1 See GA Res. 1781, 17 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 33, UN Doc. A/5217 (1962), requesting that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) prepare a draft declaration and a draft convention on the elimination of religious intolerance. The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (hereinafter Sub-Commission) had earlier appointed a special rapporteur, Arcot Krishnaswami, to study religious rights. His report presented an analysis of norms and state practice, Krishnaswami, A., Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1, UN Sales No. 60.XIV.2 (1960)Google Scholar, and draft principles prepared by the Sub-Commission on the basis of the report. Id., Ann. I [hereinafter Draft Principles].

2 GA Res. 36/55, 36 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 171, UN Doc. A/36/51 (1981). 3 General Assembly Resolution 1781, supra note 1, was transmitted by ECOSOC to the Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter Commission) and the Sub-Commission. In 1964 the Sub-Commission transmitted a preliminary draft declaration to the Commission. See 37 UN ESCOR Supp. (No. 8), para. 294, UN Doc. E/3873 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 Sub–Commission Draft Declaration]. The working group formed in the Commission considered only 6 of the 14 articles in the Sub–Commission’s draft. The Commission forwarded that draft, together with a modified text proposed by the working group, id., para. 296 [hereinafter 1964 Commission Draft Declaration], to ECOSOC for referral to the General Assembly.

The General Assembly did not consider the preliminary drafts but asked ECOSOC to invite the Commission to begin work on a draft convention to be submitted to the Assembly together with the draft declaration. In 1965 the Sub-Commission presented a preliminary draft convention to the Commission, which the latter considered over the following two years. In 1967 ECOSOC transmitted the Commission’s draft convention, consisting of a preamble and 12 articles on which the Commission had achieved agreement, to the General Assembly. For the text, jee Note by the Secretary-General: Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance, UN Doc. A/8330, Ann. III (1971) [hereinafter 1967 Draft Convention].

The General Assembly discussed the draft convention in 1967, but thereafter postponed consideration of the convention and decided in 1972 to accord priority to the completion of a draft declaration. GA Res. 3027, 27 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 72, UN Doc. A/8730 (1972). Work on the draft declaration progressed with difficulty in the Commission from 1974 until a text was adopted in 1981; it was transmitted by ECOSOC to the General Assembly in the same year.

For the history of the Declaration and the draft convention, see Liskofsky, , The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination: Historical and Legal Perspectives, 487 in Religion and the State: Essays in Honor of Leo Pfeffer 441, 460–63 (Wood, J. ed. 1985)Google Scholar; Lerner, , Toward a Draft Declaration Against Religious Intolerance and Discrimination, 11 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 82 (1981)Google Scholar; McDougal, M., Lasswell, H. & Chen, L., Human Rights and World Public Order 677–84 (1980)Google Scholar; Clark, , The United Nations and Religious Freedom, 11 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 197 (1978)Google Scholar; Claydon, , The Treaty Protection of Religious Rights: U.N. Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 12 Santa Clara Law. 403 (1972)Google Scholar. See generally Lerner, , The Final Text of the U.N. Declaration Against Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 12 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 185 (1982)Google ScholarPubMed.

4 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1988/44/Add.2, at 1 (statement by the United States Government). See also UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/26, at 48–49 (asserting that declarations adopted by the General Assembly imply “obligations of conduct” and contain “values” governing conduct that cannot be taken away by political action, although they do not give rise to “rights” from a strict legal standpoint).

5 UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC.39/1988/L.2, at 5 (analytical compilation of views regarding the significance of the Declaration on the Right to Development, prepared by the Secretary-General).

6 Article 4 of the Declaration states:

1. All States shall take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, political, social and cultural life.

2. All States shall make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where necessary to prohibit any such discrimination, and to take all appropriate measures to combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or other beliefs in this matter.

7 Section 702 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1988) does not include religious discrimination among the customary norms that it lists. See, however, comment j. Although generalized references to the freedom of religion or belief appear in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 18, GA Res. 217A, UN Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 18, GA Res. 2200, 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), and regional human rights instruments, the Declaration is the only instrument that addresses the subject in specific terms. For a compilation of the general provisions relevant to the freedom of religion or belief and freedom from discrimination based on religion or belief contained in international and regional instruments, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/L.1417 (1979).

8 Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 1986/20, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/65, at 66. For discussion in the Commission concerning the need for such a special rapporteur, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/SR.50/Add.1, at 9–14. Several representatives to the Commission objected to the appointment on the ground that the special rapporteur’s proposed mandate would overlap with that of the special rapporteur appointed by the Sub-Commission in 1983, who was authorized to study the causes and current dimensions of religious intolerance and discrimination.

9 Ribeiro, Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/35 [hereinafter 1987 Ribeiro report].

10 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1988/45, at 2 [hereinafter 1988 Ribeiro report].

11 Sub-Comm’n Res. 1983/31, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/43, at 98. The final report by Special Rapporteur Odio Benito was issued as UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/26 [hereinafter Odio Benito report]. See also UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/28 (progress report by Special Rapporteur Odio Benito).

12 1988 Ribeiro report, supra note 10, at 25, 27; 1987 Ribeiro report, supra note 9, at 27; Odio Benito report, supra note 11, at 52–53, 57. See also UN Docs. E/CN.4/1988/44 and Adds. 1–7 (comments by member states regarding establishment of a working group to draft a binding instrument).

13 See note 3 supra.

14 This model contrasts, for example, with the status of religion in the state structure of Iran. For a historical discussion of the relationship of Shiism to the governance of people, see Keddie, N., Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi’ism from Quietism to Revolution (1984)Google Scholar. On Islamic ideology and revolutionary potential in the contemporary Middle East, see generally From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (S. Arjomand ed. 1984). See also Howard, R., Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa 107–13 (1986)Google Scholar (on the relationship between political authority and religion in Commonwealth Africa).

15 Compare Art. 1(d) of the 1967 Draft Convention, supra note 3, stating that “neither the establishment of a religion nor the recognition of a religion or belief by a State nor the separation of Church from State shall by itself be considered religious intolerance or discrimination.” For discussions of the need to address church-state relations in the Declaration, see, e.g., UN Docs. E/3925/Add.1, at 7, 9 (1964); E/3925/Add.2, at 5 (1964); A/C.3/SR.2011, at 14 (1973); A/C.3/SR.2013, at 23 (1973); E/CN.4/1145, at 12, 17 (1973); E/CN.4/1146, at 8 (1973).

Special Rapporteur Krishnaswami concluded that the formal or legal characteristics of church-state relations do not necessarily bear a causal connection to whether violations of the freedom of religion or belief, or discrimination, will occur or the frequency and seriousness of such violations. A. Krishnaswami, supra note 1, at 64–65. See also Odio Benito report, supra note 11, at 19–21 (summarizing data received from 29 countries regarding church–state relations).

16 Art. I(a) of the 1967 Draft Convention, supra note 3, did include a definition of these terms: “For the purpose of this Convention: (a) the expression ‘religion or belief shall include theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs . .

In the absence of a definition within the Declaration itself, Special Rapporteur Odio Benito suggested the following working definition of “religion”: “ ‘religion’ can be described as ‘an explanation of the meaning of life and how to live accordingly.’ Every religion has at least a creed, a code of action and a cult.” Odio Benito report, supra note 11, at 4.

17 During drafting discussions, it was asserted that “religion or belief” should be understood to include, inter alia, monotheism, polytheism, atheism, agnosticism, free thought and animistic beliefs. See, e.g., UN Doc. E/3925, Annex, at 1, 3–4 (1964); 1978 UN ESCOR Supp. (No. 4) at 62, UN Doc. E/1978/34. Conversely, some governments identified systems of thought that should be specifically excluded from the definition such as racism, Nazism and apartheid, UN Doc. A/C.3/L.2033 (1973), and theories on subjects such as philosophy, history, politics, art and science. Analytical Presentation of the Observations received from Governments Concerning the Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance, Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/9135, at 11 (1973) [hereinafter Observations of Governments]. The view that the phrase “religion or belief” was well understood to refer to both religious and nonreligious beliefs prevailed, and proposed definitions (which continued to be offered as late as 1981) were rejected. See, e.g., UN Docs. E/3925/Add.1, at 10 (1964); A/9135, at 10–11 (1973); E/CN.4/1146/Add.3, at 1 (1974); 1981 UN ESCOR Supp. (No. 5) at 149, UN Doc. E/1981/25.

18 See generally Miller, R. & Flowers, R., Toward Benevolent Neutrality: Church, State and the Supreme Court (rev. ed. 1982)Google Scholar; Pfeffer, L., Religious Freedom (1977)Google ScholarPubMed.

For a case study of approaches used by U.S. courts to identify and define practices entitled to protection as religious freedoms, compare Native American Church of New York v. United States, 468 F.Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d, 633 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1980) (regarding peyotism as a Native American religion), with Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, reh’g denied, 392 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1967), rev’d on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1968) (rejecting First Amendment claims regarding LSD brought by a primate of the Neo-American Church).

19 For a discussion of descriptive and dictionary definitions of religion, see New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board, Discrimination and Religious Conviction 7–12 (1984).

20 See UN Doc. E/3925, Annex, at 7 (1964); 1981 UN ESCOR Supp. (No. 5) at 140, UN Doc. E/1981/25 (noting that any attempt to enumerate beliefs covered by the phrase “religion or belief” would necessarily be incomplete and thereby defeat the aim of universal application).

21 Article 18 of the Covenant, supra note 7, provides:

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.

2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.

3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

22 See Partsch, , Freedom of Conscience and Expression, in The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 208, 213–14 (Henkin, L. ed. 1981)Google Scholar; Van Boven, T., De Volkenrechtelijke Bescherming van de Godsdienstvrijheid 270, 275 (1967)Google Scholar. See also A. Krishnaswami, supra note 1, at 27.

23 See Kiss, , Permissible Limitations on Rights, in Henkin (ed.), supra note 22, at 290 Google Scholar; Siracusa Principles 1–38, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex, at 3–6. Cf. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 9, 213 UNTS 221 (1950); American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 12, reprinted in Organization of American States, Handbook of Existing Rules Pertaining to Human Rights in the Interamerican System 27, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.65, Doc. 6 (1985) [hereinafter American Convention].

24 See, e.g., 1988 Ribeiro report, supra note 10, at 5 (reporting allegations that Baha’is in Iran have been tortured and executed in an effort to force them to recant their faith).

25 The draft principles prepared by the Sub-Commission included a more specific definition of coercion: “No one shall be subjected to material or moral coercion likely to impair his freedom to maintain or to change his religion or belief” (emphasis added). Draft Principles, supra note 1, p t. I(3).

On the need for a more specific definition, see, e.g., 34 UN ESCOR Supp. (No. 4) at 57–58, UN Doc. E/1978/34 (discussing a proposal to include a fuller statement of the various kinds of coercion, such as legal, economic and administrative coercion); see also 36 UN ESCOR Supp. (No. 6) at 72, UN Doc. E/1979/36 (definition proposed by Cyprus).

26 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/37/Add.4, at 1 (Mauritius).

27 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/37, at 12 (Cyprus).

28 Id. at 39 (Spain).

29 See, e.g., 1988 Ribeiro report, supra note 10, at 5 (reporting allegations that Baha’i children in Iran are denied admission to the state school system unless they formally convert to Islam).

30 See Draft Principles, supra note 1, pt. I(3).

31 Cf. UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.202, at 7 (1980) (statement by representative of Mongolia, characterizing the very holding of religious services as a form of religious propaganda).

32 Regarding the legal restrictions imposed by some countries on proselytizing, see 1987 Ribeiro report, supra note 9,.at 11. See also Odio Benito report, supra note 11, at 13. The right to propagate religion is legally protected in some countries. See, e.g., UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/37, at 29 (Pakistan). Cf. UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.319, at 6–7 (1952) (regarding the need to check interpretations of Art. 18(2) of the Political Covenant, supra note 21, prohibiting coercion, that would jeopardize the freedom of teaching, worship and observance or preclude persuasive methods).

Article 12(1) of the American Convention, supra note 23, explicitly affirms the right to “disseminate” one’s religion or beliefs.

33 A. Krishnaswami, supra note 1, at 41. See also T. Van Boven, supra note 22, at 274 (arguing that the freedom to change one’s religion or belief “does not constitute a license to proselytize by offering attractive social and material profits or by exerting undue pressure upon persons in a vulnerable position”); 36 UN GAOR (73d plen. mtg.) at 1219, UN Doc. A/36/PV.73 (1981) (regarding “impermissible material incentives”).

34 See, e.g., Nsereko, , Religion, the State and the Law in Africa, 28 J. Church & St. 269, 273 (1986)Google Scholar (noting that “the majority of African states cannot dispense with the church’s role in education. Therefore, many African states permit churches to operate schools and allow religion to be taught as a subject in public schools”).

35 See Clark, supra note 3, at 200; see, e.g., UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.2009, at 4 (1973) (statement by Saudi Arabian representative characterizing proposed reference to the right to change religions as designed to benefit missionary religions).

Regarding opposition to inclusion of the right to change religions in the Universal Declaration, see Robinson, N., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 128–29 (1958)Google ScholarPubMed. Regarding objections to its inclusion in the Political Covenant on the ground that it would encourage missionary activities, see, e.g., UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.367, para. 41 (1951).

36 See UN Docs. A/36/684, at 2–3 (1981); A/C.3/36/SR.43, at 2 (1981).

37 See note 7 supra.

38 36 UN GAOR (73d plen. mtg.) at 1218–19, UN Doc. A/36/PV.73 (1981).

39 See A. Krishnaswami, supra note 1, at 38; 1987 Ribeiro report, supra note 9, at 15. See also id. (characterizing the practice of forbidding the members of a community considered heretical to claim kinship with the majority religion as an infringement of Art. 1).

40 Article 29(2) of the Universal Declaration recognizes morality as a basis for restrictions, as do all the limitation clauses in the Political Covenant. See Kiss, supra note 23, at 303–04.

In Handyside v. U.K., 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976), the European Court found that it was impossible to find a uniform European concept of “morals” in the domestic law of the European states. The Court observed that views on the requirements of morals “var[y] from time to time and from place to place, especially in our era which is characterized by a rapid and far–reaching evolution of opinion on the subject.” Id. at 22. Accord, Dudgeon v. U.K., App. No. 7525/76, Eur. Comm’n H.R., Report of Mar. 13, 1980, aff’d, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21 (ser. A) (1981). See also Communication No. 61/1979, Hertzberg v. Finland, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Committee, Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol (2d–16th sessions), UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1, at 124, 126 (1985).

Of the 29 states providing data to Special Rapporteur Odio Benito, 15 indicated that legislative or constitutional limitations upon the freedom to manifest religion or belief currently include “morals.” Odio Benito report, supra note 11, at 29.

41 See, e.g., UN Docs. E/CN.4/1988/43, at 10–11 (response from Government of Colombia, noting that the constitutional provision guaranteeing the freedom to practice any religion not contrary to Christian morality reflects the fact that Catholicism has historically been the religion professed by the majority of Colombians); E/CN.4/1987/37, at 13 (response from Government of Panama, noting that Christian morality is included, with public order, as one of two grounds for imposing limitations on the freedom to practice all religions, in recognition of the fact that Catholicism is the majority religion).

42 The limitations clause of the Draft Principles, supra note 1, employed the wording in Article 29(2) of the Universal Declaration, which cites the “rights and freedoms” of others as grounds for limitations. Article XII of the 1967 Draft Convention, supra note 3, permitted limitations based on the “individual rights and freedoms of others.”

43 GA Res. 34/180, 34 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1979).

44 For the text of Article 4, see note 6 supra. For Article 2, see text infra at p. 501. Article 3 is couched in hortatory language:

Discrimination between human beings on grounds of religion or belief constitutes an affront to human dignity and a disavowal of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and shall be condemned as a violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and enunciated in detail in the International Covenants on Human Rights, and as an obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations between nations [emphasis added].

45 Meron, T., Human Rights Law-Making in the United Nations: A Critique of Instruments and Process 181–82 (1986)Google Scholar.

46 Id. at 178–89; see also Meron, , On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AJIL 1 (1986)Google Scholar.

47 T. Meron, supra note 45, at 156, 178–83.

On the use of “fundamental” in the limitations clause of Article 18 of the Political Covenant, from which Article 1(3) of the Declaration was drawn, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.319, at 4, 14 (1952) (regarding UK proposal, later defeated, to delete “fundamental” because “the intention was to refer rather to personal rights and freedoms”; id. at 4 (emphasis added)). See also id. at 64 (uniform limitations clause for the Political Covenant proposed by the Secretary–General, omitting the word “fundamental” from the reference to the rights and freedoms of others).

48 T. Meron, supra note 45, at 77–78, 153–54.

Article 11 of the Convention, supra note 43, requires states to ensure for women, on a basis of equality with men, the same rights, inter alia, to employment opportunities (including application of the same criteria for selection), free choice of profession and employment, promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of service, and equal remuneration, including benefits.

For the text of Article 8, the savings clause of the Declaration, see text at note 37 supra. Article 23, the savings clause of the Discrimination Against Women Convention, provides: “Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions that are more conducive to the achievement of equality between men and women which may be contained: (a) In the legislation of a state party; or (b) In any other international convention, treaty or agreement in force for that state.”

49 The limitations clause of Article 19 of the Covenant, supra note 7, provides:

3. The exercise of the [freedom of expression] carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;

(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.

50 See, e.g., 1987 Ribeiro report, supra note 9, at 13; UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/SR.25, at 6, 8.

51 Cf. 1967 Draft Convention, supra note 3, Art. XI (providing that “[n]othing in this Convention shall be interpreted as giving to any person, group or institution the right to engage in activities aimed at prejudicing national security, national sovereignty or friendly relations between nations”).

Of the 29 states providing data to Special Rapporteur Odio Benito, 5 indicated that limitations on the basis of security were in effect. Odio Benito report, supra note 11, at 29. See generally Kiss, supra note 23, at 295–97 (regarding national security as a ground for limitations).

52 See, e.g., UN Doc. A/C.3/36/SR.32, at 13 (1981) (statement by representative of Australia, asserting that the draft Declaration did not give individuals or groups the right to participate in political activities against the interests of the state).

53 See Woods, , Church Lobbying and Public Policy, 28 J. Church & St. 183, 189 (1986)Google Scholar; van Boven, , Religious Liberty in the Context of Human Rights, 37 Ecumenical Rev. 345, 350–51 (1985)Google Scholar.

54 See UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/28, at 12.

55 See note 14 supra.

56 For national views concerning the scope of “belief,” see, e.g., UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/ 37, at 22 (response of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, noting that associations whose purpose is the cultivation of a philosophical ideology have the same status as religious bodies); id. at 37 (response of the Government of Spain, reporting that activities or study relating to psychic phenomena or to humanistic or spiritualistic values are not protected manifestations of belief); Observations of Governments, supra note 17, at 4 (response of the Government of Austria, stating that “belief” encompasses only those beliefs of a transcendental character and does not include every philosophy, particularly not purely political philosophy); id. at 11 (response of the Government of Sweden, excluding theories on subjects such as philosophy, history, politics and science from the purview of “belief”); UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.2012, at 12 (1973) (statement by representative of the German Democratic Republic, rejecting the view of the Austrian Government that “belief” refers only to “transcendental” philosophies); accord id. at 13 (statement by representative of the Netherlands).

57 Partsch, supra note 22, at 213–14; Lillich, , Civil Rights, in 1 Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues 115, 159 n.243, 245 (Meron, T. ed. 1984)Google Scholar.

58 Article 6 stipulates that, subject to the provisions of Article 1(3),

the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief shall include, inter alia, the following freedoms:

(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and maintain places for these purposes;

(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions;

(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief;

(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;

(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;

(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and institutions;

(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief;

(h) To observe days of rest and celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one’s religion or belief;

(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters of religion and belief at the national and international levels.

59 For discussion of the wide range of practices associated with religion or belief, factors that may justify restrictions on those practices and specific protections required for certain freedoms of religion or belief, see A. Krishnaswami, supra note 1, at 43–62. The Draft Principles, supra note 1, part II, and the 1967 Draft Convention, supra note 3, Article III, included fuller listings of the specific rights encompassed by the freedom of religion or belief than that contained in Article 6 of the Declaration.

60 Opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 UNTS 195, reprinted in 5 ILM 352 (1966). Article 1(1) of the Racial Discrimination Convention defines racial discrimination as

any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

61 T. Meron, supra note 45, at 11–16; Greenberg, , Race, Sex and Religious Discrimination in International Law, in 2 Meron (ed.), supra note 57, at 307, 322 (1984)Google Scholar.

62 On the nexus between racial discrimination and discrimination on the ground of religion or belief, see infra pp. 507–10.

63 For the text of Article 3, see note 44 supra. For the text of Article 4, see note 6 supra.

64 GA Res. 1904, 18 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 35–37, UN Doc. A/5515 (1963). Cf. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 60, Art. 2(1)(d) (requiring states parties to prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination by “any persons, group or organization”); Discrimination Against Women Convention, supra note 43, Art. 2(e) (requiring states parties to take “all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise”) (emphasis added).

65 Questionnaires prepared in connection with Special Rapporteur Odio Benito’s study requested information from governments regarding measures taken to eliminate intolerance and discrimination, “whether proceeding from official circles or individuals or groups of persons.” UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1984/28, Ann. I, at 2. Cf. T. Meron, supra note 45, at 18–23, 61–63 (on the application of the Racial Discrimination Convention and the Discrimination Against Women Convention to nongovernmental, private contexts). See also Meron, , The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 79 AJIL 283 (1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

66 Article 1 of the Racial Discrimination Declaration, supra note 64, also refers to discrimination “between human beings.”

67 The definition of discrimination contained in the 1967 Draft Convention, supra note 3, Article 1(b), did include the qualifying phrase “any other field of public life” (emphasis added).

68 See 1964 Sub-Commission Draft Declaration, supra note 3, Art. 2.

69 See 1964 Commission Draft Declaration, supra note 3, Art. III.

70 Observations of Governments, supra note 17, at 12 (India); accord UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.2013, at 6 (1973) (statement by representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, expressing agreement with proposal for deleting this phrase, on the same ground advanced by the Government of India). See also UN Doc. E/3925/Add.2, at 11 (1964).

71 See, e.g., 1979 UN ESCOR Supp. (No. 6) at 70, UN Doc. E/1979/36.

72 Cf. UN Doc. E/CN.4/1146/Add.1, at 4 (1974) (proposed article stating that “no organization or individual shall have the right to invoke this Declaration if they impair the rights of citizens”) (emphasis added).

73 1980 UN ESCOR Supp. (No. 3) at 111–12, UN Doc. E/1980/13.

74 For the text of Article 4, see note 6 supra.

75 GA Res. 3267, 29 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 88, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974).

76 See, e.g., UN Docs. E/3925, Annex, at 3 (1964) (defining “intolerance” as a mental attitude or psychological state); A/4134, at 5 (1973) (stating that “intolerance” refers primarily to a subjective attitude).

77 See, e.g., United Nations Seminar on the Encouragement of Understanding, Tolerance and Respect in Matters Relating to Freedom of Religion or Belief, UN Doc. ST/HR/SER.A/16, at 7 (1984) (defining tolerance as acceptance by individuals of the right of others to hold different views, i.e., an act of understanding) [hereinafter 1984 Geneva Seminar]; Odio Benito report, supra note 11, at 64.

78 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 3, at 209; Clark, , The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 31 Chittvs L.J. 23, 34 n.9 (1983)Google Scholar; 1987 Ribeiro report, supra note 9, at 12, 14–15; Odio Benito report, supra note 11, at 3–4.

79 See, e.g., 1987 Ribeiro report, supra note 9, at 11–13; UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/SR.30/Add.1.

The 1967 Draft Convention included the following tautological definition of “intolerance”: “the expression religious intolerance shall mean intolerance in matters of religion or belief . . . 1967 Draft Convention, supra note 3, Art. I(c). Similarly, the questionnaire prepared in connection with Special Rapporteur Odio Benito’s study, which requested information from governments regarding legislative or other measures taken to combat intolerance and discrimination, defined both intolerance and discrimination as “distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference.” UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1984/28, Ann. I, at 28.

80 See 1988 Ribeiro report, supra note 10, at 24 (regarding the relationship between religious intolerance and infringements of various human rights, such as the right to life); UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/SR.23, at 7 (regarding the relationship between violations of religious freedoms and violations of other human rights).

81 See UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/28, at 12.

82 Cf. Racial Discrimination Declaration, supra note 64, Art. 8 (calling for “all effective steps . . . in the fields of teaching, education and information with a view to eliminating racial discrimination”); Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, GA Res. 2263, 22 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 35, UN Doc. A/6716 (1967) [hereinafter Discrimination Against Women Declaration], Art. 3 (calling for measures to “educate public opinion” for the purpose of abolishing prejudice and customary and other practices based on the idea of women’s inferiority); Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 60, Art. 7 (calling for effective measures, “particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to combatting prejudices which lead to racial discrimination”).

83 The 1964 Sub-Commission Draft Declaration, supra note 3, did incorporate such a provision, in Article XIV(2) and (3), as did the 1967 Draft Convention, supra note 3, in its Article IX.

84 1979 UN ESCOR Supp. (No. 6) at 70, UN Doc. E/1979/36 (emphasis added).

85 Odio Benito report, supra note 11, at 4.

86 See Positive Measures Designed to Eradicate All Incitement to, or Acts of, Racial Discrimination: Implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. CERD/2, UN Sales No. E.85.XIV.2 (1986); T. Meron, supra note 45, at 23–35.

87 See Greenberg, supra note 61, at 323–24.

88 The 1964 Commission Draft Declaration, supra note 3, Article III(2), provided: “Everyone has the right to effective remedial relief by the competent national tribunals against any acts violating the rights set forth in this Declaration or any acts of discrimination he may suffer on the grounds of religion or belief. . . . “ The 1967 Draft Convention similarly addressed the availability of remedies, requiring states to

ensure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other State institutions against any acts, including acts of discrimination . . . , which violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention, as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such acts.

1967 Draft Convention, supra note 3, Art. X. Examples of provisions asserting a right to effective remedies appear in several international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration, supra note 7 (Art. 8), the Political Covenant, supra note 7 (Art. 2(3)), and the Racial Discrimination Declaration, supra note 64 (Art. 7(2)).

89 Special Rapporteur Ribeiro has emphasized the need to make effective remedies available to victims of intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief; he recommended that the Declaration be disseminated widely among those responsible for protecting the right to freedom of religion or belief, such as judges, lawyers and civil servants. 1988 Ribeiro report, supra note 10, at 28.

90 Article 9 of the Discrimination Against Women Declaration, supra note 82, lists, inter alia, equal conditions of access to educational institutions of all types, the same choice of curricula and equal opportunities to benefit from scholarships as areas in which all appropriate measures shall be taken to ensure equal rights for women. Similarly, Article 10 enumerates specific employment rights, including, inter alia, remuneration, leave with pay and retirement privileges, to be guaranteed, by all appropriate measures, on a basis of equality with men. See also Racial Discrimination Declaration, supra note 64, Art. 3 (citing areas in which states should make particular efforts to prevent discrimination). Of course, the obligations in the Discrimination Against Women and Racial Discrimination Conventions are elaborated in even greater detail than are the provisions of the two declarations.

The 1964 Commission Draft Declaration, supra note 3, did list fields of activity and specific rights, such as the right to take part in government, as to which “particular efforts” must be made to eliminate discrimination (Art. IV(2)). In subsequent drafting discussions, proposals to incorporate references to specific areas in which states should make particular efforts to eliminate discrimination were rejected. See, e.g., 1980 UN ESCOR Supp. (No. 3) at 110, UN Doc. E/1980/13 (listing employment and civil rights, access to citizenship, and the enjoyment of such political rights as participation in elections). Employment rights were singled out for attention in many of these proposals. See, e.g., id. at 110–11. Objections to enumerating specific rights were based on the opinion that a partial listing would suggest that states need not exert efforts to eliminate discrimination with regard to rights not mentioned. See UN Doc. A/C.3/ SR.2013, at 8–9 (1973); Observations of Governments, supra note 17, at 14; UN Doc. E/3925, Annex, at 2 (1964).

91 See UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/SR.23, at 2, 7–8; 1987 Ribeiro report, supra note 9, at 3; Odio Benito report, supra note 11, at 46. At the 1984 Geneva Seminar, participants emphasized that “on many occasions, religion and not language [is] the primary factor in the preservation of the identity and the unity of a group.” 1984 Geneva Seminar, supra note 77, at 9.

92 See UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/SR.18, para. 17 (statement by Egyptian representative characterizing Baha’ism as “a faith or opinion” and not a religion, since Baha’is are “Iranian by race and by culture”); see also Capotorti, F., Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/ Sub.2/384/Rev.1, at 43 Google Scholar, UN Sales No. E.78.XIV.1 (1979).

93 For example, Special Rapporteur Ribeiro received allegations that ethnic Turks in Bulgaria have been persecuted on religious grounds, by means including the penalization of Islamic religious practices, the destruction of Muslim graveyards and mosques, and employment discrimination. The Government of Bulgaria, however, has refused to acknowledge the Turkish ethnic nature of the Muslim community of Bulgaria and has denied that there is a Turkish minority there. 1988 Ribeiro report, supra note 10, at 4, 8, 18.

For an example of processes by which religious communities themselves determine membership within the community, see Elon, , The Ethiopian Jews: A Case Study in the Functioning of the Jewish Legal System, 19 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 535 (1987)Google Scholar.

94 The case was reported to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). See Judgment No. 134 B/1981, reprinted in UN Doc. CERD/C/107/Add.4, at 14 (1984).

95 Id. at 20–21.

96 Id. at 24. In connection with the Norwegian judgment, members of CERD discussed whether Article 1 of the Racial Discrimination Convention applies to religious discrimination. Some members believed attacks on identifiable ethnic or national groups would breach the Convention but attacks on a specific religion would not. Others disagreed, stating that good grounds could be found for extending the Convention to cover attacks against religion. 39 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 18), para. 509, UN Doc. A/39/18 (1984).

Special Rapporteur Ribeiro has recommended that the procedures established by CERD be used to monitor the implementation of international standards concerning questions of discrimination or intolerance in matters of religion or belief. 1988 Ribeiro report, supra note 10, at 28. In a similar vein, the Government of Ecuador submitted the following statement in response to the request for information on national legislation regarding freedom of religion or belief: “if any person in Ecuador considers that his rights [as stated in the Declaration] are being jeopardized . . . , he may put his case before the Ecuadorian courts or before the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination . . . “ (emphasis added). UN Doc. E/CN.4/1988/43/Add.1, at 8.

97 107 S.Ct. 2022 (1987).

98 107 S.Ct. 2019 (1987).

99 Al-Khazraji, 107 S.Ct. at 2026–28.

100 Id. at 2028. See also Santa Cruz, H., Racial Discrimination 4–5 Google Scholar, UN Doc. E/CN.4/ Sub.2/307/Rev.1, UN Sales No. E.76.XIV.2 (rev. ed. 1977) (regarding the relationship between racial and religious discrimination).

101 See, e.g., Gould, S., The Mismeasure of Man (1981)Google Scholar; Montagu, A., Man’s Most Dangerous Myth (1974)Google Scholar; Science and the Concept of Race (M. Mead, T. Dobzhansky, E. Tobach & R. Light eds. 1968). On the difficulty of defining and identifying racial groups for purposes of human rights instruments, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1984/31, at 4. Regarding the related question of the definition of “minority” under Article 27 of the Political Covenant, see Sohn, , The Rights of Minorities, in Henkin (ed.), supra note 22, at 276–82 Google Scholar; F. Capotorti, supra note 92, at 5–12.

102 See, e.g., UN Docs. E/CN.4/1987/SR.23, at 7; E/CN.4/1987/SR.46, at 10. See also UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/WG.5/WP.1 (compilation of proposals on the definition of “minority” in connection with the deliberations of the working group considering drafting a declaration on the rights of persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities). But see T. Van Boven, supra note 22, at 272 (regarding problems associated with the special protection of religious liberty under a minority system).

103 For a discussion of the concept of hierarchy and conflicts, see text at notes 45–49 supra.

104 See A. Krishnaswami, supra note 1, at 36.

105 In the case of the discriminatory employment practice described in the text at note 48 supra, the relevant questions include: How significant is the practice of barring women from certain jobs to the religious doctrine or tradition? How important is women’s access to those jobs to the elimination of employment discrimination? What is the relationship between the discriminatory employment practice and the larger goal of eliminating discrimination in all sectors of society? Does the employment bar apply to all jobs or only a few positions within the business? Is it a permanent, year–round restriction, or one that applies temporarily or only at certain times of the year?

For an example of the resolution of such conflicts under U.S. law, see Bollenbach v. Monroe–Woodbury Cent. School Dist., 659 F.Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that the school district’s refusal to assign women bus drivers to routes serving Hasidic male students, as an accommodation to the Hasidic belief in strict separation of the sexes, violates both the First Amendment and title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). See also Parents’ Ass’n of P.S. 16 v. Quinones, 803 F.2d 1235 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that a city plan to provide physically segregated accommodations, instruction in English as a second language and only female teachers for female Hasidic students within a public school attended primarily by Latino children violated the First Amendment).

106 See, e.g., New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board, supra note 19, at 202–26 (regarding controversy over the religious status of beliefs held by certain minority religions such as the Scientologists).

107 A. Krishnaswami, supra note 1, at 43.

108 Id.

109 Cf. Draft Principles, supra note 1, pt. IV(1), providing that “[i]n the event of a conflict between the demands of two or more religions or beliefs, public authorities shall endeavor to find a solution reconciling these demands in a manner such as to ensure the greatest measure of freedom to society as a whole.”

110 Article 5 states:

1. The parents or, as the case may be, the legal guardians of the child have the right to organize the life within the family in accordance with their religion or belief and bearing in mind the moral education in which they believe the child should be brought up.

2. Every child shall enjoy the right to have access to education in the matter of religion or belief in accordance with the wishes of his parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, and shall not be compelled to receive teaching on religion or belief against the wishes of his parents or legal guardians, the best interests of the child being the guiding principle.

3. The child shall be protected from any form of discrimination on the ground of religion or belief. He shall be brought up in a spirit of understanding, tolerance, friendship among peoples, peace and universal brotherhood, respect for freedom of religion or belief of others, and in full consciousness that his energy and talents should be devoted to the service of his fellow man.

4. In the case of a child who is not under the care either of his parents or of legal guardians, due account shall be taken of their expressed wishes or of any other proof of their wishes in the matter of religion or belief, the best interests of the child being the guiding principle.

5. Practices of a religion or beliefs in which a child is brought up must not be injurious to his physical or mental health or to his full development, taking into account article 1, paragraph 3, of the present Declaration.

111 Cf. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, Principle 7, GA Res. 1386, 14 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, UN Doc. A/4354 (1959). The second paragraph of Principle 7 provides that “[t]he best interests of the child shall be the guiding principle of those responsible for his education and guidance; that responsibility lies in the first place with his parents.” In contrast, Article 18(4) of the Political Covenant, supra note 7, makes no reference to considerations other than the convictions held by parents or guardians: “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.”

112 The failure to address the rights of children themselves was noted during drafting discussions. See, e.g., UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.2011, at 15 (1973) (comments by the representative of Japan). See also Observations of Governments, supra note 17, at 17 (response by the Government of Sweden).

Regarding the need to define “child” or to specify the age at which a child is entitled to make decisions concerning religion or belief, see, e.g., UN Docs. A/C.3/SR.2010, at 9 (1973); A/C.3/SR.2013, at 9–11 (1973); E/CN.4/1146/Add.3, at 4 (1974); and Observations of Governments, supra, at 17.

The Human Rights Committee has raised questions concerning the age at which children have the right to exercise the freedom of religion or belief under the Political Covenant. See, e.g., 36 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 76, UN Doc. A/36/40 (1981); 37 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 15, UN Doc. A/37/40 (1982).

For an example of situations in which such conflicts may arise, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/ 1988/43/Add.1, at 8 (summary of the membership rules of the established Church of Denmark, giving children between the ages of 15 and 18 the right to join or resign from the church if the child’s custodian provides a declaration of consent).

113 For a proposed formulation of Article 5 stressing parental responsibility, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/1146/Add.3, at 4 (1974).

114 See, e.g., Declaration of the Rights of the Child, supra note 111; Political Covenant, supra note 7, Art. 24; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 10(3), GA Res. 2200, 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966).

115 See UN Doc. E/3925/Add.1, at 6–7 (1964) (asserting the need for a proscription upon exposing children to harmful religious practices in light of such phenomena as substituting a “laying on of hands” for medical treatment); see also 1981 UN ESCOR Supp. (No. 5) at 141, UN Doc. E/1981/25.

116 See generally A. Krishnaswami, supra note 1, at 39–40; Liskofsky, supra note 3, at 481.

117 The working group on a draft convention on the rights of the child has discussed the need for a general provision regarding the “evolving capacities of the child,” or a reference to those capacities in articles addressing particular rights. UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/25, at 24–27.

118 See, e.g., Convention on Consent to Marriage, Art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1962, 521 UNTS 231 (entered into force Dec. 9, 1964) (national legislation shall specify a minimum age for marriage).

119 For an example of national legislation regulating children’s rights to exercise religious freedoms, see the discussion of the Religious Education Act of Austria, in UN Docs. CCPR/C/6/Add.7, at 27–28 (1981); E/CN.4/1988/43/Add.1, at 3. Under the Act, parents may determine the religion of their children until they are 12 years old, at which time the children may no longer be given against their will a religious education different from that previously received. At age 14, children have the right to decide for themselves what their religion will be, and state authorities must protect their choices if necessary. See also 41 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 44, UN Doc. A/41/40 (1986) (discussion of Finnish legislation under which children belong to the religious community of their parents until age 15, when they may join another religious community if they so desire); 36 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 76, UN Doc. A/36/40 (1981) (questions raised by the Human Rights Committee regarding provision in Norwegian Constitution giving children over the age of 15 the right to join or resign from the Church of Norway).

120 T. Meron, supra note 45, at 155–56; F. Capotorti, supra note 92, at 70–71.

121 See generally UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/35; 37 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 66–67, 72, UN Doc. A/37/40 (1982) (regarding the applicability of the principles underlying the Universal Declaration to Islamic societies). See, e.g., UN Docs. A/C.3/36/SR.29, at 6 (1981); A/C.3/37/SR.67, at 9–11 (1982) (asserting the supremacy of Islamic law over international human rights norms governing the death penalty).

122 Greenberg, supra note 61, at 330. For example, the freedom to teach a religion or belief (Art. 6(e)) may conflict with obligations under the Discrimination Against Women Convention if religious doctrine incorporates ideas based on stereotyped roles for the sexes or denies women admission to religious training academies. See, e.g., UN Doc. E/1987/L.20, at 21–22, 25.

123 See, e.g., Hooker, M., Islamic Law in South-East Asia 34–35 (1984)Google Scholar (observing that with regard to Southeast Asia, evidence is conflicting on the extent to which Islamic law can be considered an accurate expression of actual legal practice and that analysis of the evidence depends upon what is meant by “Islam”).

124 Article 5 of the Discrimination Against Women Convention, supra note 43, requires states to take appropriate measures to modify social and cultural patterns and practices based on stereotyped roles for men and women. In education, Article 10(c) calls for the elimination of “any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and women at all levels and in all forms of education by encouraging coeducation . . . [and] by the revision of textbooks and school programmes.” Under Article 5(2) of the Declaration, however, children should not be compelled to receive teaching intended to eliminate stereotyped gender roles if such stereotyped roles are a feature of the belief system in which their parents wish to educate them.

125 For example, Egypt has entered a reservation to Article 16 of the Discrimination Against Women Convention, supra note 43 (concerning the equality of men and women in all matters relating to marriage and family matters), which emphasizes the “sacrosanct nature of the firm religious beliefs which govern marital relations in Egypt and which may not be called into question.” 39 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 45), para. 190, UN Doc. A/39/45 (1984). In reviewing this reservation, members of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) queried whether “complementarity” and equivalency of rights between men and women under Islamic law were being equated with the concept of equality. Id. at 26. At its sixth session, CEDAW asked the United Nations “to promote or undertake studies on the status of women under Islamic laws and customs and in particular on the status and equality of women in the family on issues such as marriage, divorce, custody and property rights and their participation in [the] public life of the society.” UN Doc. E/1987/L.20, at 88–89. See also UN Doc. CEDAW/C/L.3/Add.28 (1988) (clarifying the reasons for this request in response to criticisms voiced in the General Assembly and ECOSOC).

See also UN Docs. A/C.3/37/SR.56, at 16 (1981) (statement by Iranian representative characterizing provisions in the Universal Declaration and the Covenants regarding matters such as marriage as violations of the freedom to practice one’s religion or belief); CCPR/C/SR.203, at 7–8 (1980) (statement by Iraqi representative asserting that personal status laws must be in conformity with the Shari’a).

126 T. Meron, supra note 45, at 79. Article 6 of the Discrimination Against Women Declaration, supra note 82, calls for measures to ensure for women equal rights with men under civil law, including equality in legal capacity and equal rights to acquire, administer and inherit property, but qualifies this guarantee with the excessively vague caveat that such measures must be “[w]ithout prejudice to the safeguarding of the unity and the harmony of the family.”

127 On the status of women in Islamic family law, see generally Esposito, J., Women in Muslim Family Law (1982)Google Scholar. On Islamic family and personal status law, see generally Nasir, J., The Islamic Law of Personal Status (1986)Google Scholar; Hodkinson, K., Muslim Family Law: A Sourcebook (1984)Google Scholar. See, e.g., UN Doc. E/1987/L.20, at 81–84 (regarding the effect of Shari’a personal status law in matters such as land tenure and inheritance, and the importance of control over land, as the basic resource, in rural Bangladesh).

128 J. Nasir, supra note 127, at 223–24. See generally Powers, D., Studies in Quran and Hadith: The Formation of the Islamic Law of Inheritance (1986)Google Scholar. The Unified Arab Draft Law for Personal Status, recently completed by the Ministerial Committee of the First and Second Congresses of the Arab Ministers of Justice, incorporates similarly discriminatory inheritance provisions. Under Article 251, for example, a husband receives one–half of his wife’s estate if she has no descendants, while Article 252 provides that a wife receives only one-quarter of the husband’s estate if he has no descendants. Id. at 304.

See, e.g., UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.730, at 11 (1987) (statement by member of the Human Rights Committee characterizing Art. 91 of Iraq’s Personal Status Act, concerning inheritance by daughters, as discrimination on the basis of sex). Inheritance provisions of this type appear to conflict with Article 6(a) of the Discrimination Against Women Declaration, supra note 82, which calls for women’s right to inherit property on a basis of equality with men. See, however, note 126 supra.

129 T. Meron, supra note 45, at 157.

130 Maimonides, , Sefer Nashim, Hilkot Gerushin 1:1, in Mishneh Torah (Yosef, O. & Frankel, S. pubs. 1977)Google Scholar; see generally Biale, R., Women in Jewish Law: An Exploration of Women’s Issues in Halachic Sources 70–101 (1984)Google Scholar.

131 Maimonides, supra note 130, Sefer Kedusha, Hilkot Issurai Biah 15:1; R. Biale, supra note 130, at 101–13.

132 For a historical review of women’s participation in religious communities in the United States, see 1–3 Women and Religion in America (R. Ruether & R. Keller eds. 1981, 1983, 1986).

133 See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §253 (McKinney 1986); see also R. BIALE, supra note 130, at 99, 111–12; Meislin, , Pursuit of the Wife’s Right to a ‘Get’ in United States and Canadian Courts , 4 Jewish L. Ann. 250 (1981)Google Scholar. In recognition of the importance of reform from within the religious community, the New York Board of Rabbis recently called upon rabbis to apply sanctions against former husbands who refuse to grant religious divorces and to urge couples to sign prenuptial agreements stating that in the event of civil divorce they will grant a religious divorce. American Jewish Committee, Press Release No. 87-960-160, July 22, 1987, at 3.

134 For a discussion of circumstances in which Jewish law concerning personal status may be applied to non-Jews, see Shava, , The Rabbinical Courts in Israel: Jurisdiction over Non-Jews, 27 J. Church & St. 99 (1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

135 See, e.g., Eisenman, R., Islamic Law in Palestine and Israel (1978)Google Scholar. For example, in Israel, some personal status matters lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the religious courts of the recognized religious communities and others are within the concurrent jurisdiction of the religious courts and the civil district courts. Shava, supra note 134, at 99, 101–02.

Jurisdictional conflicts between secular courts and religious courts may arise under systems of concurrent jurisdiction. See, e.g., UN»Doc. E/1987/L.20, at 74, 77 (regarding possible conflict between the canonic law and the civil law of marriage and divorce enacted in Colombia). See also H.C. 301/63, Schtreit v. Chief Rabbi of Israel, 18(1) Piskei Din 598, 608 (1964); H.C. 232/81, Vilozni v. Rabbinical Court, 36(2) Piskei Din 733, 738 (1982) (stating the rule that the Supreme Court of Israel will not sit in appeal over the decisions of the religious courts).

136 See, e.g., Shava, supra note 134.

137 See A. Krishnaswami, supra note 1, at 53.

138 1988 Ribeiro report, supra note 10, at 25.

139 Id.

140 See UN Docs. E/CN.4/1988/44, at 4; E/CN.4/1988/44/Add.3.

141 See, e.g., UN Docs. E/CN.4/1988/44/Add.2, at 2; E/CN.4/1988/44, at 3–4.

142 1988 Ribeiro report, supra note 10, at 25.

143 Special Rapporteur Ribeiro has recommended that attention be given to utilizing the “machinery now available for monitoring the implementation of international standards concerning questions of discrimination or intolerance in matters of religion or belief [, including the procedures established by] the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Human Rights Committee.” Id. at 28.

144 See T. Van Boven, supra note 22, at 276; UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/SR.50/Add.1, at 10, 12 (regarding the need for consensus in the area of freedom of religion).