² Lord Phillimore in Johnstone v. Pedlar, [1921] 2 A. C. 262, 296.

³ Chancellor Kent in Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. 68, 71 (1813).

⁴ Report, League of Nations, 1927.11. 52^I, p. 35.

⁵ Art. 6. Text in U. S. Department of State Publication No. 3381, p. 20; this Journal, Supp., Vol. 43 (1949), p. 127.

⁶ Art. 18. Final Act, Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), p. 38; this Joubnal, Supp., Vol. 43 (1949), p. 133.

⁷ See Convention relative to Private International Law, The Hague, Nov. 14, 1896, British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 88, p. 555; Convention relating to Civil Procedure, The Hague, July 17, 1905, ibid., Vol. 99, p. 990; Pan American Convention on Private International Law, Havana, Feb. 20, 1928, League of Nations Treaty Series No. 1950. See also Art. 9 of Draft Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners, Paris, 1929, League of Nations Doc. C.97. M.23 (1930).II [C.I.T.E. 62], p. 433.

⁸ A. V. Freeman, The International Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice (1938), pp. 215–216. Cf. Willard B. Cowles’ statement that “… it is a settled rule that the alien has free access to national courts as a plaintiff.” Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 1952, pp. 71, 79–80.

⁹ See, for example, Textor, Synopsis juris gentium (1680), Ch. 13.

¹⁰ Quaestionum juris publici libri duo (1737, Frank trans., 1930), p. 52; referred to with approval by Sir William Scott in The Hoop, 1 C. Rob. 196, 201 (1799), and by Justice Washington in Crawford v. The William Penn, 6 Fed. Cas. 778, 780 (1815).

¹¹ Sec. 565.

¹² Annauire, Vol. II (1878), p. 150.

¹³ Ibid., Vol. I (1877), p. 124. See also Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations (1883–1884), Vol. I, pp. 331–332.

¹⁴ Martens, Law of Nations (Cobbett trans., 4th ed., 1829), p. 102; see also Vattel, Droit des gens (1758), Art. 103.

¹⁵ Elements of International Law (8th ed., 1866), §§140, 141 (citing on the first point, Folix, Droit International Privé, §§122, 123).

¹⁶ See conclusions of a subcommittee, communicated to governments by the League of Nations Committee for the Progressive Codification of International Law, with Questionnaire No. 4, Jan. 20, 1926, C.196. M.70. 1927. V, p. 104; Conference for the Codification of International Law, 1930, Report of Preparatory Committee, Responsibility of States for Damage Caused in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, Point IV, Basis of Discussion V, C.75. M.69. 1929. V. See also Harvard Research Draft on Responsibility, this Journal, Spec. Supp., Vol. 23 (1929), p. 180.

¹⁷ “Les règles internationales concernant le traitement des étrangers,” Académie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 37 (1931, III), pp. 353 –354.

¹⁸ Droit international public (1944), p. 416.

¹⁹ The Minimum Standard of International Law Applied to Aliens (1949), p. 181.

²⁰ International Law Chiefly As Interpreted and Applied by the United States (1945 ed.), Vol. II, p. 879.

²¹ See, for example, T. D. Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International Law (5th ed., 1879), pp. 92–93.

²² W. E. Hall, A Treatise on International Law (4th ed., 1895), pp. 54–55; J. West-lake, International Law, Vol. I (1904), pp. 238–239, 313–314.

²³ Elementorum jurisprudential universalis libri duo (1688), II (Oldfather trans., 1934), pp. 96–97.

²⁴ On the point that the juridical personality of the individual would not be subject to “derogation” under the proposed Covenant of Human Rights, see Charles Malik in United Nations Bulletin, Vol. 8 (June 1, 1950), p. 472.

²⁵ By Art. 621, “Foreigners are entitled to free access to the tribunals of the nation within whose territorial limits they may be, for the prosecution and defense of their rights, in all cases within the jurisdiction of the nation … and are at liberty to employ advocates and agents of whatever description recognized by the local law, whom they may think proper, and in their judicial recourse may enjoy the same privileges and on the same terms, and no others, as members of the nation. But this right is subject to the condition respecting security for costs imposed upon transient persons by the laws affecting local tribunals.” The article reflected a rule found at that time in some twenty treaties of the United States, Great Britain and France.

²⁸ Arts. 593–595 (Borehard trans., 5th ed., 1918).

²⁷ The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915), pp. 82–83. To the same effect, see Harvard Eesearch Draft (cited in note 16, supra) at p. 180.

²⁸ Op. cit., p. 215 (italics inserted).

²⁹ No. 80.

³⁰ 1 Stat. 73.

³¹ The current version of this provision is in 28 U.S.C. 1350. Under this section, the amount in controversy is immaterial. By ruling of U. S. Attorney General Bonaparte, 26 Op. Att. Gen. 250 (1907), the section provided a right of action and a forum for Mexican nationals claiming to have been injured by an American irrigation company.

Under the original form of the statutory rule, it was held in 1795 that a district court had jurisdiction of a suit brought by a master of a French privateer for restitution of property seized by a third party and sold under a prior mortgage (Bolchos v. Three Negro Slaves, 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1,607). Two years earlier a suit in admiralty to recover possession of a vessel alleged to have been wrongfully seized as a prize of war was found not to be a suit for tort only (Moxon v. The Brigantine Fanny, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9,895).

In O’Reilly de Camara v. Brooks, 209 U. S. 45 (1908), an action for damages was brought by reason of the cancellation, by the U. S. Military Government in Havana, of previously granted rights to slaughter cattle within the city. Recovery was denied, on the holding that the right to slaughter did not survive the extinction of Spanish sovereignty and that the United States had adopted the action of the officer who ordered the cancellation.

In the period following the second World War, it was held that a district court had no competence to entertain a complaint that Nazi officials had by means of duress compelled plaintiff to transfer German assets which ultimately came into the hands of the defendant. Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaartmaatschappij, 76 F. Supp. 335 (1948).

³² Sec. 11. By the current version (28 U.S.C. 1332), the amount in controversy must exceed $3,000. In Maciak v. Olejniczak, 79 F. Supp. 817 (1948), it was held that a Federal District Court had jurisdiction of a civil action by a citizen of Poland (residing in the district) against the defendant, an American citizen and resident of the district, claiming in excess of $3,000 as a result of defendant’s failure to complete a building contract. See also Breedlove v. Nicolet, 7 Pet. 413 (1833), to the effect that an alien’s residence within a State will not deprive him of the right to sue in Federal courts. In Nelson v. Braughler et at, 35 F. (2nd) 779 (1929), it was held that while citizens of States may sue in the State of the citizenship of either plaintiff or defendant, aliens—although living in a State—can sue only in the State of defendant’s citizenship. On the other hand, an alien may apparently be sued in any district in which he may be found or in which valid service may be had. H. G. Baker & Bro. v. Pinkham et at., 211 F. 728 (1914).

In Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 233 (1922), the Court declared that “The right of a litigant to maintain an action in a federal court on the ground that there is a controversy between citizens of different States is not one derived from the Constitution of the United States, unless in a very indirect sense. Certainly it is not a right granted by the Constitution.” Nine years later, citing the Kline case, the Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit declared that “No alien has a constitutional right to sue in the United States courts.” Heine v. New York Life Insurance Co., 50 F. (2nd) 382, 386 (1931).

Non-resident aliens’ actions meeting the requirement as to minimum amount in controversy are maintainable. Fribourg v. Pullman Co., 176 F. 981 (1910); Mahopoulus v. C. E. I. & P. Ry. Co., 167 F. 165 (1908).

An alien corporation may be a party plaintiff or defendant. Price, Forbes & Co. v. Montgomery, 115 F. (2nd) 611 (1940) ; Carp v. Queen Ins. Co., 168 F. 782 (1909); Encherman v. Canada SS Lines, 57 F. Supp. 275 (1944).

It appears that Federal courts have no jurisdiction over suits between aliens in which no federal question is involved (Montalet v. Murray, 4 Cr. 46 (1807); Jackson v. Twentyman, 2 Pet. 136 (1829); Dodge v. Cunard SS Co., 19 F. (2nd) 500 (1927); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 Dall. 12 (1800); Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 5 Cr. 303 (1809)).

A district court has been held to have no jurisdiction over a suit by an alien against an unincorporated association, part of whose members were aliens. Ex parte Edelstein, 30 F. (2nd) 636 (1929).

³³ Sec. 12. 28 U.S.C. 1441 provides for removal to Federal District Courts of suits instituted in State courts over which the district courts have original jurisdiction. Generally, suits involving aliens and which otherwise meet jurisdictional requirements are removable to district courts. Harold v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 33 F. 529 (1888); In re Bed Cross Line, 277 F. 853 (1921); Ex parte Girard, Fed. Cas. No. 5,457 (1858); Roberts v. Pacific & A. Ry. & Nav. Co., 104 F. 577 (1900). For instances in which removal has not been permitted, see Cudahy v. McGeoch, 37 F. 1 (1888) ; Eddy v. Casas, 118 F. 363 (1902); and compare Cooley v. McArthur, 35 F. 372 (1888). For an interpretation of the effect of the change of language from suits “against an alien” to the present language of 28 U.S.C. 1441 (which does not specifically mention suits against aliens as being removable), see O’Conor v. Texas, 202 U. S. 501 (1906).

³⁴ Sec. 13.

³⁵ The general rule that Federal courts do not take jurisdiction over suits between aliens apparently does not apply when a Federal question is in issue and the amount in controversy is within the statutory requirement (Dodge v. Cunard SS Co., 19 F. (2nd) 500 (1927), especially statement and cases cited at p. 502).

³⁶ By 28 TJ.S.C. 2502, “Citizens or subjects of any foreign government which accords to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute claims against their government in its courts may sue the United States in the Court of Claims if the subject matter of the suit is otherwise within such Court’s jurisdiction.” This provision derives from the Act of July 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 243. The latter provided that no suit was to be maintained in any United States or State court by or for an alien against the United States for any action taken under the Acts of 1863 and 1864 relating to the seizure of abandoned property in insurrectionary districts. A proviso added: “That this section shall not be construed so as to deprive aliens who are citizens or subjects of any government which accords to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute claims against such governments in its courts, of the privilege of prosecuting claims against the United States in the court of claims, as now provided by law.” It appears that prior to the Act of 1868 aliens could bring suit in the Court of Claims without reference to reciprocal rights of United States citizens to sue in courts of the foreign countries. In Wagner’s Case, 5 Ct. CI. 637 (1869) the Court said:

“The claimant is a Bavarian by birth, and at the time of filing his petition he was not naturalized, nor is it shown that the Kingdom of Bavaria accords to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute claims against that government. But it does appear that the claimant was regularly naturalized, and declared a citizen of the United States on the 9th of November, 1868. The act prohibiting aliens from suing in this court, except in cases therein provided, was not passed until July 27, 1868 [petition filed Sept. 18, 1867], and the plea of alienage appears not to have been filed until the 11th of January, 1869.

“At the time the suit was brought, there was no disability resting on the claimant. He could sue in this court at that time at the common law, and the statute imposing the disability was not pleaded until after he was regularly naturalized.”

As to lists of states which have met the condition of reciprocity specified in the statute, see statement by Judge Eichardson in 17 Ct. CI. 17, and statement in Hackworth, Digest, Vol. III, pp. 565–566. A treaty according to the citizens or subjects of each party “free access to the tribunals of justice in their litigious affairs” was held to apply only to litigious affairs of aliens with each other and with citizens, and was held not to apply to the right contemplated by 28 U.S.C. 2502. Valk v. U. S., 29 Ct. Cl. 62 (1894); affirmed 168 U. S. 703. Suits by foreign corporations will be entertained (Volunteer Fleet v. U. S., 282 U. S. 481 (1931); Reid Wrecking Co. v. U. S., 202 F. 314 (1913); Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co. v. U. S., 39 Ct. CI. 225 (1904)).

An alien plaintiff must show reciprocity. Muller v. U. S., 4 Ct. CI. 61 (1868); Aktiebolaget Ino-Industri v. U. S., 54 F. Supp. 844 (1944). But if the foreign government gives to United States citizens the same right of suit against it which its own citizens have, then suit can be maintained in the Court of Claims, notwithstanding neither American citizen nor foreigner could maintain that kind of suit against the foreign government. Brodie v. U. S., 62 Ct. Cl. 29 (1926). The Swiss Confederation was allowed to sue in the Court of Claims (108 Ct. Cl. 388 (1947)), but a foreign government may not maintain an action in that court for the adjustment of a diplomatic claim (Berger v. U. S., 36 Ct. Cl. 243 (1901)).

By 28 U.S.C. 1491, the Court of Claims had jurisdiction over claims against the United States “(1) Founded upon the Constitution; or (2) Founded upon any Act of Congress; or (3) Founded upon any regulation of an executive department; or (4) Founded upon any express or implied contract with the United States; or (5) For liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 26 U.S.C. 1502 contains the rule that, “Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the Court of Claims shall not have jurisdiction of any claim against the United States growing out of or dependent upon any treaty entered into with foreign nations.” This section derives from the Act of March 3, 1863, Sec. 9 (12 Stat. 765, 767), from which was deleted after “nations” the phrase “or with the Indian tribes.” A Member of the House of Representatives explained the purpose of the section as follows:

“It will be observed that jurisdiction of claims arising upon treaties is withheld from the court. According to the practice of nations, such claims are usually adjusted by commissioners specially appointed for the purpose. Besides, they often partake of a political character, which renders it proper that they should be under the immediate supervision of Congress. For those and other reasons it has been deemed prudent to retain the jurisdiction over them in Congress.” (Remarks of Mr. Porter, Cong. Globe, 2d Sess., 37th Congress, Appendix, p. 124, April 15, 1862.)

Sec. 1502 has been the subject of some judicial interpretation. The Court of Claims was found without jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim of patentee growing out of or dependent upon provisions of the Agreement with Great Britain, signed Aug. 24, 1942 (56 Stat. (2) 1594), and relating to interchange of patent rights (Yassin v, U. S., 110 Ct. Cl. 211 (1948)). A suit for refund of twenty per cent of the internal revenue tax imposed by Sec. 10 of the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897 (on the ground of provisions of Art. II of the Treaty of Dec. 11, 1902, with Cuba), was held to be a claim growing out of or dependent upon a treaty, notwithstanding that the terms of the treaty were embraced thereafter in an Act of Congress (Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., v. U. S., 71 Ct. Cl. 296 (1930)). In 1883 the Court decided that it did not have jurisdiction over a case involving property situated in Alaska, title to which depended upon the terms of the treaty ceding Alaska (Kinkead v. U. S., 18 Ct. Cl. 504).

³⁷ By 46 U.S.C. 781, “A libel in personam in admiralty may be brought against the United States, or a petition impleading the United States, for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States, and for compensation for towage and salvage services, including contract salvage, rendered to a public vessel of the United States, Provided, That the cause of action arose after the 6th day of April, 1920.” Relative to this section, 46 U.S.C. 785 provides that “No suit may be brought under this chapter by a national of any foreign government unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court in which suit is brought that said government, under similar circumstances, allows nationals of the United States to sue in its courts.” Under this rule, nationals of Norway, Canada, and The Netherlands, respectively, have qualified. Westfal-Larsen & Co., v. U. S., 41 F. (2nd) 550 (1930); The Mary F. Anderson, 35 F. (2nd) 400 (1929); N. V. Stoomvaart Mattschaippij Nederland v. U. S., 18 F. Supp. 567 (1937). In the last-cited case, competence to sue was based on evidence consisting of correspondence between the Department of State and the Minister of The Netherlands. With respect to Sec. 785, U.S.C, Title 46, Section 783 permits a cross-libel or set-off of counterclaim when suit is brought by the United States, and in U. S. v. The Australia Star, 172 F. (2nd) 472 (1949), certiorari denied, 338 U. S. 823, it was held that reciprocity was not required to be established by a foreigner filing a cross-libel.

By 46 U.S.C. 742, a libel in personam is permitted against the United States if the vessel is owned by the United States or by any corporation in which the United States owns the entire capital stock, or if the vessel is in the possession of the United States or such corporation or operated by or for the United States or such corporation, and if such vessel, if privately owned and operated, would be open to proceedings in admiralty, provided such vessel is employed as merchant vessel or is a tugboat operated by such corporation. (See 46 U.S.C. 741). In The Elmac, 285 F. 665 (1922), Judge Hand noted that the libelant “is a Cuban corporation, and is not alleged to reside or have its principal place of business in this country. This, in my opinion, is a fatal objection to the suit. …” He distinguished the Elmac case from Middleton & Co. v. U. S., 273 F. 199 (1921), where the holding was that the venue stipulation that suits shall be brought in “the district in which the parties so suing, or any of them, reside or have their principal place of business,” did not apply to a suit by an alien or a foreign corporation having no place of business in the United States, since in that case the libelant may be considered, for the purpose of the suit, to reside in any district. Suit in the Middleton case was brought by an American agent of a Japanese corporation.

In Balfour, Guthrie ‘ Co. v. U. S., 90 F. Supp. 831 (1950), the company and the United Nations filed a suit against the United States as owner, and a steamship company as charterer, of a vessel on which powdered milk of UNICEF was shipped to Italy and Greece, alleging failure to deliver a portion of shipment and damage to another portion. The court held that the UNO could sue the charter company, noting that by the International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. 288–288f, designated organizations, such as the UNO (designated by Exec. Order 9698, Feb. 19, 1946), possess the capacity “to institute legal proceedings.” As to the UNO’s suing the United States, the court said that “It is apparent that Article 104 of the Charter of the United Nations was never intended to provide a method for settling differences between the United Nations and its members. It is equally clear that the International Organizations Immunities Act does not amount to a waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity from suit. The precise question posed is whether the capacity to institute legal proceedings conferred on the United Nations by that Act includes the competence to sue the United States in cases in which the United States has consented to suit by other litigants” (at p. 833). The court then held that the UNO could institute a libel suit under 46 U.S.C. 741 et seq.

³⁸ 28 U.S.C. 1346 gives the district courts, concurrently with the Court of Claims, jurisdiction over (a) civil action for the recovery of any internal revenue tax erroneously or illegally collected (with a proviso as to amount), and (b) any other civil action against the United States, not involving more than $10,000, founded on the Constitution, a Congressional Act, a regulation, a contract express or implied, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. It also confers exclusive jurisdiction over actions for money damages for injury, etc., caused by an act of a government employee. It has been held that, under the section, suits against the United States by aliens were authorized (U. S. v. New York & O. SS Co., 216 F. 61 (1914), certiorari denied, 238 U. S. 646).

By 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., tort claims of $1,000 or less against the United States may be adjusted administratively. Presumably an alien could claim, for Sec. 2672 gives agency heads authority to “consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, and settle any claim for money damages of $1,000 or less. …” (Italics inserted.)

³⁹ 8 U.S.C. 41 (derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866), provides that: “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.” Aliens receive the benefit of this provision. (Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 F. 745 (1915).) Aliens illegally within the United States have been permitted to sue for damages. (Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines, 17 F. Supp. 576 (1936).) In Wisconsin, however, an alien illegally within the United States was denied the right to sue for wages. (Coules v. Pharris, 212 Wis. 558 (1933).)

A much cited case on the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and involving rights of aliens is Barbier v. Connally, 113 U. S. 27 (1885).

In Roberto v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 177 F. (2nd) 811 (1949), a Federal court held that an alien awaiting deportation had the right to enter into a contract of fire insurance and to recover on the policy.

⁴⁰ See, for examples, Executors of Cruden v. Neale, 2 N. C. 338 (1796), with reference to Art. 4 of the 1783 Peace Treaty with Great Britain; Harden v. Fisher, 1 Wheat. 300 (1816), with reference to Art. 9 of the Jay Treaty with Great Britain.

⁴¹ Corpus Juris, Vol. 2, 1070–1071; Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 3, pp. 533, 534; American Jurisprudence, Vol. 2, pp. 494–495; Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. 68 (1813); Krachanake v. Acme Mfg. Co., 175 N. C. 435 (1918). Berger v. Stevens, 197 N. C. 234 (1929), involved suit by non-resident aliens, the suit being permitted. Suits between aliens are generally maintainable in State courts. (Corpus Juris, Vol. 2, p. 1071, note 48, for citations.)

⁴² 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 192 (1816), Rush; ibid. 229 (1855), Cushing; Wharton, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (2nd ed., 1881), §17.

“The policy of the United States in all cases of complaints made by foreigners is to extend to them the same means of redress as is enjoyed by our own citizens.” J. B. Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. 4, p. 7.

“Mutual freedom of access to the courts on a basis of equality with nationals is generally assured to the nationals of the contracting parties in the treaties between the United States and other countries.” G. H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. 3, p. 562.

It may be noted that non-resident aliens, as any non-resident plaintiffs, are customarily required to deposit security for costs. In Federal courts, the privilege of suing in forma pauperis is restricted to citizens of the United States (30 Stat. 866). Cf. Hackworth, Digest, Vol. 3, pp. 569–570.

⁴³ 8 Stat. 80. On Art. 4, see the fourth of the preliminary articles of peace, 8 Stat. 54, and, for an application by North Carolina State courts, Executors of Cruden v. Neale, 2 N. C. 338 (1796).

On the fifth article, see Gordon v. Kerr, Fed. Cas. No. 5, 611 (1805), in which Judge Washington said in his charge to the jury that if the “states thought proper to restore [confiscated lands], their power to do it grew out of this treaty; and so far neutralized any article of their constitution, which prohibited, in other cases, the exercise of such right. …”

⁴⁴ 8 Stat. 106 (Art. 13).

⁴⁵ Art. 12. A provision similar to Art. 12 had been discussed in 1781 when France made overtures to conclude the consular convention envisaged in Art. 29 of the 1778 commercial treaty (Luzerne’s proposal in Secret Journals, Vol. 3, pp. 6–19). Furthermore, in 1782 the American Congress approved a plan of a consular convention which contained provisions for consular jurisdiction not only in civil disputes between nationals, but also in cases of criminal acts committed in France by an American against an American and in the United States by a Frenchman against a Frenchman (Ibid., pp. 66–78).

⁴⁶ See provisions on administration of estates of deceased nationals, as in Art. 14 of the treaty with Sweden, 1910, 37 Stat. 1479. Norwegian consular representatives once referred to difficulties of consuls in handling the affairs of their deceased nationals before American courts, declaring that the “only effective and proper remedy of the … enumerated abuses is by treaties properly worded. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that the Courts of the United States receive little, if any influence, in considering the rights of consuls, from the background of historical precedent, international comity, and even the law of nations. …” Department of State file (National Archives) 711.572/63.

For example of consular jurisdiction as to crews of vessels under the flag of the consul’s country, see Art. 12 of the 1926 treaty with Cuba, 44 Stat. 2471.

⁴⁷ See agreements with various German States providing that disputes between different claimants to the same inheritance should be decided in the last resort “according to the laws and by the judges of the country” where the property was situated. (With Hesse, 1844, 9 Stat. 818, Art. 5; with Wurttemberg, 1844, 8 Stat. 588, Art. 5; with Bavaria, 1845, 9 Stat. 826, Art. 5; with Saxony, 1845, 9 Stat. 830, Art. 5; with Nassau, 1846, 9 Stat. 849, Art. 5.)

⁴⁸ See Convention of 1883, 25 Stat. 1372, Arts. 2, 3; Pan American Convention on Copyrights, and those on Patents and Trademarks, 1910, 38 Stat. 1785, 1811, and 39 Stat. 1675; Convention on Industrial Property, 1911, 38 Stat. 1645; Pan American Trademark Convention, 1923, 44 Stat. 2494; Pan American Trademark Convention, 1929, 46 Stat. 2907.

⁴⁹ See exchange of notes with Great Britain concerning protection of trademarks in Morocco, 1899, Malloy, Treaties, Vol. I, p. 778; with Germany, 1901, ibid., p. 559; with Italy, 1904, ibid., p. 989; and exchange of notes with Belgium concerning protection of trademarks in China, 1905, ibid, p. 111; with Prance, 1905, ibid., p. 545; with Germany, 1905, ibid., p. 560; with Great Britain, 1905, ibid., p. 800; with Italy, 1905, ibid., p. 991; with Denmark, 1907, ibid., p. 399. See also exchange of notes with Great Britain concerning protection of patents in Morocco, 1907, ibid., p. 808.

⁵⁰ 39 Stat. 1706, Art. 7.

⁵¹ See treaty of 1905 with Great Britain, in which extraterritorial rights in Zanzibar were relinquished, 34 Stat. 2870, Art. 2; exchange of notes with Iran, 1927, 47 Stat. 2644; treaty of 1943 with China, 57 Stat. 767, Arts. 1, 5.

⁵² It was mutually agreed not to present claims or request international arbitration. With certain exceptions, nationals claiming to have suffered losses were to be referred for remedy to the appropriate judicial or administrative tribunals of the government which had allegedly caused the damage or loss. Each government agreed to “use its best endeavours” to secure to the nationals of the other “the same rights and remedies as may be enjoyed by its own nationals in similar circumstances.” U. S. Treaty Series, No. 756.

⁵³ U. S. Treaty Series, No. 973. The drafting committee declared this to be “in harmony with the doctrine established in the laws of their respective countries.” The United States signed subject to the understanding that the described companies should be “permitted to sue or defend suits of any kind, without the requirement of registration or domestication.” The protocol was opened for signature on June 25, 1936.

⁵⁴ These may, as in the case of the International Bank, provide that the organization shall have “full juridical personality,” and, in particular, the capacity to contract, acquire property and institute legal proceedings (60 Stat. 1440, Art. VII, Sec. 2), or, as in the case of the United Nations Charter (Art. 104) and a number of other multilateral instruments, provide for “such legal capacity” in the territories of the Member States as may be necessary for the exercise of the organizations’ functions and the fulfillment of their purposes.

⁵⁵ See the International Organizations Immunities Act, 59 Stat. 669, Sees. 1, 2. Specified, inter alia, were the capacity to institute legal proceedings, and the enjoyment of immunity from suit and legal process in the same manner as foreign governments. As is well known, the United States has not acceded to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (a text of which is in U. N. Doc. A/64, July 1, 1946; also this Journal, Supp., Vol. 43 (1949), p. 1).

⁵⁶ Arts. 4, 5, 6 and 16 of the final draft (Journals of the Continental Congress, Vol. 5, pp. 768–779) contained provisions relating to property “piratically taken” and carried into the territories of the contracting parties, and to the condemnation of contraband goods.

⁵⁷ Art. 20.

⁵⁸ Extradition arrangements had been the subject of earlier negotiations, particularly those of 1786–87. A treaty plan dated Sept. 5, 1787, provided for mutual protection of nationals, but not of malefactors fleeing from one country to the other, who were to be surrendered. Miguel Gomez del Campillo, Relaciones Diplomaticas entre España y Los Estados Unidos, Vol. 1 (1944), pp. 385 – 398. Negotiations for a commercial treaty having been reopened in Madrid in 1791–92, Jefferson sent additional instructions to the American negotiators concerning an extradition convention. A part of the draft convention was as follows:

“The courts of justice of the United States and provinces shall be reciprocally open for the demand and recovery of debts due to any person inhabiting the one, from any person fled therefrom and found in the other, in like manner as they are open to their own citizens; likewise for the recovery of the property, or the value thereof, carried away from any person inhabiting the one, by any person fled therefrom and found in the other; which carrying away shall give a right of civil action, whether the fugitive came to the original possession lawfully or unlawfully, even feloneously; likewise for the recovery of damages sustained by any forgery committed by such fugitive. And the same provision shall hold in favor of the representatives of the original creditor or sufferer, and against the representatives of the original debtor, carrier away, or forger; also in favor of either Government, or of corporations, as of natural persons; but in no case shall the person of the defendant be imprisoned for the debt, though the process, whether original, mesne, or final, be, for the form sake, directed against his person. If the time between the flight and the commencement of the action exceed not—years, it shall be counted but as one day under any act of limitations.” (American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. 1, p. 258; italics inserted.)

In a paper on mutual delivery of fugitives from justice, Jefferson wrote:

“The carrying away of the property of another may also be reasonably made to found a civil action.

“A conviction, then, may include forgery, and the carrying away of the property of others, under the head of—

“3rd. Flight from debts. To remit the fugitive in this case, would be to remit him in every case: for, in the present state of things, it is next to impossible not to owe something. But I see neither injustice nor inconvenience in permitting the fugitive to be sued in our courts. The laws of some countries punishing the unfortunate debtor by perpetual imprisonment, he is right to liberate himself by flight; and it would be wrong to re-imprison him in the country to which he flees. Let all process, therefore, be confined to his property.” (Ibid., p. 258.)

⁵⁹ On the negotiation of the treaty see, generally, S. F. Bemis, Pinckney’s Treaty (1926). Of Art. 20, Pinckney wrote that it “appears favorable to us.” (American State Papers, Foreign Eelations, Vol. 1, p. 546.) Portions of Art. 7 also had to do with judicial remedies, covering (1) procedure in connection with arrests for debts, and (2) foreigners’ employment of counsel and agents, and the agents’ attendance at proceedings and examinations. “The first part,” said Pinckney, “taken from the 16th of Prussia; the latter part I added, because I considered it a good stipulation in all situations, but particularly so in Spain.” (Ibid., p. 545.)

⁶⁰ 8 Stat. 252, Art. 12.

⁶¹ 19 Stat. 656.

⁶² 8 Stat. 32, Art. 8. Substantially this language appears in the “plan” which was included in the instructions of John Adams, American negotiator. Secret Journals of the Congress of the Confederation, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, pp. 377, 382–383.

⁶³ Art. 7. Cf. Adams’ instructions (referred to in preceding note), p. 382.

⁶⁴ 8 Stat. 60, Art. 17. This article was one of those renewed by Art. 12 of the 1816 treaty with Sweden and Norway.

⁶⁵ 8 Stat. 84, 162 (Art. 16 in each case).

⁶⁶ 8 Stat. 116.

⁶⁷ Provisions of this article, particularly as they affected State laws, became the subject of judicial application. See, e.g., Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 7 Cr. 603 (1813); Orr v. Hodgson, 4 Wheat. 453 (1819); Bright’s Lessee v. Rochester, 7 Wheat. 535 (1822); Harden v. Fisher, 1 Wheat. 300 (1816).

⁶⁸ 8 Stat. 178, Art. 5.

⁶⁹ Morocco, 1786, 8 Stat. 100, Art. 20; Algiers, 1795, 8 Stat. 133, Art. 15; Tunis, 1797, 8 Stat. 157, Art. 20; Tripoli, 1805, 8 Stat. 214, Art. 18; Algiers, 1815, 8 Stat. 224, Art. 19; Algiers, 1816, 8 Stat. 244, Art. 19.

The 1796 treaty with Tripoli (8 Stat. 154) provided in Art. 9 for most-favored-nation treatment in connection with the privileges, immunities and jurisdiction of the consul.

⁷⁰ Tripoli, 1805, Art. 18; Algiers, 1815, Art. 19; Algiers, 1816, Art. 19.

⁷¹ Treaty of 1795, Art. 15; treaty of 1815, Art. 19; treaty of 1816, Art. 19.

⁷² Art. 22.

⁷³ American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. 5, p. 709, Art. 5 of the Colombian project.

⁷⁴ Ibld., p. 713, Art. 5 of the American counter-draft.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 714, Art. 16 of the American counter-draft.

⁷⁶ The American negotiator reported the reaction as follows:

“‘Would …,’ said the plenipotentiary of Colombia, ‘that legislation of this country was as perfect as that of the United States, in order to accede without hesitation to this article. But that advocates, proctors, agents, and factors should be present at all the proceedings of the tribunal in such cases, and at the taking of all examinations and declarations in the suits, would not fail to offer some difficulties in the forensic practices of this country.’ ” (Ibid., pp. 726–727.)

The American negotiator observed that: “As the citizens of all other countries are sure to enjoy the benefits of this article in the United States without any treaty, I thought that it could not be amiss to secure to our citizens in this way the enjoyment of like benefits.” (Ibid., p. 722.)

⁷⁷ 8 Stat. 306.

⁷⁸ 8 Stat. 552, Art. 1; 27 Stat. 926, Art. 3.

⁷⁹ Colombia, 1824 (cited supra), Art. 10; Central America, 1825, 8 Stat. 322, Art. 12; Hanseatic Republics, 1827, 8 Stat. 366, Art. 8; Brazil, 1828, 8 Stat. 390, Art. 12; Mexico, 1831, 8 Stat. 410, Art. 14; Chile, 1832, 8 Stat. 434, Art. 10; Venezuela, 1836, 8 Stat. 466, Art. 13; Ecuador, 1839, 8 Stat. 534, Art. 13; New Granada, 1846, 9 Stat. 881, Art. 13; Guatemala, 1849, 10 Stat. 873, Art. 12; El Salvador, 1850, 10 Stat. 891, Art. 13; Bolivia, 1858, 12 Stat. 1003, Art. 13; El Salvador, 1870, 18 (3) Stat. 725, Art. 13.

⁸⁰ Peru-Bolivia, 1836, 18 (2) Stat. 602, Art. 9; Peru, 1851, ibid. 612, Art. 19; Peru, 1870, 18 (3) Stat. 698, Art. 16; Peru, 1887, 25 Stat. 1444, Art. 15.

⁸¹ Colombia, 1824, 18 (2) Stat. 150, Art. 10; Hanseatic Republics, 1827, 18 (2) Stat. 400, Art. 8; Central America, 1825, 18 (2) Stat. 95, Art. 12; Brazil, 1828, 18 (2) Stat. 81, Art. 12; Mexico, 1831, 18 (2) Stat. 476, Art. 14; Chile, 1832, 18 (2) Stat. 104, Art. 10; Peru-Bolivia, 1836, 18 (2) Stat. 602, Art. 9; Venezuela, 1836, 18 (2) Stat. 787, Art. 13; Ecuador, 1859, 18 (2) Stat. 187, Art. 13; New Granada, 1846, 18 (2) Stat. 550, Art. 13; Guatemala, 1849, 18 (2) Stat. 378, Art. 12; El Salvador, 1850, 18 (2) Stat. 675, Art. 13; Peru, 1851, 18 (2) Stat. 612, Art. 19; Bolivia, 1858, 18 (2) Stat. 68, Art. 13; Peru, 1870, 18 (3) Stat. 698, Art. 16; El Salvador, 1870, 18 (3) Stat. 725, Art. 13; Peru, 1887, 25 Stat. 1444, Art. 15.

⁸² See, for example, the treaty with the Two Sicilies, 1855, 18 (2) Stat. 778, Art. 7.

⁸³ Treaties cited in note 81, supra.

⁸⁴ See, for example, the treaty with Hanover, 1840, 18 (2) Stat. 387, Art. 1. In the treaty of 1864 with Haiti, which employed this formula, there was an express clause concerning the furnishing of security for costs, where this was required. (18 (2) Stat. 412, Art. 6.)

⁸⁵ 18 (2) Stat. 594, Art. 9. In four treaties (Costa Rica, 1851, 18 (2) Stat. 159, Art. 7; Argentina, 1853, ibid. 16, Art. 8; Honduras, 1864, ibid. 426, Art. 7; Nicaragua, 1867, ibid. 566, Art. 7), the phraseology seems to leave some doubt as to whether national treatment was specified for access to courts, or only for the right to employ counsel.

⁸⁶ 18 (2) Stat. 439, Art. 23.

⁸⁷ 29 Stat. 848, Art. 1.

⁸⁸ 18 (2) Stat. 748, Art. 1.

⁸⁹ Illustrated in the 1851 treaty with Costa Rica, 18 (2) Stat. 159, Art. 8.

⁹⁰ 27 Stat. 927, Art. 3; 33 Stat. 2105, Art. 6.

⁹¹ 22 Stat. 963, Art. 4.

⁹² The 1881 treaty with Serbia, 22 Stat. 963, and the two treaties cited in note 90, supra.

⁹³ Treaties cited in note 81, supra.

⁹⁴ Hanover, 1840, 18 (2) Stat. 387, Art. 1; Hanover, 1846, ibid., 391, Art. 10; Mecklen-burg-Schwerin, 1847, ibid., 467, Art. 10.

⁹⁵ Illustrated in the treaty of 1851 with Costa Eica, 18 (2) Stat. 159, Art. 7.

⁹⁶ As in Art. 4 of the 1881 treaty with Serbia, cited in note 92, supra.

⁹⁷ Illustrated in 1860 treaty with Venezuela, 18 (2) Stat. 797, Art. 3.

⁹⁸ 18 (2) Stat. 439, Art. 23; 29 Stat. 848, Art. 1.

⁹⁹ Illustrated in Art. 10 of the 1824 treaty with Colombia, 18 (2) Stat. 150.

¹⁰⁰ New Granada, 1846, 18 (2) Stat. 550, Art. 13; El Salvador, 1850, ibid. 675, Art. 13; El Salvador, 1870, 18 (3) Stat. 725. These treaties also specified that counsel might be employed in the prosecution and defense of rights.

¹⁰¹ 18 Stat. (2) 778, Art. 7. Cf. language of nearly a dozen other treaties giving aliens the right to employ “in all causes” or “in defense of their rights” such advocates, attorneys, or other agents as they might think proper. Illustrated in Art. 19 of the 1851 treaty with Peru, 18 Stat. (2) 612, and in Art. 1 of the treaty with Hanover, 1840, ibid. 387.

¹⁰² 27 Stat. 926, Art. 3; 33 ibid. 2105, Art. 6.

¹⁰³ 22 Stat. 963, Art. 4.

¹⁰⁴ 18 (2) Stat. 412, Art. 6.

¹⁰⁵ 29 Stat. 848, Art. 1.

¹⁰⁶ Illustrated in the treaty with Central America, 1825, 18 (2) Stat. 95, Art. 12. One of the treaties in this group, that with Peru-Bolivia, 1836, 18 (2) Stat. 602, which in its Art. 9 followed the Colombian treaty formula, also contained the following:

“… to render more explicit, and make more effectual, the solemn promise and engagement hereinbefore mentioned, under circumstances to which one of the parties thereto has heretofore been exposed, it is hereby further stipulated and declared, that all the rights and privileges which are now enjoyed by, or may hereafter be conferred on, the citizens of one of the contracting parties, by or in virtue of the constitution and laws of the other, respectively, shall be deemed and held to belong to, and inhere in, them, until such rights and privileges shall have been abrogated or withdrawn by an authority constitutionally or lawfully competent thereto.”

¹⁰⁷ 18 (2) Stat. 112, Art. 2.

¹⁰⁸ 18 (2) Stat. 675, Art. 13; 18 (3) Stat. 725, Art. 13.

¹⁰⁹ 18 (2) Stat. 68, Art. 13.

¹¹⁰ See, for example, Mexico, 1831, 18 (2) Stat. 476, Art. 14; Japan, 1894, 29 Stat. 848, Art. 1.

¹¹¹ As to geographical distribution, approximately two thirds of the general access clauses were in treaties with Latin American states. Host of the remainder were in treaties with European countries.

¹¹² 18 (2) Stat. 583, Art. 4; 33 Stat. 2208, Arts. 8, 15.

¹¹³ Illustrated in the treaty of 1828 with Prussia, 18 (2) Stat. 656, Art. 14.

¹¹⁴ 19 Stat. 628, Art. 15.

¹¹⁵ Malloy, Treaties, Vol. 1, p. 854. The Attorney General, having been asked whether any legal objection might exist to the United States’ giving assurance that Greek corporations would be embraced by the term “subjects” used in Art. 1 of the 1837 treaty, advised that there was no objection. 19 Op. Atty. Gen. 303 (1889), Miller. See also Foreign Relations, 1889, p. 481.

¹¹⁶ 36 Stat. 2163. On the point that this agreement did not exonerate a Russian corporation from the operation of the rule of forum non conveniens, see Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd. (Mass.), 184 N. E. 152 (1933). The court noted that the United States had sought this agreement after a holding by a Russian court that foreign corporations could enforce their rights in Russian courts only on the basis of special conventions concluded for that purpose.

¹¹⁷ 37 Stat. 1504, Art. 7.

¹¹⁸ Deni v. Pa. R. R. Co., 181 Pa. St. 525.

¹¹⁹ Maiorano v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 213 U. S. 268 (1909).

¹²⁰ Hackworth, Digest, Vol. 3, p. 574; Foreign Relations, 1909, pp. 391–393, ibid., 1910, pp. 657–673.

¹²¹ 38 Stat. 669, Art. 1.

¹²² Liberato v. Royer, 270 U. S. 535 (1926). See also Micaz v. Compensation Commissioner (W. Va.), 13 8. E. (2d) 161 (1941), and note 127, infra.

¹²³ The treaty of 1920 with Siam (42 Stat. 1928), as also that of 1937 (53 (3) Stat. 1731), which did not follow the standard form of commercial treaty during the inter-war period, contained general access clauses for natural persons and for corporations, but no provisions concerning civil liability. (In addition, the 1920 treaty made provision for the right of “evocation” by the United States during a short period after the relinquishment of extraterritorial privileges which the United States relinquished.) Art. 4 of the 1920 treaty (to which the corresponding article in the 1937 treaty is substantially similar) contained the following:

“The citizens or subjects of the High Contracting Parties shall have free access to the courts of justice of the other in pursuit and defense of their rights; they shall be at liberty, equally with the native citizens or subjects, and with the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation, to choose and employ lawyers, advocates and representatives to pursue and defend their rights before such courts. There shall be no conditions or requirements imposed upon American citizens in connection with such access to the Courts of Justice in Siam, which do not apply to native citizens or subjects or to the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation.”

Art. 5 of the 1920 treaty provided as follows:

“Limited-liability and other companies and associations, already or hereafter to be organized in accordance with the laws of either High Contracting Party and domiciled in the territories of such Party, are authorized, in the territories of the other, to exercise their rights and appear in the courts either as plaintiffs or defendants, subject to the laws of such other Party.

“There shall be no conditions or requirements imposed upon American corporations, companies or associations, in connection with such access to the Courts of Justice in Siam, which do not apply to such native corporations or associations, or to corporations, companies or associations of the most favored nation.”

¹²⁴ Treaties within this description were those with Germany, 1923, 44 Stat. 2132; Estonia, 1925, 44 Stat. 2379; Hungary, 1925, 44 Stat. 2441; El Salvador, 1926, 46 Stat. 2817; Honduras, 1927, 45 Stat. 2618; Austria, 1928, 47 Stat. 1876; Latvia, 1928, 45 Stat. 2641; Norway, 1928, 47 Stat. 2135; Poland, 1931, 48 Stat. 1507; Danzig (declaration of accession), 1931, 48 Stat. 1680; Finland, 1934, 49 Stat. 2659; Liberia, 1938, 54 Stat. 1739.

On the point that the policy of the United States was to preserve uniformity in this type of treaty wherever possible, there is a statement of the Solicitor of the Department to the Secretary of State, May 15, 1923, State Department file (National Archives) 711.522/9, and a telegram from the Secretary of State to the American Minister at Prague, dated April 1, 1927, ibid., 711.60f 2/20.

The Treaty of Establishment and Sojourn with Turkey, 1931, provided that nationals and corporations of the contracting states should enjoy most-favored-nation treatment with respect to “judicial competence.” 47 Stat. 2432, Art. 1.

¹²⁵ The first and third of the quotations are from the first and second articles, respectively, of the German treaty (as cited in the preceding note); the second quotation is from Art. 12 of the same treaty.

¹²⁶ This protocol contained the following:

“Exemptions from requirements of giving security or making deposits for costs in judicial proceedings (cautio judicatum solvi) and the benefit of free judicial aid are not embraced within the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article I of the Treaty, but in respect of these matters nationals of the United States in Esthonia and nationals of Esthonia in the United States shall be subject to the municipal laws applicable to aliens in general. It is, however, understood that inasmuch as in the United States privileges of this character are regulated largely by the laws of the several States, nationals of the United States, domiciled in States whieh accord such exemptions and benefits to nationals of Esthonia freely or on the basis of reciprocity shall be accorded the exemptions and benefits authorized by Esthonian law.”

In the course of negotiations between the United States and Latvia, the latter country proposed provisions by which there would be (1) national treatment as to access to courts for vindicating claims and defending rights; (2) permission to assert claims against the government of the territorial state and its organs before the courts and “other proper authorities”; (3) most-favored-nation treatment as to “other matters connected with the administration of justice” and as to employing such barristers, solicitors, and agents of any kind “as may be authorized by the laws of the country.” State Department file (National Archives), 711.60p 2/1.

¹²⁷ The pertinent provisions of the treaties of the inter-war period mentioned not only a “right of action” but also “pecuniary compensation,” and stated that protection was to be accorded regardless of the alienage (or “residence outside of the territory where the injury occurred”) of the relatives, heirs or dependents of the injured party. In Antosz v. State Compensation Commissioner (W. Va.), 43 S. E. (2nd) 397 (1947), a elaim for compensation by a non-resident Polish national for the death of her husband was upheld, primarily on the basis of the treaty of 1931 with Poland, despite express provisions of West Virginia law that non-resident aliens were not entitled to such benefits. (See notes 118–122, supra.)

¹²⁸ With China, 1946, Treaties and Other International Acts Series, No. 1871; with Italy, 1948, ibid., No. 1965; with Ireland, 1950, ibid., No. 2155; with Uruguay, 1949, Sen. Ex. D, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.; with Colombia, Apr. 26, 1951, Sen. Ex. M, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.; with Greece, August 3, 1951, Sen. Ex. J, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.; with Israel, Aug. 23, 1951, Sen. Ex. R, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.; with Ethiopia, Sept. 7, 1951, Sen. Ex. F, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.; with Denmark, Oct. 1, 1951, Sen. Ex. I, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.

¹²⁹ The text of this supplemental agreement is in Sen. Ex. H, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.

¹³⁰ See Hearings of May 9, 1952, before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

¹³¹ There is some variation in wording. The language which seems to have become standard refers to “access to the courts of justice and to administrative tribunals and agencies within the territories of the other Party, in all degrees of jurisdiction, both in purauit and in defense of their rights.”

¹³² See, for example, in the treaty with Ireland, Art. VI, 1 (d), on “employing attorneys, interpreters and other agents and employees of their choice,” which follows immediately after the general access clause.

¹³³ See, for example, Art. V, par. 4, of the treaty with Uruguay.

¹³⁴ The treaty with Israel specified an exception to the general access provisions, as follows: “The first sentence of Article V, paragraph 1, shall not obligate either Party with respect to entertaining an action where a decree of dissolution of marriage is sought by an alien. For this purpose, decree of dissolution of marriage includes a decree of divorce and a decree of nullity.” (Protocol, par. 2.)

¹³⁵ There is some variation in language, reference sometimes being to “free” legal aid and to “exemption” from providing security for costs and judgment. See Protocol, par. 1, of Danish treaty; Protocol, par. 1, of Israel treaty; Art. XXIV, par. 5, of Greek treaty; Protocol, par. 3, of Colombian treaty.

¹³⁶ Protocol, par. 4. See also the final sentence of Art. VII, par. 2, of the Ethiopian treaty (according national and most-favored-nation treatment as to access to courts): “The provisions of this paragraph shall not be deemed to affect the applicable laws with respect to eautio judicatum solvi provided the requirements thereof are not excessive or arbitrary.”

¹³⁷ The treaty with China allows this to be done “upon the filing, at any time prior to appearance before such courts, tribunals or agencies, of reasonable particulars required by the laws and regulations of such other High Contracting Party without any requirement of registration or domestication.” (Art. VI, par. 4.)

On the problem in general, see Elvin E. Latty, “ International Standing in Court of Foreign Corporations,” 29 Michigan Law Eeview (1930), 28 –40.

¹³⁸ As illustrated in Art. XXIV, par. 5, of the treaty with Italy, signed Feb. 2, 1948.

¹³⁹ Art. XVIII, par. 1 (e).

¹⁴⁰ See, for example, Art. XXIII, par. 1 (f), of the Greek treaty, final sentence: “… the provisions of the present Treaty relating to the juridical status of foreign companies and their appearance in court, are excepted from the limiting provisions of the present subparagraph.”

¹⁴¹ Cf. Robert K. Wilson, “ Property-Protection Provisions in United States Commerical Treaties,” this Journal, Vol. 45 (1951), pp. 83, 105.