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Who Is the System? On Commitment, Biology, and Human Beings in the Politics of “Groundwork for International Law”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Mónica García-Salmones Rovira
Mónica García-Salmones Rovira*
Affiliation:
Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, University of Helsinki
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Extract

Professor Anthony D’Amato’s “Groundwork for International Law” (Groundwork) is an extremely pedagogical project. Despite its apparent simplicity, each rereading reveals a new layer of complexity, reflecting the depth of his lifelong engagement in the scholarship of international law. Moreover, from a certain perspective, his reexamination of the foundations of international law expresses a radicalism that reaches beyond the analysis of legal forms to provoke reflection on the nature and purpose of the international legal system.

Type
Agora: Reflections on Anthony D’Amato’s “Groundwork for International Law”
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 108 , Issue 4 , October 2014 , pp. 689 - 701
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2014

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References

1 The first aim of D’Amato’s article is “to reexamine the foundations of international law.” D’Amato, Anthony, Groundwork for International Law, 108 AJIL 650, 650 (2014)Google Scholar.

2 See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the Structure of International Legal Argument(2006); Kingsbury, Benedict, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 345 (1998)Google Scholar; Monica Garcia-Salmones Rovira, the Project of Positivism in International Law (2013); Anne-Charlotte Martineau, Une Analyse Critique Du Debat Sur La Fragmentation Du Droit International (2014).

3 See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 363–66 (2011) (articulating this type of classic natural-law argument based on justice).

4 Rubin, Alfred P., The Concept of Neutrality in International Law, 16 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 353 (1988)Google Scholar (explaining the positivist approach).

5 Joseph Alois Schumpeter, Economic Doctrine and Method: An Historical Sketch 161 n.1 (R. Aris trans., 1954) (describing “the only real phenomenon of the intellectual history of the nineteenth century” as “a philosophic tendency of a positivist character”). It is my contention that we are still living under that shadow.

6 One might choose, by way of example, the responsibility to protect, See World Summit Outcome Resolution, GA Res. 60/1, paras. 138–40 (Sept. 16, 2005), and then research the politics of those promoting it, See Anne Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (2011).

7 See Kingsbury, Benedict, International Courts: Uneven Judicialisation in Global Order, in Cambridge Companion to International Law 203 (Crawford, James & Koskenniemi, Martti eds., 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (arguing that international adjudication is not inclusive as to the issues adjudicated in the system); Koskenniemi, Martti, The Politics of International Law—20 Years Later, 20 Eur. J. Int’l L. 7 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (renewing the argument about a bias in favor of Western countries in the structure of the system of international law).

8 For a sophisticated example of the politics of interest merging a system of lawyers with an objective system, see Kelsen, Hans, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory: A Translation of the First Edition of the Reine Rechtslehre Or Pure Theory of Law (Paulson, Bonnie Litschewski & Paulson, Stanley L. trans., 1992)Google Scholar; see also id., para. 8; Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, the Limits of International Law (2005); Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Economic Foundations of International Law (2013) (providing an accentuated economist version of the politics of interest); García-Salmones|Rovira, Mónica, The Politics of Interest in International Law, 25 Eur. J. Int’l L. 765 (2014)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed (providing a historical analysis); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004) (analyzing the liberal approach); Klabbers, Jan, Setting the Scene, in Klabbers, Jan, Peters, Anne & Ulfstein, Geir, The Constitutionalization of International Law 1 (2011)Google Scholar (noting the inchoate project of virtue ethics); Rene Uruena, No Citizens Here: Global Subjects and Participation in International Law (2012).

9 See, e.g., Rajagopal, Balakrishnan, Counter-Hegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights and Development as a Third World Strategy, 27 Third World Q. 767 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (reflecting on the Third World in the 1970s).

10 Niklas Luhmann, Law As A Social System (Fatima Kastner, Richard Nobles, David Schiff & Rosamund Ziegert eds., Klaus A. Ziegert trans., 2004); see also D’Amato, Anthony, International Law as an Autopoietic System, in Developments of International Law in Treatymaking 335 (Wolfrum, Rüdiger & Röbeneds., Volker, 2005)Google Scholar; Fischer-Lescano, Andreas & Teubner, Gunther, Regime-Collisions: the Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 999 (Everson, Michelle trans., 2004)Google Scholar (sociological systems theory).

11 See Martineau, supra note 2, at 114 (describing the central role of conflicts in sociological systems theory); see also Kobayashi, Tomohiko, Dynamic Process of a Transnational Dispute Settlement as an Autopoietic System? Lessons from Cases in North America Involving the WTO, NAFTA and Domestic Laws, in Multilateralism and Regionalism in Global Economic Governance: Trade, Investment and Finance 91, 102 (Nakagawa, Junji ed., 2011)Google Scholar (pointing to the absence of conflicts in D’Amato’s autopoietic system).

12 Hans Kelsen, Das Problem Der SouveräNitäT Und Die Theorie Des VóOlkerrechts 319 (1920) (noting “the civitas maxima as an organization of the world : that is, the political core of the juridical hypothesis of the primacy of international law”) (translation by author); Philip C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (1948) (providing an American example).

13 Stadler, Friedrich, Logischer Empirismus und Reine Rechtslehre—Uber Familienaähnlichkeiten, in Logischer Empirismus Und Reine Rechtslehre, at ix (Jabloner, Clemens & Stadler, Friedrich eds., 2001)Google Scholar (tracing “family resemblances” (Familienaähnlichkeiten) between logical positivism and Kelsen’s Pure Theory).

14 Garcé-Salmones Rovira, supra note 2; Andrew Lang, World Trade After Neoliberalism: Reimagining the Global Economic Order 6 (2011) (describing the politics promoting the pursuit of individuals’ goals as “the most significant feature of neoliberal thought”).

15 D’Amato, supra note 1, at 660 (“Proposition 2: the rules of the international legal system are created by the system and not by individual states.”).

16 See, e.g., Klabbers, Peters & Ulfstein, supra note 8.

17 By “sociability,” I refer to a system that is human-friendly, that is concerned with questions of justice, and that acknowledges law collaborating in the increasingly interdependency of global society.

18 See Walker, Neil, The Post-national Horizon of Constitutionalism and Public Law: Paradigm Extension or Paradigm Exhaustion?, in After Public Law 241 (Amhlaigh, Cormac Mac, Michelon, Claudio & Walker, Neil eds., 2013) (arguing that notions of public law and constitutionalism remain vital in post-national law)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Krisch, Nico, Capacity and Constraint: Governance Through International and Transnational Law, in The Problem-Solving Capacity of the Modern State: Governance Challenges and Administrative Capacities 198 (Lodgen, Martin & Wegrich, Kai eds., 2014)Google Scholar (analyzing power-dependent regulatory distribution in informal networks of governance); Cho, Sungjoon, Beyond Rationality: A Sociological Construction of the World Trade Organization, 52 VA. J. Int’l L. 321 (2012)Google Scholar (using sociology to uncover the communitarian aspects among WTO members); Bethlehem, Daniel, The End of Geography: the Changing Nature of the International System and the Challenge to International Law, 25 Eur. J. Int’l L. 9 (2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (commenting on the individualism of the positivist project).

19 D’Amato, supra note 1, at 652; see also Alain Pellet, Complementarity of International Treaty Law, Customary Law and Non-Contractual Law making, in Developments of International Law in Treatymaking, supra note 10, at 409 (critique of—and, by his own admission, absence of engagement with—the theoretical premises of D’Amato’s autopoietic system).

20 D’Amato, supra note 1, at 652 (Axiom 1).

21 Id. ; Schachter, Oscar, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 NW. U. L. Rev. 217 (1977)Google Scholar.

22 D’Amato, supra note 1, at 653.

23 Martti Koskenniemi, the Politics of International Law 271, 293 (2011).

24 D’Amato, supra note 1, at 655.

25 Id. at 656.

26 Id. at 657.

27 Root, Elihu, The Sanction of International Law, in Addresses on International Subjects 25 (Bacon, Robert & Scott, James Brown eds., 1916)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Amorosa, Paolo, James Brown Scott’s International Adjudication Between Tradition and Progress in the United States, 16 J. Hist. Int’l L. (forthcoming 2014)Google Scholar.

28 D’Amato, supra note 1, at 662.

29 Id. (citing H. L. A. Hart, the Concept of Law 78 –79 (1961)).

30 Id. at 663.

31 Id. at 662.

32 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 348 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945).

33 Id. at xiii. The book’s preface is dated April 1944, an important period of Kelsen’s life. See Kennedy, David, Kelsen als Pragmatist des Vólkerrechts—Die Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures des Jahres 1941, in Rechtserfahrung Und Reine Rechtslehre 95 (Carrino, Agostino & Winkler, Günther eds., 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34 Kelsen, supra note 32, at 341.

35 García-Salmones Rovira, Supra note 2, at 34145.

36 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 53, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.

37 Kelsen, supra note 12, at 122 (translation by author).

38 See, e.g., Oppenheim, Lassa, The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method, 2 AJIL 313 (1908)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre 73 (1928) (defining international law as “‘general international law’—more precisely the dozen of single, generally recognized rules of international law”) (translation by author); see, e.g., Leonard Nelson, Die Wissenschaft Ohne Recht: Kritische Betrachtungen Uber Die Grundlagen Des Staats Und Volkerrechts 111 (1917) (describing Nelson’s critique of Oppenheim’s method as one of “rooting dogmas in a word-fetishism”) (translation by author).

40 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme Der Staatsrechtslehre Entwickelt Aus Der Lehre Vom Rechtssatze 8 (1911).

41 Kelsen, supra note 8, para. 27.

42 Id., para. 28.

43 Id.

44 Raz, Joseph, Critical Study: Kelsen’s General Theory of Norms, 6 Philosophia 495, 499 (1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (book review).

45 Kelsen, Hans, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 44, 55 (1941)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (reflecting on John Austin’s statement that “laws or rules, properly so called, are a species of commands”).

46 Kelsen, supra note 40, at 6–7.

47 Hans Kelsen, Die Philosophischen Grundlagen Der Naturrechtslehre Und Des Rechtspositivismus 67 (1928) (translation by author).

48 GarcíA-Salmones Rovira, supra note 2, at 12637.

49 D’Amato, supra note 1, at 667 n.74 (“The sovereignty of the international system is true even if the theory of autopoiesis is rejected.”); Luhmann, Niklas, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, in Sociocybernetic Paradoxes: Observation, Control and Evolution of Self-Steering Systems 172 (Geyer, Felix & Zouwen, Johannes vander eds., 1986)Google Scholar.

50 D’Amato, supra note 1, at 663.

51 Id. at 667 (“Individual states are not sovereign over the system; the system is sovereign over them.”).

52 The following quotation shows the theoretical difficulties that Wright encountered to employ the notion of “interests” as the fundamental theoretical tool, producing both the separation and the unity of the community of nations:

In the past, the world community has been so unorganized and its members have such varied interests that, apart from the general interests stated above, the interests of that community as such could only be determined from a balancing of the conflicting interests of categories of states. .. .

.. . This general interest in preventing war, linked with the increasing interest in international cooperation for economic and social purposes as the world shrinks and the nations became more interdependent, has resulted in the creation of increasingly effective international organization, thus providing means, other than a balancing of interests of particular categories of states or groups, for formulating and maintaining the interests of the world community as such.

Wright, Quincy, The New Law of War and Neutrality, in Varia Juris Gentium, Liber Amicorum for Jean Pierre Adrien François 414–16 (1959)Google Scholar.

53 D’Amato, supra note 1, at 656 (quoting Wright, supra note 52, at 412–14).

54 Wright, supra note 52, at 414.

55 D’Amato, supra note 1, at 652.

56 Id. at 655.

57 Id. at 651.

58 Id.

59 See, e.g., Cases on International Law: Selected From Decisions of English and American Courts With Syllabus and Annotations (James Brown Scott ed., 1906); Hepp, John, James Brown Scott and the Rise of Public International Law, 7 J. Gildedage & Progressive Era 151 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (considering taxonomy and its immediate backwardness in the face of always advancing natural sciences).

60 E.g., Gross, Leo, Hans Kelsen: October 11, 1881–April 15, 1973, 67 AJIL 491, 494 (1973)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (noting that Roscoe Pound had referred to Kelsen as “unquestionably the leading jurist of the time”).

61 In the foreword of his first major book, which opens with a sentence written by Francis Bacon, Kelsen explains that “the work is primarily of methodological character” and that “every question about a ‘what’ aims first to be legitimated by a ‘how can I ask this?’” Kelsen, supra note 40, at iv (translation by author).

62 Ernst Mach, Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations (1897); Kelsen, supra note 12, at 99 (describing Mach’s usefulness for legal theory). Other sources of inspiration from natural sciences include Charles Darwin, Werner Heisenberg, and Sigmund Freud. The first two appear in Hans Kelsen, Society and Nature: A Sociological Inquiry (1943). Freudian themes are considered in Kelsen, Hans, Der Begriff des Staates und die Sozialpsychologie, 8 IMAGO 97 (1922)Google Scholar. See also Rodlauer, Hannelore, Fragmente aus Weiningers Bildungs geschichte, in Otto Weininger, Eros Und Psyche: Studien Undbriefe 1899–1902, at 17, 23 (Rodlauer, Hannelore ed., 1990)Google Scholar (noting the importance of Charles Darwin in fin de siècle Vienna).

63 Kelsen, supra note 12. Kelsen’s Principles of International Law is usually his best-known work among international lawyers. Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (1952). Although it includes many Kel-senian themes, it is not the most daring work on the subject. See generally, e.g., Paulson, Stanley L., Introduction to Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, at xxiii (Paulson, Stanley L. & Paulson, Bonnie Litschewski eds., 1998)Google Scholar.

64 This analogy is also explicit in the work of his student Alfred Verdross. See Verdross, Alfred, Die Einheit Des Rechtlichen Weltbildes auf Grundlage Der Volkerrechtsverfassung 52 (1923)Google Scholar.

65 Haller, Rudolf, Poetic Imagination and Economy—Ernst Mach as Scientific Theorist, in Beyond Art: A Third Culture: A Comparative Study in Cultures, Art and Science in 20th Century Austria and Hungary 425, 427 (Weibel, Peter ed., 2005)Google Scholar.

66 In describing the evolution of the international legal order, Kelsen asserted: “Nature makes no jumps; and neither can law.” Hans Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations 151 (1948).

67 Notoriously, Kelsen’s student Fritz Sander identified law and nature. Sander initiated written controversies with Kelsen (including accusations of plagiarism) about the radicalization of the analogy of law and nature and the need to disregard the legal science. Sander went on to attribute to law the character of something like a living organism beyond analogies or fictions and to deny legal science the status of science. Sander, Fritz, Rechtsdogmatik oder Theorie der Rechtserfahrung? Kritische Studie zur Rechtslehre Hans Kelsens, 2 Zeitschrift Fur Offentliches Recht 511 (1921)Google Scholar; Kelsen, Hans, Rechtswissenschaft und Recht. Erledigung eines Versuchs zur UÜberwindung der “Rechtsdogmatik, ” 3 Für Offentliches Recht 103 (1922)Google Scholar (responding to Sander); cf.Kletzer, Christoph, Fritz Sander, in Der Kreis Um Hans Kelsen: Die Anfangsjahre Der Reinen Rechtslehre (Walter, Robert, Jabloner, Clemens & Zeleny, Klaus eds., 2008)Google Scholar (commenting on this controversy).

68 Kelsen, supra note 12, at 117.

69 Kelsen, Hans, Wer soll der Hóter der Verfassung sein?, 4 Die Justiz 576 (1931)Google Scholar (referring specifically to the international legal system); see also Olivier Beaud & Pasquale Pasquino, La Controverse Sur ‘le Gardien De La Constitution’ Et La Justice Constitutionelle: Kelsen Contre Schmitt (2007); Ebenstein, William, The Pure Theory of Law: Demythologizing Legal Thought, 59 Cal. L. Rev. 617, 645–46 (1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (explaining “decisionist emphasis” as what Kelsen and other legal realists grasped as the political activity of the courts).

70 Kelsen, supra note 40, at 35 (“Kein Recht ohne Gericht! “ (No law without a court!)). See generally id. at 33–37.

71 E.g., Hersch Lauterpacht, the Development of International Law by the International Court 368 (1958); Benvenisti, Eyal, The Conception of International Law as a Legal System, 2007 German Y.B. Int’l L. 393 Google Scholar.

72 In a revealing passage, D’Amato dismisses two ways of presenting his project—natural law and constitutionalism—but does not return to the issue at hand to disclose what his project is. D’Amato, supra note 1, at 659.

73 Schachter, supra note 21, at 225.