1 Senate Joint Resolution III, introduced by Senator Paul Douglas associated with 18 others, and in the House by Congressman John W.McCormack. Governors of 15 States and mayors of 20 cities issued supporting proclamations, services were held in many churches, and there was considerable news coverage both in the United States and abroad. A number of speeches were made in Congress, Acting Secretary of State Dillon received delegates from the “Assembly of Captive European Nations” on July 21, and, in a press conference on July 22, President Eisenhower denied that the proclamation had any relation to the American visit of Deputy Vice Premier Kozlov of the Soviet Union shortly before, or the Russian visit of Vice President Nixon at the same time. He added, “The United States would never accept the idea that a true peace had been established in the world until every single nation had the right to express its own views about its own destiny, and … would always use whatever peaceful methods were available to it to bring about this opportunity.” See ACEN News, Nos. 52-54, July-December, 1959, pp. 4,5,15.

2 They included 7 Eastern European states (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and East Germany), 4 Asian states (mainland China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Tibet), and 11 members of the Soviet Union (Ukraine, White Ruthenia (Byelo-Russia), Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Cossackia (Kazakhistan), Turkistan (Turkmenistan), Idel-Ural (Uzbekistan)). For some reason the Tadjikestan, Kirghiz, and Moldavian member republics were omitted, as was Outer Mongolia, which the Soviet Union recognizes as an independent state.

3 The press and radio in Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and China characterized the proclamation as “shameful,” “provocative,” “slanderous,” “violative of the independence of nations,” “interference in internal affairs,” “openly in opposition to the principles of the United Nations,” and “ in utter disregard for the established standards of behavior and practices in international life . “ The Polish radio called it “ an unfortunate move by the United States politicians who support the Cold War “ which does not “serve the cause of peace and friendship among nations.” Rumania officially protested to the United States on July 24, demanding a cessation of this celebration on the ground that “ it is directed against Rumania and the other socialist countries and that it violates the United Nations Charter.” ACEN News, July-September, 1959, pp. 8, 23-26.

4 Art. 1, par. 1; Art. 2, pars. 1, 4, 7.

5 Art. 1, pars. 2, 3; Arts. 55, 56, 72.

6 Except perhaps in trusteeship and non-self-governing territories. Charter, Arts. 72, 76.

7 Wright, Q., ‘'National Courts and Human Rights—the Fujii Case,'’ 45 A.J.I.L. 62 ff. (1951)Google Scholar; “Recognition and Self-determination,” 1954 Proceedings, American Society of International Law 23 ff.; “Freedom and Human Rights under International Law,” in Aspects of Liberty 181 ff., 203, 207 (Clinton Rossiter and Milton B. Konvitz, eds., Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1958); “The United States and Human Rights,” 26 University of Detroit Law Journal 277 ff. (1959); 28 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin 579 ff. (1953).

8 Thus excluding the matter from its ‘ ‘ domestic jurisdiction.'’ Charter, Art. 2, par. 7.

9 “The severity of condemnation which naturally attaches t o “ … “revolutionary acts and propaganda originating directly from a government and aimed at a foreign state” ought not to be confused with the state's responsibility for “revolutionary activities by private persons.” Lauterpacht, H., “Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons Against Foreign States,” 22 A.J.I.L. 105 (1928)Google Scholar. After the United States recognized the Soviet Union in 1933, it protested against propaganda by the Communist International which it said was contrary to international law and to the Litvinoff Agreement. The Soviet Union tried to defend itself by distinguishing the Communist International, which it described as a private agency, from the Soviet Government itself, admitting that propaganda by the latter was forbidden. See Preuss, Lawrence, ‘ ‘ International Responsibility for Hostile Propaganda against Foreign States,” 28 A.J.I.L. 649 ff. (1934)Google Scholar; Vernon Van Dyke, “The Responsibility of States for International Propaganda,” 34 ibid. 58 (1940). Not only “undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a state” but also their “toleration of organized activities calculated to foment civil strife in another state” is condemned in the International Law Commission's draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1951, Article 2 (5). U.N. General Assembly, 6th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 9 (Doe. A/1858), p. 10; printed in 45 A.J.I.L. Supp. 126 (1951), and in Sohn, Cases on United Nations Law 986 (Brooklyn, 1956).

10 This resolution arose from Soviet representative Vishinsky 's demand for the outlawing of “war-mongering.” See Wright, Q. “The Crime of ‘War-Mongering,’ “ 42 A.J.I.L. 128 (1948)Google Scholar; U.N. Weekly Bulletin, Nov. 11, 1947, p. 618.

11 These resolutions, passed in connection with the Korean situation, were referred to by the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, in the General Assembly on July 18, 1958, in connection with the situation in the Lebanon. See Wright, Q., “United States Intervention in the Lebanon,” 53 A.J.I.L. 123 (1959).Google Scholar

12 Ibid. 113, 124.

13 “ … it is by no means certain that of all revolutionary acts coming from abroad hostile expeditions constitute the greatest danger. At least, they present an open menace which, given the means, can be repelled by force. But the menaced state is to a considerable degree powerless against revolutionary propaganda generated abroad, possibly spread from the air by means of publications or broadcast by wireless, inciting its population to armed revolt and its troops to rebellion; against revolutionary organizations formed abroad with the view to assisting an actual or impending revolt in their mother country; against moneys being subscribed or lent, or other assistance given, for such purposes. What protection, if any, from such acts falling short of hostile expeditions does international law afford, and what duties, if any, does it impose upon the state from whose territory such acts originate!” Lauterpacht, loc. cit. 107. President Eisenhower has declared that such subversive intervention constitutes the greatest danger in the world today, and Ambassador Lodge said: “If the United Nations cannot deal with indirect aggression, the United Nations will break up.” 39 Dept. of State Bulletin 195 (1958).

14 Q.Wright, A Study of War 962 ff., 1033 ff. (Chicago); “Recognition and Self- Determination,” 1954 Proceedings, American Society of International Law 23 ff.

15 28 Dept. of State Bulletin 599 (1953).

16 “On Peaceful Coexistence,” 38 Foreign Affairs 3 (1959). To similar effect the Warsaw Treaty Conference in Moscow, Feb. 3, 1960, declared that, since “war can no longer be a means of solving international disputes, the only feasible way is to build relations between States on the basis of peaceful coexistence“; and that increasing recognition of this “provides favorable conditions for the attainment of the goals for which the Warsaw Treaty States have been fighting consistently all along: relaxation of international tensions and development of friendly cooperation among all countries.” 9 East Europe Monthly Review 50, 51 (1960).

17 Appadorai, A., The Bandung Conference (New Delhi, Indian Council on World Affairs, 1955)Google Scholar; Talbot, Phillips and Poplai, S. L., India and America 132 (New York, 1958);Google Scholar Wright, Q., “Asian Experience and International Law,” 1 International Studies (Quarterly Journal of the Indian School of International Studies) 85 (1959).Google Scholar

18 P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10, p. 18; 2 World Court Reports 35.

19 The width of the maritime belt has tended to become greater, and the high seas have been assuming the character of a mare communis, regulated by international law in the common interest, rather than a mare liberum in which states enjoy almost unlimited freedom of navigation and fishery by their ships and nationals. See 1958 U.N. Conventions on the Law of the Sea, 52 A.J.I.L. 834, 840, 844 ff., 851 ff. (1958).

20 Tending to be conceived as space beyond the air capable of supporting aerial navigation. John C. Cooper, “Legal Problems of Upper Space,” 1956 Proceedings, American Society of International Law 85 ff., 107; Jessup, Philip C. and Taubenfeld, H. J., Controls for Outer Space (New York, Columbia University Press, 1959).Google Scholar

21 Trail Smelter, 1941, 8 U. S. Arbitration Series 36 ff.; Corfu Channel Case (Merits), [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 22; Herbert W\ Briggs, The Law of Nations 310 (2nd ed., New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952). But see Myres S. McDougal and Norbert A. Schlei, “The Hydrogen Bomb Test in Perspective, Lawful Measures for Security,” 64 Yale Law Journal 648, 682 ff. (1955).

22 See also Röling, B.V.A., ‘ ‘ The Question of Defining Aggression,'’ in Symbolae Verzipl 314 ff. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1958)Google Scholar, reviewed below, p. 702.

23 Preamble, par. 1; Art. 1, par. 1; Louis Sohn “The Definition of Aggression,” 45 Virginia Law Review 677 ff. (1959).

24 Wright, Q., “The Prevention of Aggression,” 50 A.J.I.L. 514 ff. (1956)Google Scholar; “Intervention, 1956,” 51 ibid. 257 ff. (1957); “United States Intervention in the Lebanon,” 53 Hid. 112 ff. (1959).

25 Note 13 above.

26 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 19.

27 If a general de facto government controlling the entire territory of the state is set up, it is competent to speak for the state, whether recognized or not (Tinoco Arbitration). If a local de facto government claims to be a new state, there may be a duty to recognize it whenever resistance by the parent state has ended, but this is controversial. See Wright, Q., “Some Thoughts about Recognition,” 44 A.J.I.I. 551 ff. (1950)Google Scholar; Lauterpacht, H., Eecognition in International Law 6, 25 (Cambridge, 1947).Google Scholar

28 Wright, Q., ‘'The Crime of ‘ War-Mongering,'’ ‘'cited note 10 above; ‘ ‘ International Law and Ideologies,” 48 A.J.I.L. 616, 622 (1954)Google Scholar; “Eecognition, Intervention and Ideologies,” 7 Indian Tear Book of International Affairs 89, 99 ff., 116 ff. (1958), and articles by Lauterpacht, Preuss, and Van Dyke, note 34 below.

29 Note 10 above.

30 7 Hudson (ed.), International Legislation 409; 4 Hackworth, Digest 286.

31 Department of State, Trial of War Criminals 25, 39 (1945).

32 “Vernon Van Dyke, loc. cit. note 9, pp. 58 ff.

33 Ibid, and 6 Moore, Digest of International Law 46 ff., concerning United States reception of Louis Kossuth, a refugee from Hungary in 1851.

34 2 Hackworth, Digest 140 ff., 338; 7 ibid. 374 ff., 394 ff. After an exhaustive study of statutes, cases, and international incidents, Lauterpacht concludes that practice divides states into three groups: (1) liberal states that refuse to accept responsibility for private acts in their territory hostile to foreign states unless they involve preparation of a military expedition or assassination; (2) autocratic states, including some Latin American states, that mutually insure one another by punishing sedition or treason against other governments in the same way as such offenses against themselves; and (3) most of the Latin states of Europe that punish acts hostile to other governments constituting “offenses against the law of nations” which, however, is not ade quately denned (loc. cit., note 9, p. 118). He concludes: “International law imposes upon the state the duty of restraining persons resident within its territory from engaging in such revolutionary activities against friendly states as amount to organized acts of force in the form of hostile expeditions against the territory of those states. It also obliges the state to repress and to discourage activities in which attempts against the life of political opponents are regarded as a proper means of revolutionary action. “Apart from this, states are not bound to prohibit, on their territory, the commission of acts injurious to other states. In particular, revolutionary propaganda does not fall within the scope of revolutionary acts which a state is bound to prevent.“(p. 126.) Lawrence Preuss and Vernon Van Dyke (loc. cit., note 9) reached the same conclusion. However, in March, 1960, the United Nations Human Rights Commission, while urging all governments to extend asylum to any refugee whose life is in danger, added the proviso: “persons enjoying asylum should not engage in activities contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.” Since the United Nations is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of states, this might be construed as requiring the prohibition of revolutionary propaganda by such persons.

35 Vernon Van Dyke, “Autocratic Opposition to Freedom in Foreign States,” 4 Journal of Politics 437 ff. (1942).

36 U.S. v. Arjona (1887), 120 IT. S. 479.

37 Note 34 above.

38 2 Hackworth, Digest 336.

39 Note 34 above.

40 Premier Khrushchev defined co-existence on Oct. 10, 1959, at Novosibirsk as meaning: “Continuation of the struggle between the two social systems—but by peaceful means, without war, without interference by one state in the internal affairs of another. We consider it to be an economic, political and ideological struggle, but not military.” The leaders of the “Captive Nations” in America have interpreted this to mean (1) recognition of the status quo in respect to those nations: “The Soviet Union hopes that if the West recognizes as permanent the present subjugation of the peoples of East Central Europe, she will be able to convince these peoples to reconcile themselves to their present situation“; (2) continuance of conflict to establish Communism throughout the world by non-military means: “Khrushchev explains to the free world that as Capitalism succeeded Feudalism, so Communism will succeed Capitalism. Instead of ‘we will bury you', Mr. Khruschev said in substance that ‘Capitalism’ (i.e., the free world) will bury itself and that the Communists will always be there to give a hand. The replacement of the cold war by a peaceful coexistence (made in Moscow) will also, the Soviets hope, bring about a slackening of the efforts of the West to build up its defenses.” ACEN News, No. 55 (Oct., 1959), pp. 2, 3. See also statements by Senator Thomas J. Dodd and Assistant Secretary of State Andrew Berding, ibid., No. 59 (Feb., 1960) pp. 2, 3.

41 Note 16 above.