1 Res. 1966 (XVIII).

2 Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Prance, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, U.S.S.R., United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

3 The four principles were: The Prohibition of the Threat or Use of Force; The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes; The Duty to Refrain from Intervention in Matters within the Domestic Jurisdiction of any State; The Principle of Sovereign Equality. See Report on the Mexico City session by Hans Blix (Sweden), Doc. A/5746, Nov. 16, 1964. All documents of this session are contained in that report and quoted in this paper, instead of Doc. A/AC.119/L, as Mex. L. The work of the Mexican session was reported by McWhinney, , “The ‘New’ Countries and the ‘New’ International Law: The United Nations Special Conference on Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States,” 60 A.J.I.L. 1–34 (1966)Google Scholar.

4 The four new members were: Algeria, Chile, Kenya and Syria, while Afghanistan ceded its place to Burma.

5 Res. 1815 (XVII). The three other principles were: The Duty of States to Cooperate; The Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination; The Principle of Good Faith.

6 Res. 2103(XX).

7 See Report by W. Riphagen (Netherlands), Doe. A|6230 of June 27, 1966. All documents of this session are contained in that report and quoted in this paper, not as Doc. A/AC.125/L., but simply with their L. number only. Summary records of this session are also simply cited SR. (instead of A/AC.125/SR.).

8 See report of the Special Committee on the Question of Denning Aggression, General Assembly, 9th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 11 (A/2638, 1954); Report of the 1956 Spec. Comm., ibid.,12th Sess., Supp. No. 16 (A/3574, 1957).

9 Czech draft Declaration, March 17, 1966, Doc. A/AC.125/L.16.

10 L.16, sub 2.

11 Art. 6a.

12 Arts. 5 and 6.

13 General Assembly Ees. 95(1), Dee. 11, 1946.

14 Compare the statement of the President of the Drafting Committee, Doc. A/6230, p. 66.

15 For background compare President Johnson's letter of Jan. 18, 1964, to Premier Khrushchev on the renunciation of the use of force for the solution of territorial disputes. 50 Dept. of State Bulletin 157 (1964).

16 The Czech Delegation, which held that force other than armed force is prohibited by Art. 2, par. 4, at the same time maintained, without much logic, that fulleffectiveness for the prohibition of the threat or use of force could be secured by disarmament (L. 16, sub. 6).

17 General Assembly Bes. 41(1); 808 ( I X ) ; 1378 (XIV); 1884 (XVIII); and 1908 (XVIII).

18 U.N. Charter, Arts. 11 and 47, par. 1. See also the Preamble of the Moscow Test-Ban Treaty, 1963, 57 A.J.I.L. 1026 (1963).

19 Italy and The Netherlands: “ I n order to promote the development of the rule of law in the international community all states should endeavour to secure the early conclusion of a universal treaty of general and complete disarmament, accompanied by the provisions necessary for the effective supervision and control of disarmament measures for the maintenance of peace and security and for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and in the meantime shall endeavour to carry out such agreed collateral arms control and disarmament measures as would be susceptible of reducing international tension and of ensuring progress towards general and complete disarmament.“ (L. 24, sub 5.) See, for the extremely reserved position of the TJ. S. toward all proposals, including the one cited, SB. 26, p. 7.

20 Doe. A/6230, p. 23.

21 Biphagen (Netherlands), Doc. A/AC. 119/SE. 7, p. 9.

22 Italy and The Netherlands (L/24, sub 4b). Compare the statement of the U. K. representative (SB. 25, p. 19), who, like the Swedish representative, believed “that it would be difficult to reach general agreement on any proposal banning war propaganda.'' The representatives of the United States (SB. 26, p. 7) and Canada (SB. 23, p. 11) spoke along similar lines.

23 Known as Paper No. 1 (Doe. A/5746, p. 51).

24 See McWhinney, loo. cit.15.

25 In its proposal of 1964 (AC. 119/L.6) the Czech Delegation mentioned “self defence of nationsagainst colonial domination,” whereas in its 1966 proposal it speaks of “self-defence of peoples”(AC. 125/L.16).

26 Compare L.16, sub 7 and L.21, sub 6.

27 Compare the different interpretations given by the U.S.S.E. and the United States, respectively, on Arts. 52 and 53 of the Charter in relation to the question of the Dominican Republic. Security Council Doc. A/6002 (Report 16, July 16, 1964-July 15, 1965, pars. 842, 878).

28 Compare the explicit formula drawn up by Chile (L. 23, sub g) and the implicit one in the joint proposal of Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and United States (L. 22, sub 3).

29 See also p. 723.

30 Sinclair (United Kingdom), SE. 25, p. 17.

31 See par. 4 of Res. 1515 (XV).

32 Italy and The Netherlands, L. 24, par. 4 (c).

33 Prusa (Czechoslovakia), SR. 27, p. 11, seconded by Movchan (U.S.S.E.), SR. 29, p. 7. See also Pechota (Czechoslovakia), SR. 32, p. 17.

34 L.16.

35 Algeria, Burma, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Lebanon, Nigeria, Syria, the U.A.R. and Yugoslavia (L.27).

36 Dahomey, Italy, Japan, Madagascar and The Netherlands. A draft resolution by Chile, limited in scope, did not give rise to extensive discussions.

37 Doc. A/AC.125/L.25: ” 1 . The principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, set forth in Article 2, paragraph 3 of the United Nations Charter, is a corollary of the prohibition of the threat or use of force, and, as such, the expression of a universal legal conviction of the international community. ” 2 . Accordingly, (a) All States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered; (b) The parties to any such dispute shall seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, good offices or mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice; (c) Failure to reach a solution by any of the above means does not absolve the parties from the duty of continuing to seek settlement of the dispute by peaceful means; (d) Recourse to, or acceptance of a settlement procedure, including any obligation freely undertaken to submit existing or future disputes to any particular procedure, shall not be regarded as incompatible with sovereign equality. ” 3 . In order to ensure the more effective application of the foregoing principle: (a) Legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice, and in particular States should endeavour to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court. (b) General multilateral agreements, concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, should provide that disputes relating to the interpretation or application of the agreement, and which the parties have not been able to settle by negotiation, or any other peaceful means, may be referred on the application of any party to the International Court of Justice or to an arbitral tribunal, the members of which are appointed by the parties, or, failing such appointment, by an appropriate organ of the United Nations. (c) Members of the United Nations and United Nations organs should continue their efforts in the field of codification and progressive development of international law with a view to strengthening the legal basis of the judicial settlement of disputes. (d) The competent organs of the United Nations should avail themselves more fully of the powers and functions conferred upon them by the Charter in the field of peaceful settlement, with a view to ensuring that all disputes are settled by peaceful means in such a manner that not only international peace and security but also justice is preserved.“

38 Compare Ruda (Argentina), SB. 27, p. 9; in this sense also Ramaholimihaso (Madagascar), SE. 27, p. 13; Bailey (Australia), SB. 28, p. 4; Sahovic (Yugoslavia), who at the same time was of the opinion that the principle should apply to all international disputes (SB. 30, p. 7); for a contrary view: Schwebel (United States), Mex. SR. 22, p. 20; Prusa (Czechoslovakia), SR. 27, p. 12. Mention was made in this context of “frozen disputes” (e.g.,the Antarctic Treaty), Sinclair (United Kingdom), SR. 49, p. 8.

39 Movchan (TJ.S.S.R.), SR. 29, p. 7.

40 “It could not be argued that negotiation favoured the stronger party since, under both international and municipal law, agreements entered into under duress or by fraud were not legally valid.” Resich (Poland), SR. 31, p. 5.

41 Compare, e.g.,Bohrmoser (Guatemala), SB. 32, p. 15; Mameri (Algeria), SB. 32, p. 7; Engo (Cameroon), SR. 32, p. 5.

42 Chammas (Lebanon), SB. 31, p. 6.

43 Ruda (Argentina), SB. 27, p. 10.

44 Pechota (Czechoslovakia), SB. 32, p. 18.

45 Chammas (Lebanon), SB. 31, p. 6.

46 Engo (Cameroon), SB. 32, p. 6.

47 Doc. A/5746, p. 100; Mex. SR. 21, p. 17.

48 Mex. L.17.

49 For the full text see p. 715 (sub 5).

50 Doe. A/6230, p. 116.

51 Compare the United Kingdom proposal at Mexico City, Mex. L.22, sub 3.

52 Argentina (SE. 32, p. 13); Cameroon (SE. 32, p. 6); France (SE. 30, p. 4); Guatemala (SE. 32, p. 16); Nigeria (SE. 32, p. 11); Mexico (SE. 32, p. 10); U.K. (SE. 33, p. 5); U. S. (SE. 33, p. 9).

53 See report, Doc. A/5746, pp. 94-96; also McWhinney, loc. cit.19.

54 Pechota (Czechoslovakia), SE. 32, p. 16.

55 Nachabe (Syria), SE. 29, p. 11. The recommendation regarding the composition of the Court formulated by Ghana, India and Yugoslavia at Mexico (Mex. L.19) was not repeated at the second session.

56 See also Abdul Nasr (U.A.E.), SE. 29, p. 13; Molina (Venezuela), SE, 33, p. 6; Burma's explanation of vote, Doc. A/6230, p. 120,

57 Riphagen (Netherlands), Mex. SR. 19, p. 10.

58 Ghana, India, Yugoslavia (Mex. L.19, sub 3 b).

59 Restated in the five-Power draft, sub 3(e); see p. 711.

60 Doc. A/6230, p. 123.

61 Ibid.,pp. 117-123; see statements by Australia, Canada, Dahomey, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.

62 Derived from proposals by the non-aligned states cited before (L. 27) and by Chile (L.26).

63 Agreed interpretation stated by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee: “the phrase—provisions of the Charter—was intended to refer to the UN Charter as a whole” (Doc. A/6230, p. 116). The U. S. Delegation, in what would seem a somewhat overcautious approach, declared that this interpretation (on which it had insisted) “was especially important since it would not be consistent with international law to say that a party to a dispute against which force had been used would be violating the principle of pacific settlement by exercising its right of self-defense—which paragraph 4 could be taken to imply.“

64 See statements by United States delegate Sept. 21 and 23, 1964, Mex. SB. 29 and 32. This very rigid position was abandoned during the Twentieth General Assembly. See Rogers (U.S.A.), Summary Records, 20th General Assembly, Sixth Committee, Nov. 17, 1965, p. 215.

65 General Assembly, 20th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 14 (A/6014), p. 11; 60 A.J.I.L. 662 (1966). The operative part of this resolution reads as follows: ” 1 . No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements are condemned. ” 2 . No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State. ” 3 . The use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and of the principle of non-intervention. ” 4 . The strict observance of these obligations is an essential condition to ensure that nations live together in peace with another, since the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international peace and security. ” 5 . Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another State. ” 6 . All States shall respect the right of self-determination and independence of peoples and nations, to be freely exercised without any foreign pressure, and with absolute respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Consequently, all States shall contribute to the complete elimination of racial discrimination and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. ” 7 . For the purpose of the present Declaration, the term ‘State’ covers both individual States and groups of States. ” 8 . Nothing in this Declaration shall be construed as affecting in any manner the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular those contained in Chapters VI, VII and VIII.“

66 A procedural motion, simply to recommend such “incorporation” to the General Assembly, was submitted by the Czech Delegation (L.20), but later withdrawn.

67 Doc. L.12/Rev. 1, and Corr. 1.

68 See General Assembly, 20th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meeting, Dec. 21, 1965.

69 Blix (Sweden), SB. 11, p. 14.

70 See L. 13.

71 Compare the discussion under ‘ ‘ the use of force'’ which also focused on the question as to whether the right of self-defense extends beyond the scope of Art. 51. See p. 709.

72 ” According to a statement by the Chairman (SE.17, p. 12), previously agreed to by the members o£ the Committee, this meant that the Drafting Committee was not prevented from recommending appropriate drafting changes.

73 Doc. A/AC 125/5.

74 This principle is contained in par. 1 of Art. 2 of the Charter. See McWhinney, loc. cit.25.

75 For a previous elaboration, see par. 4 of the Four-Power Declaration on General Security adopted at the Moscow Conference of Nov. 1, 1943, 38 A.J.I.L. Supp. 5 (1944). Compare also Art. 5 of the draft Declaration on the Eights and Duties of States adopted by the IX.C. in 1949, 44 A.J.I.L. Supp. 16 (1950).

76 L. 16 (compare Mex. L. 6).

77 See p. 720,

78 S R . 5, p. 6.

79 L . 5 .

80 Movchan (U.8.S.B.), SE. 6, pp. 14-15; Bolintineanu (Rumania), SE. 7, p. 5.

81 Mameri (Algeria), SE. 6, p. 11.

82 McWhinney loc. cit.28.

83 Arangio Ruiz (Italy, SE. 6, p. 6-7; SE. 7, p. 11), Monod (France, SE. 6, p. 12), and Bhoi (Kenya, SE. 6, p. 16), favoured the idea but expressed a desire for more exact wording. See also Riphagen (Netherlands, SB. 5, p. 11).

84 Engo (Cameroon), SE. 6, p. 9; Amau (Japan), SE. 6, p. 16; Chammas (Lebanon), SE. 4, p. 9; Odogwu (Nigeria), SE. 5, p. 13.

85 Proposals which received minor support were those concerning the right of any state to remove foreign military bases from its territory, and concerning the prohibition of any action that may be harmful to other states. TJ.A.E. (L.9); resp. Ghana (L.11) and U.A.E. (L.9).

86 UNCTAD, Geneva, 1964, Final Act (E/CONF. 46/191, Vol. 1, Second Part, p. 10).

87 Riphagen (Netherlands), SB. 5, p. 11. The representative of France asked “why particular mention should be made of one obvious point while other more important aspects were omitted.” Monod, SR. 6, p. 12.

88 Hargrove (U.S.A.), SR. 5, p. 15; Arangio Ruiz (Italy), SR. 6, p. 6; Sinclair (U.K.), SR. 5, p. 6; Sir Kenneth Bailey (Australia), SR. 5, p. 7. For text of Res. 1803 (XVII) see 57 A.J.I.L. 710 (1963).

89 SR. 6, p. 8.

90 SR. 6, p. 16.

91 “ E a c h State has the right to freely dispose of its national wealth and natural resources. In the exercise of this right, due regard shall be paid to the applicable rules of international law and to the terms of agreements validly entered into . “ (L.7.)

92 L.16, sub 11.

93 Compare Tammes (Netherlands), Sixth Committee, Dec. 2, 1965, and El Reedy (U.A.B.), SR. 36, p. 5.

94 L.16; Morozov (U.S.S.B.), SR. 37, p. 9; Resich (Poland), SR. 35, p. 9.

95 L.28; Sir Kenneth Bailey (Australia), SB. 38, pp. 10-11; Darwin (U.K.), SR. 35, p. 10. See also Gofli Demarchi (Argentina), SR. 36, p. 4.

96 Chammas (Lebanon), SR. 37, p. 14.

97 L.28.

98 L. 16; see also Potocny (Czechoslovakia), SR. 34, p. 5.

99 Compare also the Principle of Sovereign Equality, p. 718.

100 Bailey, SR. 38, p. 11.

101 Pechota (Czechoslovakia), SE. 38, p. 12. Presumably the Czech representative would have wished to make an exception only for preferences granted to alldeveloping countries.

102 L.29.

103 L.30.

104 Especially to the U. 8., U.K. and Canada, which voted against General Principle Two of TJNCTAD, which reads: “There shall be no discrimination on the basis of differences in socio-economic systems. Adaptation of trading methods shall be consistent with this principle.“

105 Bot, Netherlands Minister in Charge of Development Aid, Second Committee, Oct. 18, 1966. Also see the Netherlands proposal to draw up a charter for economic development, General Assembly Res. 2218 (XXI) A.

106 SR. 52, p. 4.

107 Chammas (Lebanon), SE. 52, p p . 5 - 6 ; also see p . 731.

108 See Preamble of the Charter and Arts. 1 ( 2 ) , 55, Chs. X I and X II .

109 See also under Principle A concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Force, p. 709.

110 L.16.

111 L.31, Add. 1 and 3.

112 Albonico (Chile), SR. 43, p. 16.

113 Molina (Venezuela), SR. 44, p. 5; Goñi Demarchi (Argentina), SR. 43, p. 8.

114 Pechota (Czechoslovakia), SR. 40, p. 5.

115 G. Kim and P. Shastitko, ‘ ‘ Proletarian Internationalism and the National Liberation Revolutions,” Pravda, Sept. 14, 1966. The article continues: “Fully coming true today is Lenin's historic prediction that the socialist revolution will be not only and chiefly the struggle of revolutionary proletarians in their respective countries against their bourgeoisie, but the struggle of all imperialist-oppressed colonies and countries, all the dependent countries, against international imperialism” (Pull Works, Vol. 39, p. 327)… . “The national proletariat in many Asian, African and Latin American countries is very weak and often does not represent an independent political force. The bulk of the population is made up of peasants. In such conditions this part of the population can acquire a socialist consciousness chiefly only with the aid of the international proletariat. Herein lies the basis of the international alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry.'’

116 L.32.

117 These criteria were taken from Principle IV of General Assembly Res. 1541 (XV).

118 Compare also Res. 2160 (XXI), and p. 729.

119 Sinclair (U.K.), SE. 44, p . 10. See also Monod (France), SR. 41, pp. 7-8.

120 Compare the I.L.C. draft articles on the Law of Treaties, General Assembly, 21st Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 9 (A/6309/Rev. 1), 61 A.J.I.L. 263 (1967), Arts. 15, 23 and 27.

121 General Assembly, op. cit.43.

122 Compare Bolintineanu (Rumania), SR. 46, p. 9, and Movchan (U.S.S.R.), ibid., p. 6.

123 L.16.

124 L.35.

125 The representative of Nigeria rightly remarked that the theory was now being advanced that independence put an end to all treaty obligations previously assumed by the metropolitan Powers. That was as difficult to accept as the theory of universal succession to treaties (Odogwu, SR. 46, p. 14). The “objective reappraisal”the Nigerian representative was asking for presumably will be undertaken by the International Law Commission, which has the subject of state succession listed as priority item on its agenda.

126 Darwin (U.K.), SR. 46, p. 9.

127 Nabrit (U.S.A.), ibid.,p.

128 i28See L.37.

130 Because it was the Soviet Union “on which certain imperialist countries had all too often attempted to impose the implementation of spoliatory measures set forth in agreements they had concluded with the Czarist regime. Lenin had protested against such agreements and had stated that he rejected anything which constituted banditry and coercion. That statement had enraged certain reactionary circles, which had promptly undertaken an economic blockade of the Soviet Union and even acts of aggression against it. The Soviet Union had held fast, however, thus compelling the respect of the very persons who had presumed to impose upon it such iniquitous terms. The Committee must therefore help to ensure compliance with treaty obligations and at the same time assist developing nations which sought to reject inequitable agreements that had been imposed on them.” Movchan (U.S.S.E.), SE. 46, pp. 6-7.

130 Res. 2181 (XXI), General Assembly, 21st Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 16 (A/6316), p. 96.

131 Ibid.,par. 6.

132 See amendments contained in Doc. A/C.6/L.608, sub 5.

133 See p. 718.

134 Doc. A/C.6/SR. 942, p. 10. Summary records are indicated below solely by reference to their SE. number.

135 Afghanistan (SR. 936, p. 8), Cameroon (SR. 927, p . 5), Canada (SR. 928, p. 2), Ceylon (SR. 936, p. 5), Ecuador (SR. 938, p. 13), Iraq (SR. 938, p. 13), Lebanon (SR. 939, p. 2), Libya (SR. 935, p. 10), Mali (SR. 938, p. 6), Panama (SR. 936, p. 8), Syria (SR. 935, p. 8), Tanzania (SR. 934, p. 19), U.A.E. (SR. 937, p. 6). Compare also Res. 2158 (XXI) on permanent sovereignty over natural resources.

136 Afghanistan (SR. 935, p. 15), Ceylon (SR. 936, p. 8), Mali (SR. 938, p. 6), Syria (SR. 935, p. 8). Compare also the U.S.S.B. draft resolution on the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America (Doc. A/6399), which was transmitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (Res. 2165 (XXI)).

137 Ceylon (SR. 936, p. 5), Sweden (SR. 933, p. 7).

138 Austria (SR. 937, p. 13), Spain (SR. 926, p. 3), Sweden (SR. 933, p. 7), IT. S. (SE. 926, p. 3).

139 Tsuruoka (Japan), SB. 934, p. 9.

140 I t may be noted that the 21st General Assembly took the unfortunate decision to postpone the consideration of a study concerning means to facilitate and render more effective the peaceful settlement of disputes. See Docs. SPC/A/6187 and A/6617.

141 Afghanistan (SR. 936, p. 15), Argentina (SR. 933, p. 6), Canada (SR. 928, p. 2), Central African Republic (SR. 938, p. 2), Ceylon (SR. 936, p. 6), Ethiopia (SR. 936, p. 12), Japan (SR. 934, p. 9), Lebanon (SR. 936, p. 3), Nigeria (SR. 927, p. 3), Panama (SR. 936, p. 8), Sierra Leone (SR. 934, p. 15), Tanzania (SR. 934, p. 19).

142 Compare p. 717, and see Does. A/6393 and A/PV. 1459, 1463, 1465, 1466, 1467, 1468, 1469, 1482.

143 Docs. A/L. 493; A/L. 495; A/L. 498; A/L. 501.

144 Doc. A/L. 497.

145 Res. 2160 (XXI).

146 Australia, Belgium, China, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa.

147 Corner (New Zealand), A/PV. 1482, p. 56.

148 Burma (SR. 936, p. 10), Central African Republic (SR. 938, p. 3), Chile (SR. 937, p. 4), Czechoslovakia (SR. 924, p. 7), Kenya (SR. 938, p. 5), Lebanon (SR. 939, p. 2), Libya (SR. 935, p. 10), Panama (SR. 936, p. 9), Sierra Leone (SR. 934, p. 14), Somalia (SR. 937, p. 13), Syria (SR. 935, p. 8 ) ; see also A/L. 493, sub. I.

149 Lebanon (SB. 939, p. 2).

150 Res. 2131 (XX), operative par. 2.

151 See p. 722. The Netherlands delegate in the Sixth Committee of the 21st General Assembly stated: “ I f the conclusion from previous discussions is correct that the duty to cooperate entails concerted action in a positive, creative, promotive or progressive way, if indeed it is a forward-looking principle, then it would not make much difference whether we declare that States shall conduct their international relations with a view to such cooperation, or with a view to realizing that cooperation,or with a view to ensuring the realisationof that cooperation. Once the promotive concept of coordination is accepted, one formulation logically implies the other and that is, that cooperation implies its realizing as well as the ensuring of its realizing. He who is prepared to realize a thing, is also prepared to ensure to realize it . “ (Tammes, Netherlands, Sixth Committee, Nov. 7, 1966). Carillo (Spain, SE. 926, p. 12) and Vanderpuye (Ghana, SK. 931, p. 12), have spoken in the same vein.

152 El Erian (TJ.A.E.), Sixth Committee, Nov. 23, 1966.

153 Manner, SR. 934, p. 13.

154 See pp. 706-707, 710, 716, 722, 727.

155 Cited from the 1961 program of the Communist Party by Lissitzyn in his excellent study, International Law in a Divided World (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March, 1963), p. 19.

156 U Thant, “Democracy and Peace,” XT.N. Monthly Chronicle, June, 1966, p. 67.

157 Compare the negative manner in which the Soviet Union approached the Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States. General Assembly, 4th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 10 (A/925, 1949), p. 7.

158 see, e.g.,communications from Sweden, May 30, 1947, Doc. A/CN.4/2, p. 183.

159 Art. 1, I.L.C. Statute.

160 E.g.,the Declaration on Non-intervention adopted by the General Assembly and the proposed Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Force and the Bight of Self- Determination. See pp. 716-718 and 729.

161 According to a Memorandum issued by the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs (E/CN.4/ L.610) a Declaration expresses: “ a sound expectation, expressed by the United Nations General Assembly, that the members of the international community will abide by it; consequently insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a Declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon States.” In the present case, moreover, the envisaged declaration will differ from others (e.g.,that on Human Eights) which, while also lacking binding power, nevertheless lead more easily to the drafting of conventions because their subject matter does not touch directly upon all primary principles contained in the Charter. Indeed it is hard to see how in the area under discussion binding texts could be drafted without following the amendment procedure set forth in Art. 108 of the Charter.

162 See, e.g.,Yugoslavia (A/C.6/SR. 938, p. 14), and Tanzania (A/C.6/SR.934, p. 16).

163 Compare Myres McDougal, , “International Law, Power and Policy: a Contemporary Conception,” 82 Hague Academy Eecueil des Cours 156 (1953, I),Google Scholar

164 See p. 726.

165 see p. 724.

166 Kosygin, at the session of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet on Aug. 3, 1966.

167 McGeorge Bundy, , “ The End of Either/Or,” 45 Foreign Affairs 194 (1967).Google Scholar

168 Compare, e.g.,p. 724.