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Are There “Inherently Sovereign Functions” in International Law?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 June 2021
Abstract
Privatization of functions that were traditionally considered sovereign has reached new heights. International lawyers have responded mostly by seeking to limit some of the consequences of that phenomenon, by, for example, ensuring accountability of states for outsourcing. International law has sometimes appeared agnostic, however, about the very legality of privatization. This Article explores a more radical take, namely the possibility that certain state functions could be seen as “inherently sovereign” under international law. International law can be understood this way, the Article argues, despite its general deferral to sovereignty (including the sovereignty to outsource), the fact that historically all kinds of functions that we have come to associate with the state have been exercised privately, and international law's own role in legitimizing privatization in our era.
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Footnotes
For comments on earlier versions of this Article, I am grateful to Julia Emtseva, Georges Abi Saab, Martti Koskenniemi, Thomas Skouteris, Fuad Zarbiyev, Kuzi Charamba, and Stefania di Stefano. Isabella Spano provided invaluable research assistance.
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51 Id., para. 19 (Procaccia, J., concurring) (Isr.).
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57 Cordelli, supra note 9, at 8.
58 Katrougalos, supra note 10, at 414.
59 Koskenniemi, supra note 30, at 69.
60 Daphne Barak-Erez, The Private Prison Controversy and the Privatization Continuum, 5 L. & Eth. Hum. Rts. 139 (2011).
61 Verkuil, supra note 10, at 420 (emphasis added).
62 Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, para. 75, UN Doc. A/73/396 (Sept. 26, 2018) [hereinafter Alston 2018 Report].
63 The existence of such a duty in legal theory has long been intuited, but the connection to international law is typically not made. Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern, in Government by Contract 310 (Martha Minow & Jody Freeman eds., 2009); Leslie Green, The Duty to Govern, 13 Leg. Theory 165 (2007).
64 Chesterman, supra note 19, at 1073.
65 I. William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (1995); Daniel Thurer, The Failed State and International Law, 81 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 731 (1999); Jennifer Milliken & Keith Krause, State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies, 33 Dev. Change 753 (2002).
66 Chiara Giorgetti, Why Should International Law Be Concerned About State Failure, 16 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 469 (2010).
67 Moises Naim, Mafia States: Organized Crime Takes Office Essay, 91 For. Aff. 100 (2012).
68 Pablo Moscoso de la Cuba, The Statehood of “Collapsed” States in Public International Law, 18 Agenda Internacional 121 (2011).
69 The United Nations and Somalia, 1992–1996 (1996).
70 Gérard Cahin, L’état défaillant en droit international: Quel régime pour quelle notion?, in Droit du pouvoir, pouvoir du droit: Mélanges offerts à Jean Salmon 177, 589 (2007).
71 Cordelli, supra note 9, at 72.
72 Ousseni Illy, L'Etat en Faillite» en Droit International, 28 Revue Québécoise Droit International 53, 55 (2015) (author's translation).
73 Kévin-Ferdinand Ndjimba, La prise en charge par le droit international de la fragilité régalienne des États, 28 Civ. Eur. 55 (2012).
74 The notion of “sovereign dignity” has long appeared on the margins of international law, notably in relation to immunities. It is typically associated with equality between sovereigns but points to a sort of inherent value in all things sovereign and the fact that states should not subject themselves to the sovereignty of others and vice versa. See Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-doctrinal Perspective, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2003). Analytically, the key is the element of debasement of subjecting oneself to the authority of another. Although born in the horizontal state-to-state context, one can speculate that there is something equally dignity-compromising when states seemingly subject themselves to the authority of private actors which is arguably what happens when they outsource some of their sovereignty to them.
75 Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 21–22 (2d ed. 2017).
76 I note however that work on the privatization of diplomacy tends to focus on private actors engaging in their own diplomacy or states prolonging their interventions through private actors rather than anything resembling outright privatization. See Brian Hocking, Privatizing Diplomacy?, 5 Int'l Stud. Perspec. 147 (2004).
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78 Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, For. Pol'y 3, 3 (1992).
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80 Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1990).
81 Richard Wydeven, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: A Contemporary Look at Jurisdiction Under the Commercial Activity Exception Note, 13 Rev. Litig. 143, 148 (1993).
82 See, e.g., Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Magness v. Russian Fed'n, 247 F.3d 609, 613 n. 7 (5th Cir. 2001).
83 Wye Oak Tech., Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, 666 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 2011).
84 Oberlandesgericht München [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Aug. 12, 1975, Neue Jurisdtische Wochenschrift [NJW] 2144, 1975 (Ger.).
85 Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 390–91 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
86 MOL, Inc. v. Peoples Republic of Bangl., 736 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir.).
87 Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992).
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89 R. v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and others Ex Parte Pinochet [1999] 38 ILM 581 (HL) 1333–1338.
90 Wissam Abdullateff Sa‘eed Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2010).
91 Alberto Oddenino & Diego Bonetto, The Issue of Immunity of Private Actors Exercising Public Authority and the New Paradigm of International Law, 20 Glob. Jurist (2020).
92 Charles Tilly, How War Made States and Vice Versa (1987).
93 Mégret, supra note 31.
94 Maurice Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (2015).
95 II Emer de Vattel, Le droit des gens, ou, Principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains, Liv. III, ch. I, 2 (1863) (author's translation; original reads: “il serait trop dangereux d'abandonner à chaque Citoyen la liberté de se faire lui-même justice contre les Etrangers; une Nation n'aurait pas un de ses membres qui ne pût lui attirer la Guerre”)
96 Id. at 3 (author's translation; original reads: “ne peut appartenir qu'au Corps de la Nation, ou au Souverain qui la représente. Il est sans doute au nombre de ceux, sans lesquels on ne peut gouverner d'une manière salutaire, et ce que l'on appelle Droit de Majesté”)
97 Amy E. Eckert, Outsourcing War: The Just War Tradition in the Age of Military Privatization 81–90; James Pattison, Just War Theory and the Privatization of Military Force, 22 Eth. & Int'l Aff. 143 (2008).
98 II Vattel, supra note 95, Liv. III, ch. II, at 13 (author's translation; original reads: “de tout homme libre, de se joindre à telle Société qu'il lui plaît, et où il trouve son avantage, de faire cause commune avec elle, et d’épouser ses querelles”).
99 Hugo Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (1950).
100 Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Art.1, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 CTS 1.
101 Sir Geoffrey G. Butler & Simon Maccoby, The Development of International Law 124 (1928).
102 Manual of the Laws of Naval War 9, Arts. 3–10, Aug. 9, 1913.
103 Kenneth B. Moss, Marque and Reprisal: The Spheres of Public and Private War (2019).
104 Albert E. Hindmarsh, Self-Help in Time of Peace, 26 AJIL 315, 318 (1932).
105 Arthur Desjardins, Le Congrès de Paris (1856) et la jurisprudence internationale 25 (1884) (author's translation; original reads : “le souverain, quel qu'il soit, n'est plus libre, en fait, d'appliquer à sa guise ce principe ancien et nécessaire du droit international, d'après lequel les choses capturées à la guerre appartiennent à l'Etat, non au capteur”).
106 Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa, July 3, 1977, 1490 UNTS 89; International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, Dec. 4, 1989, 2163 UNTS 75; GA Res. 43/107 (Dec. 8, 1988); GA Res. 46/89 (Dec. 16, 1991); Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Art. 23(1), YILC (1991) Vol. I, 186, at 228.
107 Kim Sorensen, Sisyphus in the Agora?: How the United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries Functions as a Special Procedure of the Human Rights Council, 38 Adelaide L. Rev. 257 (2017).
108 Émile de Laveleye, On the Rights of War, 39 The Nation 392, 393 (1884).
109 Id. at 392–93 (emphasis added).
110 Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination: The Evolving Forms, Trends, and Manifestations of Mercenaries and Mercenary-Related Activities, paras. 76, 79, UN Doc. A/75/259 (July 28, 2020).
111 Dino Kritsiotis, Mercenaries and the Privatization of Warfare, 22 Fletcher F. World Aff. 11, 12 (1998).
112 Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, UN Human Rights Council, Annex, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/25 (July 5, 2010).
113 Id. Art. 1(b).
114 Id. Art. 2(i).
115 Federal Department of Foreign Affairs/ICRC, The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict, at 11 (2009).
116 Id. at 16.
117 Berenike Prem, The Regulation of Private Military and Security Companies: Analyzing Power in Multi-stakeholder Initiatives, 0 Contemp. Sec. Pol'y 1 (2021).
118 Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, UN Doc. A/62/301 (Aug. 24, 2007).
119 Id., para. 29.
120 Id., para. 46.
121 Id., para. 47.
122 Id., para. 48.
123 Tanja A. Börzel & Thomas Risse, One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, 4, in Workshop on Democracy Promotion 509 (2004).
124 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Possible Utility, Scope and Structure of a Special Study on the Issue of Privatization of Prisons, para. 28, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/21 (June 25, 1993) [hereinafter Privatization of Prisons Report].
125 Karen Bakker, The “Commons” Versus the “Commodity”: Alter-globalization, Anti-privatization and the Human Right to Water in the Global South, 39 Antipode 430 (2007).
126 Inter-Am. Comm‘n H.R., Annual Report on Human Rights in Panama 1991, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.81, Doc. 6, Rev. 1., Ch. IV (1991), at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/91eng/chap.4e.htm. See also Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Annual Report on Human Rights in Guatemala 1996, OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 95, Doc. 7, Rev., Ch. V (1996), at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/96eng/chap.5b.htm.
127 Stephanie Palmer, Public Functions and Private Services: A Gap in Human Rights Protection, 6 Int'l J. Const. L. 585 (2008).
128 CESCR, General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing, para. 14, UN Doc. E/1992/23 (Dec. 13, 1991).
129 Palmer, supra note 127.
130 See, e.g., Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para. 18 (Jan. 22–26, 1997).
131 CESCR, Concluding Observations to the Philippines’ Initial Periodic Report, paras. 11, 20, UN Doc. E/C.12/1995/7 (June 7, 1995).
132 Human Rights Committee (HRC), Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Algeria, para. 8, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.95 (Aug. 18, 1998).
133 Privatization of Prisons Report, supra note 124.
134 Alston 2018 Report, supra note 62.
135 Id., para. 51.
136 Id., para. 87.
137 Id., paras. 68–70, 82.
138 Manfred Nowak, Human Rights or Global Capitalism: The Limits of Privatization 2 (2016).
139 OHCHR, Housing Is a Human Right, Not Just a Commodity (Mar. 22, 2019), at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/AdequateHousing.aspx.
140 Ingrid Leijten & Kaisa de Bel, Facing Financialization in the Housing Sector: A Human Right to Adequate Housing for All, 38 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 94 (2020).
141 Leilani Farha, Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-discrimination in this Context, Visit to France, paras. 31–33, UN Doc. A/HRC/43/43/Add.2 (Aug. 28, 2020).
142 Guidelines for the Implementation of the Right to Adequate Housing, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-discrimination in this Context, para. 64, UN Doc. A/HRC/43/43 (Dec. 26, 2019).
143 Id., para. 67.
144 CESCR, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, para. 35, UN Doc. E/C.1/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).
145 CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The Rights to Water (2002), para. 24, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter General Comment No. 15].
146 Leilani Farha, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Koumbou Boly Barry, Léo Heller, Olivier De Schutter & Magdalena Sepulveda Carmona, Covid-19 Has Exposed the Catastrophic Impact of Privatising Vital Services, Guardian (Oct. 19, 2020), at https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/oct/19/covid-19-exposed-catastrophic-impact-privatising-vital-services.
147 Id.
148 Frédéric Mégret, Alston in Alabama: Towards a Theory of International Human Rights Law Praxis, in The Struggle for Human Rights – Law, Politics, Practice. Essays in Honor of Philip Alston (Nehal Bhuta, Florian Hoffmann, Sarah Knuckey, Frédéric Mégret & Margaret Satterthwaite eds., 2021).
149 Nowak, supra note 138, at 4.
150 Katrougalos, supra note 10, at 415.
151 Saul, Kinley, and Mowbray, supra note 27, at 913–14.
152 Inter-Am. Comm‘n H.R., Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, para. 72, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 57 (2009).
153 Id., para. 73.
154 Privatization of Prisons Report, supra note 124, para. 45.
155 Rachel Sieder, Legal Globalization and Human Rights: Constructing the Rule of Law in Postconflict Guatemala?, in Human Rights in the Maya Region: Global Politics, Cultural Contentions, and Moral Engagements 83–84 (Pedro Pitarch, Shannon Speed & Xochitl Leyva-Solano eds., 2008).
156 HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on New Zealand, para. 11, UN Doc. CCPR/C/NZL/CO/5 (Apr. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Concluding Observations on New Zealand].
157 Although that dimension has not yet had internationally the echo that it has long had domestically. Harold J. Sullivan, Privatization of Public Services: A Growing Threat to Constitutional Rights, Pub. Adm. Rev. 461–67 (1987).
158 Samuel Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (2018).
159 Kishore Singh, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Protecting the Right to Education Against Commercialization, para. 57, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/30 (June 10, 2015).
160 Id., para. 63.
161 Alston 2018 Report, supra note 62, paras. 35, 82.
162 General Comment No. 15, supra note 145, para. 11.
163 John Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Human Rights Council, Prin. 1, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Ruggie Principles].
164 Id., Prin. 3(a).
165 General Comment No. 15, supra note 145, para. 24.
166 Aoife Nolan, Privatization and Economic and Social Rights, 40 Hum. Rts. Q. 815 (2018).
167 Privatization of Prisons Report, supra note 124, para. 45.
168 HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on the United Kingdom, para. 423, UN Doc. A/50/40 (Oct. 3, 1995) (emphasis added).
169 Concluding Observations on New Zealand, supra note 156, para. 11 (emphasis added).
170 Catherine Donnelly, Positive Obligations and Privatisation Special Issue: Positive Obligations and the European Court of Human Rights, 61 N. Ir. Leg. Q. 209, 211 (2010).
171 CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food, para. 23, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999).
172 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Role of the Public Service as an Essential Component of Good Governance in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/27 (Dec. 23, 2013).
173 Id., para. 11.
174 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General Comment No. 16: State Obligations Regarding the Impact of the Business Sector on Children‘s Rights, para. 28, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/16 (Apr. 17, 2013).
175 Stéphanie Lagoutte, New Challenges Facing States Within the Field of Human Rights and Business, 33 Nord. J. Hum. Rts. 158 (2015).
176 Conor Gearty, Democracy and Human Rights in the European Court of Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal, 51 N. Ir. Leg. Q 381 (2000).
177 Alston 2018 Report, supra note 62, para. 70.
178 Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, The Parlous State of Poverty Eradication, para. 73, UN Doc. A/HRC/44/40 (July 2, 2020).
179 Privatization of Prisons Report, supra note 124, para. 45.
180 Peter Manus, Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Environment-Based Cultures: The Emerging Voice of Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 23 Wis. Int'l L.J. 553 (2005).
181 CESCR, Concluding Observations on Azerbaijan, para. 29, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.20 (Dec. 22, 1997).
182 Alston 2018 Report, supra note 62, para. 3.
183 Privatization of Water Report, supra note 182, para 15.
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186 Emmanuelle Jouannet, The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations: A History of International Law 180 (2012).
187 Julien Bauer & Philippe Le Prestre, Chapitre 2. Ménage à trois : L'État entre la société civile et le système international, in Qui a peur de l'État ? 39–97, 104 (Gordon Smith & Daniel Wolfish eds., 2018).
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Target article
Are There “Inherently Sovereign Functions” in International Law?
Related commentaries (6)
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