1 Indications of orbit/spectrum value include global communications satellite industry revenues of between $1,500 million and $2,000 million a year: Astrain, Telecommunications and the Economic Impact of Communications Satellites 1 (paper delivered at 31st Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, Tokyo, 1980); and an estimated total American investment in geostationary orbit space between 1975 and 1984 of about $2,000 million: Morgan, , The Next Decade: An Economic Outlook for the Eighties, Satellite Com., Jan. 1981, at 37 Google Scholar.

This article examines the international regulatory regime governing the orbit/spectrum resource’s satellite communications values. For an excellent survey of international legal issues involved in the simultaneous exploitation of earth orbits and the electromagnetic spectrum for remote sensing/earth observation values, see Mossinghoff, & Fuqua, , United Nations Principles on Remote Sensing: Report on Developments, 1970–1980, 8 J. Space L. 103 (1980)Google Scholar.

2 The international legal definition of “geostationary satellite orbit” is the “orbit in which a satellite must be placed to be a geostationary satellite.” International Telecommunication Union, World Administrative Radio Conference Radio Regulations (1979) [hereinafter cited as ITU Radio Regulations], Art. N1, §8, No. 3133A. A “geostationary satellite” is legally defined as a “geosynchronous satellite whose circular and direct orbit lies in the plane of the Earth’s equator and which thus remains fixed relative to the Earth; by extension, a satellite which remains approximately fixed relative to the Earth.” Id., Art. N1, §8, No. 3133. “Geosynchronous satellite” is legally defined as an “earth satellite whose period of revolution is equal to the period of rotation of the Earth about its axis.” Id., Art. N1, §8, No. 3132. See Gehrig, , Geostationary Orbit—Technology and Law, in Proceedings of The 19th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 267 (1977)Google Scholar, for a critical analysis of these definitions.

3 For a discussion of nongeostationary orbits and their disadvantages, see J. Martin, Communications Satellite Systems 41–61 (1978). Satellites are able to serve as relay platforms because they are high enough to be in the line of sight of up to 40% of the earth’s surface. Ibid. Satellites in geostationary positions will soon be replaced with larger, permanent “space information stations,” which have “an advantage over single–purpose satellites in terms of conservation of orbital and spectrum resources, economies of scale, and greater capabilities.” D. Smith, Space Stations: International Law and Policy 60 (1979).

4 For very clear descriptions of those portions of the electromagnetic spectrum used for telecommunications, see M. Franklin, Mass Media Law 536–39 (1977); and J. Martin, supra note 3, at 132–47.

5 J. Martin, supra note 3, at 136; S. H. Lay & H. Taubenfeld, The Law Relating to the Activities of Man in Space 103–12 (1970). The spectrum’s extensive and intensive margins are explained in H. Levin, The Invisible Resource (1971).

6 The frequencies used for Western Hemisphere public communications satellite service in these bands are 5.925–6.425 GHz uplink and 3.7–4.2 GHz downlink for the C band; 11.7–12.7 GHz downlink and 14.0–14.5 GHz uplink for the Ku band; and 17.7–21.2 GHz downlink and 27.5– 31.0 GHz uplink for the Ka band. ITU Radio Regulations, supra note 2, Art. N7, §4. See also Jackson, , The Allocation of the Radio Spectrum, Scientific Am., Feb. 1980, at 34–39 Google Scholar.

From a signal propagation standpoint, the C band is “ideal” and accounts for the great majority of satellite communications traffic. J. Martin, supra note 3, at 138. However, Ku–band conditions are also quite favorable and most new communications satellite systems will utilize this band. Rothblatt, , International Regulation of Digital Communications Satellite Systems, 32 Fed. Com. L.J. 403–11 (1980)Google Scholar. Although Ka–band signals propagate better than those transmitted at some neighboring frequencies, further technology development is needed to handle the band’s characteristic rain attenuation problems. J. Martin, supra note 3, at 139. NASA is developing this technology, and the satellite industry is depending upon the Ka band to satisfy mammoth satellite communications needs in the next decade. Dement, , Satellite Orbit Saturation Requires New Technology to Meet Demands, Com. News, March 1981, at 54–55 Google Scholar.

7 See notes 66–98 and accompanying text, infra.

8 See notes 10–65 and accompanying text, infra.

9 See notes 99–115 and accompanying text, infra.

The attorney who is somewhat unfamiliar with satellite communications may wish to consider the advice of Eilene Galloway, one of the world’s most respected space law scholars: “The revolution in science and technology imposes an obligation on the scientific community to keep the legal profession informed of the latest developments. National and international lawyers have the matching responsibility of absorbing new facts into the framework of social order.” Galloway, , The Community of Law and Science, in Proceedings of The 1st Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 59 (1959)Google Scholar. See also Clarke, 6 J. Brit. Interplan. Soc’y 75 (1946) (“Morals and ethics must not lag behind science, otherwise the social system will breed poisons which will cause its own destruction”).

10 “Bits per second” (bps) are the standard units employed to measure how many messages can be conveyed at any one time. Since it requires 56,000 bps to convey the human voice telephonicajly, a channel with depth of 56,000 bps could convey one voice message at a time, a channel with depth of 112,000 bps could convey about two simultaneous voice messages, and so on.

As an example of growth in the depth of international channels, consider that telegraph cables (1880) conveyed less than 10³ bps, radio broadcasting (1930) conveyed about 10⁵ bps, early telephone submarine cables and television (1955) conveyed about 10⁷ bps, modern satellites and fiber optics (1980) can convey about 10⁹ bps, and future space information stations (1995) will convey about 10¹² bps. Pelton, Global TV 2000, Satellite Com., April 1981, at 18.

11 Unless the depth described in note 10 is distributed somewhere, one does not have a channel; pathways must lead somewhere. On an international level of analysis, well–distributed channels are those which deliver depth to many or all countries, while poorly distributed channels do not deliver messages much beyond the country of origin. International satellite communications channels distribute depth much more widely than do submarine cables because the former blanket the earth with global and semi–global beams, while the latter terminate at a handful of “landings.” For an excellent discussion of the ability of domestic communication satellites greatly to improve the distribution of local broadcast stations and cable systems, see Station Representatives Association, Satellites and Broadcast Stations: A Guide to Present and Potential Satellite Technology, Uses, Regulation and Economic Impact (1980).

12 Unidirectional channels, such as broadcast stations, convey information from only one composite source. Multidirectional channels, such as telephone networks, convey information from millions of discrete sources. In technical telecommunications terminology, directionality is a function of “switching” capability, the ratio of potential sources to potential receivers in a media system or subsystem. It is possible to attain high switching ratios, that is, high directionality, with either wire or wireless channels. Traditionally, however, wire channels have dominated long–distance switched telecommunications because it was not technologically possible adequately to control isotropic information dispersal in wireless radio (or even natural aural) channels. Isotropically dispersed phenomena, like broadcast information, lose strength as the square of the distance traveled, which necessitates very complex, powerful source capabilities and results in very small source/receiver directionality ratios. With advances in microwave technology it has become possible to control isotropic information dispersal in radio channels and thereby deliver enough information to receivers without a wire to make source capabilities increasingly common, hence directionality ratios increasingly high.

These technological trends are demonstrated in the recently launched Satellite Business System and recently approved Xerox Telecommunications Network, each of which provides deep wireless channels with source–to–receiver directionality ratios of about one—the maximum attainable ratio. Kaplan, , Three Systems Defined, IEEE Spectrum, Oct. 1979, at 44 Google Scholar.

13 See, e.g., J . Martin, Telecommunications and the Computer 156–86 (2d ed. 1976).

14 Ibid.

15 See generally D. Leive, International Telecommunications and International Law: the Regulation of the Radio Spectrum 19–29 (1970).

16 The first international communications satellite service agreements may be found at International Telecommunication Union Radio Regulations (Geneva, 1959), entered into force Oct. 23, 1961, 12 UST 2377, TIAS No. 4893. For a critical analysis of early ITU satellite communications regulation, see D. Smith, International Telecommunications Control (1969).

17 ITU Radio Regulations, supra note 2, Art. N7, §5, Nos. 3450–3816M.

18 International Telecommunication Convention (Málaga–Torremolinos, 1973), Art. 4(1)(b), (2)(a), (2)(c), 28 UST 2497, TIAS No. 8572 (entered into force for the United States, April 7, 1976) [hereinafter cited as International Telecommunication Convention] (emphasis supplied). Earlier versions of the Convention may be found at International Telecommunication Convention (Atlantic City, 1947), 63 Stat. 1399, TIAS No. 1901; International Telecommunication Convention (Buenos Aires, 1952), 6 UST 1213, TIAS No. 3266; International Telecommunication Convention (Geneva, 1959), 12 UST 1761, TIAS No. 4892; International Telecommunication Convention (Montreux, 1965), 18 UST 575, TIAS No. 6267.

19 International Telecommunication Convention, supra note 18, Art. 4(2)(c).

20 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 UST 2410, TIAS No. 6347, 610 UNTS 205 (entered into force for the United States on Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty of 1967].

21 Id., Arts. I, II. For an analysis of these rules, see S. H. Lay & H. Taubenfeld, supra note 5, at 63–102.

22 M. McDougal, H. Lasswell, & I. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space 774–76, 781 (1963).

23 Robinson, , Regulating International Airwaves: The 1979 WARC, 21 Va. J. Int’l L. 1, 45 n.139 (1980)Google Scholar.

24 Christol, , The International Telecommunication Union and the International Law of Outer Space, in Proceedings of the 22D Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 43 (1980)Google Scholar.

25 ITU Radio Regulations, supra note 2, Art. 9A.

26 Id., Art. 9A, §4, No. 639BM.

27 Id., Art. 9A, §6, No. 639DD–DE.

28 See, e.g., id., Art. 9A, §2, No.639AZ.

29 In practice, the exigencies of the negotiating process generally require both sides to come to an accommodation. See Colino, , International Cooperation Between Communications Satellite Systems: An Overview of Current Practices and Future Prospects, 5 J. Space L. 65 (1977)Google Scholar.

30 Outer Space Treaty of 1967, note 20 supra.

31 Id., Art. IX.

32 In satellite communications jargon this is referred to as “frequency reuse,” and is actually a form of multiplexing or “channel sharing.”

33 “Harmful interference” is legally defined as unwanted energy due to emissions that “seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication service operating in accordance with [the Radio] Regulations.” ITU Radio Regulations, supra note 2, Art. N1 , §7, No. 3140A, 3142. “Confusion as to assigned frequencies—or worse yet, no assignment at all—would defeat the maximum beneficial use of space communications facilities.” C. Christol, The International Law of Outer Space 396 (1966).

34 Gehrig, supra note 2, at 269.

35 International Telecommunication Convention, supra note 18, Art. 4(2)(a).

36 Id., Art. 4(2)(b). See early discussion of the application of these commands to space communications in A. Haley, Space Law and Government 168–76 (1963).

37 Id., Arts. 10, 33.

38 Ibid.

39 See note 11 and accompanying text, supra.

40 International Telecommunication Convention, supra note 18, Art. 4(2)(e) (emphasis supplied).

41 Id., Art. 33 (emphasis supplied).

42 See C. Christol, Satellite Power System International Agreements 44 (U.S. Dep’t of Energy Research, 1978). These countries include Canada, Indonesia, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

43 The adoption of Article 33 is discussed by the ITU’s Secretary–General in Mili, , World Administrative Radio Conference for the Planning of the Broadcasting–Satellite Service in Frequency Bands 11.7–12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3) and 11.7–12.5 GHz (in Region 1), in Proceedings of the 20th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 346 (1978)Google Scholar.

44 The Plenipotentiary Conference is the ITU’s “supreme organ”; it meets about once a decade, it is composed of all ITU member countries, and “it is responsible for revising the International Telecommunication Convention and for establishing general policies and programs.” D. Leive, supra note 15, at 32.

45 International Telecommunication Union, Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference (1979) [hereinafter cited as WARC–79 Final Acts], Res. AY.

46 Ibid, (emphasis supplied).

47 Outer Space Treaty of 1967, supra note 20, Art. I. See also General Assembly Resolutions 1802 and 1721 specifying that “communication by satellite offers great benefits to mankind” and “should be available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global and nondiscriminatory basis,” analyzed in C. Christol, supra note 33, at 404–06.

48 Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, 23 UST 3813, TIAS No. 7532 (1973) [hereinafter cited as INTELSAT Agreement]. See generally R. Colino, The Intelsat Definitive Arrangements: Ushering in A New Era in Satellite Telecommunications (1973); Doyle, , Permanent Arrangements for the Global Commercial Communications Satellite System of Intelsat, in Proceedings of the 17th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 123 (1975)Google Scholar; Pelton, , The Intelsat Global Satellite System and the Pacific: Past, Present and Future, in Pacific Telecommunications Conference 21–23 (1979)Google Scholar.

49 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 48, Preamble, Art. II.

50 Id., Art. II (emphasis supplied); The International Telecommunication Union is one of “the public international organizations through which major efforts have been undertaken to maximize space communications.” C. Christol, supra note 33, at 394.

51 See note 12 and accompanying text, supra.

52 International Telecommunication Convention, supra note 18, Art. 4(1)(b).

53 Id., Art. 18. See also id., Art. 34(1) (binding stations “to exchange radiocommunications reciprocally without distinction as to radio system” employed).

54 Id, Art. 4(2)(d).

55 See notes 40–50 and accompanying text, supra.

56 The broadcasting–satellite service is legally defined as “a radiocommunication service in which signals transmitted or retransmitted by space stations are intended for direct reception by the general public.” ITU Radio Regulations, supra note 2, Art. N1, §3, No. 84AP. The legal definition of fixed–satellite service is, “a radiocommunication service between earth stations.” Id., Art. N1, §3, No. 84AG (emphasis supplied).

57 “The continuing implementation of digital communications and other new technology tends to merge all services into a common system.” Rutkowski, , The 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference: The ITU in a Changing World, 13 Int’l Law. 289, 301 n.35 (1979)Google Scholar. Future Canadian Anik satellites and Indian Insat satellites will be hybrid broadcasting and fixed–satellite service systems. See also note 12 supra.

58 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 48, Art. Ill (emphasis supplied).

59 Id., Art. I(k).

60 Each party signs the INTELSAT Agreement “[w]ith full regard for the principles” that “communication by means of satellites should be available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global and non–discriminatory basis,” and that “satellite telecommunications should be organized in such a way as to permit all peoples to have access to the global satellite system.” Id., Art. II, Preamble.

61 Pelton, supra note 10, at 18–29; Pollack, , Technologies for Future Intelsat Satellites, 17 J. Spacecraft 4 (1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

62 The Agreement of the Arab Corporation for Space Communications, reprinted in Senate Comm. on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Space Law: Selected Basic Documents 400–16 (Comm. Print 1976); request of African Post and Telegraph Union for a definitional study of a regional African communications satellite system, reported in Satellite Com., Dec. 1980, at 6. See also inventory of probable regional communications satellite systems in A. Chayes, Satellite Broadcasting 8–9 (1973).

63 Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization, TIAS No. 9605 (1979), Arts. 3, 5(3), 7(1). See generally Sondaal, , The Current Situation in the Field of Maritime Communication Satellites: Inmarsat, 8 J. Space L. 21 (1980)Google Scholar; Jasentuliyana, , The Establishment of an International Maritime Satellite System, 2 Annals Air & Space L. 323 (1977)Google Scholar.

64 “Bandwidth” simply means information or message–carrying ability in common usage. Technically speaking, bandwidth defines the range of cycles per second in a frequency band.

65 See notes 1–6 and accompanying text, supra.

66 See notes 13–63 and accompanying text, supra.

67 America’s foremost international space law expert, Dr. Carl Q. Christol, wisely cautions in this regard:

[l]t should be kept in mind that while definitions may be suitable for a specific object, having, for example, tangible qualities, or for private relationships, as in a contract situation, the utility of endeavoring to define a principle may be questioned. It is generally acknowledged that principles do not lend themselves readily to definitional labels. The latter serve as arbitrary limitations on growth and destroy the usefulness of principles.

With particular reference to the common heritage of mankind principle, Christol observes that while “it may be imagined that through a definition it [is] possible to achieve a degree of present specificity . . . , unfortunately, for this perspective, the history of the law has demonstrated that words have a habit of changing their meanings. As a result a definitional fetish may produce deep seated frustrations.” Finally, as to the fundamental nature of international legal principles, Christol astutely notes their “essential quality of starting points for legal reasoning.” Consequently, a priori definitional approaches “contribute more to the obscuring of goals than to [the] providing [of] guidance in the use of the yet unperfected [principle],” and “serve more to prevent the gathering of practical meaning than to enhance it.” Christol, , The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in the 7979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 14 Int’l Law. 429, 479 (1980)Google Scholar, reprinted at invitation of Stevenson, Sen. Adlai E. in The Moon Treaty: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 186–218 (1980)Google Scholar.

68 In addition to the hundreds of satellites the United States and the Soviet Union have each launched, and the communications satellite systems operated by INTELSAT, INMARSAT, Canada, and Indonesia, there are developmental satellites in orbit of European, Japanese, Chinese, and Indian origin. The Nordic states, the Arab states, Nigeria, Colombia, Brazil, Australia, and Thailand have also expressed serious interest in orbiting their own communications satellites. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 23, at 2 n.1. Certain portions of orbit/spectrum are under particularly intense development. Hill, , Corporate Star Wars: Domsats Battle for the Geostationary Orbit, Satellite Com., Aug. 1980, at 12 Google Scholar; Grenier, , Popot, , Lombard, , & Payet, , Telecom I, a National Satellite for Domestic and Business Services, in 3 International Conference on Communications 49.5.1 (1979)Google Scholar (discusses difficulty in finding suitable orbital location for new French business satellite). Indeed, computer models have already predicted significant collision probabilities, over 10–year periods, in the geostationary orbit. Rothblatt, , International Liability of the United States for Space Shuttle Operations, 13 Int’l Law. 471, 474 (1979)Google Scholar. And an American administrative agency, NOAA, has already undertaken “the first mass shifting of satellites in space” to “eliminate the possibility of a collision in the busy geostationary corridor.” Satellite Com., April 1981, at 5.

69 Considering “that it would be advantageous to introduce an experimental procedure to gain experience from application of the new concept of notifying the period of validity of an assignment in space radiocommunications,” the World Administrative Radio Conference resolves that (until 1984) “if a notifying administration which wishes to extend the period of operation originally shown on the assignment notice of a frequency assignment of an existing space station informs the [IFRB] accordingly . . . , the Board shall amend as requested the period of operation originally recorded in the Master Register.” WARC–79 Final Acts, supra note 45, Res. BY.

70 Robinson, supra note 23, at 27–28.

71 WARC–79 Final Acts, supra note 45, App. 29A, Art. 12.9.1.

72 For a very clear description of planning, see Av. Wk. & Space Tech., Sept. 10, 1979, at 75–77.

73 See notes 23–29 and accompanying text, supra.

74 See, e.g., statements made by the Indian, Chinese, Iraqi, and Colombian delegates to WARC– 79, reproduced verbatim in Rutkowski, Six Ad–Hoc Two: The Third World Speaks Its Mind 7– 12 (1979) (unpub. paper available from the author at FCC Office of Science & Technology, Washington, D.C.). See also ITU–WARC, India, Proposals for the Work of the Conference, Doc. No. 78 (Sept. 18, 1979); ITU–WARC, Iraq, Draft Resolution Relating to Planning the Radiocommunication Satellite Services Using the Geostationary Orbit, Doc. No. 359 (Oct. 13, 1979).

75 This concern led to the adoption of Res. AY, notes 43–46 and accompanying text, supra.

76 The Chairman of the U.S. delegation to WARC–79 recently observed that these nations are supporting planning “largely out of fear that developed countries were preempting the orbital positions and frequencies and consequently emerging needs would not be met.” Robinson, supra note 23, at 27.

77 Id. at 45 n.139.

78 See note 68 supra.

79 WARC–79 Final Acts, supra note 45, App. 29A, Ann. 7 (emphasis supplied).

80 Butler, , World Administrative Radio Conference for Planning Broadcasting Satellite Service, 5 J. Space L. 93, 98 (1977)Google Scholar.

81 Note 20 supra. See also C. Jenks, Space Law 200 (1965), for pre–1967 observation: “The general principle that outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation can therefore, and indeed must, now be regarded as firmly established.”

To be distinguished, however, are clear national or private exclusive property rights in values exploited from a space resource through national or private resource development activities.

By analogy, while it is universally agreed that no “State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty,” Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev,3 and Add.1 and Corrs. 1–6, Art. 89, no one questions the exclusive property rights of fishing concerns in the fish they exploit or of ocean transport concerns in their income from moving goods over conducive waters. Similarly, while no state may subject regions of the geostationary orbit to its sovereignty, property rights in exploited information channels and in the signals they conduct are clearly recognized. See, e.g., Ferrer, The Brussels Convention Concerning the Protection of Signals Transmitted from Satellites, in Proceedings of the 17th Colloquium, supra note 48, at 26.

82 Robinson, supra note 23, at 49.

83 Id. at 46–47; Rutkowski, supra note 57, at 308.

84 Rutkowski, supra note 57, at 308. See also text accompanying note 71 supra.

85 See, e.g., delegate statements quoted in Rutkowski, supra note 74, at 8.

86 Robinson, supra note 23, at 44.

87 WARC–79 Final Acts, supra note 45, App. 29A.

88 Robinson, supra note 23, at 44 n.132.

89 WARC–79 Final Acts, supra note 45, App. 29A, Art. 16.

90 U.S. Dep’t of State, Report of the Chairman of the United States Delegation to the World Administrative Radio Conference of the International Telecommunication Union, Sept. 24–Dec. 6, 1979, at 78–79 (1980) (statement of U.S. spokesman regarding Resolution BP).

91 The current rapid proliferation of satellite communications systems is certainly a function of the 18 to 1 reduction in satellite rates (in real dollars) since 1965; “satellite communications are becoming less and less expensive when compared to the price of competing items such as paper, gasoline and air transportation. Eventually the impact of this ever–lower true cost of satellite communications must be even greater.” Morgan, supra note 1, at 26.

92 See notes 77–78 and accompanying text, supra.

93 WARC–79 Final Acts, supra note 45, Res. BP.

94 Cf. Robinson, supra note 23, at 28, for the view that neither the U.S. position, which sought a completely open–ended agenda for GEO–WARC, nor the proplanning position, which sought a completely predetermined agenda, eventually prevailed.

95 WARC–79 Final Acts, supra note 45, Res. BP.

96 Robinson, supra note 23, at 45 (“The Third World fears of being preempted by earlier developed–country exploitation were belied by experience because no one could show that there had been any such preemption, despite considerable satellite activity by both developing and developed countries”).

97 Quarter transponders are available at the rate of $800,000 per full preemptible transponder.

98 WARC–79 Final Acts, supra note 45, Res. BP. The resolution also invites the ITU’s technical advisory committee, the CCIR, to provide “technical information concerning principles, criteria and technical parameters including those required for planning space services.” This clearly contemplates the provision as well of technical information required for schemes less detailed than planning.

99 See notes 6 and 56 supra.

100 See notes 10–12 and accompanying text, supra.

101 See note 6 supra. It is assumed that the 1000 MHz allocation will be split in half between fixed and broadcasting services. In ITU Region 1 (Europe, the USSR, Africa), however, 800 MHz of bandwidth has been allocated to the broadcasting–satellite service.

102 ITU Radio Regulations, supra note 2, Art. N7, §5 and, for example, Art. 9A.

103 The term “basic channel depth” is employed to streamline the analysis by disregarding the many technical factors that may affect channel depth, but are either equally applicable under planned and unplanned regimes, or only operate to further increase the channel depth available under an unplanned regime.

104 This “basic channel depth” could, of course, increase multiplicatively (but for the simplifying assumption of n.103) through the application of techniques such as contiguous spot beams, scanning spot beams, and satellite platforms. See Goldman, & Edelson, , On Several Communications Satellite Designs Using Large Space Antennas, in Pacific Conference, supra note 48, at 3B–5 Google Scholar; Reudink, & Yeh, , Rapid–Scan Area–Coverage Communication Satellite, 17 J. Spacecraft 9 (1980)Google Scholar; Katz, & Donavan, , The Design of Communications Systems on Large Space Platforms, in 1 International Conference on Communications 9.4.1 (1980)Google Scholar.

105 WARC–79 Final Acts, supra note 45, App. 29A, Art. 11.3.

106 As a simplifying assumption, “acceptable orbital positions A” is here defined as the number of available orbital positions in the ITU region in which a country falls.

107 The Soviet Union, for example, with a j value of 11/6, is entitled to two 20–MHz channels at almost every one of Region 1’s 35 available orbital positions. The typical country, however, with a j value of 4/35, is entitled to only one 20–MHz channel at each of only four of Region 1’s 35 available orbital positions A. See notes 70–73 and accompanying text, supra.

108 Under orbit/spectrum rationing, 20 MHz times 4/35 times A equals 2.3 MHz times A.

109 ITU Radio Regulations, supra note 2, Art. 7, §1A, No. 428A.

110 As a simplifying assumption, it will be deemed that a country can receive an acceptable signal from any orbital position in its ITU region. This assumption would generally only be valid through the use of two or more satellites connected by embryonic intersatellite link technology. The ITU has defined these links and allocated much bandwidth to them. ITU Radio Regulations, supra note 2, Art. N1, §3, No. 84ATF, Art. N7, §5. To the extent that this assumption is not currently justifiable, the jurimetric difference between channel distribution with and without planning loses significance.

111 It seems likely, however, that B times h equals that fraction of an ITU region’s orbital positions which do in fact provide a country with an acceptable signal. See ibid.

112 Hence countries were entitled to receive signals from about half of each region’s available orbital positions. See WARC–79 Final Acts, note 45 supra, App. 29A, Art. 12.

113 See note 109 and accompanying text, supra.

114 See note 110 supra.

115 See notes 13–65 and accompanying text, supra.

116 See notes 70–98 and accompanying text, supra.

117 See notes 101–114 and accompanying text, supra.

118 See NASA, Space Resources and Space Settlements (J. Billingham & W. Gilbreath, eds. 1979); G. O’Neill, The High Frontier (1977).

119 This includes all other countries entitled under a plan to the orbital position in controversy. WARC–79 Final Acts, supra note 45, App. 29A, Art. 4.3.

120 ICJ, Acts and Documents Concerning the Organization of the Court, No. 4, Statute of the Court, Arts. 34, 35, 36 (1978).

121 International Telecommunication Convention, supra note 18, Art. 4(2)(c).

122 Outer Space Treaty of 1967, supra note 20, Arts. I, II (emphasis supplied).

123 D. Leive, supra note 15, at 22 (quoting J. Tomlinson, The International Control of Radiocommunication 290–91 (1945)).

124 WARC–79 Final Acts, supra note 45, Res. BP.

125 Robinson, supra note 23, at 46.

126 Ibid, n.141.

127 A regional communications satellite system maximizes channel dispersion to a greater extent than a purely domestic system capable of conveying the same amount of channel depth because the former distributes this depth to several countries and total channel dispersion is the product of depth, distribution, and directionality. Notes 10–12 and accompanying text, supra. See, e.g., D. Smith, Institutional Configuration for Large Space Communications Structures: A Basis for the Development of International Space Communications Norms 10 (International Commission for the Study of Communications Problems, Doc. No. 88, 1979) (suggests ITU grant orbit/spectrum priorities to regional geostationary platforms because these systems “promise service capability for a vastly greater number of users than conventional [domestic] satellites”).

128 See, e.g., International Telecommunication Convention, supra note 18, Art. 10, and ITU Radio Regulations, supra note 2, Art. 9A.

129 The ITU’s technical advisory committee, the CCIR, advises the ITU on technical radiocommunications matters; “satellites and space communication for all applications have been a major preoccupation of CCIR now for twenty years.” Kirby, , CCIR Past, Present, and Future, in 1 International Conference on Communications 9.1.2 (1979)Google Scholar.

130 The determination of what constitutes a “full development zone” is well beyond the IFRB’s acknowledged competence, but the application of standards set elsewhere to the changing orbit/spectrum development environment is a traditional IFRB function. Resolution BP invites the IFRB to report “information about difficulties . . . in gaining access to suitable orbital locations and frequencies, and to circulate this report to administrations at least one year before [GEO–WARC].” WARC–79 Final Acts, supra note 45, Res. BP. This type of report is a solid step towards the periodic orbit/spectrum development forecasts suggested in the text.

131 INTELSAT’S satellite systems expert Dr. Joseph Pelton estimates that the international consortium will be able to lease enough transponders to support 36 separate domestic satellite communications systems by 1985. Pelton, Intelsat and the Age of the Technological Already 3 (paper delivered at Fifth Conference on Satellite Communications for Public Service Users, Washington, D.C., 1980).

132 There is perhaps no wiser investment a developing state or development aid source can make than in telecommunications infrastructure and software. The basis for this advice has been summarized with brilliant simplicity as follows: “Information is the necessary, if not sufficient, condition for advancement.” Robinson, supra note 23, at 40 n.120.