take the trouble to relate the absence of diplomatic relations to a state's ability or willingness to carry out its international obligations.

85 “ In fact, of course, though founder members (particularly permanent members of the Security Council) have invoked each set of (membership) arguments, without much regard to consistency, they have generally been guided in their voting by a cruder set of considerations—namely whether a given applicant, if admitted to membership, would strengthen their ‘side’ in the United Nations or not. In general, as might be guessed, this has meant that the West has supported new admissions and the Communist bloc has been suspicious of them. It has also meant in fact and contrary to the clear intentions of the Charter, that applications have seldom been considered on individual merits but rather as a part of a general bargain, like the celebrated ‘package deal’ in 1955.” Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution 73 (1959). Mr. Nicholas’ conclusions are documented in Goodman, Some Thoughts on Chinese Representation in the United Nations 20-44 (1962) (unpublished divisional paper on file at the Yale University Law Library).

86 In 1956 the Soviet Union supported Japan's application for admission, and both the United States and the Soviet Union have voted favorably on the applications of the non-committed countries.

87 E.g., the deal involving Outer Mongolia and Mauritania in 1961.

88 Rosalyn Higgins makes a different case. See Higgins, note 1 above, at 11-57, and her earlier article; Cohen, note 50 above.

89 Note that in 1946 the U. S. proposed that a group of applicants be admitted in a “package deal.” The Soviet Union, however, thought each candidate should be considered on its merits. Compare the following quote from the opinion of the International Court of Justice in the “Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations“: : ‘ ‘ The second part of the question concerns a demand on the part of a Member making its consent to the admission of an applicant dependent on the admission «sf other applicants. “Judged on the basis of the rule which the Court adopts in its interpretation of Article 4, such a demand clearly constitutes a new condition, since it is entirely unconnected with those prescribed in Article 4. It is also in an entirely different category from those conditions, since it makes admission dependent, not on the conditions required of applicants, qualifications which are supposed to be fulfilled, but on an extraneous consideration concerning States other than the applicant State. “The provisions of Article 4 necessarily imply that every application for admission should be examined and voted on separately and on its own merits; otherwise it would be impossible to determine whether a particular applicant fulfils the necessary conditions. To subject an affirmative vote for the admission of an applicant State to the condition that other States be admitted with that State would prevent Members from exercising their judgment in each case with complete liberty, within the scope of the prescribed conditions. Such a demand is incompatible with the letter and spirit of Article 4 of the Charter.” [1948] I.C.J. Rep. at 64-65.

90 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Plenary Meeting 3 (Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.31).

91 In 1961 a package deal set Mauritania (and the votes of the West African states against Nationalist China on the participation issue) against Outer Mongolia (and the Nationalist Chinese veto on the Mongolian membership application). If the Nationalist Chinese rejected the Outer Mongolian membership application, the Soviet Union would veto Mauritania's application and this would trigger the West African vote to swing against retaining Nationalist China in the United Nations. Mauritania was admitted.

92 Cf., The Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Order of 1947, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/161.

93 gee generally Higgins, note 1 above, at 321-322; Laing, , “Admission of Indian States to the United Nations,” 43 A.J.I.L. 144 (1949)Google Scholar; and Schachter, , “The Development of International Law Through the Legal Opinions of the United Nations Secretariat,” 25 Brit. Tr. Bk. Int. Law 91, 101-109 (1949).Google Scholar

94 U.N3 Press Release PM/473.

95 “ In the view of Dr. Ivan Kerno Assistant Secretary General for Legal Affairs, the problem was analogous, from the viewpoint of international law, to the situation which arises when part of an existing state breaks away and becomes a new state. According to that theory there would be no change in the international status of India which continued as a state with all treaty rights and obligations as well as the rights and obligations in the United Nations. Therefore, following that theory of state succession, Pakistan would be regarded as having broken off and become a new state and, as a new non-Member state, must seek admission to the United Nations pursuant to the provisions of Article 4 of the Charter… . While this legal opinion was only intended for the guidance of the Secretariat, its ultimate effect was to plot the course which the Security Council and the General Assembly subsequently followed.” Laing, loc. cit. note 93 above, at 146.

96 Laing, loc. cit.

97 ‘’ Some support for (the contention that Pakistan should be admitted automatically) was to be found among other delegations but it was not pushed with … vigor, the feeling being that the question of membership in this case was of the order of a fait accompli and that it was more important to set up principles applicable in future cases… . Throughout the controversy, there was never any question as to the desirability of India and Pakistan as Members… . Following established procedure, (Pakistan's) membership having been favorably reported upon by the Security Council, it was referred to the First Committee and reported by that Committee to the General Assembly. In the subsequent balloting the admission of Pakistan was approved by a vote of fifty-three to one. The negative vote was cast by Afghanistan, with which Pakistan was having some border disagreement. However, in accordance with later instructions received from his government, the Afghanistan delegate withdrew his negative vote and the admission of Pakistan was unanimous.” Laing, loc. cit. note 93 above, at 146-148.

98 See Security Council, 16th Tear, Official Records, Supp. at 59-60 (Docs. S/4957 and S/4958).

99 U.N. Doc. A/4914, cited in Higgins, op. cit. note 1 above, at 324.

100 Syria could have been classified—under state and governmental succession doctrine— as a “new” state, much as Pakistan was, and could have been forced through the formalities of Art. 4 procedures. In both the Syrian and Pakistani cases, the claimants’ responsibility was unquestioned, and formal procedures were sacrificed for “universality” in the Organization.

101 Cf. Charter of the Organization of American States, Art. 3. Delegates to the San Francisco Conference virtually overlooked the consequences for the Organization of division within a Member body politic. See, generally, 3 UNCIO at, e.g., 31-32, 60-61, 454-455, etc., and 7 ibid, at 11-12, 18-19, 24-25 and 34. Delegates were more concerned with Chap. VI of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, which designated by name the permanent members of the Security Council. Mexico, for example, proposed that the permanent seats on the Council be called “semipermanent” and that the Assembly review at the end of 8-year periods the allocation of seats in this category. 11 UNCIO 289.

102 McDougal, Lasswell and Vlasic, note 55 above, at 908-910; Sohn, “Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal from an International Organization,” 77 Harvard Law Rev. 1381 (1964).

103 See U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Credentials Committee Reports, as follows: 6th Sess. (A/1983); 7th Sess. (A/2234); 8th Sess. (A/2490) (A/2593); 9th Sess. (A/2752) (A/2880); 10th Sess. (A/3027) (A/3091); 11th Sess. (A/3536); 12th Sess. (A/3773); 13th Sess. (A/4074); 14th Sess. (A/4346); 15th Sess. (A/4578) (A/4743); 16th Sess. (A/5055); 17th Sess. (A/5395); 18th Sess. (A/5676/Rev. 1).

104 Note that in the Credentials Committee meetings for the 18th Session, Algeria, the U.S.S.E., and Liberia thought “the time had come for the U.N. to undertake a review of the validity of the credentials submitted by (South Africa).” The South African Government, in their view, was not “representative of the people of South Africa and … persistently violated the principles of the U.N. Charter and continued to defy numerous resolutions adopted by the U.N. organs … “ U.N. General Assembly, 18th Bess., Official Records, Report of the Credentials Committee (Doe. A/ 5676/Rev. 1) at 2. In the Credentials Committee meetings for each of the sessions cited at note 103, the Soviet Union has invariably challenged the credentials of the Government of the Republic of China.

105 Cf. U.N. documents cited above, note 103, from the 11th Sess. through the 18th Sess. See also Higgins, op. cit. note 1 above, at 158-159.

106 See, generally, Higgins, note 1 above, at 159-161.

107 See the statement of the Secretary General to the Security Council, U.N. Security Council, Official Records, 827th Meeting, at 2 (Doc. S/P.V. 827) (1958). The letter was cited by the Russian delegate, Mr. Sobolev, at 3 and, according to him, had “been sent “ to all the members of the Council.

108 Per Sobolev, ibid, at 1, 2 and 3.

109 I.e., Panama, U.N. Security Council, Official Records, 827th Meeting, at 3, 5 (Doc. S/P.V. 827) (1958); United Kingdom, ibid, at 2-3.

110 Ibid. at 5.

111 Ibid. at 2, 3-4; U.N. Security Council, Official Records, 834th Meeting, at 3 (Doe. S/P.V. 834) (July 18, 1958).

112 Detailed statistics on U.N. voting on this question may be found in Halpern, Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents, Appendix B, pp. 503-507 (1965), with charts indicating both aggregate annual votes as well as specific state behaviour through time.

113 I.e., in the U.N. the representation of Yemen in 1962 and the representation of the Congo in 1960; in the League of Nations, the representation of Ethiopia. The first two decisions are well summarized in Higgins, op. cit. note 1 above, at 161-164. The Ethiopian case is summarized in Walters, History of the League of Nations 623- 669 (1952).

114 E.g., the Congolese decision seemed to turn largely on the interpretation of the Congo's Loi Fondamentale. See the remarks of the delegates from Ghana, U.N. General Assembly, 15th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting, at 883 (Doc. A/P.V. 918) (1960); the Camerouns, ibid, at 885-886 (Doc. A/P.V. 918); the Philippines, Ibid. at 892 (Doc. A/P.V. 919); the Soviet Union, Ibid. at 894-896 (Doc. A/P.V. 919); Guinea, ibid, at 907-911 (Doc. A/P.V. 920); the Congo (B), ibid, at 917-920 (Doc. A/P.V. 921); Czechoslovakia, ibid, at 924-925 (Doc. A/P.V. 921); Liberia, ibid, at 926 (Doc. A/P.V. 921); Poland, ibid, at 927 (Doc. A/P.V. 921); Bulgaria, ibid, at 933 (Doc. A/P.V. 921); Haiti, ibid, at 938-939 (Doc. A/P.V. 922); Albania, ibid, at 940 (Doc. A/P.V. 922); the Central African Republic, ibid, at 944-945 (Doc. A/P.V. 922); and the United States, ibid, at 957 (Doc. A/P.V. 923). On the Yemen representation question, see, e.g., remarks of the delegates of Jordan, U.N. General Assembly, 17th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting, at 1220 (Doc. A/P.V. 1201) (1962); of Saudi Arabia, ibid, at 1222 (Doc. A/P.V. 1201) and at 1230- 1231 (Doc. A/P.V. 1202); and of the U.A.E., ibid, at 1228 (Doc. A/P.V. 1202). On the Ethiopian representation question, in its second report to the second session of the League Assembly, the Credentials Committee noted that the Ethiopian credentials were “derived from the same authority as had more than once in the past issued the full powers of the Ethiopian delegation to previous sessions of the Assembly.” League of Nations Official Journal, 17th Assembly, at 40.

115 In the Congolese representation question, the issues of control were not at all clear when Mobutu and Lumumba sought to have their delegations represented at the United Nations. See, generally, U.N. Doc. A/4557 (1961), and the remarks of the representatives from Ghana, U.N. General Assembly, 15th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting, at 884 (Doc. A/P.V. 918) (1960); and of the Philippines, ibid, at 892 (Doc. A/P.V. 919). In regard to the Yemen representation question, of. the remarks of the delegates of Jordan, U.N. General Assembly, 17th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting, at 1220 (Doe. A/P.V. 1201); of Saudi Arabia, ibid, at 1222 (Doc. A/P.V. 1201); and of the U.A.R., ibid. In the Ethiopian representation question, the League Credentials Committee described the Ethiopian situation thus: “The Head of the State is in a foreign country; the Government is no longer in the capitol; according to some of the documents submitted a governmental authority is stated to be established in another part of the country. It seems exceptionally difficult to judge of the nature and extent of the power of that authority, and of the strength of the connection still existing between it and the Head of this State.” League of Nations Official Journal, 17th Assembly, at 40 (1936).

116 In the Congolese representation question the Soviet Union and other Communistbloc countries justified their votes against seating the delegation appointed by Mr. Kasavubu on grounds that his regime was subservient to the United States, Belgium and colonialism generally. See, e.g., the remarks of the Soviet Union representative at U.N. General Assembly, 16th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting at 894-901 (Doc. A/P.V. 919). Questions of capacity and willingness to fulfill international obligations did not arise in the Yemeni case, but were of undoubted importance when the League Assembly voted to seat Haile Selassie's delegation. See, generally, Walters, op. cit.'note 113 above, at 690.

117 This was a factor of undoubted importance in the Ethiopian case. The Credentials Committee decided to seat the Ethiopian Delegation because ‘ ‘ (t) oo many Members of the Assembly were resolved not to be dragged any further along the path which they considered dishonorable.” Walters, op. cit. note 113 above, at 690. On the Congolese decision, see, generally, the comments cited in footnote 93 above.

118 This was a factor of undoubted importance in the Ethiopian case. On the Yemen decision see the remarks of the Royalist-appointed delegate from Yemen, U.N. General Assembly, 17th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting at 1221 (Doc. A/P.V. 1201) (1962). On the Congolese decision see the remarks of Czechoslovakia, U.N. General Assembly, 15th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting at 922-923 (Doc. A/P.V. 921) (1960); of Bulgaria, Ibid. at 933; and of the Ukrainian S.S.E., ibid, at 945 (Doc. A/ P.V. 922). For two representation decisions in the International Labor Organization, see Liang, , “Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State: Criteria and Procedure,” 45 A.J.I.L. 689, 690 (1951).Google Scholar

119 I.e., The Congolese, Yemeni and Ethiopian representation decisions.

120 F. P. Walters has described the Ethiopian decision thus: “ In the past, the appointment of the Credentials Committee, and its proceedings, once appointed, had been a matter of quick-moving routine and necessary to the Assembly as to every other international conference, but totally devoid of political interests. Membership had been neither coveted nor avoided: the Secretary drew up a list, the Assembly accepted it. But on this occasion it proved difficult to find nine delegates willing to undertake so invidious a task… . Finally Eden and Delbos had to serve in person and Litvinov joined them, together with other willing delegates— an unexpected event, since hitherto the Committee had always been composed of delegates of the second and third rank.” Walters, op. cit. note 113 above, at 690.

121 Debate on the Congolese question thus covers more than one hundred pages of General Assembly records.

122 See note 11 above.

123 See, e.g., the documents cited at note 103 above.

124 In a relatively recent press conference (May 27, 1964; note No. 2932, p. 8), Secretary General U Thant offered a summary of perspectives as follows: “The question of the admission or representation of China is sure to come up in the next session of the General Assembly. Regarding this question, as you are no doubt aware, there are two schools of thought. One school maintains that the question is one of the admission of China—the admission of a new Member State. This position has been held by the majority of the Member States. On the other hand, there is another school of thought which maintains that the question is one of representation and not admission. They argue that China is already a Member of the United Nations, China being a founding Member of the United Nations. The question is, who should represent China? This is a concept held by some of the Members who, of course, form the minority. So, on this, I am not competent to take a public position. Of course, I have to abide by the decision of the General Assembly when it meets in the fall.“

125 Fitzmaurice, , ‘ ‘ Chinese Representation in the United Nations,'’ 6 Tear Book of World Affairs 36 (1952)Google Scholar, notes that, in passing on the Chinese participation question, Members will vote “ in the light of their view as to the status (of the authority issuing credentials) and its right to act on behalf of the State concerned … “ (p. 39).

126 See Pollux, , “The Interpretation of the Charter,” 23 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 54 (1946).Google Scholar

127 See the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom explaining his government's vote on the China question in the 17th Session of the General Assembly: General Assembly, 17th Sess., Official Records, 1162nd Meeting, at 648, 649 (1962).

128 See text below.

129 What we seek to establish by this review is that the mere fact that Communist China now has control over most of the people and territory of the original state of China does not identify it as the “Republic of China” upon which the United Nations Charter conferred membership. A state, it may be recalled, is more than mere territory and people: it is a “body politic” which exhibits both an internal governmental and social organization and a pattern of external relations. The state of China upon which the framers and ratifiers of the United Nations Charter thought they were conferring membership certainly is not in any factual sense the same state, as Professor Barnett's detailed description makes clear, which today exhibits itself upon the mainland. If a decision be taken, by way of legal fiction, to regard it as the ‘ ‘ same'’ state, the question becomes: for what policies and with what probable consequences for world public order?

130 Barnett, Communist China in Perspective 27 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962) ; we are indebted to the author and to the publishers for permission to make extensive use of materials from the book. Cf. Sehurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (1966).

131 Barnett, op. cit. 27.

132 Ibid, at 46.

133 Ibid, at 38.

134 Ibid, at 39.

135 Ibid, at 27.

136 Ibid. at 37.

137 Ibid, at 37-38.

138 Ibid, at 38.

139 Ibid, at 34.

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid, at 35.

142 Ibid, at 33.

143 Ibid, at 32.

144 Ibid, at 35.

145 Ibid, at 33.

146 Ibid.

147 Ibid, at 30.

148 Ibid, at 35.

149 Ibid, at 36.

150 Ibid, at 27.

151 Ibid, at 29.

152 Ibid, at 30.

153 Ibid.

154 Ibid, at 32.

155 Ibid, at 31.

156 Ibid, at 33-34.

157 Ibid, at 28.

158 Ibid, at 29.

159 ibid, at 28.

160 Ibid, at 31.

161 Ibid, at 30.

162 Ibid, at 30. For general analyses of Communist China's foreign policy, see Barnett, Communist China and Asia (1960) and sources cited at pp. 558-559; idem (ed.), Communist Strategies in Asia (1963); Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy (1962) and sources cited at pp. 142-144; Cooley, East Wind Over Africa (1965); Clubb, Twentieth Century China (1964), esp. pp. 368-395; Halperin, China and the Bomb (1965); Halperin and Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control (1965); Halperin and Tsou, “Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior,” 59 Am. Pol. Sci. Q. 80 (1965); Halpern, “China in the Postwar World,” 21 China Quarterly 20 (1965); idem, “ Communist China's Foreign Policy: The Recent Phase,” 11 China Quarterly 89 (1962); idem (ed.), Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents (1965); Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (1966); idem, Communist China's External Policy and Behavior as a Nuclearifower (1963); Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (1962); Pentony (ed.), China, The Emerging Red Giant (1962), particularly the North and Whiting articles at pp. 48 and 53, respectively.

163 For charts listing, as of March 1, 1965, the countries recognizing either the People's Republic of China or the Government of the Republic of China, see Halpern, Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents 496-501 (1965).

164 Authoritative statements of Communist Chinese views on war and peace occur throughout The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement, a volume published by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, in 1965, which contains major editorials from the People's Daily and Red Flag from the 1963-1964 period (cited as “Polemic“).For comparative analysis of, and documents on, Communist Chinese and Soviet views of minimum order and other issues, see Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (1961); Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking (1963); Dallin (ed.), Diversity in International Communism (1963), especially the introduction; Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (1963); Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (1964); Mosely, “The Chinese-Soviet Rift: Origins and Portents,” 42 Foreign Affairs 11 (1963); Lowenthal, World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith (1965); Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict (1962). For other sources see Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift 491- 492 (1964).

165 For a recent explanation of this policy, see People's Daily, ‘ ‘ A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the U.S.A.,” March 8, 1963, in 10/11 Peking Review 58, 61 (March 15, 1963).

166 For a comprehensive, authoritative analysis of Communist China's view of the United Nations, consult Adams, Communist China and the United Nations (1964) (Master's essay on file at the Burgess-Carpenter Library of Columbia University). The Chinese Communists have been no less kind to the League of Nations: “ … the League of Nations is a League of Robbers by which the various imperialisms are dismembering China. The principal task of the Lytton Commission of Enquiry sent to China by the League was to prepare the dismemberment of China and the repression of all the revolutionary movements that have raised the flag of the Chinese Soviets.” From a telegram, dated Oct. 6, 1932, and signed ﹛inter alia) by Mao Tse-tung, in Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung 266-267 (1963).

167 U.N. Charter, Art. 1, pars. 1, 2.

168 Lin Piao, “Long Live the Victory of People's War,” in 36 Peking Review 9, 14 (Sept. 3, 1965). See also Resolution of the Indonesian Communist Party, in 13 ibid. 17 (March 27, 1964), analyzed by Tsou, “Mao Tse-tung and Peaceful Coexistence,” 8 Orbis 36, 42 (1964). Lin Piao's statement seems a chimerical rendition of the more traditional “united front” tactic. Cf. Statements by Mao Tse-tung, 20 Peking Review 6 (May 14, 1965), and 5 ibid. 5 (Jan. 31, 1964).

169 It is not unlikely that the Communist Chinese will adjust their strategy, at least temporarily, if they continue to suffer strategic defeats in the Afro-Asian world. For valuable and analogous insights, see Brzezinski and Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSB (1964). For a Communist Chinese response to the Hilaman thesis, which held out the promise of more salutory TJ.S.-Communist Chinese relations to the second generation of Peking leaders, see 30 Peking Review 19 (July 24, 1964); see also People's Daily, “Cultivating and Training Millions of Successors to Proletarian Revolution,” Aug. 3, 1964, in 32 ibid. 12 (Aug. 7, 1964).

170 This is the opinion of many specialists on Communist Chinese foreign policy. See, e.g., Barnett, Communist China in Perspective 80; Halperin, China and the Bomb 13-14 (1965); Halpern, “China in the Postwar World,” note 162 above, at 36-38; Hinton, op. cit. note 162 above, at 155-156; Hsieh, “The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 1963,” 8 Journal of Conflict Resolution 99, 105 (1964); Lowenthal, “China,” in Brzezinski (ed.), Africa and the Communist World 142, 149 (1963); Mosely, note 164 above, at 16-17; Tsou, “Mao Tse-tung and Peaceful Coexistence,” 8 Orbis 36, 44 (1964); Zagoria, note 164 above, at 245-246.

171 Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag, “Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace,” in Polemic, note 164 above, at 221, 235. The XI. S. nuclear threat was a principal stated justification for the first of Communist China's nuclear tests. Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, Oct. 16, 1964, in 42 Peking Review, Spec. Supp. ii (Oct. 16, 1964).

172 The United States, in the Communist Chinese view, is over-extended. Lo Juiching, “Commemorate the Victory Over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle Against IT. S. Imperialism Through to the End ! “ (published in Red Flag), in 20 Peking Review 7, 13 (May 14, 1965); Peng Chen, speech of May 25, 1965, in 24 ibid. 10, 13 (June 11, 1965); People's Daily, “ A Great People, A Glorious Banner,” Dec. 20, 1964, in 52 Hid. 11, 12 (Dec. 25, 1964).

173 See, e.g., Shih Tsu-chih, ‘ ‘ The Fundamental Path for the Liberation Movements in the dolonial and Semi-Colonial Areas,” in Studies in International Affairs, No. 5, May 3, 1960, 6024 JPRS 41-55; Chou En-lai, speech of Dec. 25, 1963, “African People's Example of Daring to Wage Armed Struggle and Seize “Victory,” in 1 Peking Review 34 (Jan. 3, 1964); Zagoria, note 164 above, at 360; Chou En-lai, speech of Jan. 8, 1964, in 3 Peking Review 18, 21 (Jan. 17, 1964).

174 “ … (the Chinese Communists) seem to have been guided not by a desire to bring on a general war but by the perhaps correct calculation that more vigorous Soviet action would not lead to general nuclear war.” (Italics ours.) Halperin, note 162 above, at 14; see also ibid, at 39; Halperin and Perkins, note 162 above, at 58; Hinton, Communist China in the World Community 155 (1966); Zagoria, note 164 above, at 356-357.

175 See particularly Zagoria, note 164 above, at 312-316. Armed struggle has been the “correct p a t h “ in Cuba (31 Peking Review 20 (July 31, 1964)); in the Congo (People's Daily, “ N o Change of Horses in the Congo Can Save the IT.S. from Defeat,” in part in 29 Peking Review 33, 34 (July 17, 1964)); in Malaya (C.P.C.C.C. letter of April 15, 1965, to the Central Committee of the Malayan Communist Party, in 19 Peking Review 6 (May 7, 1966)); for “Africans Who Want to Win and Sustain Independence” (People's Daily, “Long Live the Free and Independent New Africa,” April 15, 1965, in 16 Peking Review 9, 11 (April 17, 1964)); in Algeria, Chou En-lai, speech of Dec. 25, 1964, in 1 Peking Review 29 (Jan. 3, 1964)).

176 Cf. XVI (13) CDSP 5, 9-10 (April 22, 1964). Recent Communist Chinese policy pronouncements still possess the ardor Suslov has described: “The peoples want revolution and liberation, and there is no weapon that can intimidate them. The atom bomb can scare only the cowards who have lost their revolutionary will, it cannot scare revolutionaries.” Lo Jui-ching, “The People Defeated Japanese Fascism and They Can Certainly Defeat U. S. Imperialism Too,” speech of Sept. 3, 1965, in 36 Peking Review 31, 33 (Sept. 3, 1965); see also Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, 11 ibid. 6, 7 (March 12, 1965); Liu Ning-i, speech of July 28, 1965, in 32 ibid. 23 (Aug. 6, 1965); 20 ibid. 13 (May 14, 1965).

177 In detailed exposition of the Chinese Communist attitude toward nuclear war, Suslov continues to document the Chinese unconcern with the certain destruction of large numbers of individuals, Communist and non-Communist: “This concept is even more lucidly expressed in the collection of articles Long Live Leninism! which the CC CPC has approved and is circulating. ‘On the ruins of fallen imperialism,’ it says, ‘the victorious people will build a thousand times more wonderful future at an extremely rapid rate.’ That is the kind of ultra revolutionary verbiage, complete political irresponsibility that is particularly dangerous because it is being demonstrated by people standing at the helm of a large socialist country. “Here it would be appropriate to recall certain facts. When in a conversation with Tao Chu, member of the CC CPC, a Czechoslovak journalist mentioned that in the event of a thermonuclear war the whole of Czechoslovakia, where 14 million people live, might be destroyed, the answer he received was: ‘In the event of a war of annihilation, the small countries in the socialist camp will have to subordinate their interests to the common interests of the camp as a whole.’ Another high-ranking CPR official told Soviet representatives that Comrade Togliatti, General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party, was wrong when expressing anxiety for the fate of his people he said that if a thermonuclear war broke out the whole of Italy would be destroyed. ‘Other people will remain,’ declared this official, ‘and imperialism will be wiped out… .’ “ Ibid. 1966]

178 “Local” wars, in Communist terminology, are wars started by the “imperialist powers“; “wars of national liberation” are begun by indigenous Communist or nationalist forces. See Halperin and Perkins, note 162 above, at 57, and Zagoria, note 164 above, who describes at pp. 195-199 Sino-Soviet differences over the handling of the Middle East crisis of 1958.

179 “At (the 1957 Moscow meeting of Communist parties), the chief subject of controversy between us and the delegation of the CPSU was the transition from capitalism to socialism. In their original draft of the Declaration (the product of the meeting) the leadership of the CPSU insisted on the inclusion of the erroneous views of the 20th Congress on peaceful transition. The original draft said not a word about non-peaceful transition; moreover, it described peaceful transition as ‘securing a majority in parliament and transforming parliament from an instrument of the bourgeois dictatorship into a genuine people's state power.’ … The Chinese Communist Party resolutely opposed the wrong views contained in the draft declaration submitted by the leadership of the CPSU.” Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag, “The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves,” in Polemic, note 164 above, at 55, 73. In the Congo, the “parliamentary path to power” was an “illusion.” People's Daily, “People of the Congo (Leopoldville), Fight on!”, May 6, 1964, in 20 Peking Review 14, 15 (May 15, 1964). See, generally, People's Daily, “The Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us,” Dec. 31, 1962, in Dallin, Diversity in International Communism 706 (1963); People's Daily, “More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us,” in ibid, at 794.

180 Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Bed Flag, “The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves,” Appendix I, in Polemic, note 164 above, at 105-106.

181 Cf. General Assembly Res. 498 (V) (Feb. 1, 1951); Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (1960).

182 Hinton, note 174 above, at 258-272; Hsieh, note 162 above, at 17-18, 123-130; Tsou, “The Quemoy Imbroglio: Chiang Kai-shek and the United States,” 12 Western Pol. Q. 1084 (1959); idem, “ Mao's Limited War in the Taiwan Strait,” 3 Orbis 332 (1959); Whiting, “The Logic of Communist China's Policy: The First Decade,” in Pentony, note 162 above, at 70, 78-81; Zagoria, note 164 above, at 200-221.

183 Cf. General Assembly Resolutions 1353 (XIV); 1723 (XVI): Barnett, Communist China and Asia 314-315 (1960); Hinton, note 174 above, at 285-289.

184 Hinton, note 174 above, at 273-307; Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi (1964). See also Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking (1965), who believes the Indian invasion was undertaken “as an essay in forcing tactics vis-a-vis Moscow.” (p. 144.)

185 See, generally, Pringsheim, “China's Bole in the Indo-Pakistani Conflict,” 24 China Quarterly 170 (1965). Liu Shao-chi, in a speech of Sept. 28, 1965, had this to say of the U.N. and Kashmir: ‘ ‘ As everybody knows, the United Nations has” completely betrayed its own charter and it is in a mess. Recently on the Kashmir issue it disregarded the explicit statement in the charter about national self-determination and discarded its past resolutions providing for a ‘plebiscite'. This is another entry in the shameful record of the United Nations.” 40 Peking Review 15, 16 (Oct. 1, 1965). See also Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, Sept. 7, 1965, in 37 Peking Review 6 (Sept. 10, 1965), ibid, at 7; 38 ibid. 11 (Sept. 17, 1965), ibid, at 14; 39 ibid. 8 (Sept. 24, 1965), ibid, at 9 and 13-16.

186 Cooley, note 162 above, at 109-112; Hinton, note 174 above, at 193.

187 Cooley, note 162 above, at 99-103; Hinton, note 174 above, at 192.

188 “Usurping the name of the United Nations, the United States has placed the Congo under military occupation … “ “The Chinese people have always staunchly supported the Congolese people's just struggle against imperialism and for national independence.” People's Daily, “People of the Congo, (Leopoldville), Fight on!”, May 6, 1964, in 20 Peking Review 14, 16, 17 (May 15, 1964).

189 Whiting, loc. cit. note 182 above, has skillfully demonstrated Chinese “caution.” For recent Communist Chinese attempts to subvert stable regimes, cf. Topping, “Peking Pressing Overseas Chinese,” New York Times, July 10, 1965, p. 3, col. 2; (Burma), ibid., Nov. 1, 1964, p. 26, col. 4; (Congo), ibid., Nov. 27, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.

190 “(The people) have come to realize that the U. S. imperialist-manipulated United Nations is by no means something sacrosanct, that one can oppose the United Nations and withdraw from it and that one can do without entering it . “ Chou En-lai, speech of Jan. 24, 1965, in 5 Peking Review 5 (Jan. 29, 1965). Compare the Communist Chinese stand with the “Final Communique of Second Afro-Asian Conference Preparatory Meeting,” in 17 Peking Review 6 (April 24, 1964), which sought the strengthening of the United Nations.

191 The Communist Chinese have never clarified the constitutional basis of this organization. Presumably they thought that Communist China, Indonesia, and possibly Cambodia and Pakistan, would provide the initial membership. At a later date, the Communist Chinese seem to have assumed, the initial membership would be joined by the “emerging” “revolutionary” nations of Asia and Africa.

192 Predecessors of this threat include Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China, Jan. 10, 1965, in 3 Peking Review 5 (Jan. 15, 1965) (“thoroughly remolded“); People's Daily, “Indonesia's Bold, Revolutionary Action,” Jan. 10, 1965, in ibid. 7 (Jan. 15, 1965) (“thorough overhaul“) at 9. For the threat itself see Chou En-lai, speech of Jan. 24, 1965, in 5 Peking Review 5 (Jan^.29, 1965); Chen Yi, speech of Jan. 26, 1965, ibid, at 7; reaffirmed and modified by Cnen Yi, Press Conference of Sept. 20, 1965, in 41 Peking Review 7, 12 (Oct. 8, 1965). The threat parallels tactics the Communist Chinese have resorted to in the international Communist movement and elsewhere: “The Chinese leaders do not limit themselves to proclaiming incorrect views. They are now striving wherever possible to isolate the democratic public organizations of (Asia, Africa and Latin America), to create separate, enclosed confederations and actually to oppose them to the international confederations of the working people.” Kommunist, “Marxism-Leninism is the Basis for the Unity of the Communist Movement,” Oct. 18, 1963, in Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift 466, 468 (1964).

193 Presumably the Communist Chinese would eliminate from the United Nations all bodies of limited and specialized membership. “In international affairs, all countries should have equal rights. There should be absolutely no distinction between big and small ones… . “ Observer, “The More He Tries to Cover Up, The More He Exposes—On Adlai Stevenson's U.N. Speech,” People's Daily, Feb. 1, 1965, in 6 Peking Review 12 at 13 (Feb. 5, 1965).

194 '’ The increase in the number of Asian and African members in the United Nations has by no means brought any fundamental change in the fact that the U.N. has become a U. S. imperialist instrument for aggression.” People's Daily, Jan. 10, 1965, in 3 Peking Review 8 (Jan. 15, 1965).

195 The Communist Chinese demanded “thorough” reorganization after they editorially approved the membership increase in ECOSOC and the Security Council. Cf. sources cited in note 197 below.

196 Communist China has declared “illegal” the seating of Malaysia in the United Nations and the Security Council. Chou En-lai, speech of Jan. 24, 1965, in 5 Peking Review 5 (Jan. 29, 1965). It also sought to exclude Malaysia from the Second Afro-Asian Conference. Cf. 33 ibid. 18 (Aug. 13, 1965).

197 This is not to say that Communist Chinese policy has not been specialized to particular situations. At times they have proclaimed adherence to the Charter and support for the United Nations. Cf. Chou En-lai's press conference in Somalia of Feb. 3, 1964, 7 Peking Review 14, 15 (Feb. 14, 1964). Compare this with his press conference in Cairo a year later, printed in 15 ibid. 8 (April 9, 1965). Communist China has also reversed positions to support increased membership in the Security Council and ECOSOC. Chou En-lai's press conference, above. For the previous Communist Chinese position, which proclaimed the seating of Communist China a pre-condition to enlargement of the Security Council and ECOSOC, cf. 2637 SCMP 43 (1964).

198 Communist China's prime targets here have been Pakistan and Cambodia. A “China-Pakistan Joint Communique” of March 7, 1965, claimed that “the United Nations should reorganize itself in order to better reflect the balance of forces in the world and present international realities.” 11 Peking Review 10 (March 12, 1965). This was not a reference to expansion of ECOSOC and the Security Council. For a similar statement in a Sino-Burmese communique, cf. 32 ibid. 30 (Aug. 6, 1965).

199 Liu Shao-chi, on Sept. 28, 1965, declaimed at a state banquet in honor of Prince Sihanouk: “Recently, Cambodia withdrew from the U.N. special committee of decolonialization. This is another just and courageous action following Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations. It is a resounding slap in the face of the apologists for neo-colonialism as well as a protest of non co-operation against the U. S. control of the United Nations.” 40 Peking Review 15, 16 (Oct. 1, 1965). For Communist Chinese approval of Indonesia'* withdrawal from the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, see Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, Jan. 10, 1965, in 3 Peking Review 5 (Jan. 15, 1965); People's Daily, “Indonesia's Bold, Revolutionary Action,” Jan. 10, 1965, ibid. 7 (Jan. 15, 1965); ibid. 10 (Jan. 15, 1965); 5 ibid. 9 (Jan. 29, 1965).

200 Trygve Lie, the Communist Chinese claimed, was a “servile American stooge,” “ a n instrument and accomplice of aggression for the United States,” “ an out-and-out American tool and jackal,” and a “Wall Street majordomo from head to foot.” NCNA, April 8, 1952, in 313 SCMP 2 (1952). The Communist Chinese deemed it “necessary” to “remove Dag Hammarskjold, executor of the imperialist and colonialist policies, from the office of U.N. Secretary General.” People's Daily, Feb. 18, 1961, 2443 SCMP 32, 34. U Thant has been thought to be “ acting “ as “Washington's political broker,” People's Daily, “U.N.—Sanctuary for the Indian Aggressor,” Sept. 14, 1965, in 38 Peking Review 14 at 15 (Sept. 17, 1965); an “agent of U. S. imperialism,” People's Daily, “ T h e Second African-Asian Conference Should be Postponed,” Oct. 23, 1965, in 44 ibid. 8 (Oct. 29, 1965).

201 The Communist Chinese have paid little attention to the activities of the Secretariat. Adams, note 166 above, thus found no Chinese commentary on the Soviet Union's “ troika “ proposal. But cf. comments quoted in note 200 above.

202 In Peking's view the 19th Assembly was a ‘ ‘ farce , ‘ ‘ proving the United Nations “shamelessly” manipulated by the United States. 37 Peking Review 30 (Sept. 10, 1965). By the 20th Session the Assembly had become “ a conference for opposing the revolutionary movements of the oppressed nations, and oppressed peoples … a conference which wilfully interfered in the internal affairs of sovereign states and a conference for pursuing the policy of American-Soviet cooperation for the domination of the world.” People's Daily, “The U.N.—A Market Place for the U.S.-Soviet Political Deals,” Dec. 27, 1965, in 1 Peking Review 13 (Jan. 1, 1966). The Communist Chinese review of the 15th Assembly included these comments: “The U.N. General Assembly remains a tool of TJ. S. imperialism, a voting machine for it to pursue its policies of aggression and war… . The people of the world should in no way place their hopes for their liberation and for world peace on the United Nations which is dominated by U. S. imperialism.” 2364 SCMP 40, 41 (1960).

203 E.g: “ A s to Britain, France and the Soviet Union, although they are permanent members of the Security Council, they in fact cannot do much. Occasionally their proposals are adopted but only when they accord with or at least do not run counter to the interests of the United States.” People's Daily, “Whither the United Nations,” Feb. 15, 1965, in 8 Peking Review 13, 14 (Feb. 19, 1965).

204 Nan Han-chen, speaking at an Afro-Asian Economic Seminar on Feb. 23, 1965, declared that: “ A t the same time, it must also be pointed out that so-called ‘multilateral aid’ through international organizations is a new trap set by the neo-colonialists to exploit the Afro-Asian countries. As is well known, the so-called International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the International Finance Corporation and the International Development Association are all ‘political banks’ with U. S. imperialism as their nerve centre for carrying out activities of aggression… . (The) debtor countries, in addition to submitting their national economic policy and planning to be ‘reviewed’ by the World Bank and accepting its ‘supervision’ over the use of such loans … “ 10 Peking Review 16, 19 (March 5, 1965). See also Red Flag, Feb. 4, 1964, in 407 SCMM 42, 51. Communist China has labeled the WHO “ A U.S.-dominated agency conducting espionage activities under the name of health.” NONA, April 8, 1952, in 313 SCMP 2, 3 (1952). For the Communist Chinese the League of Nations was a “League of Robbers“: the “principal task of the Lytton Commission … was to prepare the dismemberment of China… . “ Extract from an Oct. 6, 1932, telegram of the Chinese Soviet Government, in Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung 266-267 (1963). For contemporary corroboration of this view, of. 6 Peking Review 14 (Feb. 5, 1965).

205 Press Conference of Chen Yi, Communist Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister, on Sept. 29, 1965, in 41 Peking Review 7, 11-12 (Oct. 8, 1965). For a milder predecessor to this statement, of. Chou En-lai's written responses to questions asked by Kamal Amer, 38 ibid. 8 (Sept. 17, 1965).

206 “Though (the Asian, African and Latin American countries) form a majority in (the United Nations), these countries cannot fully exercise their legitimate rights, and their proposals and demands are usually ignored or only perfunctorily discussed. Even when resolutions against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism are adopted at their insistence, their drafts are invariably watered down or amended by the United States and its partners before they are approved. Anti-colonialist resolutions adopted after hard struggle are invariably pigeonholed.” 42 Peking Review 10, Oct. 15, 1965. See also People's Daily, Feb. 4, 1964, in 3156 SCMP 17-18 (1964); but cf. 21 Peking Review 22 (May 22, 1964), one of the few occasions when the Communist Chinese press cited with approval actions in the U.N. Decolonization Committee.

207 “ A Great Victory for Leninism,” Red Flag, April, 1965, in 19 Peking Review 7, 9, 10; “Apologists of Neo-Colonialism,” Polemic, note 164 above, 196, 197. See also a Nov. 28, 1963, speech by Liao Cheng-chih, in 49 Peking Review 12 (Dec. 6, 1963): “ T o advocate the bestowing of independence by the U.N… . would simply mean liquidating the national-independence movement and helping U. S. imperialism in advancing its neo-colonialist policy.” (p. 15); Red Flag, “What the Congolese Situation Shows,” March 1, 1962, in 306 SCMM 7 (1962); People's Daily, “People of the Congo (Leopoldville), Fight o n ! “ , May 6, 1964, in 20 Peking Review 14 (May 15, 1964). Communist China has shown itself admirably informed about the activities of the Committees of 16 and 21. Cf. 21 ibid. 22 (May 22, 1964).

208 “ … universal and complete disarmament can be realized only after imperialism, capitalism and all systems of exploitation have been eliminated.” “Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government … “ Sept. 1, 1963, in Griffith, note 164 above, at 371, 386. “ I t is wrong to consider general and complete disarmament the ‘overriding task’ of the world peace movement.” 50 Peking Review 14 (Dec. 13, 1963). See, generally, Adams, note 166 above; Chiu, “Communist China's Attitude Towards Nuclear Tests,” 21 China Quarterly 96 (1965); Halperin and Perkins, note 162 above. However dramatic the statements of recent vintage, Peking's attitude has a longstanding base. Adams, note 166 above, writes thus of the period from 1957-1960: “Peking evidenced little interest in this period in the Soviet concern about surprise attack, and was pointedly dubious about the possible accomplishments of an experts’ meeting on the subject. Nor was Peking any more favorable to the convening of an experts’ conference on the problem of detecting test ban violations.” (p. 236.)

209 ‘ ’ The Geneva 18-nation disarmament conference is in fact still under the manipulation and control of the United States and can in no way reflect the aspirations of the peoples… . We thank the U. S. Government for its generosity in not opposing China's participation in the Geneva disarmament conference but we must tell it frankly that it will not have the pleasure of our company.” People's Daily, Nov. 22, 1964, in 48 Peking Review 14 (Nov. 27, 1964). Of U Thant's proposal, the People's Daily wrote: “So-called talks among countries possessing nuclear weapons would in fact be a nuclear club in disguise. We will not join such a club even if an invitation is sent us together with a sedan chair.” Ibid. Contrast these statements with an earlier policy position: “ … it must be pointed out that any international agreement concerning disarmament, without the formal participation of the Chinese People's Republic and the signature of her delegate, cannot, of course, have any binding force on China.” Resolution of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, in 4 Peking Review 19 (Jan. 26, 1960).

210 New York Times, Dec. 2, 1965, p. 1, col. 7.

211 People's Daily, “New Starting for Efforts to Ban Nuclear Weapons Completely,” Nov. 21, 1964, in 48 Peking Review 12, 14 (Nov. 27, 1964); see also 4 ibid. 14 (Jan. 22, 1965).

212 The latest comprehensive Communist Chinese proposal reads thus: (1) All countries in the world, both nuclear and non-nuclear, solemnly declare that they will prohibit and destroy nuclear weapons completely, thoroughly, totally and resolutely. Concretely speaking, they will not use nuclear weapons, nor export, nor import, nor manufacture, nor test, nor stockpile them; and they will destroy all the existing nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in the world, and disband all the existing establishments for the research, testing, and manufacture of nuclear weapons in the world. (2) In order to fulfill the above undertakings step by step, the following measures shall be adopted first: a. Dismantle all military bases, including nuclear bases on foreign soil, and withdraw from abroad all nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. b. Establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone of the Asian and Pacific region, including the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan; a nuclear-weapon-free zone of Central Europe; a nuclear-weapon-free zone of Africa; and a nuclear-weapon-free zone of Latin America. The countries possessing nuclear weapons shall undertake due obligations with regard to each of the nuclear-weapon-free zones. c. Refrain from exporting and importing in any form nuclear weapons and technical data for their manufacture. d. Cease all nuclear tests, including underground nuclear tests. (3) A conference of the Government heads of all the countries of the world shall be convened to discuss the question of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and the question of taking the above-mentioned four measures in order to realize step by step the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Halperin, note 3 above, believes “these proposals are not meant to be negotiable… . “ (p. 67.) After its first nuclear test, Communist China made an apparently “new” proposal: “the nuclear powers (should) undertake not to use nuclear weapons… . “ People's Daily, Nov. 22, 1964, in 48 Peking Review 12 (Nov. 27, 1964). This was to be a commitment unqualified by traditional doctrines of self-defense; from it, according to the People's Daily, would follow ineluctably the end of nuclear testing and the cessation of nuclear production. Ibid, at 13. Note that in early 1960 the Chinese opposed a proposed Soviet troop reduction. Zagoria, note 164 above, at 292.

213 See World Law Fund, Current Disarmament Proposals 1 (1964).

214 See, e.g., 291 SCMM 42 (Dec. 11, 1961). The McCloy-Zorin Agreement of 1961 called for an “international disarmament organization … within the framework of the United Nations.” Its inspectors “should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places, as necessary for the purposes of effective verification.” Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of the Soviet Union and the United States, Sept. 20, 1961, in World Law Fund, note 213 above, at 189, 191.

215 Major Chinese and Soviet documents are collected in Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift at 326, 331, 340, 371 (1964); see also Griffith's text at 159-166; Chiu, note 208 above, at 102-106.

216 At the China Arms Control Conference (July 9-19, 1964, Airlie House, ‘Warrenton, Virginia), the participants, including both China specialists and disarmament experts, were in virtual agreement that Communist China would not conclude an arms control agreement “within the next five or ten years.” Halperin and Perkins, note 162 above, at 155. See also Chiu, note 208 above, at 107.

217 “Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government,” Aug. 15, 1963, in 33 Peking Review 7, 12 (Aug. 16, 1963). See also 32 ibid. 16, 17 (Aug. 7, 1964). In his press conference of Sept. 29, 1965, Chen Yi had this to say of Peking's attitude toward nuclear proliferation: ‘ ‘ As for the peaceful use of atomic energy and the building of atomic reactors, China has already been approached by several countries, and China is ready to render them assistance… . China hopes that Afro-Asian countries will be able to make atom bombs themselves, and it would be better for a greater number of countries to come into possession of atom bombs.” 41 ibid. 7, 8 (Oct. 8, 1965). Communist China has chided the Soviet Union for its apparent interest in a “non proliferation” agreement (c/. People's Daily, “The Soviet Government Once Again Exposes Itself,” Jan. 30, 1966, in 6 Peking Review 14 (Feb. 4, 1966)), and has criticized Khrushchev for over-estimating the possibilities of accidental war (20 ibid. 18 (May 14, 1965)).

218 Cf., e.g., Whiting, note 181 above, at 80-87, 99-101, 139-143.

219 See, generally, Adams, note 166 above.

220 Liao Cheng-chih, one of Peking's foreign policy planners, has recently stated: “The flag of the United Nations is dripping with the blood of the peoples of Asia and Africa. Manipulated by the United States, the United Nations has become a tool of U. S. imperialism for undermining and suppressing the national-liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin-America. And now, through the instrumentality of the so-called U.N. ‘Special Committee for Peace-Keeping Operations,’ the U. S. imperialists and their partners are plotting to set up a permanent U.N. force to suppress the national-liberation movements. We Afro-Asian peoples shall never tolerate the use of the United Nations by U. S. imperialism and its accomplices for their dirty deeds.” 21 Peking Review 15 (May 21, 1965).

221 '’ We favour negotiations with imperialist countries. But it is absolutely impermissible to pin hopes for world peace on negotiations, spread illusions about them and thereby paralyze the fighting will of the peoples, as Khrushchev has done.” Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Bed Flag, “Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace,” Polemic, note 164 above, at 221, 253. In the following situations, the Communist Chinese protested proposals for or attempts at U.N. discussion of critical international issues: Viet-Nam, July-August, 1965: 33 Peking Review 8-10 (Aug. 13, 1965). Viet-Nam, January-February, 1965: 7 ibid. 19, 20 (Feb. 12, 1965). Viet-Nam, Fall, 1964: Liu Ning-i, “The Militant Unity of China and Vietnam,” in 49 ibid. 26, 28 (Dec. 4, 1964). Viet-Nam, Summer, 1964: C.P.C.C.C. Reply to the C.P.S.U.C.C. letter of July 30, 1964, in 36 Peking Review 6 (Sept. 4, 1964). (The C.P.S.U., wrote the Communist Chinese, had “aided and abetted the aggressor by actively supporting the U. S. attempt to intervene in Viet-Nam through the United Nations.” Ibid. 7.) Malaysia, Summer, 1964: 37 Peking Review 8 (Sept. 11, 1964). Dominican Republic, Spring, 1964: Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, May 3, 1964, in 19 ibid. 12 (May 7, 1964).

222 0n the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir in September, 1965: “ T h e so-called mediation by the United Nations is based on a report of the Secretary-General. The report itself is unfair… . On the Kashmir question, the United Nations has once again proved a tool of U. S. imperialists and their partners in their attempt to control the whole world.” “Chinese Government Statement,” Sept. 7, 1965, in 37 Peking Review 6 (Sept. 10, 1965). See also People's Daily, “U.N.—Sanctuary for the Indian Aggressor,” Sept. 14, 1965, in 38 ibid. 14 (Sept. 17, 1965). Of the Security Council action, the Communist Chinese wrote: “ … (t)he U. S. Government instructed its representative to the United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg to get on the move and collaborate with the Soviet Union in manipulating the Security Council to pass two resolutions for the purpose of intervention. Both resolutions distorted the facts … “ People's Daily, “Who Backs the Indian Aggressors?”, Sept. 18, 1965, in 39 ibid. 13 (Sept. 24, 1965).

223 Cambodia-Viet-Nam border, May, 1964: opposed a U. S. proposal to send U.N. observers to investigate Cambodian charges that South Viet-Nam forces had entered Cambodian territory. People's Daily, “ U . S. Imperialism Must Not Be Allowed to Lead the U.N. Into Indo-China,” May 25, 1964, in 22 Peking Review 8 (May 29, 1964). Cuba, Fall, 1962: opposed U.N. supervision of missile withdrawal from Cuba. Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag, “Why Khrushchov Fell,” Polemic, note 164 above, at 481, 485.

224 Communist China has opposed proposals for U.N. “fact-finding” missions in— at the very least—the following situations: 1. Dominican Republic, Spring, 1965: 21 Peking Review 33 (May 21, 1965); 2. Viet-Nam, Fall, 1963: 42 ibid. 25 (Oct. 18, 1963); 3. Malaysia, 1963-1964: 3 ibid. 14 (Jan. 15, 1965); People's Daily “Oppose Malaysia—A Product of Neo-Colonialism, Support the Struggle of the North Kalimantan People,” in 14 ibid. 28 (April 3, 1964); 4. Cuba, Fall, 1962: Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag, “The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves,” in Polemic, note 164 above, 55, 96; 5. Lebanon, Summer, 1958: labeled UNOGIL an “instrument of U. S. British intervention,” 1796 SCMP 42, June 20, 1958, quoted in Adams, note 166 above, at 68.

225 In 1963 the Indian Government proposed that the Sino-Indian border dispute be arbitrated by the International Court of Justice or another arbitral body. The Communist Chinese refused. See Note from the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China, Oct. 9, 1963, in 42 Peking Review 9 (Oct. 18, 1963).

226 The Communist Chinese have opposed proposals for an international force in the following situations: Viet-Nam: an Indian proposal called for an Afro-Asian force to be sent to Viet- Nam. 20 Peking Review 25 (May 14, 1965) ; Laos: the Vice President of the Laotian National Assembly recommended that an international force be stationed in Laos for 10 or 15 years. 23 ibid. 14 (June 5, 1964) ; Viet-Nam: Britain's Prime Minister Wilson proposed an “international peace force” for Viet-Nam. 28 ibid. 8 (July S, 1965); Cyprus: People's Daily, “Indonesia's Bold, Revolutionary Action,” Jan. 18, 1965, in 3 ibid. 7, 8 (Jan. 15, 1965); see also 8 ibid. 16 (Feb. 21, 1964). t, Cf. the Albanian Zerii Popullit article summarized in 17 ibid. 27 (April 23, 1965) and entitled “Soviet-U. S. Plot to Establish an International Gendarmerie.“

227 It made little difference to the Chinese Communists that ONUC was composed in part of Asians and Africans. Cf. People's Daily, Feb. 18, 1961, 2443 SCMP 32, 34. And the Communist Chinese have virulently attacked the Soviet Union for its role in the Congo conflict. See Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag, “Apologists of Neo-Colonialism,” Polemic, note 164 above, 185, 199-200; People's Daily, “People of the Congo (Leopoldville), Fight On!”, May 6, 1964, in 20 Peking Review 14, 15 (May 15, 1964); Red Flag, “ A Great Victory for Leninism,” April, 1965, in 19 ibid. 7, 10 (May 7, 1965).

228 The purpose of United States in supporting the Canadian proposal is obviously to take over with the so-called emergency international force the areas in Egypt which have been occupied by Britain, France and Israel unlawfully so as to realize the vile scheme of depriving Egypt of its sacred sovereignty over Suez.” Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, Nov. 7, 1956, quoted in Adams, note 166 above, at 59.

229 For Communist Chinese appraisal of U.N. activities during 1964, see People's Daily, “ Hail the Triumphant Revolutionary Developments in the Congo (L) , “ June 24, 1965, in 27 Peking Review 15 (July 3, 1964) ; statement by Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Nov. 28, 1964, in 49 ibid. 5 (Dec. 4, 1965).

230 Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag, ‘ ‘ Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?”, in Polemic, note 164 above, at 139. See especially pp. 162, 167-170.

231 Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag, “ A Comment on the March Moscow Meeting,” in 13 Peking Review 7, 9 (March 26, 1965).]

232 19 Ibid. 10 (May 7, 1965). To the same effect, 20 ibid. 18 (May 14, 1965); 24 ibid. 16 (June 11, 1965); 25 ibid. 8 (June 18, 1965).

233 Communist China has sought to manipulate the membership and timing of international conferences to insure that the conferences produced preferred results. It has, for example, attempted to exclude the Soviet Union from the Second Afro-Asian Conference, principally on grounds that the Soviet Union was not an Asian state. E.g., Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, May 30, 1964, in 23 Peking Review 6 (June 5, 1964). It also was a prime mover for postponement of the Second Afro-Asian Conference. Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, “China Will Not Attend African-Asian Conference Which Leads to a Split,” Oct. 26, 1965, in 44 ibid. $ (Oct. 29, 1965).

234 Communist China has formally protested againsts a UNECA representative attending an Afro-Asian Economic Seminar held in Algeria Feb. 22-27, 1965 (11 Peking Review 18 (March 12, 1965)), and against U Thant attending the Second Afro-Asian Conference (Chen Yi, Press Conference of Sept. 29, 1965, in 41 ibid. 7, 10 (Oct. 8, 1965)).

235 Cf. Chen Yi, speech at the Second Asian-African Conference Preparatory Meeting, April 11, 1964, in 16 ibid. 6, 8 (April 17, 1964).

236 Cheng, ‘ ‘ Anti-Imperialism: Keynote of the Second African-Asian Conference,'’ in 26 ibid. 5, 6 (June 25, 1965).

237 “The Chinese formula is ‘unanimity through consultation'… . The Communist Party of China did not accept Khrushchev's demand for majority rule at international conferences. The CPC's insistence on unanimity, which so far has neither been officially endorsed nor officially rejected by the (Communist) movement as a whole, obviously represents a claim to a veto for itself … and for the right to form and lead ‘fractions’ (combinations) within the international Communist movement.” Hinton, note 174 above, at 98-99.

238 E.g., World Council of Peace, Nov. 28, 1963, described by Liao Cheng-chih in 49 Peking Review 12, 15 (Dec. 6, 1963). The Chinese Communists, often finding themselves in a minority position, have sought “unanimity through consultation” at transnational conferences. E.g. : (1) Various Communist Party Conferences; cf. Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag, “Why Khrushchov F e l l , “ Polemic, note 164 above, at 481, 488. (2) Sixth World Trade Union Congress (Warsaw, Oct. 9-22, 1965); cf. 44 Peking Review 15 (Oct. 29, 1965). (3) The Second African-Asian Conference; cf. People's Daily, “Keep Up Efforts for Success of Second African-Asian Conference,” June 29, 1965, in 27 Peking Review 6 (July 2, 1965); Chen Yi, speech of April 17, 1964, quoted in 25 ibid. 18 (June 18, 1965).

239 Quoted in Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag, ‘ ‘ The Leaders of the CPSU Are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times,” Polemic, note 164 above, at 303, 337. A principal issue in the Sino-Soviet rift has been Chinese unwillingness to accept either Soviet leadership or majority decision. See Dallin, Diversity in International Communism xxix (1963).

240 This chart is principally derived from the following sources: Hsieh, Taiwan-Ilha Formosa: A Geography in Perspective (1964); Rostow et al., The Prospects for Communist China (1954); Mancall, Formosa Today (1964); U. S. Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Far Eastern Division, Investment in Taiwan (Formosa): Basic Information for United States Businessmen (1959).

241 Delegates’ credentials went unchallenged after the pertinent post-World-War-II revolutions. See text above, at notes 103-105.

242 Indeed, it was not until the spring of 1963 that Cuba was thought to be a “socialist country” by members of the Communist bloc.

243 See Griffith, op. cit. note 215 above.

244 E.g., U N. General Assembly Resolutions 35 ( I ) ; 113 (II) ; 197 (III) ; 296 (IV); 450 (VI); 620 (VII).

245 U.N. General Assembly Res. 396 (V).

246 Security Council, 5th Tear, Official Records, Jan.-May Supp. 16-18 (U.N. Doc. S/1457 and Corr. 1) (1950).

247 Admission is, under Art. 4 (2) of the Charter, “effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.” Goodrich and Hambro, after a survey of both the Dumbarton Oaks and the San Francisco travaux, conclude that “ (t)here is nothing to indicate that the delegates did not intend to make a favorable recommendation by the Security Council a necessary condition to admission by vote of the General Assembly.” Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents 135 (rev. ed., 1949). Their conclusion is borne out by the subsequent practice of the relevant organs. In the first session of the General Assembly, Australia proposed that the Assembly “has primary and final responsibility in the process of admission.” (U.N. Docs. A/C.l/23/Rev. 1 and A/C.l/23/Corr. 1.) Neither this nor a similar Argentinian proposal was accepted. Goodrich and Hambro, op. cit. at 136. A similar proposal, made by the United States in the Security Council in 1947, was also not accepted. U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 190.

248 See text above at p. 691.

249 U.N. Charter, Art. 24(1).

250 The group should consist of the permanent members of the Security Council other than China, and Members representative of the major voting blocs in the United Nations. All Members of the United Nations should be entitled to submit solutions to the Chinese participation question, and to comment in writing on solutions being considered by the group. We recommend that the group generally hold public meetings; yet we note that it may be advisable for the group to iron out the intricacies of particular plans in private sessions.

251 The two Chinese claimants should be entitled to submit proposals themselves for solving the Chinese participation question, and should have rights to comment on and criticize proposals submitted to the committee. It is not inconceivable that either* or both of the Chinese claimants would refuse to participate in the 15-to-20 group which we recommend. Given the novelty of the Chinese participation question, we would suggest, in these circumstances, that a refusal to participate in the discussions be regarded as an unwillingness to fulfill one's international obligations.

252 This is a proposal not unknown in the history of international organization. Prior to Germany's admission to the League as a permanent member of the Council in 1926, Poland, Brazil, Spain, China and Belgium all claimed permanent membership in the Council. Eventually, the Assembly's First Committee proposed a plan which created a new form of “semi-permanent” membership. In principle non-permanent members of the League Council could not be re-elected after their term expired. The First Committee's proposal relaxed this rule, and permitted the Assembly, by a twothirds majority vote, to declare not more than three states “re-eligible” for Council membership. No limit was placed on the number of times a state might be re-elected. Presumably Poland, Spain and Brazil would qualify for “re-eligibility,” and thus would assume a position in the League intermediate between the Great Powers and the rank and file of League Members. See, generally, League of Nations Official Journal, 7th (Ordinary) Assembly, Spec. Supp. 45 (1926); and “Walters, A History of the League of Nations 316-327 (1952). When Georgia and Armenia submitted applications for League membership, they were permitted to take part in the social and economic activities of the League, even though their applications were not approved.

253 This proposal, too, is not without precedent in the history of international organization. When Abyssinia, and later Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, applied for League membership, they were seated only after appropriate declarations—in the former case to eliminate slavery and traffic in arms, and in the latter three, to adhere to the provisions of the Minorities Treaties. See, generally, Hudson, , “The Members of the League of Nations,” 16 Brit. Tr. Bk. Int. Law 130 (1935)Google Scholar, and Graham, The League of Nations and the Recognition of States (1933).

254 Cf. the Dec. 8th, 1964, speech by Ireland's Foreign Minister Aiken to the General Assembly. New York Times, Dec. 9, 1964, p. 6, col. 3.

255 The vacancy might be only temporary, and Communist China might be seated as a permanent member once it gave evidence that its perspectives and operations were consonant with the principles and purposes of the Charter.

256 India has been suggested. E.g. Wilcox and Marcy, Proposals for Changes in the United Nations 307 (1955).

257 E.g., prior to 1955, Italy participated in deliberations of the Trusteeship Council without being a Member of the U.N. Although it was without the vote when either Somalia or general trusteeship problems were discussed, Italy could (1) include items in the agenda, (2) request special sessions of the Trusteeship Council, (3) submit draft resolutions and propose other motions or amendments without a second, and (4) append its views to the reports or recommendations of the Trusteeship Council. Italy, moreover, had access to the private meetings of the Council, and it was to be notified of the first meeting of each session of the Trusteeship Council and of the provisional agenda. Italy, however, was not permitted to participate in the work of the subsidiary organs of the Council. Trusteeship Council Res. 310 (“VII) entitled “Question of the Full Participation of Italy in the Work of the Trusteeship Council.“

258 For an earlier and still relevant projection and evaluation of alternatives, see Dean, “United States Foreign Policy and Formosa,” 33 Foreign Affairs 360 (1955).

259 See text above at p. 682.

260 I t is obvious that Communist China could not, without substantial modification of its foreign policy objectives, adhere to a “compromise” settlement designed by the drafting committee, if the compromise permits separate representation for Taiwan in the United Nations. This, however, should not preclude the drafting committee from reaching such a compromise. It is for the world community to spell out the terms of participation in the United Nations, and not for Communist China to dictate terms to the United Nations. Rejection of the world community-approved settlement plan would be a virtual demonstration that Communist China is unwilling to fulfill the terms of the Charter. We note that both France and the United Kingdom have employed variants of a “two China” policy. Both countries have consulates in Taiwan; Prance has an ambassador, and the United Kingdom a chargé d'affaires in Communist China. Communist China has, however, unceasingly rejected proposals for “compromise,” particularly those in the form of a “two-Chinas” solution. Cf. Chen Ti, June 20, 1964, Press Conference: People's Daily,”The Chinese People are Determined to Liberate Taiwan,” June 27, 1965, in 27 Peking Review 9 (July-2, 1965); Commentator, “Don't Pall into the Imperialist Trap , “ People's Daily, July 9, 1964, in 29 ibid. 35 (July 17, 1964) (Malawi had invited representatives of both “Chinas” to its independence celebrations); “ India Aids U. S. ‘Two Chinas’Plot , “ 27 ibid. 23 (July 3, 1964); “What is the Sato Government up to in the U.N.?”, 51 ibid. 6 (Dec. 18, 1964); “Risaku Sato's Daydream,” 49 ibid. 30 (Dec. 4, 1964); “New Delhi's Attempt to Create ‘Two Chinas’ Denounced,” 47 ibid. 18 (Nov. 20, 1964) (India had invited delegations from both “ C h i n a s “ to the 22nd International Geological Conference). At a June 20, 1964, press conference, Foreign Minister Chen Yi declared: “We are convinced that U. S. imperialism's manipulation of the United Nations will sooner or later break down and the Chiang Kai-shek gang will sooner or later be ousted from it. The lawful seat of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations will sooner or later be restored. This, of course, takes time. We are not in a hurry, we can wait. Under no circumstances will we barter away principles and sovereignty; any attempt to make the restoration of China's seat in the United Nations a bait for our acceptance of the ‘two Chinas’ scheme is doomed to failure.” 26 ibid. 6, 7 (June 26, 1964); People's Daily, “China's Sovereignty Over Taiwan Brooks No Intervention,” May 12, 1964, 20 ibid. 6 (May 15, 1964); People's Daily, “ O n Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between China and France,” Jan. 29, 1964, 5 ibid. 10 (Jan. 31, 1964); Chou En-lai, Press Conference, Pakistan, Feb. 25, 1964, 10 ibid. 18 (March 6, 1964); Chou En-lai, interview with Bernard Tesselin, Feb. 3, 1964, 7 ibid. 14 (Feb. 14, 1964).