1 Timothy, D. Sisk, Peacemaking In Civil Wars: Obstacles, Options, And Opportunities (Kroc Inst. Int’l Peace Stud., Occasional Paper Series No. 20:OP:2, 2001)Google Scholar, available at <http://www.nd.edu>; see also A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Doc. A/59/565, ¶ 85 (2004); In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/59/2005 & annex, ¶ 108 (2005); cf. Wallensteen, Peter & Sollnberg, Margareta, Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989-96, 34 J. Peace Res. 339 (1997)Google Scholar.

2 Bell, Christine, Peace Agreements And Human Rights, app. (2000)Google Scholar. See also the increasing number of Web sites and publications dedicated to making the text of peace agreements available, for example, Conciliation Resources, <http://www.c-r.org>; U.S. Institute of Peace, <http://www.usip.org>; and INCORE: University of Ulster, <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/>.

3 See Women, Peace and Security, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2004/814; SC Res. 1325 (Oct. 31, 2000); UN Press Release SG/SM/7257, Secretary-General Comments on Guidelines Given to Envoys (Dec. 10, 1999) (noting the issuance of guidelines addressing human rights and peace negotiations); UN Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Addendum: Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 [hereinafter Principles to Combat Impunity]; see also The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, Report of the Secretary- General, UN Doc. S/2004/616 (providing for a series of recommendations for negotiations, peace agreements, and Security Council mandates); Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations [Brahimi Report], UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809,¶ 58 (providing for UN ability to put conditions on peace agreements in which it will be asked to be involved); cf. A More Secure World, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1103, 226-28, 264; In Larger Freedom, supra note 1, passim.

4 International Law And Ethnic Conflict (David Wippman ed., 1998); Patrick, M. Regan, Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts, 40 J. Conflict Resol. 336 (1996)Google Scholar.

5 Clapham, Christopher, Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking, 35 J. Peace Res. 193, 194 (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (arguing that a new notion of “standing” emerged after the Cold War, which required that all parties to the conflict be recognized as valid participants in any peacemaking process).

6 See Malcolm, N. Shaw, International Law 1036–39 (5th ed. 2003)Google Scholar (on noninterference). For an example of a regional framework that focused on the state and required disarming of armed opposition groups as a precursor to direct negotiations, see Agreement for Procedure on Establishing Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America, Aug. 7, 1987, Costa Rica-El Sal.-Guat.-Hond.-Nicar., UN Doc. A/42/521-S/19085, annex (1987), 26 ILM 1166 (1987).

7 See peace agreement Web sites cited supra note 2.

8 Bell, supra note 2, at 6.

9 See generally Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation Of Peace Agreements ( Stephen, John Stedman, Rothchild, Donald, & Elizabeth, M. Cousens eds., 2002)Google Scholar; Oslerhampson, Fen, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed Or Fail (1996)Google Scholar (for overviews of the field).

10 See, e.g., Kristian, Skrede Gleditsch & Beardsley, Kyle, Nosy Neighbors: Third-Party Actors in Central American Conflicts, 48 J. Conflict Resol. 379 (2004)Google Scholar; Regan, supra note 4; Stephen Stedman, John & Rothchild, Donald, Peace Operations: From Short-Term to Long-Term Commitment, 3 Int’l Peacekeeping 17, 25 (1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (giving some limited attention to the clarity of a peace agreement); Walter, Barbara, The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement, 51 Int’l org. 335 (1997)Google Scholar.

11 SEE, E.G., William Zartman, I., Ripe For Resolution (1985)Google Scholar; World Bank, Conflict Prevention And Reconstruction Unit, Breaking The Conflict Trap: Civil War And Development Policy 83 (2003)Google Scholar, available at <http://www-wds.worldbank.org/>.

12 See, e.g., James, D. Fearon & David, D. Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, 97 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 75 (2003)Google Scholar.

13 See, e.g., Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements And The Durability Of Peace (2004); Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation To Resolution 283-84 (1998); Dorina, A. Bekoe, Toward a Theory of Peace Agreement Implementation: The Case of Liberia, 38 J. Asian & Afr. Stud. 256 (2003)Google Scholar; Schneckener, Ulrich, Making Power-Sharing Work: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation, 39 J. Peace res. 203 (2002)Google Scholar; John Stephen , Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, 22 Int’l security 5 (1997)Google Scholar.

14 Most notably, the Israeli/Palestinian Oslo Accords. Geoffrey, R. Watson, The Oslo Accords: International Law And The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreements (2000)Google Scholar; Quigley, John, The Israel-PLO Interim Agreements: Are They Treaties? 30 Cornell Int’l L.J. 717 (1997)Google Scholar; see also Campbell, Colm, Fionnuala, Nl Aoláin, & Harvey, Colin, The Frontiers of Legal Analysis: Reframing the Transition in Northern Ireland, 66 Mod. L. Rev. 317 (2003)Google Scholar; Kooijmans, P. H., The Security Council and Non-State Entities as Parties to Conflicts, in International Law: Theory And Practice: Essays In Honour Of Eric Suy 333 (Wellens, Karel ed., 1998)Google Scholar; Fionnuala, Nl Aoláin, The Fractured Soul of the Dayton Peace Agreement: A Legal Analysis, 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 957 (1998)Google Scholar; Steven, R. Ratner, The Cambodia Settlement Agreements, 87 AJIL 1 (1993)Google Scholar; Stahn, Carsten, Constitution Without a State? Kosovo Under the United Nations Constitutional Framework for Self-Government, 14 Leiden J. Int’l L. 531 (2001)Google Scholar; Yee, Sienho, The New Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 Eur. J. Int’l L. 176 (1996)Google Scholar.

15 But see Steven, R. Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace In Lands Of Conflict After The Cold War 26–28 (1995)Google Scholar (for partial discussion of the legal obligations imposed by peace agreements in the context of their relevance to consent and UN peacekeeping); Wippman, David, Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No? 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 607, 642–43 (1995)Google Scholar. Cf <http://www.pilg.org> (for materials approaching peace agreements as a group). Lawyers have also not looked particularly at social science insights into implementation.

16 In Larger Freedom, supra note 1,¶114; Bekoe, supra note 13; Licklider, Roy, The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993, 89 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 681, 685 (1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17 This analysis, slightly adapted, is taken from Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie, Slaughter, & Snidal, Duncan, The Concept of Legalization, 54 Int’l Org. 401 (2000)Google Scholar; see also infra text at notes 73-77.

18 The term lex pacificatoria, however, is the author’s own. Cicero used the term “pacificatoria legatione,” or “delegation of peacekeepers” (translation by author), in Philippic, Cicero, bk. XII, §1, f 3 (n.d.), reprinted in Cicero Philippics 508 (Walter, C. A. Kerr trans., Heinemann, William Ltd. 1926)Google Scholar.

19 Bell, supra note 2, at 20—29; cf. Wallensteen & Sollenberg, supra note 1 (using different classification with some similarities).

20 Mitchell, C. R., The Structure Of International Conflict 206–16 (1981)Google Scholar; Zartman, supra note 11.

21 Mitchell, supra note 20.

22 Declaration of the OAU Ad-hoc Committee on Southern Africa on the Question of South Africa, Aug. 21, 1989, UN Doc. A/44/697, annex, available at <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/oau/harare.html>.

23 Mandela, Nelson, Long Walk To Freedom: The Autobiography Of Nelson Mandela 663 (Abacus ed. 1995)Google Scholar.

24 Tashkent Declaration on Fundamental Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict in Afghanistan, July 19, 1999, UN Doc. A/54/174-S/1999/812, annex, available at <http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/> [hereinafter Tashkent Declaration]; cf. Joint Declaration of the EC Troika and the Parties Directly Concerned with the Yugoslav Crisis, July 7, 1991, reprinted in Yugoslavia Through Documents: From Its Creationto Its Dissolution 311 (Snežana Trifunovska ed., 1994) (EC attempt to set a context to address escalating hostilities in former Yugoslavia).

25 See, for example, the early agreements in South Africa between the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African National Party (SAG), and/or Inkatha (IFP), dealing incrementally with common commitments to end violence (Groote Schuur Minute, May 4, 1990, ANC-SAG); ending of armed actions and review of states of emergency (Pretoria Minute, Aug. 6, 1990, ANC-SAG); and implementing of antiviolence measures and stabilizing peace (Royal Hotel Minute, Jan. 29, 1991, ANC-IFP; DF Malan Accord, Feb. 12, 1991, ANC-SAG). These documents are available online at <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/minutes.html>, apart from the Royal Hotel Minute, which is reprinted in South African Institute of Race Relations, Race Relations Survey 1991/92, app. E, at 519 (1992)Google Scholar.

26 Joint Declaration on Peace: The Downing Street Declaration, Dec. 15, 1993, Ir.-U.K.; and Statement by the Taoiseach, Mr. Albert Reynolds, on the Joint Declaration on Peace (Dec. 15, 1993), at <http://www.cain. u/ster.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/dsdl51293.htm>.

27 Joint Declaration on Peace, supra note 26.

28 Mallie, Eamonn & Mckittrick, David, The Fight For Peace: The Secret Story Behind The Irish Peace Process 105–06 (1996)Google Scholar.

29 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, Aug. 28, 2000, available at <http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html> [hereinafter Burundi Peace Agreement]; Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, 37 ILM 751 (1998), available at <http://www.nio.gov.uk/agreement.pdf> [hereinafter Belfast Agreement]; Peace Agreement, July 7, 1999, Sierra Leone-Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), available at <http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html> [hereinafter Lomé Agreement]; Interim Const. (S. Aft.) (Act No. 200, Dec. 22, 1993), available at <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sf10000_.html>.

30 Belfast Agreement, supra note 29; Interim Const., supra note 29.

31 See, e.g., Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace, Dec. 29, 1996, Guat.-Unidad revolucionaria nacional guatemalteca (URNG), UN Doc. A/51 /796 SI 1997/114, Annex II, 36ILM 258(1997) [hereinafter Guatemala Peace Agreement]; Joint Declaration, Oct. 4, 1994, El Sal.-Frente farabundo martí para la liberatión nacional (FMLN), available at <http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html> [hereinafter El Salvador Agreement]; Burundi Peace Agreement, supra note 29.

32 International Law and Ethnic Conflict, supra note 4; Gleditsch & Beardsley, supra note 10, at 379; Regan, supra note 4.

33 See Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-PLO, 36 ILM 551 (1997) (Oslo II); Const. (S. Aft.) (Act No. 108, 1996, entered into force Feb. 7, 1997).

34 See, e.g., Agreement on the Normalization of Relations, Aug. 23, 1996, Croat.-Fed. Rep. Yugo. (FRY), 35 ILM 1219 (1996); Treaty of Peace, Oct. 26, 1994, Isr.-Jordan, 34 ILM 43 (1995); see also Agreement on the Regulation of Relations and Promotion of Cooperation, Apr. 8, 1996, FRY-Maced., 35 ILM 1246; Agreement on Special Parallel Relations, Feb. 28, 1997, FRY-Rep. Srpska, available at <http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/bosnia/yusrp.html>.

35 See agreements concerning Sierra Leone, 1996-99, at <http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html>; Accords of the Liberian Conflict, 1990-96, at <http://www.c-r.org/accord/lib/accordl/accords_contents.shtml>; Israel-Palestine peace agreements, 1993-present, at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/peace%20process/reference%20documents/>.

36 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Art. 2, 1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].

37 Arguably, it places emphasis on a positivist notion of the treaty as a “formal instrument” defined by formalist criteria, rather than as a substantive “source of obligation,” although these two concepts are both present to some degree. Shabtai Rosenne, Developments In The Law Of Treaties, 1945-1986, at 14-15 (1988).

38 See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 6, at 812.

39 See Vienna Convention, supra note 36, Art. 31; cf. Koskenniemi, Martti, From Apology To Utopia 300 (1989)Google Scholar (on the difficulty of constructing intention)

40 For a review of interstate wars since 1990, see Monty, G. Marshall & Ted, Robert Gurr, Peace And Conflict 2005: A Global Survey Of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, And Democracy 11–12 (2005)Google Scholar, available at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/PC05print.pdf> (references concerning five interstate conflicts, the majority of which have some relationship to intrastate conflict and follow similar peace agreement patterns, to some extent).

41 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995. 35 ILM 75 (1996) [hereinafter DPA].

42 See, e.g., Rosenne, supra note 37, at 11.

43 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, 25 ILM 543 (1986) (has a similarly worded Article 3); see also Arnold, Duncan Mcnair, The Law Of Treaties (1961)Google Scholar (for law of treaties prior to 1969); Rosenne, supra note 37, at 17-18 (noting International Law Commission drafts that included “any international agreement in written form . . . concluded between two or more States or other subjects of international law” as treaties).

44 See Moir, Lindsay, The law Of Internal Armed Conflict 53 (2002)Google Scholar; Cassese, Antonio, The Status of Rebels Under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-international Armed Conflicts, 30 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 416, 423 (1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45 Rosenne, supra note 37, at 10-33 (noting the growth of the gray area in 1989; id. at 32).

46 See, e.g., common Art. 3, Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3114, 75 UNTS 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3217, 75 UNTS 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3316, 75 UNTS 135; and Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 1, 999 UNTS 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 1, 993 UNTS 3; Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res. 1514 (XV) ¶¶4, 11, 18 (Dec. 14, 1960) (referring to “national liberation movements”); Moir, supra note 44; Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountability Of Armed Opposition Groups In International Law (2002); Cassese, supra note 44.

47 See Lusaka Protocol, Nov. 15, 1994, Angola -União nacional para a independência total de Angola (UNITA), UN Doc. S/1994/1441, at <http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html>; Burundi Peace Agreement, supra note 29; Ceasefire Agreement, July 10, 1999, Aug. 1 & 3 1 , 1999, Dem. Rep. Congo-other Afr. states-Movement for the Liberation of the Congo-Congolese Rally for Democracy (witnessed by international organizations), at <http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html>; Guatemala Peace Agreement, supra note 31; El Salvador Agreement, supra note 31; Israel-Palestine peace agreements, supra note 35; General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, Oct. 4, 1992, Mozam.-Renamo, at <http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html>; Peace Agreement, Aug. 4, 1993, Rwanda- Rwandese Patriotic Front, at <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/>; Lomé Agreement, supra note 29.

48 James Anaya, S., Indigenous Peoples In International Law 189 (2004)Google Scholar.

49 ILO Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 28 ILM 1382 (1989); see Anaya, supra note 48, at 15-31, 110; see also Meijknecht, Anna, Towards International Personality: The Position Of Minorities And Indigenous Peoples In International Law (2001)Google Scholar; Castellino, Joshua & Jérémie, Gilbert, Self-Determination, Indigenous Peoples and Minorities, 3 Macquarie L.J. 155 (2003)Google Scholar.

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51 Galtung, Johan, Peace By Peaceful Means: Peace And Conflict, Development And Civilization 197 (1996)Google Scholar (frames the term “structural violence” to refer to any constraint on human potential due to economic and political structures).

52 On the Final Agreement of March 21, 1999, between South Africa and the ‡Khomani San (comprising Mier Settlement and San Settlement) (Afrikaans version on file with author), see South Africa Press Release, Deputy President Mbeki and Minister Hanekom to Officiate at Khomani/Southern Kalahari San Land Claim (Mar. 12, 1999), at <http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1999/9905 111 52p 1011 .htm>; Chennells, Roger, The ‡Khomani San Land Claim, 26 Cultural Survival Q. 51 (2002)Google Scholar. A summary of the Canada-Nisga’a Framework Agreement, 1991, Can.-Brit. Colum.-Nisga’a Tribal Council, and a full list of Canadian agreements are available at <http://www.atns.net.au/index.php>. The Agreement-in-Principle, Feb. 15, 1996, and the Final Agreement, Aug. 4, 1999, Can.-Brit. Colum.-Nisga’a Tribal Council, are available at <http://www.gov.bc.ca/arr//negotiation/nisgaa/default.htm> (and linked archive).

53 For full texts of the Georgia-Abkhazia agreements, see A Question Of Sovereignty: The Georgiaabkhazia Peace Process, Accord, Sept. 1999 (Jonathan Cohen ed.), available at <http://www.c-r.org/accord/geor-ab/accord7/index.shtml>. On Moldova-Transdniestria, see, for example, Memorandum on the Bases for Normalization of Relations, May 8, 1997, Mold.-Transdniestria, at <http://www.ecmi.de/cps/documents_moldova_memo.html>. On Bougainville-Papua New Guinea, see Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville, Jan. 23, 1998, Papua N.G.-Bougainville Transitional Gov’t-Bougainville Resistance Force-Bougainville Interim Gov’t-Bougainville Revolutionary Army-Bougainville leaders; Bougainville Peace Agreement, Aug. 30, 2001 (see section A regarding legal status), both available at <http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html>. On Russia-Chechnya, see Truce Agreement: Principles for Determining the Fundamentals of Relations Between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic [Khasavuyrt Accord], Aug. 25, 1996, Russ.- Chechnya (on file with author).

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55 See Meijknecht, supra note 49, at 225 (noting that any rational basis for this difference is difficult to find, and locating it in the acknowledgment of historical wrongs done to indigenous peoples); see also Cassese, Antonio, International Law 63 (2d ed. 2005)Google Scholar; Hector, Gros Espiell, The Right To Self-Determination: Implementation Of United Nations Resolutions ¶ 56, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.l, UN Sales No. E.79. XIV. 5 (1980)Google Scholar.

56 Cf. Malanczuk, Peter, Some Basic Aspects of the Agreements Between Israel and the PLO from the Perspective of International Law, 7 Eur. J. Int’l L. 485 (1996)Google Scholar (effectively arguing that these concepts give the Israeli-PLO agreements international legal status).

57 See Bell, Christine & Keenan, Johanna, Human Rights Non-governmental Organisations and the Problems of Transition, 26 Hum. Rts. Q. 330, 344–45 (2004)Google Scholar.

58 Cf. Wallensteen & Sollenberg, supra note 1, at 343 (classifying some of the peace agreements in these situations as “partial agreements”).

59 Meijknecht, supra note 49, at 24-25.

60 See generally Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 ICJ Rep. 174, 179 (Apr. 11)Google Scholar; Tahvanainen, Annika, The Capacity to Conclude Treaties—Which Entities Can Become Parties to Treaties Under International Law? (Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, 2004)Google Scholar (report to the committee drafting a Nordic treaty on the Sami indigenous people’s rights).

61 See Brownlie, Ian, Principles Of Public International Law 57 (6th ed. 2003)Google Scholar; Malanczuk, Peter, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction To International Law 91 (1997)Google Scholar; Shaw, supra note 6, at 175-246. Some of these commentators view actors with some attributes of legal personality as having “limited legal personality” or constituting “partial international legal subjects.” See Malanczuk, Peter, Multinational Enterprises and Treaty-Making—A Contribution to the Discussion on Non-State Actors and the “Subjects “ of International Law, in Multilateral Treaty-Making: The Current Status of Challenges to and Reforms Needed in The international Legislative Process 45, 55 (Vera, Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar [hereinafter Malanczuk, Multinational Enterprises].

62 Meijknecht, supra note 49, at 34.

63 See Klabbers, Jan, An Introduction To International Institutional Law 43–48 (2002)Google Scholar; cf. Malanczuk, Multinational Enterprises, supra note 61, at 55 (arguing that some subjects of international law “have legal personality only with respect to certain international rights and obligations”).

64 See Zegveld, supra note 46, at 51 (discussing the status of the El Salvador Agreement on Human Rights, July 26, 1990, El Sal.-FMLN-UN, UN Doc. A/44/971-S/21541, annex (1990)); cf Cassese, Antonio, The Special Court and International Law: The Decision Concerning the Lomé Agreement, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 1130, 1134–35 (2004)Google Scholar (arguing that the Lomé Agreement was an international one, owing to the status of the nonstate actors, but also the intention of the parties in signing the Agreement). But see Kooijmans, supra note 14.

65 Higgins, Rosalyn, Problems And Process: International Law And How We Use It 50 (1994)Google Scholar.

66 See, e.g., Richard, A. Posner, The Problems Of Jurisprudence (1990)Google Scholar.

67 See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 55, at 5.

68 Vienna Convention, supra note 36, pt. V. 69 Lipson, Charles, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal? 45 Int’l Org. 495 (1991)Google Scholar (describing the term “binding agreement” as “misleading hyperbole”).

70 See generally Commitment And Compliance: The Role Of Non-Binding Norms In The International Legal System (Shelton, Dinah ed., 2000)Google Scholar; 54 Int’l Org., No. 3, Legalization and World Politics (2000)Google Scholar; Aust, Anthony, The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments, 35 Int’l &Comp. L.Q. 787 (1986)Google Scholar; Richard, R. Baxter, International Law in “Her Infinite Variety,” 29 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 549 (1980)Google Scholar; Lipson, supra note 69; Schachter, Oscar, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding InternationalAgreements, 71 AJIL 296 (1977)Google Scholar.

71 See sources cited supra note 70.

72 Michael Reisman, W., The Concept and Functions of Soft Law in International Politics, in Essays in Honour of Judge Taslim Olawale Ellas 135, 136 (Emmanuel, G. Bello & Bola, A. Ajibola eds., 1992)Google Scholar.

73 Abbott et al, supra note 18; see also Hillgenberg, Hartmut, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 Eur. J. Int’l L. 499 (1999)Google Scholar (full discussion of the mechanisms with which nontreaty commitments form “legal effect”); cf. Jan Klabbers, The Concept Of Treaty In International Law (1996); Chinkin, Christine, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in Commitment and Compliance, supra note 70, at 21, 24 Google Scholar; Reisman, supra note 72.

74 Abbott et al., supra note 18, at 405.

75 Id. at 406.

76 Id.

77 Id. at 402.

78 See generally sources cited supra note 70.

79 See generally sources cited supra note 70.

80 See Cassese, supra note 64; cf. Malanczuk, Multinational Enterprises, supra note 61, at 58-62 (discussing legal status of multinational companies and internationalized contracts). But see supra notes 59-65 and corresponding text.

81 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kallon, Kamara, Decision on Jurisdiction, Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E) (Mar. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Kallon] (discussed infra text at notes 88-99).

82 See, e.g., Fisher, Roger & Ury, William, Getting To Yes: Negotiating An Agreement Without Giving In 84–98 (2d ed. 1992)Google Scholar (for importance of “objective criteria,” as standards external to the parties in the conflict).

83 See Watson, supra note 14, at vii; see also Thomas M. Franck, The Power Of Legitimacy Among Nations 35-37 (1990).

84 Wimbledon, S.S. 1923 PCIJ (set. A) No. 1, at 25 Google Scholar.

85 Cf. Wedgwood, Ruth, Legal Personality and the Role of Non-governmental Organizations and Non-State Political Entities in the United Nations System, in Non-State Actors As New Subjects Of International Law 21, 35 (Hofmann, Rainer & Geissler, Nils eds., 1999)Google Scholar (arguing that it may prolong conflict because international status may strengthen the resistance of nonstate groups to settlement, citing the example of Georgia and Abkhazia); cf. Aust, supra note 54, at 48 - 54 (discussing the exercise of treaty-making capacity by parts of a state); Lissitzyn, Oliver, Territorial Entities Other Than States in the Law of Treaties, 125 Recueil des Cours 5 (1983 III)Google Scholar (semble).

86 Cf. Wedgwood, supra note 85, at 34 (Wedgwood’s (converse) argument relating to the difficulties of lack of legal status for nonstate actors).

87 See Vienna Convention, supra note 36, Art. 3(c); cf Cassese, supra note 64, at 1139-40 (noting the argument that translating Sierra Leone’s Lomé Agreement into national legislation could mean that its provisions continue to bind the government, even when the underlying agreement was void, thus preventing the government from prosecuting amnestied crimes in domestic courts). There can also be arguments that notions of estoppel, precommitment, and unilateral declaration would obligate the state. See Watson, supra note 14, at 201-64; Hillgenberg, supra note 73, at 505.

88 Kallon, supra note 81.

89 For the Lome Agreement, see supra note 29.

90 Kallon, supra note 81, ¶ 48.

91 Cf. Cassese, supra note 64 (noting the tautologies of the decision and criticizing the reasoning).

92 Protocol I, supra note 46, Art. 2; Protocol II, supra note 46, Art. 1.

93 Zegveld, supra note 46, at 16-17.

94 Cf. Wedgwood, supra note 86, at 36 (arguing that decisions over treaty-making capacity should be made with a view to the implications of so doing).

95 Cf. Kallon, supra note 81, ¶ 62 (where the Special Court drew a distinction between the issue of the state’s obligations under the Agreement, and the validity of the treaty establishing the jurisdiction of the court).

96 But see 2 Witness To Truth: Report Of The Sierra Leone Truth And Reconciliation Commission ¶559 (2004) (finding that the amnesty was necessary to making peace).

97 See Letter Dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2000/786, annex, cited in Kallon, supra note 81, ¶¶ 8 - 9 ; see also Cassese, supra note 64, at 1138-39 (arguing that this would have been a better legal approach).

98 See Kallon, supra note 81, ¶¶ 66-74 (discussion of the limits of amnesty).

99 See Lomé Agreement, supra note 29, Art. IX; cf. Brief of the Redress Trust (Redress), the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and the International Commission of Jurists, Kallon (n.d.), supra note 81, available at <http://www.redress.org/casework/AmicusCuriaeBrief-SCSLl.pdf>.

100 See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 ICJ Rep. 131, para. 2.4(c) (July9) (Elaraby,J.,sep. op.) (describing the 1993 Oslo Accord as “contractual and . . . legally binding on Israel” when finding the construction of the wall contrary to international law).

101 See, e.g., Robinson v. Sec’y of State for N. Ir., [2002] UKHL 32, available at <http://www.bailii.org/databases.html#ew> [hereinafter Robinson] (the House of Lords majority judgment held that the Northern Ireland Act should be interpreted purposively, in light of the unique circumstances underlying it. The Law Lords (per Hoffmann, L.J.) described the Act as “a constitution for Northern Ireland, framed to create a continuing form of government against the background of the history of the territory and the principles agreed in Belfast”; id., ¶25); Azanian People’s Org. (AZAPO) v. President of S. Afr. & Others, 1996 (4) SA 671, 125 (CC) (challenging establishment of amnesty under Truth and Reconciliation law as a violation of international law) ; r/f HCJ 4481 /91, Bargil v. Israel, [1991] IsrSC 47(4) 210, available at <http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files_eng/91/810/044/z01/91044810.z01.pdf>, cited in Kretzmer, David, The Occupation Of Justice: The Supreme Court Of Israel And The Occupied Territories 23–24, 204 n.23 (2002)Google Scholar (where the court dismissed as nonjusticiable a petition challenging the legality of the Likud government’s settlement policy because the matter was a political question and the subject of intensive peace negotiations).

102 See infra text at notes 131-38.

103 Robinson, supra note 101 (in effect revising, to prevent the collapse of the devolved legislature, the very clear electoral procedures set out in the Northern Ireland Act, 1998).

104 Cf. Ex parte Chairperson of Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of Constitution of S. Afr., 1996 (4) SA774 (CC), 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) [hereinafter In re Certification of Constitution] (delayed rather than prevented the certification of the final Constitution); see also Robinson, supra note 101,¶¶ 42-75 (dissenting judgments of Lord Hutton and Lord Hobhouse, respectively, which would have terminated the operation of the devolved legislative Assembly that stood at the center of the Belfast Agreement).

105 See supra text at note 41.

106 Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the Problem of Restoring Peace in Indo-China, July 21, 1954, 31 Dep’t St. Bull. 164 (1954), UK Cmd. 9239, at 9, 60 AJIL 643 (1966).

107 Three agreements were signed on February 19, 1959: Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus; Treaty of Guarantee Between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey; Treaty of Alliance Between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, reprinted in Documents on International Affairs 1959 (Kinged, Gillian., 1963)Google Scholar, available at <http://www.kypros.org/constitution/treaty.htm>; see also Jeffrey, L. Dunoff, Steven, R. Ratner, & Wippman, David, International Law: Norms, Actors, Process: A Problem-Oriented Approach 33–66 (2002)Google Scholar; Wippman, David, International Law and Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus, 31 Tex. Int’l L.J. 141 (1996)Google Scholar.

108 The Camp David Accords pointed toward a similar interstate initiation and underwriting of negotiations, although they did not reach the multilateral treaty stage. Framework for Peace in the Middle East, Isr.-Egypt, Sept. 17, 1978, 1136 UNTS 196; Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty, Isr.-Egypt, Sept. 17, 1978, 1138 UNTS 53. The accords were both signed by Israel and Egypt and witnessed by then-president of the United States Jimmy Carter. See Binder, Guyora, Treaty Conflict And Political Contradiction: The Dialectic Of Duplicity (1988)Google Scholar. On the relationship of the Camp David and Dayton processes, see Holbrooke, Richard, To End A War 204 (1999)Google Scholar.

109 Gaeta, Paola, The Dayton Agreements and International Law , 7 Eur. J. Int’l L. 147 (1996)Google Scholar; see also aust, supra note 54, at 52.

110 The central annexes were signed by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the entities. However, Annex 1-B (Agreement on Regional Stabilization) and Annex 10 (Agreement on Civilian Implementation) were signed by the three republics and the entities. DPA, supra note 41.

111 Wedgwood, supra note 85, at 34.

112 Gaeta, supra note 109, at 150-52.

113 Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland, Apr. 10, 1998, Art. l(ii), 37 ILM 777 (1998), available at <http://www.nio.gov.uk/agreement.pdf> .

114 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Oct. 23, 1991, 31 ILM 180 (1992) [hereinafter Cambodia Political Settlement]; see also Ratner, supra note 14, at 9 (interestingly showing that this device was aimed primarily at enabling authority to be granted from a national sovereign to the UN Transitional Authority for Cambodia, without using Chapter VII of the UN Charter).

115 See, e.g., Fortna, supra note 13, at 21. The Cambodian mechanism probably comes closest to including nonstate actors as parties to the treaty but is not available in contexts where the nonstate actors do not cumulatively equate to “the state.”

116 See, e.g., Declaration of the Parties to the Agreement Between Ireland and the United Kingdom, Apr. 19, 2004, Ir.-UK, <ZMz’^£Z?d?<http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/index.asp?locID=199&docID=1765> (British-Irish agreement on reinterpretation of the Belfast Agreement’s citizenship provisions, to accommodate Irish immigration).

117 Richard, R. Baxter, International Law in “Her Infinite Variety? 29 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 549 (1980)Google Scholar.

118 Id. at 550.

119 See, e.g., Bill No. 372, The Constitution of Sri Lanka—Draft Bill to Repeal and Replace Constitution of Sri Lanka, presented to Parliament Aug. 3, 2000, at <http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/2000ConstitutionBill/Index2000ConstitutionBill.html>; Fiji Act No. 13 of 1997, Constitution Amendment Act 1997, as amended by Act No. 5 of 1998, at <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/>; Macedonia Framework Agreement (Ohrid Framework Agreement), Aug. 13, 2001, Annex A, Constitutional Amendments, at <http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html>.

120 Interim Const., supra note 29, ch. 5.

121 Act No. 2 of 1994, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act, 1994, amend, to sched. 4 of Act 200 of 1993, § 13, Art. XXXIV [hereinafter South Africa Amendment Act] (self-determination provisions addressed at the Afrikaner Brotherhood in South Africa); see BELL, supra note 2, at 49.

122 For more detail, see BELL, supra note 2, at 107.

123 Preliminary Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Confederation, Mar. 18, 1994, Bosn. & Herz.- Croat., 33 ILM 605 (1994); Constitution of the Federation, Mar. 18, 1994, id. at 740 (together, Washington Agreement), available at <http://www.usip.org/libraiy/pa.html>.

124 DPA, supra note 41; see also Bell, supra note 2, at 144-47.

125 Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Feb. 23, 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/648, annex, available at <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/99648_l.pdf> [hereinafter Rambouillet Accords]. Security Council Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999) then drew on this agreement to provide for transitional arrangements.

126 Bougainville Peace Agreement, supra note 53.

127 See Barendt, Eric, An Introduction To Constitutional Law 3–4 (1998)Google Scholar.

128 Cf. Paul, R. Williams & Spencer, William, Iraq i Political Compact, Boston Globe, Aug. 13, 2005, at A15 Google Scholar (arguing that Iraq’s draft constitution is “first and foremost a political compact”).

129 Interim Const., supra note 29.

130 See id., ch. 5 (The Adoption of a New Constitution); see also Teitel, Ruti, Transitional Justice 197–201 (2000)Google Scholar (documenting the use of temporary “transitional” constitutions in a range of jurisdictions).

131 Loughlin, Martin, Sword And Scales (2000)Google Scholar (reviewing relationship between law and politics in public law realm).

132 Teitel, supra note 130, at 5.

133 Bougainville Peace Agreement, supra note 53, §A.3; Interim Const., supra note 29, Art. 35. 134 cf. Marko, Joseph, Five Years of Constitutional Jurisprudence in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A First Balance (European Diversity & Autonomy Papers No. 7/2004)Google Scholar, available at <http://www. eurac.edu/documents/edap/2004_edap07.pdf> (whose analysis illustrates the underlying politics of the reasoning of the Bosnian Constitutional Court decisions with respect to the DPA).

135 John, E. Finn, Constitutions In Crisis: Political Violence And The Rule Of Law 6 (1991)Google Scholar.

136 E.g., Republic of Fiji Islands v. Prasad, [2001] FJCA 2, available at <http://www.paclii.org/fj/cases/FJCA/2001/> (asserting the continued status of the 1997 Fijian Constitution in aftermath of coup); see Williams, George, Republic of Fiji v. Prasad, 2 Melbourne J. Int’l L. 144 (2001)Google Scholar; Iyer, Venkat, Restoration Constitutionalism in the South Pacific, 15 Pac Rim L. & Pol’y J. 39, 59–72 (2006)Google Scholar.

137 Kretzmer, supra note 101, at 187 (arguing that while the Israeli Supreme Court has been conservative, it has had some influence in shaping decisions in the “shadow of the law”).

138 Sallah v. Attorney-General (Const. Ct. Ghana, Apr. 20, 1970, unreported), reprinted in 2 Gyandoh, Samuel & Griffiths, J., A Sourcebook Of The Constitutional Law Of Ghana 493 (1972)Google Scholar (concerning the validity of the dismissal of a senior civil servant belonging to the earlier regime following a coup); see also Mahmud, Tayyab, Jurisprudence of Successful Treason: Coup d’Etat & Common Law, 27 Cornell Int’l L.J. 49, 65–69 (1994)Google Scholar.

139 See Slu beni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine, Case U 7/97 (Const. Ct. Bosn. & Herz. Dec. 22, 1997), available at <http://www.ccbh.ba>; Yee, supra note 14, at 176-92.

140 See sources cited supra note 139.

141 This difficulty bolsters the argument that peace agreements face a particular set of implementation difficulties in formally democratic states. See Campbell, Colm & Fionnuala, Ní Aoláin, The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted Democracies, 27 Hum. Rts. Q. 172 (2005)Google Scholar. These states are the most likely to have a functioning prior constitutional order from which to attack the constitutional manifestations of the peace agreement.

142 See, e.g., SC Res. 1023 (Nov. 22, 1995) (on which Croatian Erdut Agreement of 1995, infra note 190, was suspensive); SC Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999).

143 See, e.g., SC Res 788 (Nov. 19, 1992) (calling for Liberian parties to Yamoussoukro IV Accord to respect the agreement and requesting the secretary-general to dispatch a special representative to Liberia to evaluate and report on the situation, and to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution).

144 Kosovo: SC Res. 1244, supra note 142; East Timor: SC Res. 1272 (Oct. 25, 1999); Afghanistan: SC Res. 1378 (Nov. 14, 2001).

145 Kosovo: UN Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/1 (Jan. 14, 2000) (establishing Joint Interim Administrative Structure, thereby implementing the agreement signed on December 15, 1999, by the Kosovo Albanian political party leaders present at the talks leading to the Rambouillet Accords); East Timor: UN Docs. UNTAET/REG/1999/2 (Dec. 2, 1999), 2000/23 (July 14, 2000), 2000/24 (July 14, 2000); Afghanistan: SC Res. 1383 (Dec. 6, 2001) (endorsing Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions, Dec. 5, 2001, UN Doc. S/2001/1154, §1(4) [hereinafter Bonn Agreement]).

146 East Timor: UN Doc. UNTAET/REG/2001/2 (Mar. 16, 2001); Kosovo: UN Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (May 15, 2001) (Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government); Afghanistan: Bonn Agreement, supra note 145, §1(4).

147 East Timor: UN Doc. UNTAET/REG/2001/2, supra note 146; Kosovo: UN Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/9, supra note 146; Afghanistan: Bonn Agreement, supra note 145, § 1(6).

148 But note, as regards UN authorization, SC Res. 1500 (Aug. 14, 2003) (welcoming establishment of Governing Council of Iraq); SC Res. 1511 (Oct. 16, 2003) (welcoming establishment of preparatory constitutional committee); SC Res. 1546 (June 8, 2004) (endorsing proposed framework for transition).

149 (1) Mandate: SC Res. 1483 (May 22, 2003) (recognizing the United Kingdom and the United States as occupying forces under unified command (“the Authority”))- (2) Transitional government: CPA Reg. 6 (July 13, 2003), available at <http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/index.html> (establishing the Governing Council of Iraq (GCI) as the principal body of the Iraqi interim administration with a consultative role); Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, Mar. 8, 2004, at <http://www.cpa-iraq.gov/government/TAL.html> (providing for vesting an Iraqi interim government consisting of a president, prime minister, and cabinet of ministers with full sovereignty [hereinafter Transitional Administrative Law]); CPA Reg. 9 (June 9, 2004), available at CPA Reg. 6 Web site, supra (dissolving the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)). (3) Elections: Transitional Administrative Law, supra (elections held on January 30, 2005). (4) New Constitution: Text of the Draft Iraqi Constitution, available at <http://iraqigovernment.org/constitution_en.htm> (draft approved October 15, 2005).

150 Kenneth, W. Abbott & Snidal, Duncan, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 Int’l Org. 421, 428–29 (2000)Google Scholar (citing FRANCK, supra note 83).

151 Id.

152 See, e.g., Angola: Lusaka Protocol, supra note 47; Democratic Republic of Congo: Ceasefire Agreement, supra note 47; El Salvador: Peace Agreement, Jan. 16, 1992, El Sal.-FMLN, UN Doc. A/46/864-S/23501, annex (1992), available at <http://www.usip.org/library/pa/html>.

153 Fortna, supra note 13.

154 Wat 20. 155 Lusaka Protocol, supra note 47, Annex 3; DPA, supra note 41, Annex 1A; Lomé Agreement, supra note 29, Annex 1.

156 Burundi Peace Agreement, supra note 29, Protocol II, ch. II; Interim Const., supra note 29, ch. 15.

157 Burundi Peace Agreement, supra note 29; Belfast Agreement, supra note 29; Interim Const., supra note 29; DPA, supra note 41; Bougainville Peace Agreement, supra note 53.

158 General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, supra note 47; Guatemala Peace Agreement, supra note 31; El Salvador Agreement, supra note 31.

159 DPA, supra note 41, Annex 4, Art. 2; El Salvador Agreement on Human Rights, supra note 64, Art. 1; Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, Mar. 29, 1994, Guat.-URNG-UN, Art. 3.2, available at <http://www. usip.org/library/pa.html>.

160 Bangura, Yusuf, Strategic Policy Failure and Governance in Sierra Leone, 38 J. Mod. Afr. Stud. 551, 564 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Clapham, supra note 5; International Crisis Group, Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years After The Peace Agreement (Europe Report No. 80, 1999)Google Scholar, available at <http://www.icg.org>.

161 Clapham, supra note 5.

162 See Ben, D. Mor, Peace Initiatives and Public Opinion: The Domestic Context of Conflict Resolution, 34 J. Peace Res. 197 (1997)Google Scholar.

163 See In re Application by de Brun and McGuinness for Judicial Review, [2001] NIQB 3.

164 Cf. Guelke, Adrian, South Africa In Transition: A Misunderstood Miracle (1999)Google Scholar (arguing that South Africa’s Interim Constitution has been misunderstood as a constitutional compromise between majority and minority communities, with the strongest restraints on majority power expressly transitional). Note, however, that it can be argued that on occasion the ANC felt politically constrained to work within the existing constitution rather than to amend it unilaterally.

165 Cf. Schneckener, supra note 13 (arguing that the key to long-term success of peace agreements lies in institutional design aimed at enabling elite leadership and cooperation).

166 Burundi Peace Agreement, supra note 29, Protocol I, ch. I; South Africa Amendment Act, supra note 121, § 13, Art. XXXIV; Belfast Agreement, supra note 29; Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, pmbl., supra note 50.

167 Cf. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 150.

168 See SC Res. 1325,¶15 (Oct. 31, 2000); Women, Peace and Security, supra note 3, ¶ 63; Principles to Combat Impunity, supra note 3, princ. 6 (recommending broad consultation on the composition of truth commissions), princ. 32 (reparations procedures), princ. 35 (institutional reforms aimed at preventing recurrence of violations); see also The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, supra note 3, ¶ 64(h).

169 See Hampson, supra note 9; Bell, Christine, Peace Agreements and Human Rights: Implications for the UN, in The UN, Human Rights and Post-Conflict Situations 241, 246–48 (Nigel, D. White & Klaasen, Dirk eds., 2005)Google Scholar.

170 See sources cited supra note 169.

171 Abbott et al., supra note 17, at 404.

172 Examples are numerous. See, e.g., DPA, supra note 41 (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and the European Union as witnesses); Lomé Agreement, supra note 29, Art. 34 (Togo, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Commonwealth of Nations as moral guarantors); Tashkent Declaration, supra note 24 (the United Nations as observer).

173 See preliminary discussion of contemporary treaty guarantees in Wippman, supra note 15, passim; Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy In International Law 193-94 (2000). Cf. Ress, Georg, Guarantee, in 2 Encyclopedia Of Public International Law 626 (Bernhardt, Rudolf ed., 1995)Google Scholar; Ress, Georg, Guarantee Treaties, in id. at 634 Google Scholar (discussing guarantees and treaties of guarantee and their implications for state obligations). But see Kallon, supra note 81,¶41 (where Special Court interpreted third-party signatures as evidence that those parties were “moral guarantors” that “assumed no legal obligation”).

174 Peceny, Mark & Stanley, William, Liberal Social Reconstruction and the Resolution of Civil Wars in Central America, 55 Int’l Org. 149, 151 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. But see Paris, Roland, The Perils of Liberal International Peace building, 22 Int’l Security 54 (1997)Google Scholar (criticizing the same strategy for contributing to instability in war-torn societies).

175 Peceny & Stanley, supra note 174; see also Ellen, L. Lutz & Sikkink, Kathryn, International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America, 54 Int’l Org. 633 (2000)Google Scholar.

176 UN Press Release SG/SM/7257, supra note 3.

177 See Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/1999/836, ¶ 54.

178 See Kallon, supra note 81, ¶89.

179 The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, supra note 3,¶13.

180 General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, supra note 47; Accord, Mar. 9, 1990, Colom.-political parties- M-19-Catholic Church (in the capacity of a moral and spiritual guide for the process), available at <http://www. c-r.org/accord/col/accordl4/keytext.shtml>.

181 Dinis, S. Sengulane & Jaime, Pedro Goncalvesyl Calling for Peace: Christian Leaders and the Quest for Reconciliation in Mozambique, in The Mozambican Peace Process In Perspective, Accord, 1998 (Armon, Jeremy, Hendrikson, Dylan, & Vines, Alex eds.)Google Scholar, available at <http://www.c-r.org/accord/moz/accord3/index.shtml>.

182 Kooijmans, supra note 14.

183 See Gleditsch & Beardsley, supra note 10 (showing how the different parties were affected by transnational input to the peace processes in Central America).

184 &r Korhonen, Outi, International Governance in Post-conflict Situations, 14 Leiden J. Int’l L. 495 (2001)Google Scholar; Wilde, Ralph, From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administration, 95 AJIL 583 (2001)Google Scholar [hereinafter Wilde, Danzig to East Timor]; Wilde, Ralph, Representing International Territorial Administration: A Critique of Some Approaches, 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 71 (2004)Google Scholar [hereinafter Wilde, Representing ITA].

185 Cf Campbell, Harvey, & Ní Aoláin, supra note 14, passim (arguing that the Belfast Agreement should be seen as a hybrid domestic and international law instrument); Laura, A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AJIL 295 (2003)Google Scholar (discussion of hybrid courts and tribunals).

186 D P A , supra note 41, Annex 1A (Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement); Cambodia Political Settlement, supra note 114, Annex 2 (Withdrawal, Ceasefire, and Related Measures).

187 See William, G. O’Neill, Reform of Law Enforcement Agencies and the Judiciary ¶¶ 19–24 (Int’l Council on Hum. Rts. Pol’y working paper, 2005)Google Scholar, at <http://www.ichrp.org>.

188 See, e.g., DPA, supra note 41, Annex 7, Art. 1; Burundi Peace Agreement, supra note 29, Protocol IV, ch. 3, Art. 17; Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons, Georgia-Abkhazia- Russ.-UNHCR, Apr. 4, 1994, available a* ACCORD, supra note 53; Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Aug. 18, 2003, Liber.-Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)-Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)- political parties, Art. 12 [hereinafter Liberia Peace Agreement]; Cotonou Agreement, July 25, 1993, Liber, interim gov’t-National Patriotic Front of Liber .-United Liberation Movement of Liber, for Democracy- ECOWAS-UN, pt. Ill, §F, Art. 18, UN Doc. S/26272 (1993); Economic Community of West African States Six- Month Peace Plan for Sierra Leone (23 October 1997-22 April 1998), Oct. 23, 1997, ECOWAS-Armed Forces Revolutionary Council regime of Sierra Leone-UN-OAU, Art. 4. The latter three agreements are available online at <http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html>.

189 See, e.g., Lusaka Protocol, supra note 47, Annex 3.11.10; DPA, supra note 41, Annex 1, Art. 9; Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, Oct. 23, 1991, Art. 13, 31 ILM 174 (1992); Cambodia Political Settlement, supra note 114, pt. XI; Democratic Republic of the Congo: Ceasefire Agreement, supra note 47, Art. 3(9); General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, supra note 47, Protocol VI(3); Agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament (Supplement to the General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993), Jan. 15, 1993, Somali movements and parties, Art. 4, available at <http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html>.

190 See, e.g., DPA, supra note 41, Annex 3 (provides for Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to oversee elections); Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (Erdut Agreement), Nov. 12, 1995, Croat.-Local Serb Community, UN Doc. A/50/757-S/1995/951, annex, Art. 12, 35 ILM 184 (1996) (OSCE and United Nations, other international organizations, and interested states requested to oversee elections); Agreement between Guinea Bissau and the Self-Proclaimed Military Junta, Nov. 1, 1998, Art. 5, available at <http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html> (ECOWAS, Community of Portuguese-speaking countries, and the international community to observe elections); Liberia Peace Agreement, supra note 188, Art. IX (United Nations, OAU, ECOWAS, and nations elsewhere to be requested to monitor elections); General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, supra note 47, Protocol III (United Nations, OAU, and other agreed organizations to monitor elections).

191 See, e.g., Burundi Peace Agreement, supra note 29, Protocol I, Art. 6 (delegating decision on establishing international criminal tribunal to the UN Security Council). But cf. SC Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone, despite provision for it not being included in the terms of the Lomé Agreement); SC Res. 827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, even though it was not explicitly provided for in the DPA).

192 See International Labour Organization, Report of the Committee Set up to Examine the Representation Alleging Non-observance by Mexico of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), Made Under Article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Authentic Workers’ Front (FAT) (2004), available at <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newcountryframeE.htm> (where ILO examined the complaint as regards the Convention through the framework of the San Andrés Larráinzar Agreements between the ELZN and the Mexican government, supra note 50, which were based on this Convention).

193 See Burundi Peace Agreement, supra note 29, Protocol I, Art. 6.

194 See generally Korhonen, supra note 184.

195 See Mor, supra note 165; Stedman, supra note 13.

196 See Ian, S. Lustick, Ending Protracted Conflicts: The Oslo Peace Process Between Political Partnership and Legality, 30 Cornell Int’l L.J. 741 (1997)Google Scholar.

197 See Motion for a Resolution Tabled for the Debate on Cases of Breaches of Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law Pursuant to Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure by Luigi Vinci on Sri Lanka, Eur. Parl. Doc. PE 338.629 (2003), at <http://www.europarl.eu.int/activities/archive/motion/search.do?language=EN>.

198 See Whyte, Nicholas, Macedonia: Not out of the Woods Yet, International Crisis Group Update Briefing (Feb. 25, 2005)Google Scholar, at <http://www.crisisgroup.org>; Devasish Roy, The International Character of Treaties with Indigenous Peoples and Implementation Challenges for Intra-State Peace and Autonomy Agreements Between Indigenous Peoples and States: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh at 3, UN Doc. HR/Geneva/TSIP/Sem/2003/BP.8, available at <http://www.unhcr.ch/indigenous/treaties.htm>.

199 Cf. Campbell, Harvey, & Ní Aoláin, supra note 14, at 326-28 (arguing that the Belfast Agreement must be read as a “hybrid” international/domestic agreement).

200 DPA, supra note 41, Annex 10, Art. V.

201 Belfast Agreement, supra note 29, Annexes A, B, respectively; El Salvador: Peace Agreement, supra note 152, ch. 2, Art. 3(B) (providing for international legal advisory services for police monitoring); Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society, Sept. 19, 1996, Guat.-URNG-UN, pt. IV, ¶ 36 ILM 304 (urging international community to provide technical and financial assistance with police reform).

202 Belfast Agreement, supra note 29, “Validation, Implementation and Review.”

203 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993 Google Scholar, Isr.-PLO, Art. X, 32 ILM 1525 (1993) [hereinafter Declaration of Principles].

204 See, e.g., Addis Ababa Agreement Concluded at the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, Mar. 27, 1993, Somali Movements and Parties, pt. V, available at <http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html>.

205 See, e.g., Declaration of Principles, supra note 203, Art. VII.

206 Cf. Harold Koh, Hongju, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 Yalel.J. 2599 (1997)Google Scholar; McCrudden, Christopher, Human Rights Codes for Transnational Corporations: The Sullivan and MacBride Principles, in Commitment and Compliance, supra note 70, at 418 Google Scholar.

207 Karyn, S. Weinberg, Equity in International Arbitration: How Fair is “Fair”? A Study of Lex Mercatoria and Amiable Composition, 12 B.U. Int’ll.J. 227 (1994)Google Scholar; cf. Derek, W. Bowett, Claims Between States and Private Entities: The Twilight Zone of International Law, 35 Cath. U. L. Rev. 929 (1986)Google Scholar; Fatouros, A. A., International Law and the Internationalized Contract, 74 AJIL 134 (1980)Google Scholar.

208 Fatouros, supra note 207.

209 Cf. Ratner, supra note 15, at 43-50 (noting that the most recent phase of UN peacekeeping related to negotiated agreements involves both “preserving” and “promoting” the settlement, id. at 44).

210 DPA, supra note 41, Annex 4, Art. 6 (Constitutional Court), Annex 6, Art. 7 (Human Rights Chamber); Interim Const., supra note 29, ch. 5, Art. 71; see also In re Certification of Constitution, supra note 104, 1996 (4) SA 774 (CC), 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC); Burundi Peace Agreement, supra note 29, Protocol II, ch. 2, Art. 15(5) (similar provision).

211 See, e.g., DPA, supra note 41, Annex 4, Art. IV(3)(f).

212 See, e.g., id., Annex 1A, Art. 8; Cambodia Political Settlement, supra note 114, Annex 2, Art. 2 (providing for Mixed Military Working Group to be established to resolve problems arising in the observance of the cease-fire).

213 See, e.g., Burundi Peace Agreement, supra note 29, Protocol III, ch. 3, Art. 27; Bougainville Peace Agreement, supra note 53, pt. E.

214 See notes 144-49 supra and corresponding text.

215 But note that the distinction can also be viewed as one of degree, as peace agreements have in part developed common practices through transnational contacts, while in the commercial law setting common legal practices respond to a notion of the “illegitimacy” of national laws, albeit in a very different context.

216 Bell, Christine, Campbell, Colm, & Fionnuala, Ní Aoláin, Justice Discourses in Transition, 13 Soc. Legal Stud. 305, 309 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

217 See generally Wilde, Danzig to East Timor, supra note 184; Wilde, Representing ITA, supra note 184.

218 See sources cited supra note 184.

219 See, e.g., Andreas, F. Lowenfeld, Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator’s View, in Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration 71, 84–85 (Thomas, E. Carbonneaued., rev. ed. 1998)Google Scholar (explaining that the concept of lex mercatoria “is not that of a self-contained system covering all aspects of international commercial law to the exclusion of national law, but rather... a source of law made up of custom, practice, convention, precedent—and many national laws”); see also Claire Cutler, A., Private Power And Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law In The Global Political Economy 16 (2003)Google Scholar.

220 U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: Rwanda (Mar. 2006), at <http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.htm#gov>.

221 Koh, supra note 206, at 2646.

222 Id. (Koh identifies this process as having three main dynamics: interaction (between transnational actors and parties); interpretation (of the application of legal norms); and internalization (of legal norms). He argues that this theory synthesizes, rather than replaces, other theories of compliance.)

223 Cf. id. at 2651-54 (using Oslo Accords as an example, Koh argues that transnational legal processes tied the antipeace-process Netanyahu into the Oslo framework to the point where he even signed and complied with a further agreement).

224 Koh’s account of the role of transnational legal process in the Oslo Accords itself illustrates this difficulty, id. at 2653, as it can be argued that the agreements signed by Netanyahu in fact operated to dismantle key Oslo understandings rather than to implement them.

225 Cutler, supra note 219; Lowenfeld, supra note 219.

226 See Brian, Z. Tamanaha, A Non-essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J. L. & Soc. 296 (2000)Google Scholar (review of nature of pluralist approaches to what constitutes “law”).

227 Klabbers, supra note 63; Catherine, Brölmann, A Flat Earth? International Organisations in the System of International Law, 70 Nordic J. Int’l L. 319 (2001)Google Scholar; cf. Malanczuk, Multinational Enterprises, supra note 61 (discussing whether internationalized contracts evidence a revision of international law).

228 See Thomas, M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AJIL 46 (1992)Google Scholar.

229 See, e.g., Burundi Peace Agreement, supra note 29 (signed by a range of political parties as well as armed opposition groups); see also Dili Peace Accord, Apr. 21, 1999 (signed by the National Council of Timorese Resistance and Falantil, and the Pro-integration Party); cf. South Africa National Peace Accord, Sept. 14, 1991, available at <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/sa4.pdf> (signed by ANC and National Party government, and a range of forty parties, including civic actors).

230 See, e.g., Peceny & Stanley, supra note 174; Sambanis, Nicholas, Using Case Studies to Expand of Civil War, 2 Persp. on Pol. 259 (2004)Google Scholar; see also Licklider, supra note 16, at 685 (discussing difficulties with definitions and research design).

231 See, e.g., Peceny & Stanley, supra note 174; Sambanis, supra note 230; cf. Licklider, supra note 16.

232 See, e.g., Fortna, supra note 13; Licklider, supra note 16; Walter, supra note 10.

233 The case study approaches do provide some process analysis. See Sambanis, supra note 230 (critiquing World Bank, supra note 11); cf. Bekoe, supra note 13.

234 Boaventura de, Sousa Santos, Law and Democracy: (Mis)trustingthe Global Reform of Courts, in Globalising Institutions: Case Studies In Regulation And Innovation 253 (Jenson, Jane & Boaventura de, Sousa Santos eds., 2000)Google Scholar.

235 See Bertram, Eva, Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of United Nations Peace Building, 39 J. Conflict Resol. 401 (1995)Google Scholar.

236 See sources cited supra note 184.

237 For evidence of the potential of “organizational” tools to promote common practice without articulating norms, see U.S. Dep’t of State, Post-conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix (Apr. 1, 2005), at <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/52959.htm> (note, however, caveats in the preface as regards the need to be appropriate for context). See Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit, Post Conflict Stabilisation: Improving the United Kingdom’s Contribution (Autumn 2004), at <http://www.postconflict.gov.uk/consultation/>.

238 Cf. Bell, supra note 2, at 320; Berman, Nathaniel, The International Law of Nationalism: Group Identity and Legal History, in International Law and Ethnic Conflict, supra note 4, at 25 Google Scholar.

239 See sources cited supra note 238.