¹ 2 Donald W. Meinig, The Shaping of America: Continental America 1800–1867, at 185(1993).

² See Mark F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law 337–53 (1926).

³ The unequal application to foreigners of the act of state doctrine in Britain exemplifies this practice. Under British law, it was no defense to the commission of a wrongful act against the person or property of a British subject that the act was done at the behest of the Crown. Johnstone v. Pedlar, [1921] 2 App. Cas. 262, 271 (appeal taken from Ir.). However, in the case of acts committed abroad against a foreigner being sued upon in British courts, the British tortfeasor could raise the defense that the act had been undertaken by the command of the British Government, or that the British Government had ratified the act after it had been committed. Successfully raising this defense divested British courts of jurisdiction over the case. Id. Accordingly, the Crown could retroactively immunize depredations abroad of British subjects against indigenous peoples. The Privy Council in Johnstone ameliorated the unfairness of the act of state doctrine by denying its applicability to wrongs committed against foreigners on British soil. Id. at 273.

Indigenous peoples and dominant ethnic groups in U.S. territories fared little better under U.S. law. At dispute in the Insular Cases, a series of Supreme Court decisions beginning with De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901), and ending with Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922), was the legal status of newly acquired overseas territories and the degree of constitutional protection to be extended to their inhabitants. In a famed concurrence, Justice White wrote that, although the Constitution applied to an unincorporated territory such as Puerto Rico, which Congress had not fully integrated into the United States, see Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 292–93 (1901) (White, J., concurring), not every provision of the Constitution bound Congress in legislating for unincorporated territories, see id. at 340–42. Justice White justified denial of equal protection to the inhabitants of unincorporated territories on the grounds that those peoples might form “an uncivilized race … absolutely unfit” to receive American citizenship. Id. at 306. This line of thinking culminated in 1922 when Chief Justice Taft, finally speaking for a majority of the Court, adopted White's theory, in part because the residents of Puerto Rico—despite their American citizenship—were “of a different origin and language from those of our continental people,” Balzac, 258 U.S. at 311. For detailed analysis, see Gerald R. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 Yale L.J. 909, 957–64 (1991), on which this discussion draws. See also Frederic R. Coudert, The Evolution o] the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 26 Colum. L. Rev. 823 (1926) (reviewing Insular Cases).

⁴ See, e.g., Bartolomé de las Casas, Brevísima relación de la destructión de las Indias, in 10 Obras Completas 29 (Ramón Hernández & Lorenzo Galmés eds., 1992) (1537, pub. 1552), translated in The Devastation of the Indies: A Brief Account (Herma Briffault trans., 1974); Bartolomé de las Casas, Historia de las Indias (André Niu Van ed., 1986) (1561), abridged and translated in History of the Indies (Andrée Collard ed. & trans., 1971); Alonso de la Vera Cruz, De dominio infidelium etjusto bello, in 2 The Writings of Alonso de la Vera Cruz 91 (Ernest J. Burrus ed. & trans., 1968) (1553–54); Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis recenter inventis, in De Indis et de jure belli relectiones 217 (Ernest Nys ed. & John P. Bate trans., Carnegie ed. 1917) (1532); idem, De jure belli Hispanorum in barbaros, in De Indis etdejure belli relectiones, supra, at 269 (1532). For a history of the Jesuit Republic in Paraguay, see Philip Caraman, The Lost Paradise: An Account of the Jesuits in Paraguay, 1607–1768 (1975).

⁵ Cayuga Indians (Gr. Brit.) v. United States, 6 R.I.A.A. 173 (U.S.-Brit. Arb. Trib. 1926). In Cayuga Indians, Great Britain brought a claim against the United States on behalf of the Cayuga Indians in Canada for payment of an annuity covenanted to be paid to the “Cayuga Nation” by the State of New York in a 1795 treaty. At the time of the treaty, the majority of the Cayuga had migrated to Canada. The State of New York paid the annuity to the Cayuga Nation according to the terms of the 1795 treaty until 1810, when the Cayuga in Canada sided with the British in the War of 1812. Beginning in 1810, New York paid the annuity only to the Cayuga in New York. Id. at 175–76. The tribunal held that the Cayuga Nation and the Cayuga as individuals had no status under international law. Id. at 176. Nevertheless, the tribunal ruled on strictly legal grounds that under Article IX of the Treaty of Ghent, in which the United States agreed to restore the Indians to their position prior to the War of 1812, the United States was liable for payment of the annuity to the Cayuga in Canada. Id. at 184–86. An award of $100,000 in unpaid interest and for a capital sum whose interest would provide a one-half share of the annuity was given to the Canadian Cayuga. Id. at 189–90. Interestingly, the tribunal also noted that general principles of equity, fair dealing and justice recognized by international law established that the Cayuga in Canada ought to have been paid a proportionate share of the annuity from 1810 onwards and that the tribunal could have justified its award on that basis alone. Id. at 179–84.

⁶ Id. at 176.

⁷ For an eloquent elaboration of this point, see Shri Virendra Dayal, Patriotism and Human Rights, Lecture at the Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel National Police Academy, Hyderabad, India (Mar. 22, 1994) (transcript on file with author); see also Myres S. Mcdougal, Harold D. Lasswell & Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order 114 n.44 (1980) (linking decolonization with demands by deprived peoples for wider participation in shaping and sharing global values, including human rights).

⁸ Ironically, the Praetorian edict uti possidetis iti possideatis (literally, “as you possess, so may you possess”) was an effective occupative concept that, applied in its original sense, would have benefited the indigenous peoples. The edict was shorthand for the Latin interdict “Uti nunc eas aedes, quibus de agitur, nee vi nee clam nee precario alter ab altero possidetis, quo minus ita possideatis, vim fieri veto.” John B. Moore, Memorandum on Uti Possidetis: Costa Rica-Panama Arbitration 6 (1913), reprinted in 3 The Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore 328, 329 (John Bassett Moore Fund 1944). Under this interdict, “the possession was adjudged to the actual possessor unless he had obtained it vi clam or precario [literally, ‘by force, in secret, or with permission’] from the other, in which case it was given to that other.” William W. Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 734 (Peter Stein ed., 3d rev. ed. 1963); see also Fritz Schulz, Classical Roman Law 60, 448–53 (1951) (explaining that uti possidetis was almost always used to confirm possession of property by open, peaceful occupant). Such an interdict confirming the rights of the occupant would clearly have been favorable to indigenous land rights, if properly applied.

⁹ For an analysis of the transformation of the classical Roman concept of uti possidetis, which confirmed possession of land by a peaceful occupant, into a principle of international law, used by Latin American states in boundary disputes, that vested definitive title in conquered or discovered lands to the conquering or discovering occupants and their successors, see Moore, Memorandum on Uti Possidetis, supra note 9, at 5–45.

¹⁰ UN Dep't of Pol. Aff., Decolonization, Dec. 1975, at 54. Article 73 of the UN Charter requires states that administer non-self-governing territories “to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible.”

¹¹ The literature by nongovernmental organizations decrying the denial of basic rights to indigenous peoples has exploded over the past 10 years, both in quantity and in the number of organizations represented. See, e.g., Amnesty International, Human Rights Violations Against Indigenous Peoples of the americas (1992); Julian Berger, Aborigines Today: Land and Justice (1988) (Anti-Slavery Society); Shelton H. Davis, Land Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Role of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1988) (Cultural Survival); Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, Indigenous Peoples: A Global Quest for Justice (1987); Indigenous Affairs (Serial 1994) (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs); The Law of the Mother: Protecting Indigenous Peoples in Protected Areas (Elizabeth Kemp ed., 1993) (World Wide Fund for Nature; International Union for the Conservation of Nature); Juan E. Mendez, The Miskitos in Nicaragua, 1981–1984 (1984) (Americas Watch); Carole Nagengast, Human Rights and Indigenous Workers: The Mixtecs of Mexico and the United States (1992) (Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies); The Rights of Indigenous Peoples in International Law: Workshop Report (Ruth Thompson ed., 1986) (University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre).

¹² See, e.g., Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as Agreed Upon by the Members of the Working Group at its Eleventh Session, UN ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 45th Sess., Ann. 1, Agenda Item 14, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/ 1993/29 (1993); Draft Instrument on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Organization of American States (Aug. 8, 1994) (on file with author).

¹³ Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN GAOR, World Conference on Human Rights, 48th Sess., pt. II, para. 32, UN Doc. A/CONF.1 57/24 (Part I) (1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1661, 1677 (1993).

¹⁴ GA Res. 163, UN GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 281, UN Doc. A/48/49 (1993). For UN Secretariat proposals for this decade, see Programme of Action for the International Decade, Working Paper submitted by the Secretariat, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/AC.4/TM.4/3 (1994), and Programme of Activities of the International Decade of the World's Indigenous People, UN Doc. A/49/446 (1994). But, for an indication of the disappointment expressed by indigenous leaders about the lack of resources made available, see id. at 17, para. 77.

¹⁵ For a discussion of the extent to which the International Court of Justice limits itself to addressing only issues raised by the formal parties versus the likelihood of its deciding cases on issues raised proprio motu, see Carsten Smith, The Relation Between Proceedings and Premises (1962).

¹⁶ Cayuga Indians, 6 R.I.A.A. 173(1926).

¹⁷ Id. at 189.

¹⁸ Western Sahara, 1975 ICJ Rep. 12 (Advisory Opinion of Oct. 16). The Court heard this case at the request of the UN General Assembly.

¹⁹ Id. at 64–65, 68. See generally id. at 40–68 (analyzing nature of legal ties between Western Sahara and Kingdom of Morocco and Mauritanian entity). It seems to be unwise, on policy grounds, to create “half” titles that are not enough to win a case, but sustain national aspirations. For territorial claims, which are by their nature exclusively disjunctive, the better rule is clean decisions that leave no ends hanging.

²⁰ Id. at 43–44.

²¹ Id. at 44 (emphasis added).

²² Id.

²³ Id. at 64.

²⁴ Id. at 64–65.

²⁵ Id. at 68. In a separate opinion, Judge Dillard argued for a more functional, transcultural test, based not on observable signs of sovereignty, but on “the consciousness of the people.” Id. at 125 (Dillard, J., sep. op.).

²⁶ Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond., Nicar. intervening), 1992 ICJ Rep. 351 (Sept. 11), available in 1992 WL 457492 [hereinafter Gulf of Fonseca]. Gulf of Fonseca involved a dispute over (1) six land boundary lines between El Salvador and Honduras that had been left unsettled by the 1980 peace treaty ending the so-called Soccer War of 1969; (2) sovereignty over islands in the Gulf of Fonseca; and (3) the legal status of the maritime spaces in the gulf. The Court permitted Nicaragua to intervene to a limited degree respecting the legal status of the waters in the gulf.

²⁷ See id., paras. 49, 51, 1992 WL 457492, at *93–95, 96–97.

²⁸ Id., para. 3, 1992 WL 457492, at *17.

²⁹ Id., para. 47, 1992 WL 457492, at *92.

³⁰ Id., para. 49, 1992 WL 457492, at *94.

³¹ Id., para. 50,1992 WL 457492, at *95–96. Judge ad hoc Torres-Bernérdez's separate opinion even more emphatically denied that limits of indigenous poblaciones constituted a rule of law for settling the boundary. See 1992 ICJ Rep. at 644–49, paras. 28–37, 1992 WL 457492, at *529–39.

³² Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 ICJ Rep. 6 (Feb. 3), reprinted in 33 ILM 571 (1994). Libya and Chad submitted to the Court a longstanding dispute over territorial claims in their border region, including the Aouzou strip. The Court awarded virtually all of the disputed territory to Chad, in accordance with the latter's submission.

³³ Henry W. Dagenhardt, Chad-Libya, in Border and Territorial Disputes 113, 114 (Alan J. Day ed., 2d ed. 1987).

³⁴ Matthew M. Ricciardi, Title to the Aouzou Strip: A Legal and Historical Analysis, 17 Yale J. Int'l L. 301, 313–14 (1992). Ricciardi's brilliant and comprehensive study lapses into a legal anachronism in assessing title claims of the Toubou, for he uses Western categories of title, under which the claims of the indigenous inhabitants fail. See id. at 382–434, 468–69. For further discussion, see infra part III.

³⁵ See Territorial Dispute, 1994 ICJ Rep. at 12–14, 15. In its submission, Libya argued “that the territory in question, at all relevant times, was not terra nullius,” id. at 13, and that the “indigenous peoples were, at all relevant times, religiously, culturally, economically and politically part of the Libyan peoples,” id. Libya based its claim, as a state, in part on the rights and titles conferred by indigenous inhabitants. Id. at 15.

³⁶ Id. at 38.

³⁷ Not surprisingly, the agreement between the parties to implement the Judgment includes language that would continue to block claims of indigenous peoples. Article 5, paragraph 1 states: “With a view to ensuring their joint security, the two Parties shall refrain from encouraging or providing any support whatsoever from their territories to groups hostile to either of the Parties.” Agreement between the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arabjamahiriya and the Republic of Chad concerning the practical modalities for the implementation of the Judgment delivered by the International Court of Justice on 3 February 1994, Apr. 4, 1994, UN Doc. S/1994/402, Annex (1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 619, 621 (1994).

³⁸ Territorial Dispute, 1994 ICJ Rep. at 44 (Shahabuddeen, J., sep. op.), available in 1994 WL 417031, at *69.

³⁹ See supra text at and notes 26–31.

⁴⁰ Such a situation obtained in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia along the Ethiopian-Somali border. An 1897 treaty between Britain and Ethiopia gave the Ogaden to Ethiopia, but Annex 3 of the treaty reserved grazing rights for tribes from either side of the border in the Ogaden. Roger East, Ethiopia-Somalia, in Border and Territorial Disputes, supra note 33, at 126, 126–28. Britain retained administration over the Ogaden under a 1944 treaty between the countries, Agreement for the Regulation of Mutual Relations, Dec. 19, 1944, UK-Eth., Art. VII, 93 UNTS 303, which was withdrawn by treaty in 1954, although tribal grazing rights were reaffirmed, Agreement Respecting the Withdrawal of British Military Administration from the Territories Designated as the Reserved Area and the Ogaden, Nov. 29, 1954, UK-Eth., Arts. I–II, 207 UNTS 284. See generally I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (rev. ed., Longman 1980) (1965).

⁴¹ Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 ICJ Rep. 6 (Apr. 12). Portugal petitioned the Court to declare that Portugal held, inter alia, rights of passage between the territory of Damão, on the northeastern coast of India north of Bombay, and its territorial enclaves of Dadrá and Nagar-Aveli, and between the enclaves themselves, to the extent required for the effective exercise of Portuguese sovereignty over the territories. Id. at 9–10. In mid-1954, Portuguese authority in Dadrá and Nagar-Aveli had been overthrown with the assistance of groups based in Indian territory. Id. at 30. India subsequently suspended Portuguese passage through Indian territory to the enclaves, id. at 44, and Portugal asked that the Court declare that the suspension violated India's international obligations arising from custom and treaties, id. at 9.

After examining the history of local practice regarding the contested right, the Court held that local custom during the British and post-British periods established Portugal's right of passage for private persons, civil officials and goods, subject to India's regulation. Id. at 40. However, the Court also ruled that no right of passage existed for armed forces, armed police, and arms and ammunition, since local custom gave British and Indian authorities discretion to deny passage for those items. Id. at 43.

It is this investigation of customary rights, see id. at 35–43, that are recognized by international law in Right of Passage that could serve as a model for the treatment by international tribunals of the rights of indigenous persons.

⁴² See generally W. Michael Reisman, Autonomy, Interdependence, and Responsibility, 103 Yale L.J. 401 (1993).

⁴³ Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1992 ICJ Rep. 114, 138 (Order of Apr. 14) (Lachs, J., sep. op.) [hereinafter 1971 Montreal Convention]. Libya sought, inter alia, a declaration by the Court that the United States should pursue arbitration under Article 14 of the 1971 Montreal Convention, a treaty governing terrorist acts against civil aviation. The Court held that UN Security Council Resolution 748 of March 31, 1992, under chapter VII of the UN Charter, mandating Libyan cooperation with French, British and American attempts to bring to justice the Libyan official allegedly responsible for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, divested the Court of jurisdiction in the matter. Judge Lachs's separate opinion emphasized that there was not, in the UN system, a complete separation of powers among the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the International Court of Justice; rather, the Court's deferral to a Security Council decision reflected the limits of the system within which the Court rendered justice. See id. at 138–39.

⁴⁴ ICJ Statute Art. 62, reprinted in 1978 ICJ, Acts & Docs. 85 (giving Court discretion to accept requests to intervene); id: Art. 63, 1978 ICJ Acts & Docs. 85 (giving states right to intervene where construction of convention to which state is party is involved); Rules of the Court, Arts. 81–86, 1978 ICJ Acts & Docs. 145–49 (establishing procedures for permissive intervention and intervention as of right). Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (conferring broad power on parties for intervention of right and on federal courts for permissive intervention). See generally Shabtai Rosenne, Intervention in the International Court of Justice (1993).

⁴⁵ See, e.g., Minquiers and Ecrehos case (Fr. v. UK), 1953 ICJ Rep. 47, 49 (Nov. 17) (reprinting and applying special agreement between parties without examining its compatibility with international law). Cf. Continental Shelf (Tunis, v. Libya), 1982 ICJ Rep. 18, 37–38 (Feb. 24) (questioning propriety of applying to dispute, as specified in first paragraph of special agreement between parties, “new accepted trends” embodied in then-unfinalized United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea); id. at 144–58 (Oda, J., dissenting) (disputing deference given by Court to draft Law of Sea Convention and contesting Court's reading of special agreement); Smith, supra note 15, at 92–93 (arguing that parties cannot, by special agreement, compel Court to render judgment contrary to basic principles of international law).

⁴⁶ There are exceptions. For example, the Security Council may determine the existence of a threat to the peace under Article 39 of the UN Charter and then, acting under Articles 41 and 48 of chapter VII, order the parties to submit their dispute to the Court. By virtue of Articles 25 and 103, such a Security Council decision would then constitute a type of submission. See UN Charter Arts. 25, 39, 41, 48, 103. Cf. Corfu Channel case (UK v. Alb.), Preliminary Objection, 1948 ICJ Rep. 15 (Mar. 25). British ships had suffered damage from mines placed in the Corfu Channel off the Albanian coast. The Security Council passed a resolution, SC Res. 22, UN Doc. S/INF/2/REV.1 (II), at 3 (1947), recommending that Britain and Albania refer the dispute to the Court. Albania indicated in a letter to the Court of July 2, 1947, that it was “prepared … to appear before the Court,” 1948 ICJ Rep. at 20, despite the unilateral nature of Britain's Application and Albania's nonmembership in the United Nations. Albania argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction, since Albania, as a UN nonmember, could not be bound by Britain's unilateral Application absent the conclusion of a special agreement between the parties. Id. at 21. Albania also argued that the Security Council's recommending resolution did not confer jurisdiction over the dispute on the Court. Id. at 22. The Court held, however, that it had jurisdiction, interpreting Albania's letter as waiving its right to contest the admissibility of the UK application. Id. at 26–27. One may question whether such intiatives will actually increase the Court's jurisdiction. See W. Michael Reisman, The Other Shoe Falls: The Future of Article 36(1) Jurisdiction in the Light of Nicaragua, 81 AJIL 166 (1987).

⁴⁷ ICJ Statute Art. 38, 1978 ICJ, Acts & Docs. 77.

⁴⁸ Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arabjamahiriya) (Tunis, v. Libya), 1985 ICJ Rep. 192 (Dec. 10). The Court refused to revise its 1982 delimitation of the continental shelf between Libya and Tunisia, 1982 ICJ Rep. 18, despite the subsequent revelation that Libya had introduced misleading evidence about the western limit of its historic claims to the continental shelf area in dispute. Instead of acknowledging that its Judgment had proved to be erroneous, the Court refused Tunisia's request for revision because it found that Tunisia was negligently ignorant of the facts withheld by Libya. 1985 ICJ Rep. at 206, paras. 26–28.

⁴⁹ 1971 Montreal Convention, 1992 ICJ Rep. at 138 (Lachs, J., sep. op.); see also supra note 43 (explaining Judge Lachs's views).

⁵⁰ See, e.g., South-West Africa—Voting Procedure, 1955 ICJ Rep. 67, 77 (Advisory Opinion of June 7). See generally Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & James C. Miller, The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Context and Procedure 119–269 (1967).

⁵¹ Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 ICJ Rep. 554 (Dec. 22) (fixing, according to special agreement, border between parties along northernmost frontier of Burkina Faso with Mali).

⁵² Resolution on the Intangibility of Frontiers, OAU Doc. AGH/Res. 16(1) (1964), quoted in id. at 564, reprinted in Documents of the Organization of African Unity 49 (Gino J. Naldi ed., 1992).

⁵³ Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 557.

⁵⁴ Id. at 565.

⁵⁵ Id. at 566.

⁵⁶ Id. at 659 (Abi-Saab, J., sep. op.).

⁵⁷ For one statement of the emerging norm of international law governing indigenous peoples, see Raidza Torres, The Rights of Indigenous Populations: The Emerging International Norm, 16 Yale J. Int'l L. 127, 145–74(1991).

⁵⁸ Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Art. 34(1), in Organization of American States, Handbook of Existing Rules Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.65, doc. 6, at 167 (1985) (“The Court may, at the request of a party or the delegates of the Commission, or motu proprio, decide to hear as a witness, expert, or in any other capacity, any person whose testimony or statements seem likely to assist it in carrying out its functions.”); see also Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AJIL 611, 638–40 (1994) (tracing participation by nongovernmental organizations as amici curiae in briefs and oral proceedings before Inter-American Court of Human Rights). The intervention of Nicaragua in Gulf of Fonseca marked the first time the ICJ or the Permanent Court of International Justice permitted a third party to intervene under Article 62 of the Statute. 1992 ICJ Rep., para. 421, 1992 WL 457492, at *458.

⁵⁹ For an analysis of participation by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals as amici curiae before the International Court of Justice, see Shelton, supra note 58, at 619–28. Shelton argues that the Court may accept submissions from nongovernmental organizations in advisory, but not contentious, proceedings. Id. at 628. To date, the Court has invited only one submission from a nongovernmental organization: a statement in the 1950 International Status of South-West Africa proceedings, 1950 ICJ Rep. 128 (Advisory Opinion of July 11), from an international human rights group, which the Court rejected on technical grounds. Shelton, supra, at 623–24. In 1970 the present author sought permission to file “some form of amicus curiae brief” with the Court. Professor Reisman to the Registrar, 1970 ICJ Pleadings (2 Namibia) 636–37 (Sept. 10, 1970). The Registry denied the request on the grounds that Article 66, paragraph 2 of the Statute of the Court limited the Court to receiving information exclusively from states and public international organizations. Registrar to Professor Reisman, id. at 638–39 (Nov. 6, 1970).