1 WTO, Regional Trade Agreements, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm.

2 Arguably, two “waves of regionalism” preceded the establishment of the WTO: (1) during the 1960s, when RTAs proliferated in Europe and then among the developing countries in Africa and Latin America, and (2) during the late 1980s and the early 1990s, in tandem with the Uruguay Round negotiations. See Bhagwati, Jagdish, Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview , in New Dimensions in Regional Integration 28 (Jaime de, Melo & Panagariya, Arvind eds., 1993)Google Scholar.

3 Luis Abugattas, Majluf, Swimming in the Spaghetti Bowl: Challenges for Developing Countries Under the “New Regionalism,“ at 3 (2004), at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtab28_en.pdf Google Scholar.

4 For more discussions on regional arrangements within the multilateral trade system, see Regionalism, Multilateralism and the Politics of Global Trade (Barry, Donald & Keith, Ronald eds., 1999 Google Scholar) and Wang, Guiguo, The Law of the WTO: China and the Future of Free Trade, ch. 3 (2005)Google Scholar.

5 See infra note 24 and accompanying text. Both arrangements were concluded within the framework of the WTO.

6 The existing FTAs are with ASEAN, Chile, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Macau, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, and Singapore. Details are available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/fta_qianshu.shtml. Information on the agreements being negotiated is at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/fta_tanpan.shtml.

7 China has evolved considerably from a revolutionary power to an emerging economy since the late 1970s. This period of development started with the end of the disastrous Cultural Revolution and the gradual establishment of Deng Xiaoping’s open door policies. In accordance with its well-enforced domestic policy of “clear up wrongs and bring things back to order” (Boluan Fanzheng), China also became increasingly open, active, and pragmatic in its foreign relations. For more about China’s foreign policy evolution after 1949, see Hunt, Michael, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy 232–50 (1996)Google Scholar.

8 Ideology is a key factor in understanding China’s modern development; it dominated China’s domestic politics, as well as its foreign policies, until the 1980s. See Lexian, Fang, Is China’s Foreign Policy Becoming Less Ideological? (conference paper presented at University of Durkham, Oct. 24–25, 2003), at http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/china.studies/ischinasforeignpolicybecominglessideological.pdf Google Scholar.

9 Conventionally translated as “self-reliance,” the term Zili Gengshengvias highlighted in China’s foreign relations, especially in the Maoist era. It referred to the relationship between the state and economic development, and meant that China should basically rely upon itself to achieve independence and further development. For the later evolution of this policy, see Kerr, David, Has China Abandoned Self-Reliance? , 14 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 77 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 In early 1992, former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping visited a few cities in south China and called on the next generation of Chinese leaders to speed up economic reform and to promote more openness. He gave particular attention to the relationship between socialism and a market economy, and noted that a market economy did not equal capitalism. Subsequently, the Chinese Communist Party’s Fourteenth National Assembly formally adopted the policy of “A Socialist Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics” as the goal model of future reform. For more about Deng’s southern tour and its impact, see The Nanxun Legacy and China’s Development in the Post-Deng Era (Wong, John & Zheng, Yongnian eds., 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Prior to joining the W TO, China was subject to an annual review by the United States for most-favored-nation treatment. In such reviews, human rights, political issues, and trade matters were entangled, with China seen as a target of criticism. This ongoing point of conflict was eliminated in one fell swoop by China’s accession to the WTO since MFN status is a cornerstone of the multilateral system. For further discussions on this matter, see Wang, Guiguo, The Law of the WTO: China and the Future of Free Trade, ch. l (2005)Google Scholar.

12 Chinese officials and scholars use the expression “peaceful rise” to describe China’s foreign policy approach. Also referred to as “peaceful development,” this approach holds that China will develop economically by taking advantage of the peaceful international environment and that it will, through that development, maintain and contribute to world peace. For further discussion, see Pan, Esther, The Promise and Pitfalls of China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ (2006), at http://www.cfr.org/publication/10446/ Google Scholar.

13 By 2011, China had established 163 bilateral economic cooperation arrangements and 14 free trade areas, and entered into 129 bilateral investment treaties and 9 FTAs. See National Bureau of Statistics of China, Report on the Economic and Social Achievements During the “11th Five-Year Plan” (II) (in Chinese), at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/ztfx/sywcj/t20110302_402706681.htm Google Scholar.

14 The concept of trade creation and diversion was first put forward in Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (1950). Charles Kindleberger discussed the investment-creation and diversion effects of regional integration in European Integration and the International Corporation, Colum. J. World Bus., Winter 1966, at 65. Since then, questions concerning European and North American integration have been the subject of much research. See, e.g., Baldwin, Richard, Forslid, Rikard, & Haaland, Jan, Investment Creation and Investment Diversion: Simulation Analysis of the Single Market Programme (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 1308, 1995)Google Scholar.

15 See Carlos A. Primo, Braga, Safadi, Raed, & Yeats, Alexander, NAFTA’s Implications for East Asian Exports (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 1351, 1994 Google Scholar); Fukao, Kyoji, Okubo, Toshihiro, & Stern, Robert, An Econometric Analysis of Trade Diversion Under NAFTA (Univ. of Michigan Sch. of Pub. Policy, Discussion Paper No. 491, 2002)Google Scholar.

16 See Ctr. for Int’l Econ., Economic Analysis of AUSFTA: Impact of the Bilateral Free Trade Agreement with the United States 42–44 (Apr. 2004), at http://www.tliecie.com.au/content/publications/CIE-economic_analysis_ausfta.pdf Google Scholar. In fact, as a result of the proliferation of regionalism, the percentage of intra-regional trade has increased sharply over the past years: by the end of 2008, FTA-related trade accounted for 52 percent of the United States’ total exports, 70 percent of those of the European Union (EU), and 50 percent of those of die East Asian region. Intra-regional trade amounts to more than 50 percent of all world trade.

17 Hujintao’s Report on the Party Congress, XINHUA, Oct. 24, 2007 (in Chinese), at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/24/content_6938568_4.htm.

18 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is an intergovernmental organization established in June 2001 comprising China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Though the organization’s primary objectives relate to security, it also deals with the economic cooperation of the parties. For more information, see http://www.sectsco.org/EN/.

19 In 1992, with the Asian Development Bank’s assistance, China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Viet Nam entered into a program of subregional economic cooperation—die Greater Mekong Subregion—designed to enhance economic relations among the countries. For more information, see http://www.adb.org/GMS/about.asp.

20 The Greater Tumen Initiative is a joint mechanism of the four member countries: China, Mongolia, Russia, and South Korea. Supported by the UN Development Programme, it provides a multilateral forum for the members to identify and implement regional initiatives that encourage economic growth, improve living standards, and contribute to peace and stability in northeast Asia. For more information, see http://www.tumenprogramme.org/index.php?id=l.

21 Formally inaugurated in February 2001, Boao Forum for Asia, http://www.boaoforum.org/Html/adoutjs-en.asp, is a nongovernmental, not-for-profit international organization committed to “promoting regional economic integration and bringing Asian countries even closer to their development goals.”

22 Established in 1989, and currently with twenty-one member economies, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation is a forum for facilitating economic growth, cooperation, trade, and investment in the Asia-Pacific region. Unlike the WTO and other multilateral trade bodies, it imposes no treaty obligations on its participants. For more information, see http://www.apec.org.

23 The Asia-Europe Meeting was officially established in 1996 at the first summit in Bangkok. It is an interregional forum that comprises the European Commission, the twenty-seven members of the EU, and the thirteen members of the ASEAN + 3 . As of 2008, India, Mongolia, and Pakistan have also been participating. For more information, see http://www.eeas.europa.eu/asem/index_en.htm.

24 The mainland–Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) was signed on June 29,2003, and is available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enhongkong.shtml. The mainland-Macao CEPA was signed on October 18, 2003, and is available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enmacau.shtml. Both entered into force on January 1, 2004. Each year a supplementary agreement has been signed between the mainland and its two Special Administrative Regions to further liberalize trade between the parties. By May 2010, seven such agreements have been signed.

25 The China-Chile FTA was signed on November 18, 2005, and entered into force on October 1, 2006. See China-Chile FTA, at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enchile.shtml.

26 The China-Pakistan FTA was signed on November 24, 2006, and entered into force on July 1, 2007. On February 21, 2009, the two parties further signed the Agreement on Trade in Services, which entered into force on October 10, 2009. See China-Pakistan FTA, at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enpakistan.shtml.

27 China and ASEAN first signed the Framework Agreement on China-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Cooperation in November 2002, and in November 2004 they signed the Agreement on Trade in Goods of the China-ASEAN FTA, which entered into force in July 2005. In January 2007, the two parties signed the China-ASEAN Agreement on Trade in Services, which entered into effect in July 2007. In August 2009, they signed the China-ASEAN Agreement on Investment. The text of the 2002 China-ASEAN FTA is available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/aseanchinafta.pdf. The subsequent agreements are available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/chinaasean.shtml.

28 See China , New Zealand Ink FTA , China Daily (Aug. 21, 2009), at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hellochina/newzealandambassador2009/2009-08/21/content_8597662.htm Google Scholar.

29 New Zealand was the first country that signed (in 1997) the bilateral agreement with China on the latter’s accession to the WTO and was the first developed country that officially recognized (in 2004) China’s “market economy” status.

30 Under the China-Singapore FTA, signed on October 23, 2008, the two countries will accelerate liberalization of trade in goods on the basis of the Agreement on Trade in Goods of the China-ASEAN FTA and will further liberalize trade in services. See China-Singapore FTA, at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/ensingapore.shtml.

31 See China-Peru FTA, Apr. 28, 2009, at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enperu.shtml.

32 See China-Costa Rica FTA, Apr. 8, 2010, at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/encosta.shtml.

33 See News Release, China-FTA Network, Positive Progress Made at China-Chile FTA Talks on Investment Agreement (Feb. 10, 2010), at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/enchile/enchilenews/201002/2135_l.html.

34 See News Release, China FTA Network, China-Pakistan FTA on Trade in Services Comes into Force on Oct. 10 (Sept. 13, 2009), at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/enpakistan/enpakistannews/200911/1454_l.html [hereinafter China-Pakistan FTA on Trade in Services Comes into Force].

35 See News Release, China FTA Network, ASEAN-China FTA Investment Agreement Signed (Aug. 19,2009), at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/enasean/chianaseannews/200911/l473_l.html.

36 China and Pakistan maintained close relationships since 1950, when Pakistan was among the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China. For over sixty years, the two countries have had frequent, in-depth, and high-level exchanges that have led, over the years, to diverse agreements on political, economic, military, and cultural cooperation, as well as on technical assistance.

37 See Hong, Zhu, Continuing Development of Establishing the China-Pakistan FTA , International Business Daily (Dec. 1, 2008) (in Chinese), at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/pakistanarticle/chpakistan/pakhwmy/200812/473_l.html Google Scholar.

38 See Agreement on the Early Harvest Programme for the Free Trade Agreement Between China and Pakistan, Annexes 1, 2 (Apr. 15, 2005), at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enpakistan.shtml.

39 See China-Pakistan FTA, supra note 26.

40 China-Pakistan FTA on Trade in Services Comes into Force, supra note 34.

41 For instance, the FTAs concluded by the United States are largely based on the NAFTA model, and European FTAs make use of a cluster of such instruments.

42 See Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China, Art. 1 & Annex 2, Nov. 29, 2004, at http://www.aseansec.org/16646.htm.

43 The Early Harvest Programme was endorsed by the asean and Chinese commerce ministers during meetings in September 2002 and was incorporated into the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between the Association of South East Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China, supra note 27, two months later. Given that it is basically a framework for tariff reduction (which is a necessary part of any FTA), the Early Harvest Programme is an integral part of the China-asean FTA.

44 See Medalla, Erlinda M. & Balboa, Jenny D., The Impact of asean-China FTA Early Harvest Program: The Case of the Philippines with Focus on Short-Run Effects on the Agriculture Sector (Research Paper Series No. 2007-01, Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 2007), at http://publication.pids.gov.ph/details.php?pid=4245 Google Scholar.

45 Needless to say, the exclusion of the whole agricultural sector would not meet the “substantially all trade” requirement of GATT Article XXIV.

46 Under the China-Philippines Early Harvest Programme, which took effect on January 1, 2006, 214 tariff lines were granted zero tariffs. Medalla & Balboa, supra note 44, at 10.

47 Like others, when joining the WTO China first negotiated with the then existing WTO members on a bilateral basis. Agreements resulting therefrom were multilateralized in the form of a protocol on admission that contains the terms and conditions of China’s accession to the WTO, including market access for trade in services, reduction of tariffs, and so on. As China was considered a nonmarket economy or, in any event, not a full market economy, sections 15 and 16 of the Protocol set out the circumstances (relating to antidumping, safeguards, and countervailing duties) in which other countries are not required to treat China as a market economy.

48 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China on the Recognition of China’s Full Market Economy Status and the Commencement of Negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement Between Australia and the People’s Republic of China, para. 2 (Apr. 18, 2005), at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/mou_aust-china_fta.pdf. Documents on China’s accession to the WTO, including its Protocol of Accession, WTO Doc. WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001), are available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm.

49 On the eve of the thirteenth China-EU Summit in Brussels, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on October 5, 2010. One of the achievements for China was that Germany promised to continue urging the EU to recognize China’s status as a full market economy as soon as possible, and China agreed to hold talks with the EU on the matter. See Chinese Premier Meets with German Chancellor , Global Times (Oct. 6, 2010), at http://china.globaltimes.cn/diplomacy/2010-10/579538.htm Google Scholar.

50 See supra note 32.

51 China–New Zealand FTA, Apr. 7, 2008, at http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/l-The-agreement/2-Text-of-theagreement/index.php [hereinafter China–New Zealand FTA]; see also China-New Zealand Environment Cooperation Agreement, at http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/l-The-agreernent/l-Key-outcomes/0-downloads/ECA-NZ.pdf.

52 The preamble to the China-Chile FTA, supra note 25, provides that the two parties “recogniz[e] that this Agreement should be implemented with a view toward. . . promoting sustainable development in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation.” In its Article 108, it further provides that the “Parties shall enhance their communication and cooperation on . . . environment through . . . the Environmental Cooperation Agreement between the Parties.”

53 The preamble of the China-Pakistan FTA, supra note 26, provides: “Recognizing that this Agreement should be implemented with a view toward raising the standard of living, creating new job opportunities, and promoting sustainable development in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation . . . .”

54 See supra note 31.

55 For details, see the Chile-United States FTA, Jan. 1, 2004, ch. 19, at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text, and the Peru–United States FTA, Apr. 12, 2006, ch. 18, at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text.

56 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

57 These terms are defined in Article 125 of the China–New Zealand FTA, supra note 51.

58 Id, An. 128.

59 Id., Annex l.pt. A.

60 As a country with a large population but relatively less farmland, China will become increasingly dependent on the import of agricultural products. Such a change in its domestic economic situation will lead to significant changes in China’s policies on agricultural trade.

61 In addition to standard matters, the China–New Zealand FTA, supra note 51, Arts. 13 5 (f), (g), covers “bonds, including government issued bonds, debentures, loans and other forms of debt, and rights derived therefrom,” as well as “any right conferred by law or under contract and any licenses and permits pursuant to law.”

62 See, e.g., id., Art. 138; China-Peru FTA, supra note 31, Art. 129; China-ASEAN Agreement on Investment, supra note 27, Art. 4.

63 China–New Zealand FTA, supra note 51, Art. 143. It further elaborates that fair and equitable treatment includes “the obligation to ensure that, having regard to general principles of law, investors are not denied justice or treated unfairly or inequitably in any legal or administrative proceeding affecting the investments of the investor,” while full protection and security “requires each Party to take such measures as may be reasonably necessary in the exercise of its authority to ensure the protection and security of the investment.” Id.

64 Id.

65 Id, Art. 183.

66 Id, Art. 186.

67 China-Pakistan FTA, supra note 26, Art. 54(2). Many of China’s first-generation BITs contain similar provisions. Article 8 of the China-Peru BIT, with similar provisions, was tested in Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6 (June 19, 2009).

68 China–New Zealand FTA, supra note 51, Art. 153(1).

69 Article 153(4) of the China–New Zealand FTA, supra note 51, states that the FTA’s provisions on dispute settlement prevail over the arbitration and conciliation procedures of both ICSID and the UN Commission on International Trade Law.

70 Id, Art. 154(1).

71 See Civil Procedure Law, Art. 238 (China). In this regard, provisions of the China-New Zealand FTA must prevail in case of conflicts between such provisions and Chinese law. On the matter of the statute of limitations, Article 135 of the General Principles of Civil Law of China stipulates: “Except as otherwise stipulated by law, the limitation of action regarding applications to a people’s court for protection of civil rights shall be two years.” Since the China-New Zealand FTA and the Chinese law differ regarding the limitation period—with the latter dictating that international treaty provisions (including those of the FTA) must prevail—Chinese law has been amended, in effect, by the FTA, with the consequence that the FTA controls.

72 The conclusion of NAFTA may serve as a good example in this context. Beyond geopolitical considerations, under NAFTA rules the United States was able to secure oil supply from Canada and also to ease domestic tension concerning the availability of cheap labor and raw materials in Mexico.

73 In 2009, China overtook the United States as die world’s largest automobile market and Germany as the world’s largest exporter. See Miller, John W. & Walker, Marcus, China Dethrones Germany as Top Goods Exporter , Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 2010 Google Scholar, at A6. And in 2010, China overtook Japan as the world’s second-largest economy behind the United States. However, because of its huge population, China’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) still lags far behind many other countries. For instance, according to the International Monetary Fund, China’s per capita GDP in 2009 was only U.S.$3,566, significantly lower than that of Japan (U.S.$39,573), and China ranked only ninety-ninth worldwide in this respect, which makes China’s per capita GDP still lower than that of middle income countries. See Ming, Zhang, China Still Behind Japan Economically , China Daily (Aug. 23, 2010), at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-08/23/content_11186779.htm Google Scholar.

On September 23, 2010, in an address at the sixty-fifth session of the UN General Assembly, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao provided an effective summary of the country’s current economic situation. Despite China’s having the world’s third largest GDP, that amount is, in per capita terms, merely one-tenth that of developed countries. China has enjoyed over thirty years of rapid growth, but its further development faces constraints in relation to energy, resources, and the environment. Although China is a leading producer of textiles, electronic and electrical products, and iron and steel products (among other things), it remains at the lower end of the global industrial chain. Finally, whereas many coastal areas and large and medium-sized cities are modern and thriving, the western region and vast areas in the center of the country “are still rather backward, and we have 150 million people living below the poverty line set by the United Nations.” China Reaffirms Support for UN’s leading Role in World Affairs , UN Daily News (Sept. 23, 2010), at http://www.un.org/news/dh/pdf/english/2010/23092010.pdf Google Scholar.

74 As mentioned earlier, China has been working hard to develop its market economy over the past years, with the consequence that at least some of its economic sectors are now much more market driven than those in countries that have been granted that status. However, a number of traditional economic powers, including the United States and EU, have not yet recognized China’s status as a full market economy. From a legal perspective, this problem is a product of China’s WTO accession protocol, under which China accepted to be treated as a nonmarket economy for a fifteen-year period— until 2016, at the latest. Consequently, Chinese products have suffered serious discriminatory treatment in export trade, especially in the context of investigating trade remedies.

75 Taiwan became a WTO member, under the name of “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu,” on January 1, 2002. For further information on Taiwan’s WTO accession and status, see http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/chinese_taipei_e.htm.

76 For further discussions of China-Taiwan economic relations, see Wang, Guiguo, The Across-the-Strait Relations After the Hong Kong Ministerial (2006)Google Scholar (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). See also Hsieh, Pasha, Facing China: Taiwan’s Status as a Separate Customs Territory in the World Trade Organization , 39 J. World Trade 1195 (2005)Google Scholar.

77 China-Chile Free Trade Agreement Implementation (in Chinese), at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/chile/chile_xiedingshishi.shtml.

78 See China-Pakistan FTA on Trade in Services Comes into Force on Oct. 10, supra note 34.

79 New Zealand Trade Minister: China is New Zealand’s Second Largest Exporter , Guangzhpu Daily (Apr. 2, 2010) (in Chinese), at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ftazkun/201004/2377_l.html Google Scholar.

80 News Release, China-asean Economic Ministers Meeting Held in Da Nang in Vietnam, Spoke Highly of China-asean Free Trade Area Implementation (Aug. 26,2010) (in Chinese), at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/article/chinadongmeng/dongmengnews/201008/3216_1.html.

81 These provisions are a natural legal response to the huge amount of foreign investment in China and the more recent surge in China’s investment in other economies. In 2009, China attracted a total of U.S.$90 billion in foreign investment, making it the world’s second largest recipient of foreign investment. Xi Jinping, Vice-President of the People’s Republic of China, Speech at the UNCTAD World Investment Forum 2010, at 2 (Sept. 7, 2010), at http://unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org/img/Statement_Jinping_Vice_President_of_China.pdf. Also, according to the 2009 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment published by the Chinese government, the direct investments made by Chinese entities in other countries and regions amounted to U.S.$56.53 billion in 2009. By the end of that year, Chinese entities had invested in about thirteen thousand enterprises in 177 countries and regions, and the accumulated outward foreign direct investment reached U.S.$245.75 billion. See National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China And State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 2009 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 2 (in Chinese and English), at http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/201009/1284339524515.pdf Google Scholar. UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy, at 6, fig. 1.5, at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2010_en.pdf, reported that the mainland of China had ranked sixth in the world in terms of outward foreign direct investment in 2009.

82 See Webb, Richard, Camminati, Josefina, & Thorne, Raúl León, Antidumping Mechanisms and Safeguards in Peru 27–28 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3658, 2005)Google Scholar. For the Protocol of Accession, see supra note 48.

83 New Zealand dairy products have an export value of NZ$363 million (average over 2004–06) and amounts to 18 percent of New Zealand’s total exports to China. Under the FTA, Chinese tariffs on some New Zealand dairy products will be phased out over five to six years; tariffs on cheese, butter, and liquid milk will be phased out over ten years; and tariffs on milk powders will be phased out over twelve years. See Frequently Asked Questions About the NZ-China FTA (July 2, 2010), at http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/5-FAQ/index.php#OutcomesGoods Google Scholar.

84 In the relatively peaceful international environment after the Second World War, the relationship between net exporters of energy and net importers is becoming increasingly interdependent as a result of industrialization and the globalization of the world economy. For individual country energy profiles, see http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm.

85 The upshot was the Energy Charter Treaty, which aimed at strengthening the mechanisms relating to energy development issues and at mitigating the risks associated with energy-related investment and trade. See http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=7.

86 See Rufa, Shen, Xiaohui, Li, & Xue, Liu, China’s Crude Oil Import Dependence Exceeds Warning Line (Economic Reference Paper, Mar. 29, 2010) (in Chinese), at http://energy.people.com.en/BIG5/l124l678.html Google Scholar.

87 Over the past few years, energy diplomacy has become an important part of Chinese leaders’ summit diplomacy. It also functions as an important boost for adopting China’s “going-out” strategy, an important part of the national development strategy. See Qinhua, Xu, Chinas Energy Diplomacy audits Implications for Global Energy Security 4 (Friedrich Ebert Stiffung Briefing Paper, Aug. 2007), at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04763.pdf Google Scholar.

88 Members of the Gulf Co-operation Council include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

89 See Golovnina, Maria, China’s Thirst for Energy Fuels WestwardExpansion , Reuters, Mar. 11 2010, at http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE62A2ED20100311 Google Scholar.

90 See China’s Growth Benefits Chile Copper Export: Report , Xinhua News Agency (Oct. 26, 2009), at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-10/27/content_12337830.htm Google Scholar.

91 In this regard, China’s FTA negotiations with Australia, if successful, may assist in negotiating deals on iron ore and other natural resources.

92 See Machlup, Fritz, A History of Thought on Economic Integration 41 (1977)Google Scholar.

93 China’s rise in recent years is viewed by some with uncertainty and anxiousness, for fear of the potential threat presented by its combination of rapid economic growth, military modernization, and energy demands. There are various reasons for such fears. See Khalid R., Al-Rodhan, A Critique of the China Threat Theory: A Systematic Analysis , 31 Asian Persp. 41 (2007)Google Scholar.

94 Other East Asian states also aspire to strengthen their economic ties and closer relationships with asean. For instance, South Korea signed the Agreement on Trade in Goods with nine asean member states in August 2006; Japan completed its Comprehensive Economic Partnership with asean in April 2008; and the India-asean Trade in Goods Agreement was concluded in August 2009.

95 See, e.g., Inst. of Southeast Asian Studies, Developing aean-China Relations: Realities and Prospects 36–42 (2004)Google Scholar.

96 China’s FTA conclusion with asean may “defuse American influence” in the region. Vincent Wei-cheng, Wang, The Logic of China-asean Free Trade Agreement: Economic Statecraft of “Peaceful Rise,” at 23 (U. Malaya Conference Paper, Aug. 2007), at http://web.rollins.edu/tlairson/mba/chinaaseanfta2.pdf Google Scholar.

97 Though China has been one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, it did not take an active role until recently in the shaping of the global political order. The present system is still largely based upon the old Bretton Woods system, in which China’s influence and decision-making power were limited. The so-called new international economic order was therefore welcomed by China.

98 Many observers held that China is “ill prepared” since “it lacks experience in international financial systems management.” But a number of them have also acknowledged that China “is facing a turning point in its relationship with the international system. From passively accepting regulations of existing international financial institutions, the country will be joining the restructuring process for the first time.” Zaibang, Wang, International Situation 2008: Historic Transformations Highlight Urgent Need for Systematic Readjustments , 19 Contemp. Int’l Rel. 65 (2009)Google Scholar; see also Chin, Gregory & Thakur, Ramesh, Will China Change the Rules of Global Order? , Wash. Q., Oct. 2010, at 119 Google Scholar.

99 The Protocol of Provisional Application was adopted in order to bring the GATT into force at an earlier date than the ITO. It is through this protocol that GATT is applied as a treaty in international law.

100 For detailed discussion of China’s effort to resume the status of a GATT contracting party, see Wang, Guiguo, China’s Return to GATT—Legal and Economic Implications , 28 J. World Trade 51 (1994)Google Scholar.

101 Having adopted the open policy, China began its efforts to return to the international arena. After first attempting (prior to the establishment of the W TO) to resume contracting party status (as under the GATT), negotiations between China and WTO members concentrated on the conditions under which China could join the multilateral trade organization.

102 For the Protocol of Accession, see supra note 48.

103 More and more economists are coming to see antidumping measures as, in some sense, “protectionism in disguise.” For example, Hoekman and Kostecki note that antidumping “constitutes straightforward protectionism that is packaged to make it look like something different.... Anti-dumping is not about fair play. Its goal is to tilt the rules of game in favor of import-competing industries.” Koekman, Bernard & Kostecki, Michel, The political economy of the world trading system: The WTO and Beyond 322–23 (2001)Google Scholar.

104 See Protocol of Accession, supra note 48, Art. 16.

105 Id, Art. 15.

106 Recently, Canada and other countries have been using both antidumping and subsidies rules against Chinese exports. On September 20, 2010, the Canada Border Services Agency announced that the initiation of both dumping and countervailing duty investigations into certain steel grating that originated in, or was exported from, China. This investigation is the tenth of its type currently in progress by Canada against China. See News Release, Canada Border Services Agency, The CBSA Investigates the Dumping and Subsidizing of Certain Steel Grating (Sept. 20, 2010), at http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/media/antidumping/2010/2010-09-20-eng.html. Similarly, on September 16, 2010, the EU announced that, in addition to the already ongoing antidumping investigation, it started an investigation into Chinese subsidies for wireless modems. See European Commission, Notice of Initiation of an Anti-subsidy Proceeding Concerning Imports of Wireless Wide Area Networking (WWAN) Modems Originating in the People’s Republic of China, European Commission, 2010 O.J. (C 249) 8 (Sept. 16,2010). Such simultaneous initiation of antidumping and anti-subsidy investigations may amount to double counting and therefore constitute serious trade barriers to Chinese exports.

107 For discussions on WTO-plus and WTO-minus provisions, see The WTO: Governance, Dispute settlement & Developing Countries (Janow, Merit E., Donaldson, Victoria, & Yanovich, Alan eds., 2008 Google Scholar) and Julia Ya, Qin, “W TO-Plus “ Obligations and Their Implications for the World Trade Organization Legal System , 37 J. World Trade 483 (2003)Google Scholar.

108 Chinese leaders have never failed to use their visits to foreign countries for promoting China’s market economy status. Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Germany in October 2010 is an example. For details, see supra note 49.

109 There were very strong reactions in Taiwan after the ECFA was concluded. For comments, see http://tpsa.hcu.edu.tw/ezcatfiles/b083/img/img/l181/Bl-2.pdf (in Chinese).

110 See Cross-straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, June 29, 2010 [hereinafter Cross-straits ECFA], pmbl., at http://www.moea.gov.tw/Mns/populace/news/wHandNews_File.ashxJnews_id==19723&seria_.no=6.

111 Obviously, Taipei tends to argue the former, whereas Beijing prefers the latter. In a speech by C. Y. Leung, the Convener of Hong Kong’s Executive Council, it was argued that the “ECFA is a little different from [a] CEPA in terms of coverage—the nature of the two agreements are similar.” C. Y. Leung, Speech at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, at 10 (Sept. 22, 2010), at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/0923_transcript_hong_kong.pdf. In any case, Taiwan would refuse to treat the ECFA as equivalent to the CEPA, as that might be interpreted as implying that Taiwan has the same political status as the China’s two Special Administrative Regions.

112 See Cross-straits ECFA, supra note 110, Annex I: Product List and Tariff Reduction Arrangements Under the Early Harvest Programme for Trade in Goods, at http://www.moea.gov.tw/Mns/populace/news/wHandNews_File.ashx?news_id=T9723&serial_no=l.

113 Taiwan-China Trade: No Such Thing as a Free Trade , Economist Newsbook (June 25, 2010), at http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/06/taiwan-china_trade Google Scholar.

114 See Cross-straits ECFA, supra note 110, Annex IV: Sectors and Liberalization Measures Under the Early Harvest Programme for Trade in Services, at http://www.moea.gov.tw/Mns/populace/news/wHandNews_File.ashx?news_id=19723&serial_no=4.

115 Id. at 9 (Specific Commitment 2).

116 Cross-straits ECFA, supra note 110, Art. 5.

117 Jiang, Alex, ECFA Cheers, but Abo Worries, Foreign Investors , Focus Taiwan (June 9, 2010), at http://focustaiwan.tw/ShowNews/WebNewsJDetaiI.aspx?ID=201006090038&Type=aECO Google Scholar.

118 Report by the Secretariat, Trade Policy Review of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen andMatsu xiii, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/232 (May 31, 2010).

119 See ECFA to Help Taiwan with Global Integration: WTO , China Post (July 6, 2010), at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan-business/2010/07/06/263434/ECFA-to.htm Google Scholar.

120 >Ralph, Jennings, Taiwan Using China Trade Deal to Sell Foreign FTAs , Reuters (Mar. 26, 2010), at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/26/us-taiwan-economy-idUSTRE62P19A20100326 Google Scholar.

121 See Hu, Zep & Wu, Sofia, U.S. Recognizes Taiwan’s Right to Sign FTAs , Focus Taiwan (July 8, 2010), at http://focustaiwan.tw/ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?ID=201007080006&Type=aIPL Google Scholar.

122 Having said that, recent developments show that the Chinese government is getting more tolerant concerning Taiwan’s participation in international organizations such as the World Health Organization and WTO. It appears that the Chinese government has also consented to Taiwan’s negotiating an FTA with Singapore. Thus, when both sides treat the matter with adequate sensitivity, Taiwan’s negotiations with other countries on FTAs may not necessarily cause serious problems.

123 For further discussion of this issue, see Wang, Guiguo, The China–Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement Revisited , 5 J. World Investment & Trade 177 (2004)Google Scholar.

124 Note by the Secretariat, Synopsis of “Systemic” Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements 22, WTO Doc. WT/REG/W/37 (Mar. 2, 2000).

125 Teh, Robert, Prusa, Thomas J., & Budetta, Michele, Trade Remedy Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements (Working Paper, WTO Doc. ERSD-2007-03, Sept. 2007)Google Scholar.

126 For discussions on the application of safeguard measures in FTAs, see Pauwelyn, Joost, The Puzzle of WTO Safeguards and Regional Trade Agreements , 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 109 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

127 Indonesia, Philippines Seek Delay in Full Implementation of CAFTA , Dateline Philippines (Jan. 10, 2010), at http://mindoropost.com/2010/01/10/indonesia-philippines-seek-delay-in-full-implementation-of-cafta Google Scholar.

128 Sarfaraz, Sohail, Massive Misuse of Pak-China FTA Detected , Pakistan Business Recorder (Apr. 12, 2010), at http://prgmea.org/nc/ncl2-04-10.html Google Scholar.

129 According to the latest statistics by China’s General Administration of Customs, China imported 204 million tons of crude oil in 2009, 47.7 percent of which came from Angola, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. These figures also showed that China’s oil imports from the above three nations, compared to those for the previous year, increased by 7.6 percent, 8.6 percent, and 15.1 percent, respectively. See Saudi Arabia, Angola, Iran Remain Top 3 Oil Suppliers to China , People’s Daily Online (Feb. 10, 2010), at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90858/90863/6892818.html Google Scholar.

130 China realized the need and therefore negotiated an agreement with Russia for the supply of oil through a pipeline across the border of the two countries a few years ago. According the agreement, Russia would provide fifteen million tons of oil to China annually from 2011 for twenty years. In September 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Chinese President Hu Jintao attended the ceremony, held in Beijing, that marked the completion of the pipeline project. The two countries are now negotiating agreements to supply other forms of energy and natural resources, including natural gas and minerals. See Xiaoming, Wang, New Sino-Russian Energy Deal: After the Oil-for-Loans Talks Failed in March , People’s Daily (Sept. 28, 2010) (in Chinese), at http://big5.ce.cn/cysc/ny/shiyou/201009/28/t20100928_20512128.shtml Google Scholar.

131 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

132 China and Australia started their first round of official FTA negotiations in Sydney in May 2005. The fourteenth round was completed in February 2010. China and India established a Joint Study Group in 2003 to examine the possibility of their economic engagement, and in October 2007, the Joint Task Force finalized its report on the feasibility of the China-India FTA.

133 In August 2010, Yu Woo-ik, South Korea’s ambassador to China, stated that his country and China “are expected to initiate official FTA talks in 2011”; feasibility studies by government officials, industry representatives, and scholars from both countries had been wrapped up before the ambassador issued his statement. Lan, Lan & Qingfen, Ding, Sino-ROK’s FTA Talks “Likely Next Year,” China Daily (Aug. 5, 2010), at http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7093447.html Google Scholar.

134 The 2010 dispute over China’s interference with the export of rare earth to Japan and other countries further exemplifies the fragility of the relationships between the countries involved. It also reflects the continuing distrust between China and Japan, despite the lip service that their officials give to strengthening the friendship of the two most important countries in East Asia.