1 José, E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AJIL 873, 874 (2003)Google Scholar.

2 The representative of Costa Rica, referring to Resolution 1373, said, “In short, for the First time in history, the Security Council enacted legislation for the rest of the international community.” UN Doc. A/56/PV.25, at 3 (2001).

3 Press Conference by Security Council President (Apr. 2, 2004), at <http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2004/pleugerpc.DOC.htm>.

4 See, e.g., José, E. Alvarez, The UN’s War’ on Terrorism, 31 Int’l J. Legal Info. 238, 241 (2003)Google Scholar; Happold, Matthew, Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United Nations, 16 Leiden J. Int’l L. 593,596 (2003)Google Scholar; Krisch, Nico, The Rise and Fall of Collective Security: Terrorism, US Hegemony, and the Plight of the Security Council, in Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security Versus Liberty? 879, 883 (Christian, Walter et al. eds., 2003)Google Scholar.

5 See, e.g., Dicke, Klaus, Weltgesetzgeber Sicherheitsrat, 49 Vereinte Nationen 163 (2001)Google Scholar; Jasper, Finke & Wandscher, Christiane, Terrorismusbekämpfung jenseits militärischer Gewalt. Ansätze der Vereinten Nationen zur Verhütung und Beseitigung des internationalen Terrorismus, 49 Vereinte Nationen 168, 172 (2001)Google Scholar.

6 Krisch, supra note 4, at 884.

7 1 Oppenheim’s International Law 114 (Robert, Jennings & Arthur, Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992)Google Scholar.

8 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 43 (Oct. 2, 1995), 35 ILM 32 (1996).

9 Id., para. 44.

10 1 International Legislation: A Collection of Texts of Multipartite International Instruments of General Interest, at xiii (Manley O. Hudson ed., 1931).

11 See Skubiszewski, Krzysztof, International Legislation, in 2 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 1255, 1255 (Rudolf, Bernhardt ed., 1995)Google Scholar. On the use of the term “international legislation,” see also the references in Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 7, at 32 n.9.

12 See, e.g., Jost, Delbrück, Transnational Federalism: Problems and Prospects of Allocating Public Authority Beyond the State, 11 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 31,37 (2004)Google Scholar; Harper, Keith, Does the United Nations Security Council Have the Competence to Act as a Court and Legislature? 27 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. 103, 126–29 (1994)Google Scholar; Frederic, L. Kirgis Jr., The Security Council’s First Fifty Years, 89AJIL 506, 520, 522 (1995)Google Scholar; Koskenniemi, Martti, The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical View, 6 Eur.J. Int’l L. 325, 326 (1995)Google Scholar; Lopez, Laura, Uncivil Wars: The Challenge of Applying International Humanitarian Law to Internal Armed Conflicts, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 916, 954 (1994)Google Scholar; see also Paul, C. Szasz, Remarks, in The UN Decade on International Law: Progress and Promises, 89 ASIL Proc. 172,183 (1995)Google Scholar.

13 SC Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001), 40 ILM 1278 (2001) (deciding that all states should take wide-ranging measures to combat international terrorism and to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism); SC Res. 1540 (Apr. 28, 2004), 43 ILM 1237 (2004) (deciding that all states should act to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, in particular for terrorist purposes).

14 Skubiszewski, supra note 11, at 1255.

15 Cf. SC Res. 1373, supra note 13, paras. 1, 2; SC Res. 1540, supra note 13, paras. 1, 3.

16 The classic resolutions are expressly or implicitly limited in time until the purpose for which they are adopted— usually to secure performance of an obligation or the cessation of an internationally wrongful act by the addressee— is accomplished. The same applies, in principle, to legislative resolutions. However, there seems at present to be no end to the fight against international terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the targets of some of the legislative resolutions in question.

17 SC Res. 1390, para. 2(a) (Jan. 16, 2002), 41 ILM 511 (2002). For similar specific obligations, see SC Res. 1333, para. 8(c) (Dec. 19, 2000), 40 ILM 509 (2001); SC Res. 1267, para. 4(b) (Oct. 15, 1999), 39 ILM 235 (2000).

18 SC Res. 1373, supra note 13, para. 1(c).

19 The representative of New Zealand defined a “generic resolution” as a “resolution, not in response to a particular fact situation.” UN Doc. S/PV.4568, at 5 (2002); UN Doc. S/PV.4772, at 5 (2003); see also UN Doc. S/PV.4568, supra, at 20 (statement by Liechtenstein).

20 Farley, Maggie, U.N. Measure Requires Every Nation to Take Steps Against Terrorism, L.A. Times, Sept. 28, 2001 Google Scholar, at A6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnews File.

21 On Resolution 1373, see Jurij Daniel, Aston, Die Bekämpfung abstrakter Gefahren für den Weltfrieden durch legislative Maβnahmen des Sicherheitsrats—Resolution 1373 (2001) im Kontext, 62 Zeitschrift Für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht Und Völkerrecht [ZAÖRV] 257 (2002)Google Scholar; Finke & Wandscher, supra note 5, at 168-73; Happold, supra note 4, at 593-610; see also An Imperial Security Council? Implementing Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1390, 97 ASIL Proc. 41–54 (2003) (with contributions by Jane, E. Stromseth, Miller, Elin, and Turk, Danilo)Google Scholar.

22 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 39 ILM 270 (2000)Google ScholarPubMed.

23 UN Doc. S/PV.4950, at 9-10 (2004).

24 See, e.g., UN Doc. A/56/757, at 4 (2001) (India and the fifteen member states of the European Union); UN Doc. A/56/PV.59, at 34 (2001) (Kazakhstan).

25 UN Doc. A/56/PV.48, at 9 (2001) (Turkey); see also UN Doc. A/56/PV.34, at 13 (2001) (Guatemala).

26 UN Doc. A/56/PV.25, supra note 2, at 10 (Singapore).

27 UN Doc. S/PV.4413, at 15 (2001) (United Kingdom).

28 UN Doc. S/PV.4453, at 7 (2002) (France).

29 See id.; & id. (Resumption 1).

30 See the statement of Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the United Kingdom representative on the Security Council and chairman of the Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee:

UN Doc. S/PV.4432 , at 5 (2001) (emphasis added).

31 See, e.g., UN Doc. A/55/PV.95, at 3 (2001); UN Doc. A/55/PV.102, at 3 (2001).

32 See UN Doc. S/PV.4453 (Resumption 1), at 26 (2002).

33 SC Res. 1422 (July 12, 2002), 41 ILM 1276 (2002); SC Res. 1487 (June 12, 2003), 42 ILM 1025 (2003). These resolutions, however, were classified as legislative resolutions by Happold, supra note 4, at 609; Zimmermann, Andreas & Björn, Eberling, Grenzen der Legislativbefugnisse des Sicherheitsrats, 52 Vekeinte Nationen 71, 72–73 (2004)Google Scholar.

34 See with regard to SC Res. 1422, UN Doc. S/PV.4568, supra note 19, at 3 (Canada); and with regard to SC Res. 1487, UN Doc. S/PV.4772, supra note 19, at 5, 7, 15 (Canada, Liechtenstein, Trinidad and Tobago, respectively); UN Doc. S/PV.4568 (Resumption 1), at 7, 9 (2002) (Samoa, Germany).

35 Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9* (1998), 37 ILM 999 (1998)Google ScholarPubMed, corrected through Jan. 16, 2002, at <http://www.icc-cpi.int>, provides:

36 Such a resolution had already been envisaged “in the spirit. . . which calls for ‘the progressive development of international law’ “by David A. Koplow in 1996. David, A. Koplow, Remarks, in Nuclear Non-Prolijeration and Weapons Control, 90 ASIL Proc. 565, 571 (1996)Google Scholar.

37 UN Doc. S/PV.4950, supra note 23, at 23 (India). For similar concerns, see id. at 30 (Cuba); id. (Resumption 1), at 5 (Mexico); id. at 14 (Nepal); id. at 17 (Namibia).

38 Id. (Resumption 1), at 3 (Egypt).

39 UN Doc. S/PV.4950, supra note 23, at 31 (Indonesia). For similar views, see id., at 32 (Iran); id. at 5 (Algeria); UN Doc. A/58/PV.30, at 20 (2003) (Algeria).

40 Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 8, para. 28; see also id., paras. 29-30; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ Rep. 16, 54, para. 118 (June 21)Google Scholar (referring to “a situation which the Court has found to have been validly declared illegal [by the Security Council]” (emphasis added)). The latter statement suggests that the Court has, at least implicitly, examined the validity of the Security Council’s action.

41 Brownlie, Ian, International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations: General Course on Public International Law, 255 Recueil des Cours 9, 214–15 (1995)Google Scholar; see also Lamb, Susan, Legal Limits to United Nations Security Council Powers, in The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie 361, 365 (Guy, S. Goodwin- Gin & Stefan, Talmon eds., 1999)Google Scholar. But see also the decision of Trial Chamber 2 of the Internationa] Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which held that “such discretionary assessments [as the existence of a threat to the peace] are not justiciable.” Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Jurisdiction, No. ICTR-96-15-T, at 6, para. 20 (June 18,1997), available at <http://www.ictr.org>.

42 Compare the statement of the representative of Paraguay, UN Doc. A/56/PV.36, at 2 (2001): “The effective implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) requires the will and cooperation of all Member States. For this we need a representative, equitable and transparent Council.”

43 See International Court of Justice Statute Art. 38(1).

44 See, e.g., Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. UK; Libya v. U.S.), 1992 ICJ REP. 3 & 114 (Apr. 14) [hereinafter Lockerbie].

45 But see Skubiszewski, supra note 11, at 1261 (regarding lawmaking acts of international organizations as a new source of law distinct from treaties).

46 See Martin, Kühnemund, Die Vereinten Nationen und der “Krieg gegen den Terrorismus” 54–55 (Forschungsstelle Dritte Welt Working Paper 34, 2003), at <http://www.forschungsstelle-dritte-welt.de/Schriften.htm>..>Google Scholar

47 Article 25 of the UN Charter provides: “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”

48 On the police function of the Security Council, see Jochen Abr, Frowein & Krisch, Nico, Introduction to Chapter VII, in 1 The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 701, 705–06, paras. 12-14 (Bruno, Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002)Google Scholar; Koskenniemi, supra note 12, at 325-48.

49 The representative of Colombia expressly referred to Article 41 as the legal basis of Resolution 1373. UN Doc. S/PV.4394 (Resumption 1), at 7 (2001).

50 UN Doc. A/56/PV.25, supra note 2, at 3.

51 Happold, supra note 4, at 598-601; Zimmermann & Eberling, supra note 33, at 71-72.

52 Harper, supra note 12, at 149; Tomuschat, Christian, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will, 241 Recueil Des Cours 195, 344–46 (1993 IV)Google Scholar. :

53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, Art. 31(1) & (3)(b), 1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention],

54 Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 8, para. 30. On the importance of “subsequent practice” for the interpretation of constituent instruments of international organizations, see also Georg Ress, Interpretation, in The Charter of the United Nations, supra note 48, at 13, 27-30.

56 Tadić, supra note 8, para. 29.

56 UN Doc. S/23500, at 3 (1992), at <http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/cbw-unsc23500.html>.

57 Id. at 4.

58 Id.; UN Doc. S/PRST/1996/17, para. 4; UN Doc. S/PRST/1998/12, para. 4; SC Res. 1172, pmbl. (June 6, 1998); GA Res. 57/63, pmbl. (Nov. 22, 2002); GA Res. 58/44, pmbl. (Dec. 8, 2003). The “means of delivery” was added only in the preamble to Security Council Resolution 1540, supra note 13, as was “the threat of illicit trafficking” in such weapons.

59 SC Res. 1368, para. 1 (Sept. 12, 2001); SC Res. 1373, supra note 13, pmbl.; SC Res. 1377, annex, pmbl. (Nov. 12, 2001); SC Res. 1456, annex, pmbl. (Jan. 20, 2003); SC Res. 1465, para. 1 (Feb. 3, 2003); SC Res. 1535, pmbl. (Mar. 26,2004); see also GA Res. 50/53, para. 7 (Dec. 11, 1995) (recalling “the role of the Security Council in combating international terrorism whenever it poses a threat to international peace and security”); GA Res. 49/60, annex [Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism], para. 2 (Dec. 9, 1994) (“Acts, methods and practices of terrorism constitute a grave violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, which may pose a threat to international peace and security . . .”).

60 GA Res. 48/92, pmbl. (Dec. 20, 1993).

61 GA Res. 57/337, annex, para. 28 (July 3, 2003).

62 GA Res. 53/71, pmbl. (Dec. 4, 1998).

63 This was first suggested by Paul, C. Szasz, Restructuring the International Organizational Framework, in Environmental Change and International Law: New Challenges and Dimensions 340, 360 (Edith Brown, Weiss ed., 1992)Google Scholar. See also Harper, supra note 12, at 126 n.101; Tomuschat, supra note 52, at 344-45.

64 See Aston, supra note 21, at 287-88, 290.

65 See Frowein & Krisch, supra note 48, at 709, para. 23; Zimmermann & Eberling, supra note 33, at 71-72. But see Krisch, supra note 4, at 884-85 (observing that “the legal situation is far from clear”). Concerns are expressed by Finke & Wandscher, supra note 5, at 172.

66 See Aston, supra note 21, at 283; Wagner, Markus, Die wirtschaftlichen Maβnahmen des Sicherheitsrates nach dew, 11. September 2001 im völkerrechtlichen Kontext—Von Wirtschaftssanktionen zur Wirtschaftsgesetzgebung? 63 ZAÖRV 879, 907-09, 913 (2003)Google Scholar.

67 Tadić, supra note 8, paras. 35, 39; see also Kanyabashi, supra note 41, at 7, para. 27.

68 See Frowein & Krisch, supra note 48, at 710-12.

69 Id. at 710, para. 25.

70 UN CHARTER Art. 25 (emphasis added); see Lamb, supra note 41, at 366-67.

71 See also UN CHARTER Art. 24(2) (providing that the specific powers given to the Security Council, inter alia, in Chapter VII are granted for the discharge of its duties under the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security).

72 Compare the statement of the Chinese representative: “Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery is conducive to the maintenance of international peace and security “ UN Doc. S/PV.4950, supra note 23, at 6.

73 UN CHARTER Art. 13(l)(a); see also Harper, supra note 12, at 153.

74 See Hans-Joachim Schütz, Article 26, in The Charter of the United Nations, supra note 48, at 464,467, para. 11. The General Assembly has only recently reaffirmed the “absolute validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament.” GA Res. 58/44, pmbl. (Dec. 8, 2003).

75 Compare the statement of the representative of Pakistan: “there are grave implications to this effort by the Security Council to impose obligations on States, which their Governments and sovereign legislatures have not freely accepted, especially when some of these obligations could impinge on matters relating to their national security and to their right of self-defence.” UN Doc. S/PV.4950, supra note 23, at 15.

76 Schütz, supra note 74, at 469, para. 18.

77 Happold, supra note 4, at 605-07; Zimmermann & Eberling, supra note 33, at 72. Contra Aston, supra note 21, at 287; Paul, C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AJIL 901, 904 (2002)Google Scholar; Tomuschat, supra note 52, at 344-45.

78 GA Res. 46/36 L (Dec. 9, 1991) (Transparency in Armaments). The resolution called upon all member states to provide annually by May 31, to the secretary-general, relevant data on imports and exports of conventional arms to be included in the register. UN member states were also invited to report on their military holdings and procurement through national production and relevant policies.

79 See SC Res. 687, paras. 8, 10, 12 (Apr. 3, 1991), 30 ILM 846 (1991).

80 The Council has, however, established a commission for the “technical task” of demarcating the precise coordinates of a boundary set out in an agreement between two states. Id., para. 2; SC Res. 773 (Aug. 26, 1992); SC Res. 833 (May 27, 1993), 32 ILM 1465 (1993).

81 Kelsen, Hans, The Law of the United Nations 294–95 (1950)Google Scholar.

82 UN CHARTER Arts. 40,42,43(1), 51 (providing that the Council may take such action or measures (as it deems) necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security); see Frowein & Krisch, supra note 48, at 711, para. 30; Kirgis, supra note 12, at 517 & n.87.

83 There can be no question of the Security Council’s having “in fact replaced the conventional law-making process on the international level,” as stated by Krisch, supra note 4, at 884.

84 UN Doc. S/PV.4950, supra note 23, at 28.

85 Id. at 3 (Brazil); id. at 5 (Algeria); id. at 7 (Spain); id. at 9 (Angola); id. at 11 (United Kingdom); id. at 20 (Peru); id. at 21 (New Zealand); id. at 24 (India); id. at 25 (Singapore); id. at 27 (Sweden); id. at 28 (Japan, Switzerland); id. at31 (Indonesia); id. (Resumption 1), at 4 (Malaysia for the Non-Aligned Group); id. at5(Mexico); id. at 8 (Republic of Korea); id. at 11 (Jordan); id. at 14 (Nigeria); UN Doc. S/PV.4956, at 9 (2004) (Romania); see also UN Doc. S/PV.4451, at 19 (2002) (India, with regard to Resolution 1373).

86 Press Conference by Security Council President, supra note 3.

87 For example, the Egyptian delegate stated that any Council action should be “on a temporary basis for a specific, limited time until an internationally ratified treaty can be concluded.” UN Doc. S/PV.4950, supra note 23, (Resumption 1), at 2; see also id. at 4 (Malaysia); id. at 15 (Nigeria); id. at 17 (Namibia, Kuwait).

88 See UN Doc. S/PV.4956, supra note 85, at 7.

89 China’s UN ambassador said that Resolution 1540 “fills the gap” now, but he advocated a global treaty for the longer run. Edith, M. Lederer, U.N. Adopts Resolution to Keep Weapons of Mass Destruction from Terrorists, AP Newswires, Apr. 28, 2004, available in 2004 Westlaw, Allnewsplus Google Scholar.

90 UN CHARTER Art. 103; Vienna Convention, supra note 53, Art. 30(1).

91 Frowein & Krisch, supra note 48, at 712, para. 30.

92 See Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law 666–67 (6th ed. 2003)Google Scholar.

93 UN Doc. S/PV.4772, supra note 19, at 10 (Iran); id. at 13 (Brazil); id. at 25 (Germany); UN Doc. A/58/PV.29, at 9 (2003) (Cuba); UN Doc. S/PV.4568, supra note 19, at 3 (Canada); id. at 5-6 (New Zealand); id. at 11 (France); id. at 15 (Costa Rica on behalf of the nineteen member states of the Rio Group); id. at 15 (Iran); id. at 18 (Ireland); id. at 22 (Brazil); id. at 23 (Switzerland); id. at 26 (Mexico); id. at 30 (Venezuela); id. (Resumption 1), at 2 (Fiji); id. at 5 (Guinea); id. at 8 (Malaysia); id. at 10 (Syria); id. at 14 (Cuba); UN Doc. A/57/PV.22, at 6 (2002) (Liechtenstein).

94 UN Doc. S/PV.4772, supra note 19, at 21.

95 UN Doc. S/PV.4568, supra note 19, at 6.

96 See supra note 35.

97 On this controversy, see Fritsche, Claudia, Security Council Resolution 1422: Peacekeeping and the International Criminal Court, in Verhandeln Für Den Frieden—Negotiating For Peace, Liber Amicorumtono Eitel 107 (Jochen Abr, Frowein et al. eds., 2003)Google Scholar; Zimmermann, Andreas, “Acting Under Chapter VII (...)”—Resolution 1422 and Possible Limits of the Powers of the Security Council, in id. at 253 Google Scholar.

98 Lockerbie (Libya v. UK), supra note 44, 1992 ICJ REP. at 15, para. 39:

99 Contra Epstein, William & Paul, C. Szasz, Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: A Means of Strengthening the Treaty, 33 Va. J. Int’l L. 735, 754 (1993)Google Scholar.

100 Lopez, .supra note 12, at 954-57 (with regard to the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I in the context of internal armed conflicts); Szasz, supra note 77, at 903 (with regard to the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism).

101 SC Res. 1373, supra note 13, para. 3(d). In the case of Security Council Resolution 1540, supra note 13, the U.S. delegate expressly clarified that “Member States not parties to treaties or regimes will not be forced, through this draft resolution, to adopt them.” UN Doc. S/PV.4950, supra note 23, at 18. Even in the case of Iraq, the Council in Resolution 687, para. 7 (Apr. 3, 1991), 30 ILM 846 (1991), only “invited” Iraq to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

102 On informal consultations, see Feuerle, Loie, Note, Informal Consultation: A Mechanism in Security Council Decision- Making, 18 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. 267 (1985)Google Scholar; Natalie Reid, Informal Consultations (Jan. 1999), at <http:,7www.globalpolicy.org/security/informal/natalie.htm>.

103 On the drafting of Security Council resolutions, see Michael, C. Wood, The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, 1998 Max Planck Y.B. UN L. 73, 80–81 Google Scholar.

104 UN Doc. S/PV.4950, supra note 23, at 2.

105 See Rudolf Dolzer, Article 31, in The Charter of the United Nations, supra note 48, at 573, 577, para. 18.

106 Id. at 576, para. 17.

107 Rule 37 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, Dec. 21, 1981, UN Doc. S/96/Rev.7, UN Sales No. E.83.1.4 (1983), provides:

108 Letter Dated 6 June 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada, Jordan, Liechtenstein, New Zealand and Switzerland to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2003/620. This request was strongly supported by the European Union, which “fully shares the views expressed in the letter concerning the advisability of convening a public meeting and inviting interested States to speak in Security Council discussions.” UN Doc. S/2003/639. For similar letters, see UN Docs. S/2002/723 and S/2004/412.

109 UN Doc. S/2002/723 (emphasis added).

110 UN Doc. S/2003/620.

111 UN Doc. S/PV.4568, supra note 19, at 5.

112 See Dolzer, supra note 105, at 577-78, paras. 22, 23. Several states have even claimed that Article 31 gives a general “right” to be heard by the Council. UN Doc. S/PV.3864, at 17, 57 (1998) (Costa Rica, Iraq); UN Doc. A/53/33, at 19 (1998) (Libya); UN Doc. A/53/PV.40, at 9 (1998) (Ukraine). But this is going too far.

113 UN Doc. S/PV.4385, at 2 (2001).

114 UN Doc. A/56/PV.36, supra note 42, at 2 (Paraguay); UN Doc. A/56/PV.34, supra note 25, at 13 (Guatemala); UN Doc. A/56/PV.33, at 3, 16 (2001) (Japan, India); UN Doc. A/56/PV.28, at 5, 16 (2001) (Yugoslavia, Ghana).

115 UN Doc. A/56/PV.25, at 3 (2001).

116 UN Doc. S/PV.4572, at 2 (2002). The meeting at which the draft resolution was adopted, again lasted for only five minutes.

117 UN Doc. S/PV.4568, supra note 19, at 2, 29; id. (Resumption 1), at 2, 12; see also UN Doc. S/2002/937, at 6.

118 UN Doc. S/PV.4772, supra note 19, at 2, 28.

119 See UN Doc. S/PV.4950, supra note 23, at 8.

120 See Assessment of the Work of the Security Council During the Presidency of Germany (April 2004), UN Doc. S/2004/505, at 8 Google Scholar; see also UN Doc. S/PV.4950, supra note 23, at 2; id. (Resumption 1), at 2.

121 UN Doc. S/PV.4950, supra note 23, at 7.

122 Id. (Resumption 1), at 8 (Republic of Korea). Similar concerns about clarity of language and definition of terms were expressed by Canada, India, Ireland, speaking on behalf of the European Union, and Switzerland. UN Doc. S/PV.4950, supra note 23, at 19, 24, 26-27, & 28, respectively.

123 Compare the statement of the Brazilian delegate, UN Doc. S/PV.4950, supra note 23, at 4, who recommended that “the text [of the resolution] take into account the independence of national congresses in the exercise of their law-making power.”

124 Compare the statement of the French delegate, id. at 8, who observed that “[t]he Council is establishing the goals, but it leaves each State free to define the penalties, legal regulations and practical measures to be adopted.”

125 SC Res. 1373, supra note 13, para. 1(b) (emphasis added).

126 The General Assembly’s Sixth Committee is currently considering a draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, which would include a definition of terrorism if adopted. For the suggested definition, see Article 2 of the draft Convention. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996: Sixth Session, UN GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 37, Annex II, at 6, UN Doc. A/57/37 (2002).

127 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Apr. 22, 1998, Arts. 1, 2, United Nations, Instruments Related to the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism 152, UN Sales No. 01. V.3 (2001), available at <http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/related/1998CairoArabConvention.pdf>.

128 UN Doc. S/PV.4453, supra note 28, at 9 (also stating that “foreign occupation is the most brutal form of terrorism; therefore, resistance to foreign occupation—especially Israeli occupation of Arab territories in Palestine, the Syrian Golan and southern Lebanon—constitutes legitimate struggle”; id. at 8).

129 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra note 22, Art. 2(l)(b).

130 Aston, supra note 21, at 262 n.26; see also id. at 262-64. For further examples of unclear terms, see Peterke, Sven, Die Bekämpfung der Terrorismusfinanzierung unter Kapitel VII der UN-Charta. Die Resolution 1373 (2001) des UN-Sicherheitsrats, 14 Humanitäres Völkerrecht 217 (2001)Google Scholar; Wagner, supra note 66, at 901-02.

131 See Gehr, Walter, Recurrent Issues (Briefing for Member States on 4 April 2002)Google Scholar, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/rc.htm>.

132 Several states have voiced concerns about the definitions in Security Council Resolution 1540. See, e.g., UN Doc. S/PV.4950, supra note 23, at 15 (Pakistan); id. at 24 (India); id. at 30 (Cuba); id. at 34 (Syria).

133 The Security Council recognizes the utility of having national control lists and calls upon all member states to develop such lists. SC Res. 1540, supra note 13, para. 6.

134 Vienna Convention, supra note 53, Art. 32.

135 Wood, supra note 103, at 94; see also Talmon, Stefan, The Statements by the President of the Security Council, 2 Chinese J. Int’l L. 419, 438 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

136 The verbatim protocol for all four resolutions in question records that the text of the draft resolutions had been “prepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations.”

137 Wood, supra note 103, at 94 n.33.

138 Resolution 1373, in paragraph 6, gives a ninety-day report-back date. As many states complained that ninety days were too little, Resolution 1540, in paragraph 4, now provides for a six-month report-back date.

139 See in this connection the statement of the Indian delegate in the Security Council: “India will not accept externally prescribed norms or standards, whatever their source, on matters pertaining to domestic jurisdiction of its Parliament, including national legislation, regulations or arrangements which are not consistent with its constitutional provisions . . . .” UN Doc. S/PV.4950, supra note 23, at 24.

140 SC Res. 1373, supra note 13, para. 6.

141 Rosand, Eric, Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AJIL 333, 339 (2003)Google Scholar. On the CTC in general, see Rostow, Nicholas, Before and After: The Changed UN Response to Terrorism Since 11th September, 35 Cornell Int’l L.J. 475, 482–86 (2002)Google Scholar.

142 But see Krisch, supra note 4, at 885.

143 UN Doc. S/PV.4950, supra note 23, at 23.

144 UN Doc. S/PRST/2004/26.

145 As of July 20, 2004, thirty-three states still had to submit their second report and thirty-eight states still had to submit their third report. Reports are available online at Reports from Member States, <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/submitted_reports.html>.

146 See, e.g., UN Doc. S/2004/360, at 3 (Andorra); UN Doc. S/2004/158, at 3 (Jamaica); UN Doc. S/2004/374, at 5 (Niger); UN Doc. S/2004/179, at 4 (Qatar); UN Doc. S/2004/127, at 3 (Republic of Korea); UN Doc. S/2004/170, at 9 (South Africa); UN Doc. S/2004/429, at 4-5 (Timor-Leste).

147 SC Res. 1373, supra note 13, para. 2(e).

148 The relevant provision is § 129 b of the German Criminal Code, which permits the prosecution of individuals who support terrorist organizations based abroad. Prior to this change in the law, the existence of an independent suborganization in Germany was the criterion that had to be fulfilled in order for a crime to be constituted. For the text of the provision, see Thirty-fourth Criminal Law Amendment Act, v. 22.8.2002 (Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I S.3390).

149 German Federal Supreme Court, Order of June 13, 2003, No. StB 6/03. See the Court’s Press Release No. 73/2003 (June 13, 2003), at <http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de>.

150 UN CHARTER Art. 1(1).

151 European Commission, Serving the People of Europe: How the European Commission Works 6 (July 2002), at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/pubIications/booklets/move/34/txt_en.pdf>.

152 UN Doc. S/2004/642, at 6, para. 14. For concerns about the CTC’s monitoring capability, see also Rosand, supra note 141, at 341.