1 Robert, Edwin Herzstein, The War That Hitler Won: The Most Infamous Propaganda Campaign in History (1978)Google Scholar.

2 See Françoise J. Hampson, Incitement and the Media: Responsibility of and for The Media in the Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia (Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, Papers in the Theory and Practice of Human Rights No. 3, 1993); and Article 19 Organization, Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina (1994).

3 See Rwanda: Les Médias Du Génocide (Jean-Pierre, Chrétien et al. eds., 1995)Google Scholar [hereinafter Rwanda]; and Article 19 Organization, Broadcasting Genocide: Censorship, Propaganda and State Sponsored Violence in Rwanda 1990-1994 (1996) [hereinafter Broadcasting Genocide].

4 See Marilyn, Matelski, Vatican Radio: Propagation by the Airwaves (1995)Google Scholar.

5 &c Herbert, Schiller, Mass Communications and American Empire 63-78 (1970)Google Scholar; and Louis Meulstee, Wireless for the Warrior (1995).

6 See Fred, H. Gate, International Disaster Communications: Harnessing the Power of Communications to Avert Disasters and Save Lives (Annenberg Washington Program, Communications Policy Studies, 1994)Google Scholar.

7 David, Abshire, International Broadcasting: A New Dimension of Western Diplomacy (Washington Papers No. 35, 1976)Google Scholar.

8 See Philo, C. Wasburn, Broadcasting Propaganda: International Radio Broadcasting and the Construction of Political Reality (1992)Google Scholar.

9 Jamming has been defined as the “deliberate use of interfering radio signals sent from one or more transmitters to garble emissions from other transmitters in order to make them unintelligible at reception.” John, B. Whitton & Arthur, D. Larson, Propaganda Towards Disarmament in the War of Words 210 (1964)Google Scholar.

10 See Howard, H. Frederick, Cuban-American Radio Wars: Ideology in International Telecommunications (1986)Google Scholar.

11 See Douglas, Waller, America’s Persuader in the Sky , Time, Aug. 21, 1995, at 38 Google Scholar.

12 Id.

13 John Martin, L., International Propaganda 87, 223 (1958)Google Scholar; N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1949, at 11; Whitton & Larson, supra note 9, at 211.

14 See National Sovereignty and International Communication (Kaarle, Nordenstreng & Herbert, I. Schiller eds., 1979)Google Scholar; Martin, supra note 13, at 86-87.

15 Martin, supra note 13, at 85. Soviet jamming of U.S. and British radio broadcasts began in 1948, and approximately a thousand jamming stations were operational by 1949.

16 Richard, Robinson, Word War Three: International radio broadcasting is under threat. The word wars of the Cold War are over and the broadcasters are seeking new roles. Is world band radio now redundant? , Geographical Mag., July 1993, at 27, 29 Google Scholar.

17 The combined budgets of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were reduced from U.S. $225 million in 1994 to $71 million in 1996. International Broadcasting: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Operations and Human Rights of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 104th Cong. (July 9,1996) (statement of Rep. Christopher H. Smith), available in 1996 WL 10829302.

18 See, e.g., Article 19 Organization, supra note 2; and Hampson, supra note 2.

19 Charolette, Eager, Desperately Seeking Bosnia’s Truth: Ship-board pirate radio station Radio Brod offers music, news, and relief for Bosnian refugees , Observer (London), Sept. 19, 1993, at 17 Google Scholar.

20 Estimates of the exact number of people killed vary between half a million and eight hundred thousand. See Alain Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century 68 (Alison Marschner trans., NYU Press 1995) (1994); and Gérard Prunier, the Rwanda Crisis: History of A Genocide 265 (1995).

21 See, e.g., Rwanda: Talking Peace and Waging War: Human Rights Since the October 1990 Invasion, Africa Watch, Feb. 27, 1992, at 24; and Broadcasting Genocide, supra note 3, at 17.

22 See Lindsey, Hilsum, The Radio Station Whose Call Sign Is Mass Murder , Observer, May 15, 1994, at 19 Google Scholar; Alison des, Forges, Rwanda Violence Wasn’t Random , Salt Lake Trib., reprinted from Wash. Post wire, Apr. 18, 1994 Google Scholar.

23 For an account of the historical divisions between the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, see Prunier, supra note 20, at 1-40. The 1993 Arusha Peace Accord between the Hutu-led Government of Rwanda and the Tutsi RPF called for a democratically elected government and the establishment of a broad-based transitional administration prior to elections, as well as for the repatriation of refugees and the integration of the armies of the two opposing sides. See UN Dep’t of Public Information, Reference Paper, The United Nations and the Situation in Rwanda 2 (DPI/1484/AFR/PRO, 1994).

24 Prunier, supra note 20, at 168, 222-24.

25 Broadcasting Genocide, supra note 3, at 71; Prunier, supra note 20, at 188-89.

26 These included Félicien Kabuga, financial adviser to President Habyarimana and president of die station’s Board of Directors; leader of the extremist Coalition pour la Defense de la République, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza; Minister of Transport and Communications André Ntagerura; and numerous others. The eight employees hired by RTLM had all worked for Radio Rwanda in its earlier, more extremist incarnation and were members of prominent extremist political groups. See Broadcasting Genocide, supra note 3, at 72-77.

27 Id. at 86. In fact, many of the people involved in organizing militias and gangs like the Interahamwe were among the supporters and financiers of RTLM.

28 Id. at 94-95. In one case, a journalist named in such a broadcast called the station repeatedly and begged that his “death warrant” be retracted. A retraction was made and the man’s life was spared.

29 Id. at 97.

30 Id. at 88-89.

31 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.l, at 10-12.

32 Id. at 17.

33 Id. at 23.

34 Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Study 2: Early Warning and Conflict Management 86 (1996); Prunier, supra note 20, at 209.

35 Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from The Rwanda Experience, Synthesis Report 19 (1996).

36 Broadcasting Genocide, supra note 3, at 115, 120-22.

37 Mat 116.

38 The linkage of the broadcasts and the killings was demonstrated in part when a 39-year-old auto mechanic was captured but then let go after RTLM called for his release.

39 Broadcasting Genocide, supra note 3, at 116-17.

40 RTLM broadcast, April 15, 1994, reprinted in Rwanda, supra note 3, at 194.

41 Id. at 300.

42 See, e.g., Hilsum, supra note 22.

43 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Introduction to UN Dep’t of Public Information, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996, at 44, UN Sales No. E.96.I.20 (1996).

44 See Int’l Herald Trib., June 13, 1994; and Douglas, Jehl, Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings “Genocide , “N.Y. Times, June 10, 1994, at A8 Google Scholar. According to Presidential Decision Directive 25, the classified U.S. government document outlining the Clinton administration’s policy on peacekeeping operations, summarized in 33ILM 795 (1994), genocide was considered an appropriate justification for U.S. intervention. For the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, see 78 UNTS 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].

45 SeeSC Res. 918 (May 17, 1994).

46 See Clinton Administration avoids definition of “genocide,” Human Rights Watch/Africa Press Release (June 10, 1994).

47 US to Help Equip UN in Rwanda, Chicago Trib. (N.Y. Times News Service), June 16, 1994, at 8.

48 Thomas, Lippman, U.S. Aides Fear New Violence in Burundi , Wash. Post, June 17, 1994, at A19 Google Scholar.

49 Prunier, supra note 20, at 296.

50 Broadcasting Genocide, supra note 3, at 135-36. RTLM broadcast 24 hours a day during the first 10 days of the mass killing.

51 United Press International, Apr. 12, 1994.

52 Associated Press, Apr. 13, 1994. See also Marguerite, Michaels, Descent into Mayhem , Time, Apr. 18, 1994, at 44 Google Scholar; Massacres Spreading in Rwanda, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1994, at A3; Arthur, Allen, Deadly Chaos Spills from Capital to Disrupt All of Rwanda , Chicago Sun-Times, Apr. 19, 1994, at 26 Google Scholar; Red Cross Reports Massacres All Across Rwanda (CBS Morning News, Apr. 19, 1994), available in 1994 WL 3477513.

53 Statement by Christine Shelly, Acting Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release (Apr. 28, 1994).

54 Wash. Post, Apr. 7, 1994, at A18.

55 Associated Press, Apr. 25, 1994.

56 Elaine, Sciolino, For West, Rwanda is Not Worth the Political Candle , N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1994, at A3 Google Scholar. This was the first testing ground of Presidential Decision Directive 25, which set new guidelines for American participation in UN peacekeeping missions, including that interventions must be in response to threats to international peace and security and that they must advance U.S. interests at an acceptable level of risk.

57 See Holly, Burkhalter, The Question of Genocide: The Clinton Administration and Rwanda , World Pol’y J., Winter 1994/95, at 46 Google Scholar.

58 Author’s interviews with officials in the Department of State and the Department of Defense, as well as with representatives of various Washington-based human rights groups (Nov. 1996).

59 The USCR press release stated:

U.S. Committee for Refugees, Responding to the Rwanda Crisis: Declare Genocide, and Other Policy Steps (May 3, 1994).

60 The Crisis in Rwanda: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Africa of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong. 15 (1994).

61 Id. at 24.

62 Letter from Senator Edward, M. Kennedy to Secretary of State Warren Christopher (June 1, 1994)Google Scholar (on file with author).

63 InterAction News Release, Statement on Rwanda Crisis (June 30, 1994). The point was reiterated less than two weeks later in an InterAction joint statement signed by 34 groups. InterAction Statement on Urgent International Action for Rwanda and Burundi (July 11, 1994) (on file with author).

64 Crisis in Central Africa: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on African Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong. 66-67 (1994). The same point was made in U.S. Committee for Refugees, The Rwanda Crisis (Advocacy Action Alert No. 3, July 29, 1994).

65 This letter was paraphrased to the author by a member of Senator Kennedy’s staff who had it in her hand. The letter was undated.

66 Although this article focuses on the United States, it is important to note that there were calls for the French military to jam RTLM broadcasts as well. Although Bruno Delaye, Chief Counselor on Africa to the French presidency, later asserted that “France was willing to stop the broadcasts but was unable to find the transmitter,” Human Rights Watch has strongly rejected this assertion. See Human Rights Watch Arms Project Press Release, Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandese Genocide (May 1995).

67 Author’s interviews with Defense Department officials (Nov. 1996).

68 See Waller, supra note 11; and Martin, Streetly, Evergreen Eavesdropper (Lockheed C-130) , Flight Int’l, Feb. 22, 1995, at 34 Google Scholar. Commando Solo has the ability to jam TV and radio broadcasts and substitute messages on any frequency. The 70-million-dollar plane, also known as the EC-130, was used in the Persian Gulf war and in the Grenada and Haiti operations. The U.S. Air Force has six of these planes, which belong to the 193d Special Operations Group, based in Harrisburg, Pa. See <http://hqafsoc.hurlburt.af.mil/ec-130.html>.

69 See Walter, Clarke & Jeffrey, Herbst, Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention , Foreign Aff., Mar.— Apr. 1996, at 70 Google Scholar. Staff of U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., Congress, Somalia and the Question of U.S. Intervention (1992). 70 Interview with Department of Defense official (Oct. 1996).

71 These provisions are described in part II infra.

72 Interviews by Professor Frank Chalk with senior officials of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency, Washington, D.C. (Apr. & Dec. 1995), cited in Frank Chalk, Hate Radio in Rwanda 12 (on file with author).

73 See Crisis in Central Africa, supra note 64, at 60; Burkhalter, supra note 57, at 51.

74 Interview with Roger Winter, U.S. Committee for Refugees (Feb. 8, 1997).

75 Interview with Jeff Drumtra, U.S. Committee for Refugees (Nov. 25,1996); Interview with Holly Burkhalter, Human Rights Watch-Africa (Oct. 25, 1996).

76 Ed, Broadbent, Media, Even in the West, Partly to Blame for Rwanda Massacres , Gazette (Montreal), May 3, 1995, at B3 Google Scholar, cited in Chalk, supra note 72, at 10.

77 In December 1941, Streicher wrote that “if the danger of . . . reproduction of that curse of God in the Jewish blood is finally to come to an end, then there is only one way—the extermination of that people whose father is the devil.” 14 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 548 (1947) [hereinafter Trial]. See also Telford, Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials 378 (1992)Google Scholar.

78 Trial, supra note 77, at 549 (emphasis added).

79 Id. at 584.

80 Id. at 584-85. The terra “on conquered people” again suggests a focus on crimes against the peace.

81 The exact meaning of these holdings was disputed by the Russian judge at Nuremberg. See Whitton & Larson, supra note 9, at 81.

82 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, UN ESCOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 6, Art. IV(c), at 8, UN Doc. E/794 (1948).

83 Id., Commentary at 31.

84 UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 3d Sess., 85th mtg., at 230-32 (1948).

85 Id. at 220.

86 UN GAOR, 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 87th mtg., at 253 (1948).

87 UN ESCOR, Ad Hoc Comm. on Genocide, 6th Sess., 16th mtg., at 9, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.16 (1948). It should be noted, however, that it was not only the Soviets who wanted a broader definition of incitement. France, for example, was also a vocal proponent of this position. The U.S. stand, however, was polarized out of fear of Soviet and Soviet-bloc abuse of the incitement provision.

88 Genocide Convention, supra note 44, Art. III.

89 International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, Sept. 23, 1936, 186 LNTS 301. Article 2 provides that “ [t]he High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to ensure that transmissions from stations within their respective territories shall not constitute an incitement either to war against another High Contracting Party or to acts likely to lead thereto.” Id. at 309.

90 Elizabeth, A. Downey, A Historical Survey of the International Regulation of Propaganda , in Regulation of Transnational Communications 341, 345 (Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies, 1984)Google Scholar.

91 Article 44 of that Convention stated: “All stations, whatever their purpose, must be established and operated in such a manner as not to result in harmful interference to the radio services or communications of other Members . . . .” See Whitton & Larson, supra note 9, at 217.

92 GA Res. 110 (II) (1947), 1947-48 U.N.Y.B. 93.

93 See UN Charter Art. 2, paras. 4, 7.

94 Letter from Assistant Chief of Telecommunications Policy Staff (Lebel), Department of State, to John Whitton (Aug. 30, 1950), 13 Whiteman Digest 1031-32.

95 UN ESCOR, 11th Sess., Supp. No. 5A, ch. 2, at 2 (1950), cited in Whitton & Larson, supra note 9, at 211-12.

96 Whitton & Larson, supra note 9, at 212; Martin, supra note 13, at 86.

97 GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).

98 GA Res. 424 (V), UN GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, UN Doc. A/1775 (1950).

99 See George, A. Codding, Jr., Jamming and the Protection of Frequency Assignments, 49 AJIL 384, 385, 387 (1955)Google Scholar.

110 ITU, Documents of the Plenipotentiary Conference, Buenos Aires, 1952, Doc. 446, at 15, cited in id. at 387.

101 Rochelle, B. Price, Jamming and the Law of International Communications , In Regulation of Transnational Communications, supra note 90, at 391, 391 Google Scholar; Martin, supra note 13, at 84.

102 See Natalie Hevener Kaufman, Human Rights Treaties and the Senate 167-68 (1990).

103 See Ǻshild Samnoy, Human Rights as International Consensus: The Making of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1945-1948, at 20-21 (1993).

104 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 97, Art. 19.

105 Id., Art. 29.

106 UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.174, at 6 (1950).

107 UN Doc. A/C.3/L.921 (1961).

108 UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.1078, at 93 (1961).

109 UN Doc. A/C.3/L.925 (1961).

110 For an overview of the debates in the Human Rights Commission on these issues, see Stephanie, Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of International Law Concerning Hate Speech , 14 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 1, 19-46 (1996)Google Scholar.

111 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 19, para. 3, 999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].

112 Harris, D. J., O’Boyle, M. & Colin, Warbrick, The Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 409-11 (1995)Google Scholar.

113 See UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.377, at 6, 8 (1953).

114 ICCPR, supra note 111, Art. 20.

115 Karl, Josef Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms , in The International Bill of Rights 209, 227 (Louis, Henkin ed., 1981)Google Scholar.

116 Message from the President of the United States transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights to the Senate (1978), quoted in id. at 230.

117 Kaufman, supra note 102, at 9, 12-14, 134-35.

118 Karl, Josef Partsch, Racial Speech and Human Rights: Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination , in Striking A Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression, and Nondiscrimination 21, 24 (Sandra, Coliver ed., 1992)Google Scholar.

119 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, Art. 4, 660 UNTS 195.

120 Partsch, supra note 118, at 24.

121 Again, although this article focuses on U.S. and general international law, it is important to note that the European tradition of freedom of expression permits a less absolute understanding of this freedom than traditional U.S. jurisprudence. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Art. 10, 213 UNTS 222. See also text at note 112 supra. For a modern interpretation of this provision by the European Court of Human Rights, see Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994).

122 Benno, Signitzer, Regulation of Direct Broadcasting from Satellites: The U.N. Involvement 79 (1976)Google Scholar; and Gennady, Zhukov & Yuri, Kolosov, International Space Law 128 (1984)Google Scholar. Doctrinal authority in international law for this position was asserted by the international lawyer Hersch Lauterpacht. See Hersch, Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law 197 (1927)Google Scholar. The 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation asserted that every state had “complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.” Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, Art. 1, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 UNTS 295. This delineation of territorial rights to airspace, however, was challenged by the development of the satellite. Unlike airspace, outer space was considered the common heritage of mankind under international law. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, Art. 1, 18 UST 2410, 610 UNTS 205.

123 United States of America: Draft Principles on Direct Broadcast Satellites, UN Doc. A/AC.105/WG.3(V)/ CRP.2, Art. IX (1974); Signitzer, supra note 122, at 79; Vincent, B. Feher, Television Without Frontiers: Possible U.S. Responses , 9 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev. 65, 104-18 (1992)Google Scholar.

124 UNESCO Declaration, UN Doc. A/AC.105/109, para. 14 (1973).

125 Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting, GA Res. 37/92, UN GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 98, UN Doc. A/37/51 (1982).

126 See Stein, M. L., U.S. Appears Ready to Rejoin UNESCO: Left the organization in 1984 in opposition to its proposed curtailment of press freedom , Editor & Publisher, Sept. 11, 1993, at 18 Google Scholar.

127 Omar Javier, Arcia, War Over the Airwaves: A comparative analysis of U.S. and Cuban views on international law and-’policy governing transnational broadcasts, 5 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 199, 201-05 (1996)Google Scholar.

128 See text at note 104 supra. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 121, tracks Article 19 of the Universal Declaration rather closely.

129 Price, supra note 101, at 391, 393. The United States, for example, accused Cuba of executing a member of Jehovah’s Witnesses in 1983 for allegedly spreading “propaganda to incite armed rebellion.” Elliott, Abrams, Human Rights in Cuba , Dep’t St. Bull., Sept. 1984, at 53 Google Scholar.

130 Arcia, supra note 127, at 217.

131 Id. at 220; Kimberly Howland, P., Radio Marti and the U.S.-Cuban Radio War , 36 Fed. Comm. L. J. 69, 90 (1984)Google Scholar.

132 Arcia, supra note 127, at 224.

133 Richard Falk, M., On Regulating International Propaganda: A Plea for Moderate Aims , 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 622, 624 (1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

134 Id.

135 These include conspiracy and “fighting words” and are discussed in text at notes 141-45 infra.

136 See Samnoy, supra note 103, at 20-21.

137 See Kaufman, supra note 102, at 17-19. Some of the leading opponents of ratification were, in fact, McCarthyites.

138 The United States ratified the Genocide Convention in 1989, the ICCPR in 1992, and the Racial Discrimination Convention in 1994.

139 Henry, J. Steiner & Philip, Alston, International Human Rights in Context 123 (1996)Google Scholar.

140 “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. I.

141 See, e.g., Lee, C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in America (1986)Google Scholar.

142 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

143 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951).

144 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266-67 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).

145 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). The Brandenburg Court actually acquitted a Ku Klux Klan member who had made racist remarks at a Klan rally because his remarks did not apparently meet this standard. See also Chief Judge Learned Hand, cited by Chief Justice Vinson in Dennis v. United States: “ [Courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil’, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.” 341 U.S. at 510.

146 The Soviet Union in 1989 removed the conditions it had imposed on ratification of the ICCPR and other human rights treaties. See letter from Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs Eduard A. Shevardnadze to UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (Feb. 28, 1989), translated in 83 AJIL 457 (1989).

147 The United States, for example, was willing to accept Cuban broadcasts directed at the United States that called on black Americans to rise against the Government rather than to jam these broadcasts because the net advantage still belonged to the United States. Arcia, supra note 127, at 202.

148 The spread of conflict from ethnic strife in Rwanda to civil war in Zaire and then political unrest in Congo also suggests that responding to human rights crises as they develop is an extremely important method of working to forestall larger regional conflicts.

149 UN Charter Art. 2, paras. 4, 7; see also Ian, Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 287 (4th ed. 1990)Google Scholar.

150 See, e.g., Thomas, M. Franck & Nigel, S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force , 67 AJIL 275,. 277, (1973)Google Scholar; and Ulrich, Beyerlin, Humanitarian Intervention , in [Installment] 3 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 211, 212 (Rudolf, Bernhardt ed., 1981)Google Scholar.

151 See, e.g., International Law 205 (Grigorii, I. Tunkin ed., Kim, Pilarski trans., 1990)Google Scholar.

152 See Louis, Henkin, Human Rights in Domestic Jurisdiction , in Human Rights, International Law, and The Helsinki Accord 21 (Thomas, Buergenthal ed., 1977)Google Scholar.

153 Javier, Pérez de Cuéllar, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1991 U.N.Y.B. 3, 7 Google Scholar. Similarly, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali asserted in his Agenda for Peace that “[t]he time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty . . . has passed . . . .” Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. A/47/277, para. 17 (1992), reprinted in 31 ILM 956, 959 (1992).

154 UN Charter ch. VII. These threats are defined in Article 39 of the Charter.

155 SC Res. 688 (Apr. 5, 1991), reprinted in 30 ILM 858 (1991).

156 SC Res. 770 (Aug. 13, 1992), reprinted in 31 ILM at 1468.

157 SC Res. 794 (Dec. 3, 1992).

158 SC Res. 940 (July 31, 1994).

159 Jean-Pierre, L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the UN Charter , 4 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 203, 258-59 (1974)Google Scholar.

160 “Without a doubt, any government practicing genocide may be a target of humanitarian intervention.” Nikolai, Krylov, Humanitarian Intervention: Pros and Cons , 17 Loy. L. A. Int’l & Comp. L. J. 365, 391 (1995)Google Scholar.

161 Id. at 392.

162 See Clarke & Herbst, supra note 69.

163 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444; see also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107-08 (1973).

164 The Constitution Act, 1982, enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), ch. 11, §319, cited in John, Manwaring, Legal Regulation of Hate Propaganda in Canada , in Striking a Balance, supra note 118, at 106, 108 Google Scholar.

165 Manwaring, supra note 164, at 108-09.

166 See note 146 supra.

167 Of course, establishing a right in international law to jam in certain circumstances also opens the door to greater acceptance of unilateral jamming by individual states based on their own determination of these standards. If, however, international norms can be developed, such unilateral actions outside these bounds would be condemned and possibly punished by the international community.

168 Boutros-Ghali, supra note 153, para. 43, at 966.

169 See, e.g., Jesse, Helms, Saving the UN: A Challenge to the Next Secretary General , Foreign Aff., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 2 Google Scholar.

170 See Prunier, supra note 20, at 9-92.

171 Even if they were not clearly definable government organs, they would still have been likely to be held liable according to human rights legal standards. See Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, reprinted in 9 Hum. Rts. L. J. 212 (1988).

172 Indictment, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, Case ICTR-96 (July 12, 1996) (emphasis added).