1 Among other gaps are studies on the role of small powers (p. 13) and of Latin American members in the League (p. 406), its historical roots in 19th-century diplomacy by conference (pp. 13–14), the relation of nonmember states to the League (p. 406), and the role of public opinion, the news media and the leading personalities inside and outside the League (p. 406). Some of these personalities are lovingly recalled in the short “Réminiscences” by Vladimir Socoline, who served the League as Under Secretary-General (pp. 409–12). This piece of “oral history” will be of interest to those who were personally acquainted with the Geneva actors. Socoline expresses the hope, shared by many of the contributors in one form or another, that the spark that was ignited in Geneva, despite many painful setbacks, will never be extinguished (p. 412).

2 This “symbiotic” relationship was, in Barros’s view, unfairly criticized by some former Secretariat officials (p. 36). However, in order to appreciate this point, one would have to know more about Drummond’s second career as Lord Perth, British Ambassador in Rome during the period that was critical to the League and the Foreign Office, the Italo-Ethiopian war. His acceptance of this appointment motivated the UN General Assembly to include in the Terms of Appointment of the Secretary-General, approved on Feb. 1, 1946, Article 4(b) which reads:

Because a Secretary-General is a confidant of many governments, it is desirable that no Member should offer him, at any rate immediately on retirement, any governmental position in which his confidential information might be a source of embarrassment to other Members, and on his part a Secretary-General should refrain from accepting any such position [1946–47 U.N.Y.B. 82].

The injunction was complied with in the case of UN Secretaries-General Trygve Lie, U Thant and Kurt Waldheim.

3 Egerton relies here on the Oxford English Dictionary 113 n.4.

4 The results of this study cycle were published by the League of Nations International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation in Paris: Collective Security: A Record of The Seventh and Eighth International Studies Conference (M. Bourquin ed. 1936). I was particularly glad to see the references to the Institute and the International Studies Conference (pp. 103- 04), which I served as an official from 1935 to 1940. While Egerton mentions the study on collective security, he does not mention the study cycle 1935–1937, which was devoted to some problems of peaceful change and in a sense, was the logical counterpart to collective security. The results of the 1935–1937 study cycle were edited again by Maurice Bourquin under the title Peaceful Change Procedures, Population, Raw Materials, Colonies, Proceedings of the Tenth International Studies Conference, Paris, June 28th-July 3rd, 1937 (1938).

5 Paragraph 1 of Article 8 reads: “The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations” (emphasis added). As will be seen from the text, the underscored words define the concept of collective security.

6 League of Nations O.J. Spec. Supp. 24, Annex 16, at 117, 118 (1924) (italics in original). The Rapporteurs conclude: “Thus, after five years’ hard work, we have decided to propose to the Members of the League the present system of arbitration, security and reduction of armaments— a system which we regard as being complete and sound” (id. at 119, italics in original).

7 It is, however, mentioned by Maurice Vaïsse on p. 246 of his essay, La Société des Nations et le désarmement. He makes the point:

How can one conceive a scheme for disarmament without American participation? In the first place, France is deprived of the security guarantee which Wilson and Lloyd George promised to Clemenceau as a substitute for the French claim to establish a Rhine state. As a consequence of the Anglo-Saxon defection, France finds itself in the paradoxical position of a victor who lives in fear of the vanquished. In the absence of Anglo-American assistance, France makes disarmament dependent on guarantees of its security [reviewer’s translation].

Vaïsse, however, is wrong in speaking of “Anglo-Saxon defection.” Britain ratified the treaty, but its entry into force was dependent upon American ratification, which, in turn, was dependent upon American membership in the League—which was not forthcoming. See Art. 2, 225 Consolidated Treaty Series 425–27 (C. Parry ed. 1969).

8 Ostrower writes that it was, “superficially, one of the more rousing speeches in support of collective security ever made by a representative of a Great Power” and that it “electrified” the League (p. 136). I happened to be in the audience and can testify to its electrifying impact in the crowded auditorium.

9 Plettenberg’s comment on the nonaggression pact is interesting: “In practice the new Soviet withdrawal into ‘non-involvement’ considerably impaired the defensive positions of Poland, France and Britain vis-a-vis Germany. This was the inevitable consequence of the fact that the Western Powers had never taken seriously the Soviet position of ‘indivisibility of peace’ and ‘collective security’ “ (p. 170).

10 In concluding the essay, Plettenberg wrote:

However, the united front or collective security policy of the USSR—for which the League of Nations served as the main platform—was not a “lost cause”. Underlying this concept was the collective defence of all “non-Fascist” Powers against “Fascist imperialism”. Subsequently, the anti-Hitler coalition not only confirmed such a policy, but implemented it also by military means; a stand which, not only in the Soviet view, might have been reached a few years earlier by mere “political” firmness. The opening of the second, “western” front against Hitler was late, but it took place on 6 June 1944—10 years after Litvinov and Barthou had reached agreement on the Eastern Locarno Pact and on the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations [p. 173].

11 According to J. H. Spencer, Ethiopia at Bay (1984), when the Emperor and his delegation arrived in Geneva to defend his cause in the Assembly, they had to stay in a hotel,

although the Emperor had a private villa in nearby Vevey. The Swiss government, faithful to its fierce anti-Ethiopian prejudices, refused to allow him to occupy his villa even for the short period of the special session of the Assembly. The pretext was that he could not do so without undertaking to abstain from political activities—a requirement which if consistently applied would have closed down the Assembly of the League [p. 72].

Another example of concern for neutrality and objectivity related to the (Swiss) International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). When Italy used poison gas, Ethiopia asked the ICRC to appeal to national Red Cross societies for gas masks.

This request was turned down by the IRCC [(ICRC); Spencer refers to it as the International Red Cross Committee (IRCC)]. In attempting to justify this outrageous and highly partisan refusal, the IRCC argued that it could not forward a general appeal for gas masks “without specifying for what purposes the masks were to be used.” The committee neglected to indicate to what other conceivable use they might be put [p. 50]!

When the Committee of Thirteen of the League called upon the ICRC to supply “such information as it had in its possession as might throw light on the [Ethiopian] accusations . . . [t]he IRCC declined the request, alleging that the ‘neutrality which the International Red Cross Committee is bound to observe makes it necessary for the Committee to exercise very great discretion’ “ (id.). Spencer adds that the President of the Committee was Max Huber,

a particularly prominent international lawyer. He had served as judge on the Permanent Court of International Justice, and for three years was its president as well. By his signature on this disgraceful and futile attempt to cover up an international crime which, by then, had become widely known and which Was never denied by Italy, he prostituted his own reputation and that of international law to the call of political convenience [id.].

12 The quotation is from Salvador de Madariaga, Disarmament 48 (1929).

13 In a footnote, the author quotes from Madariaga’s Morning Without Noon 31 (1973): “Let fear of war vanish and armaments will soon be discarded. No one goes about with a revolver in his pocket in the streets of Geneva, but one does sometimes in Shanghai or in Chicago.” No doubt, were Madariaga writing today, he would have selected other cities.

14 Article 21 reads: “Nothing in this Covenant will be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.”

15 Essential Facts About the League of Nations 176 (1938).

16 Id.

17 See Customs Régime between Austria and Germany, 1931 PCIJ, ser. A/B, No. 41 and literature cited on p. 712 of 2 World Court Reports (M. O. Hudson ed. 1931).

18 The Refugee Problem: Report of A Survey (1939) (no page given).

19 For a guide to the voluminous literature on the League, see Bibliographical Handbook of the League of Nations (Victor-Yves Ghebali, prov. ed. 1980).