1 In re Arbitration (Guy./Surin), para. 392 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Sept. 17, 2007), available at <http://www.pca-cpa.org>; see also Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 ICJ Rep. 13, 56, para. 78 (June 3); McRae, D. M. Proportionality and the Gulf of Maine Maritime Boundary Dispute, 1981 Can. Y.B. Int’l L. 287, 290.Google Scholar

2 Prosecutor v. Galić, No. IT-98-29-A, at 204-05, paras. 6-7 (Nov. 30, 2006) (Meron, J., sep. & partially diss. op.).

3 Enzo Cannizzaro, Il Principio Della Proporzionalitá Nell’ordinamento Internazionale 481 (2000) (Eng. summary); see also Enzo, Cannizzaro Contextualizing Proportionality. jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the Lebanese War , Int’l Rev. Red Cross, No. 864, Dec. 2006, at 779.Google Scholar

4 Thomas, M. Franck The Power Of Legitimacy Among Nations 45-46 (1990).Google Scholar

5 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14 (June 27).

6 Id. at 127, para. 249.

7 Id. at 122, para. 237.

8 Id.

9 Id. at 103, para. 194.

10 Judge Schwebel defends the proportionality of U.S. countermeasures in his magisterial dissenting opinion, id. at 269-70, 514-21, paras. 7, 9, 201-14. Some authorities take the position that the real test of legality is always and fundamentally “the well-established requirement of necessity and proportionality.” John Norton, Moore The Secret Warin Central America and the Future of World Order , 80 AJIL 43, 107 (1986)Google Scholar.

11 For example, American assistance to Salvadoran counterinsurgency efforts would presumably have been legal, insofar as these were deployed inside El Salvador.

12 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) (Int’l Ct. Justice Dec. 19, 2005), available at <http://www.icj-cij.org>.

13 Id, para. 146.

14 Id, para. 147.

15 Id.

16 In both cases, the ICJ also established its right to render a “second opinion” as to the proportionality of the actual countermeasures taken (the jus in bello). The Charter’s text, however, while limiting the right to initiate military hostilities, says nothing about an obligation to apply proportionality once hostilities have begun. For an application of that principle to the jus in bello, it is necessary to look elsewhere (see the next section below).

17 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, supra note 12, Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans at 7, para. 31. To the same effect, see id., Separate Opinion of Judge Simma at 3, para. 13.

18 Thomas, Hurka Proportionality in the Morality of War , 33 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 34, 44 (2005).Google Scholar

19 Id.; see also E. Thomas, Sullivan The Doctrine of Proportionality in a Time of War , 16 Minn. J. Int’l L. 457 (2007).Google Scholar

20 Documents on the Laws of War 29 (Adam, Roberts & Richard, Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989)Google Scholar. As to the Manu code, see also Patrick, Olivelle The Law Code of Manu 112-13 (2004)Google Scholar; Patrick, Olivelle Dharmaūtras, The Law Codes Of Ancient India 159 (1999)Google Scholar; and Armour, W. S. Customs of Warfare in Ancient India , 8 Grotius Soc’y Transactions, Problems of Peace and War 71, 72–77 (1922).Google Scholar

21 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 1 AJIL Supp. 95 (1907).Google Scholar

22 Id.

23 Declaration (IV, 2) Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899, 1 AJIL Supp. 157 (1907)Google Scholar.

24 Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899, 1 AJIL Supp. 155 (1907).Google Scholar

25 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 UNTS 137, 19 ILM 1524 (1980).

26 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 ILM 1507 (1997).

27 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 UST 583, 1015 UNTS 164.

28 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. NO. 21, 103d Cong. (1993), 1974 UNTS 45.

29 Convention [No. IV] Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.

30 Convention [No. IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287.

31 William, J. Fenrick The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare , 98 Mil. L. Rev. 91, 91 (1982).Google Scholar

32 Id. at 127.

33 Id. at 122.

34 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].

35 Id., Arts. 48, 51(4). An important decision regarding the indiscriminate deployment of a weapon is that rendered by the German Federal Constitutional Court in 2006, stipulating that an armed forces authorization to shoot down any aircraft intended to be used against human lives (i.e., one that was hijacked by terrorists to be used as a weapon) is incompatible with the constitutional guarantee of the right to life (Art. 2.2, sentence 1 of the Basic Law) and Article 1.1’s guarantee of human dignity to the extent that it fails to distinguish between perpetrators and persons on board the aircraft who are not participants in the crime. Bundesverfassungsgericht, Feb. 15, 2006, No. 1 BvR 357/05, available at <http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20060215_lbvr035705en.html>.

36 Protocol I, supra note 34, Arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii).

37 Fenrick, supra note 31, at 97.

38 Id. at 104.

39 See Antonio, Cassese Weapons Causing Unnecessary Suffering: Are They Prohibited? 58 Rlvista di Diritto Internazionale 12, 15 (1975)Google Scholar; Stefan, Oeter Methods and Means of ‘Combat, in The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts 105, 114, para. 401 (Dieter, Fleck et al. eds., 1999).Google Scholar

40 ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 AUGUST 1949, at 392, para. 1389 (Yves, Sandoz Christophe, Swinarski & Bruno, Zimmermann eds., 1987).Google Scholar

41 Id. at 396, para. 1395.

42 Id. at 404, para. 1418.

43 Id. at 409, para. 1430.

44 Id. at 477, para. 1598.

45 Judith Gail, Gardam Proportionality and Force in International Law , 87 AJIL 391, 391 (1993)Google Scholar [hereinafter Gardam, Proportionality and Force]; see also Judith, Gail Gardam Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States 13 (2004)Google Scholar (wherein she points out that the principle applies not only to the use of force by states in self-defense, but also to the authorization by the Security Council of collective use of force by member states constituting a “coalition of the willing”).

46 Gardam, Proportionality and Force, supra note 45, at 391.

47 Oliver O’donovan, The Just War Revisited 48 (2003).

48 Id.

49 Id. at 49.

50 Theodor, Meron Bloody Constraint: War And Chivalry In Shakespeare (1998).Google Scholar

51 O’Donovan, supra note 47, at 62.

52 Id.

53 For a close examination of these events and of the modern doctrinal origins of proportionality, see John, E. Noyes The Caroline: International Law Limits on Resort to Force, in International Law Stories 263 (John, E. Noyes Laura, A. Dickinson & Mark, W. Janis eds., 2007).Google Scholar

54 Jennings, R.Y. The Caroline and McLeod Cases , 32 AJIL 82, 89 (1938)Google Scholar (quoting letter of Daniel Webster to British minister Henry S. Fox, Apr. 24, 1841, 29 Brit. Foreign & St. Papers 1129).

55 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Commentary to Art. 21, para. 4, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 74, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001 /Add. 1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility] (quoting Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ Rep. 226, para. 30 (July 8)).

56 Christopher Greenwood, Command and the Laws of Armed Conflict 24 (Strategic Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper No. 4, 1993).Google Scholar

57 Hurka, supra note 18, at 59.

58 Addendum—Eighth Report on State Responsibility, para. 121, UN Doc. A/CN.4/318/Adds.5–7 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 1, at 13, 69–70, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.l (Part 1).

59 Naulilaa(Port. v. Ger.),4Ann. Dig. 274,274–75 (Spec. Arb.Trib. 1928), 2 R.I.A.A. 1011,1028 (in French).

60 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 55.

61 Id. at 266, para. 105(2)(E). For an analysis of the interpretative dangers to which this opinion opens the door, see W. Michael, Reisman Holding the Center of the Law of Armed Conflict , 100 AJIL 852, 859 (2006).Google Scholar

62 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 55, at 257, para. 78; see also supra note 35.

6 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 55, para. 79.

64 Id., para. 78.

65 Michael, N. Schmitt Fault Lines in the Law of Attack, in Testing the Boundaries of International Humanitarian Law 277, 293 (Susan, C. Breau & Agnieszka, Jachec-Neale eds., 2006).Google Scholar

66 The Tokyo District Court, in the Shimoda case, heard a claim against the postwar Japanese government (as surrogates for the United States) by plaintiffs who had been injured in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While the court held for the defendant on other grounds, it did find that the atomic bombings were disproportionate, focusing on the absence of military targets in both cities and ignoring the Japanese government’s plea that the tactic had shortened the war and thus reduced the number of casualties. Shimoda v. State, 355 Hanrei Jiho 17 (1963), translated in 8 Jap. Ann. Int’l L. 231, 240 (1964), available at <http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat>..>Google Scholar

67 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 ICJ Rep. 161 (Nov. 6).

68 Id. at 174–76, paras. 22–26 (quoting Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, U.S.-Iran, Art. X(l), Aug. 15, 1955, 8 UST 899, 284 UNTS 93).

69 Id. at 179, para. 32.

70 Id. at 182, para. 41.

71 Id. at 183, para. 43.

72 Id. at 187, para. 51.

73 Id. at 196, para. 73.

74 Id.

75 Id. at 198, para. 76.

76 Id.

77 Id. at 198–99, para. 77.

78 Id. at 218, para. 125(1).

79 Id. at 233–35, paras. 30–39 (Higgins, J., sep. op.).

80 Id. at 285, para. 37 (Buergenthal, J., sep. op.).

81 In re List (Hostages Trial, 1948), 8 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 34, 69 (1949).Google Scholar

82 SC Res. 678, para. 2 (Nov. 29, 1990).

83 See Statement of Sir David Hannay (UK), UN Doc. S/PV.2977 (Part II) (closed), at 72 (Feb. 14, 1991).

84 Judge Roberto Ago, in his previous capacity as rapporteur on the International Law Commission’s project to draft articles on state responsibility, tended to the former of these positions. See Addendum—Eighth Report on State Responsibility, supra note 58, at 69.

85 Id., para. 120 (emphasis added).

86 Identical Letters Dated 2006/07/12 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2006/515-A/60/937.

87 Humanitarian Factsheets on Lebanon, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Press Releases IHA/1215 (Aug. 11, 2006), IHA/1216 (Aug. 14, 2006).

88 Security Council Calls for End to Hostilities Between Hizbollah, Israel, Press Release SC/8808 (Aug. 11, 2006).

89 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Responding to Hizbullah Attacks from Lebanon: Issues of Proportionality, Legal Background (July 25, 2006), available at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Law/LegaHIssues+and+Rulings> (quoting 2 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law 415 (Lauterpachted, H.., 7th ed. 1952)Google Scholar).

90 UN Doc. S/PV.5489 (July 14, 2006); UN Doc. S/PV.5493 (July 21, 2006).

91 Secretary-General Says ‘Immediate Cessation of Hostilities’ Needed in Lebanon, Press Release SC/8781 (July 20, 2006).

92 Dr. Kim Howells MP (UK), Statement, House of Commons Debate (July 17, 2006), available at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmhansrd.htm>.

93 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the Period from 21 January 2006 to 18 July 2006), UN Doc. S/2006/560 (July 21, 2006).

94 Identical Letters Dated 2006/07/17 from the Chargé d’ Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2006/529-A/60/941; UN Doc. S/PV.5493, supra note 90; see also Andreas, Zimmermann The Second Lebanon War: Jus ad bellum, jus in bello and the Issue of Proportionality , 2007 Max Planck Y.B. UN L. 99, available at <http://www.mpil.de/ww/en/pub/news.cfm>..>Google Scholar

95 Press Release SC/8781, supra note 91. Among those asserting disproportionality, in addition to the Arab states, were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Djibouti, France, India, New Zealand, and Switzerland, but not the United Kingdom or the United States, which, together with Israel, asserted that the war was to be seen as part of the larger war on terror. Press Release SC/8808, supra note 88; UN Doc. S/PV.5493, supra note 90, at 4–5.

96 Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council,” Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1, UN Doc. A/HRC/3/2 (Nov. 23, 2006).

97 Id. at 5, para. 25 (singling out attacks on civilians in this regard); see also id. at 71, para. 317.

98 Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict at 8, para. 26, UN Doc. S/2007/643 (Oct. 28, 2007).

99 Paul, Reynolds Q&A: Mid-East War Crimes? BBC News, July 21, 2006, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5198342.stm>Google Scholar.

100 Richard, Cohen Op-Ed, …No, It’s Survival , Wash. Post, July 25, 2006, at A15Google Scholar. For a discussion of proportionality in the context of the Israeli war against Hezbollah in 2006, see ASIL Newsletter, Sept./Oct. 2006, at 1, 4–5, 12.Google Scholar

101 Zimmermann, supra note 94, at 127–30.

102 Steven, Erlanger Book Faults Israeli Air War in Lebanon , N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 2007, at A14Google Scholar (a prepublication report excerpting the study, William, M. Arkin Divining Victory: Airpower in The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War (2007)Google Scholar).

103 9 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law NO. 10, Nuernberg, October 1946-APRIL 1949 (1950).

104 Id, United States v. Alfried Krupp, Case 10, at 1443 (U.S. Mil. Trib. Ill 1948).

105 Krupp, id. at 1444–45.

106 Id. at 1445.

107 Id.

108 ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia paras. 71–79 (June 8, 2000), reprinted in 39 ILM 1257 (2000) [hereinafter ICTY Final Report]. On June 2, 2000, the prosecutor announced her decision not to take the issue to the Security Council. UN Doc. S/PV.4150, at 3 (June 2, 2000).

109 ICTY Final Report supra n o t e 1 08, 39 ILM at 1271, para. 48.

110 Schmitt, supra note 65, at 297; see ICTY Final Report, supra note 108, at 1272, para. 52.

111 ICTY Final Report ; supra note 108, at 1279, para. 77.

112 Id. at 1278–79, paras. 75–77.

113 Id. at 1273, para. 56.

114 Id. at 1276–77, para. 70. “But,” according to David Kennedy,

David Kennedy, of War and Law 143 (2006); see also Implementing Limitations on the Use of Force: The Doctrine of Proportionality and Necessity , 86 ASIL Proc. 39 (1992)Google Scholar (discussion by Oscar Schachter, at 39; Françoise Hampson, at 45; Yoram Dinstein, at 54; Ruth Wedgwood, at 58).

115 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, No. IT-95–16-T-14, para. 535 (Jan. 14, 2000).

116 Id., para. 524. “The basic obligation to spare civilians and civilian objects as much as possible must guide the attacking party when considering the proportionality of an attack.” Prosecutor v. Galić, No. IT-98–29-T, para. 58 (Dec. 5, 2003); see also Yoram, Dlnstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict 119–29 (2004)Google Scholar (including a nuanced discussion of the law’s evolution, leading to the conclusion that” [n]owadays, customary international law recognizes the principle of proportionality” as applicable to attacks on, or collateral damage to, civilians in armed conflict, id. at 120).

117 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, supra note 115, para. 524.

118 See text at note 81 supra.

119 Prosecutor v. Galić, supra note 116, para. 58.

120 Another “objective criterion” has been proposed: “how a reasonable commander should have determined whether there existed military necessity.” Yusuf, Aksar Implementing International Humanitarian Law: From The AD HOC Tribunals to a Permanent International Criminal Court 170 (2004).Google Scholar

121 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, No. IT-95–14/2-A, para. 426 (Dec. 17, 2004).

122 Id., para. 686 (quoting Professor Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, supra note 39, at 1, 30, para. 130Google Scholar).

123 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter bars states “from the threat or use of force” without specifying a distinction between military and nonmilitary force. It may be surmised that this ban was intended to apply to military force, despite efforts by some to have it be applicable to all force. For a discussion of this point, see Nikolas, Sturchler The Threat of Force in International Law 44–52 (2007)Google Scholar. In the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ expressed the view that a demonstration of naval force by Britain in the territorial waters of Albania, when provoked by mine laying, and deploying no actual recourse to military force, did not constitute a violation of Article 2(4) because it was not intended to exercise political pressure on Albania but merely to sweep mines. Corfu Channel (UK v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 ICJ Rep. 4 (Apr. 9).

124 See supra note 55.

125 Id, Art. 35.

126 Id.

127 Id., Art. 35(b).

128 Id., Commentary to Art. 36, para. 4.

129 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 55, Art. 37(1).

130 Id., Commentary to Art. 37(3) (quoting the tribunal in the Rainbow Warrior arbitration to the effect that “a long established practice of States and international Courts and Tribunals of using satisfaction as a remedy…. relates particularly to the case of moral or legal damage done directly to the State, especially as opposed to the case of damage to persons involving international responsibilities,” Rainbow Warrior (NZ/Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 217, 272- 73, para. 122 (1990)).

131 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 ICJ Rep. 7 (Sept. 25).

132 Id. at 56, para. 85.

133 Id.

134 Id, para. 87.

135 Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417 (1978) [hereinafter Air Services Agreement].

136 For a full discussion, see Lori Fisler, Damrosch Retaliation or Arbitration—or Both? The 1978 United States- France Aviation Dispute , 74 AJIL 785, 791 (1980).Google Scholar

137 Air Services Agreement, supra note 135, at 443, para. 83.

138 Id. at 443–44, para. 83.

139 Damrosch, supra note 136, at 792.

140 Air Services Agreement, supra note 135, at 444, para. 83.

141 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 ICJ Rep. 136 (July 9).Google Scholar

142 Id. at 164, para. 66.

143 Id. at 170, para. 84.

144 Id. at 170–71, para. 85.

145 Id. at 195, para. 140.

146 Id. (citing Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 55, Art. 25).

147 Id. (quoting Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 131, at 40, para. 51).

148 HCJ 8414/05, Yassin v. Israel (Sept. 4,2007), excerpted in Israel Ministry of Justice, Dep’t for Human Rights and Foreign Relations, The Security Fence 5, para. 14, available at <http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/8FE32643–48F4–4FD5-BC15-F35ED83B232B/0/AnswerSecurityFence.pdf>; see also Isabel, Kershner Israel’s Top Court Orders Separation Barrier Rerouted , N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 2007, at A3.Google Scholar

149 HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel (June 30, 2004), 43 ILM 1099, 1121, paras. 60–61 (2004).

150 See notes 153 & 154 infra. The concept of proportionality is also incorporated in Article 52(1) of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, and Article 5 of the as yet unadopted European Constitutional Treaty, and it affects the jurisprudence of both the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice. This regional jurisprudence will be summarized below.

Special thanks go to Professor Steve Charnovitz of the AJIL Board of Editors for helping the author find a path through the WTO regulatory thicket.

151 Note that the term “countermeasure” in the WTO agreement is reserved for authorized retaliation following a violation of WTO rules regarding prohibited or actionable subsidies. Nevertheless, that term has been used in a broader way in some W TO arbitrations to refer to retaliation under the DSU rather than in the narrow textual way it is used in the SCM Agreement. In this article, the term “countermeasure” will be used to refer to any retaliation authorized by the WTO. See Andrew, D. Mitchell Proportionality and Remedies in WTO Disputes , 17 Eur.J. Int’l L. 985 (2006)Google Scholar; Thomas, Sebastian World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment of Proportionality: Equivalence and Appropriateness , 48 Harv. Int’l L.J. 337 (2007).Google Scholar

152 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes [hereinafter DSU], Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 2, 1869 UNTS 401, in World Trade Organization, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 354 (1999)Google Scholar [hereinafter The Legal Texts], reprinted in 33 ILM 1226 (1994)Google Scholar. The WTO documents cited in this article are available at the organization’s Web site, <http://www.wto.org>.

153 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Arts. 7.9, 7.10, WTO Agreement, supra note 152, Annex 1A, 1869 UNTS 14, in The Legal Texts 231 (1999) [hereinafter SCM Agreement].

154 W., Arts. 4.10, 7.9.

155 Id., Arts. 4.10 n.9, 4.11 n.10.

156 E.g., Decision by the Arbitrator, Canada—Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, Recourse to Arbitration by Canada Under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, paras. 3.9, 3.11, 3.38, WT/DS222/ARB (adopted Feb. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Canada—Aircraft].

157 Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Recourse by European Communities to Arbitration Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, para. 7.1, WT/DS27/ARB (adopted Apr. 9, 1999).

158 Id., para. 6.5.

159 Id., para. 7.1.

160 Id., para. 6.3.

161 Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Recourse by the European Communities to Arbitration Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, paras. 20, 36, 38, WT/DS48/ARB (adopted July 12, 1999).

162 Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil Under Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS46/ARB (adopted Aug. 28,2000) [hereinafter Brazil- Export Financing].

163 Id., paras. 3.44–45.

164 Id, para. 3.51 n.51.

165 Id., para. 3.54; see also Canada—Aircraft, supra note 156.

166 Brazil—Export Financing, supra note 162, para. 3.55.

167 Id, para. 3.58.

168 Id, para. 3.44.

169 Id., para 3.45.

170 Id., para. 3.51 n.51.

171 Decision of the Arbitrator, United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations,” Recourse to Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS108/ARB (adopted Aug. 30, 2002) [hereinafter U.S.—Foreign Sales Corporations].

172 Id., para. 5.18.

173 Id, para. 5.24.

174 Id, para. 6.10.

175 Id., para. 6.24; see also Canada—Aircraft, supra note 156, para. 3.9.

176 U.S. —Foreign Sales Corporations, supra note 171, para. 5.30.

177 Id., para. 5.59 (quoting Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 55, Art. 49).

178 Canada—Aircraft, supra note 156, para. 3.121.

179 Id, para. 3.122.

180 Decision by the Arbitrators, United States—Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (original complaint by the European Communities), Recourse to Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT7DS136/ARB (adopted Feb. 24, 2004); see also Decision by the Arbitrator, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (original complaint by Brazil), Recourse to Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA (adopted Aug. 31, 2004).

181 Andrew, D. Mitchell Proportionality and Remedies in WTO Disputes , 17 Eur. J. Int’l L. 985, 1004 (2006)Google Scholar. The views of Canada and the United States are set out at DSB, Minutes of Meeting Held on 18 March 2003, WT/DSB/M/145, paras. 45–47, 49 (May 7, 2003).

182 Appellate Body Report, United States—Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan, para. 120, WT/DS192/AB/R (adopted Oct. 8, 2001).

183 Id. n.90. The Appellate Body cited Article 51 of ILC, Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second Reading, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev. 1 (July 26,2001), which remained unchanged in Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 55, adopted by the Commission later that year.

184 Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/AB/R, para. 259 (adopted Feb. 15, 2002).

185 Axel, Desmedt Proportionality in WTO Law , 4 J. Int’l Econ. L. 441, 442 (2001).Google Scholar

186 Sebastian, supra note 151, at 378.

187 For a more critical view of arbitration’s role, see id. at 364–78.

188 A recent WTO case criticized for its unpredictability is Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 7,2005).

189 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS 194 [hereinafter GATT].

190 United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, para. 5.26, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345, 392–93 (1990).

191 Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, para. 75, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200, 223(1991).

192 Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, para. 186, WT/DS161/AB/R & WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted Dec. 11, 2000).

193 Id, para. 180.

194 Id, para. 181.

195 Id, para. 182.

196 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, para. 193, WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Mar.12, 2001).

197 Id, paras. 168,173–75.

198 Of course, a panel would verify that the alleged threat is a real one. Moreover, a panel could look for corroboration that the defendant government is actually seeking the level of protection that it claims before a panel.

199 Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, para. 373(D)(hi)(b), (iv)(a), WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 7, 2005); see also id, paras. 317–18.

200 Alan, O. Sykes The Least Restrictive Means , 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 403, 416 (2003)Google Scholar. Since states are free to choose the level of consumer protection they wish to impose, the “necessity” test cannot be a strict cost-benefit analysis because the arbitration proceeds on the assumption that local benefits ipso facto justify the trade costs, so long as they are a bona fide exercise of the prudential policymaking discretion of the state and not a mere sham meant to divert trade. Donald, H. Regan The Meaning of Necessary’in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing , 6 World Trade Rev. 347 (2007).Google Scholar

201 Thus, “decisionmakers can condemn a challenged regulation even when the efficacy of the proposed alternative regulation may be less than the efficacy of the challenged regulation.” Sykes, supra note 200, at 416.

202 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WTO Agreement, Annex 1 A, in The Legal TEXTS, supra note 152, at 59 [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. Article 2.2 requires that any application to imports of measures intended to prevent the spread of diseases “is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.” See also Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, in The Legal Texts, supra, at 121. Article 2.2 provides that “technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create.”

203 Desmedt, supra note 185, at 445.

204 SPS Agreement, supra note 202, Art. 5.6.

205 Panel Report, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, para. 8.167, WT/DS18/R (adopted June 12, 1998); Appellate Body Report, para. 194, WT/DS18/AB/R (adopted Oct. 20, 1998); see also Appellate Body Report, Japan-—Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, paras. 118 - 3 1 , W T/DS76/AB/R (adopted Feb. 22, 1999).

206 Sykes, supra note 200, at 407.

207 Desmedt, supra note 185, at 441.

208 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3 [hereinafter EC Treaty].

209 Case C-8/89, Zardi v. Consorzio agrario provinciale di Ferrara, 1990 ECR 1–2515, 2532, para. 10.

210 EC Treaty, Arts. 173 (as in effect 1992) (now Art. 230), 177 (as in effect 1992) (now Art. 234), 215 (as in effect 1992) (now Art. 288). Article 173, in particular, gives the European Court of Justice jurisdiction to review acts of the Community institutions—the Commission, Council, and Parliament—for incompatibility with Community law.

211 Takis, Tridimas The Principle of Proportionality in Community Law: From the Rule of Law to Market Integration , 31 Irish Jurist 83, 84 (1996)Google Scholar.

212 Case C-331/88, The Queen v. Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Fedesa, 1990 ECR 1–4023.

213 Zardi, supra note 209, at 2532–33, para. 10.

214 Case C-l 14/76, Bela-Mühle Josef Bergmann KG v. Grows-Farm GmbH, 1977 ECR 1211, 1232 (opinion of Advocate-General Capotorti).

215 Case C-265/87, Hermann Schräder HS Kraftfutter GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Gronau, 1989 ECR 2237, 2269, para. 21; see also Case C—11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 ECR 1125, 1136.

216 Case C-138/78, Stöking v.Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, 1979 ECR 713; Case C-179/84, Bozzetti v. Invemizzi SpA, 1985 ECR 2301; Case C-265/87, supra note 215.

217 Case C-382/87, R. Buet v. Ministère public, 1989 ECR 1235, 1251, para. 11.

218 Case C-178/84, Commission v. Germany, 1987 ECR 1227, 1270, para. 28.

219 Joined Cases C - l 19/76 & 120/76, Ohlmuhle Hamburg AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Waltershof, 1977 ECR 1269, 1279, para. 2(c); see also Case C-331/88, The Queen v. Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State for Health, ex parte: Fedesa, 1990 ECR 4023, 4024, 4031–35, 4049–51, 4062–64 [hereinafter Fedesa].

220 Fedesa, supra note 219, at 4063, para. 14.

221 Case C-240/78, Atalanta Amsterdam B.V. v. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees, 1979 ECR 2137, 2143.

222 Id. at 2151, para. 15.

223 Case C-l 18/75, Watson and Belmann, 1976 ECR 1185, 1191, 1200.

224 Case C-265/88, Criminal Proceedings Against Lothar Messner, 1989 ECR 4209, 4212, para. 14.

225 Id. at 4220.

226 Gráinne, de Búrca The Principle of Proportionality and Its Application in EC Law , 1993 Y.B.Eur. L. 105, 105.Google Scholar

227 The same point is made by Professor de Búrca: “it can be argued that the more clearly the agreed standards or grounds of review can be articulated, the more clearly it can be seen whether a court is genuinely attempting to apply these in a structured way to the decision taken rather than substituting its overall judgment as to what would be a better or a preferable decision.” Id. at 108.

228 ”[T]he more ‘individual’ the interest affected by the measure under review, or the more severely an important Community interest is affected, the more closely t he Court of Justice will be prepared to look at it. But this will still depend partly on the nature of the subject matter and the interest which the measure claims to serve.” Id. at 114.

229 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].

230 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3.

231 Data on ratification are available at the Web site of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), <http://www.ohchr.org>.

232 Joan, Fitzpatrick Human Rights in Crisis: The International System for Protecting Rights During States of Emergency 36–37 (1994)Google Scholar.

233 Id. at 60.

234 ICCPR, supra note 229, Art. 4( 1). For similar provisions in regional treaties, see European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 15(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 UNTS 221 [hereinafter European Convention]; American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 27(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 UNTS 123.

235 Mattias, Kumm Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the Proportionality Requirement, in Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy 131 (George, Pavlakos ed., 2007).Google Scholar

236 European Convention, supra note 234, Art. 10.

237 Kumm, supra note 235, at 134–35.

238 ICCPR, supra note 229, Art. 4(1) (emphasis added).

239 Human Rights Committee [HR Comm.], General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.ll (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter General Comment].

240 Id. at 2, para. 3.

241 Regarding Israel’s broad derogation, filed with its ratification of the ICCPR, see Adam, Mizock The Legality of the Fifty-two Year State of Emergency in Israel , 7 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 223, 227, 230–33 (2001).Google Scholar

242 General Comment, supra note 239, at 2–3, para. 4.

243 Id. at 3, para. 4.

244 Id, para. 6.

245 Id. at 2, para. 3.

246 Id., paras. 3, 4.

247 HR Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations, Israel, at 3, para. 11, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Aug. 18, 1998).

248 HR Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations, Syrian Arab Republic, at 2, para. 6, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/84/SYR (Aug. 9, 2005).

249 Id.

250 See Silva v. Uruguay, Communication No. 34/1978, para. 8.4, UN Doc. CCPR/C/12/D/34/1978 (Apr. 8, 1981). The Committee could “not see what ground could be adduced to support the contention that, in order to restore peace and order, it was necessary to deprive all citizens, who as members of certain political groups had been candidates in the elections of 1966 and 1971, of any political right for a period as long as 15 years.”

251 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1902, at 2, para. 12 (Mar. 29, 2001) (comments of Sir Nigel Rodley (UK), member of the Human Rights Committee).

252 Id. at 3, para. 13.

253 Id., para. 18 (statement by the chair, P.N. Bhagwati).

254 Id. at 2–3, para. 12 (Mr. Rodley).

255 Robert, Thomas Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law 77 (2000)Google Scholar. See, as to the situation of proportionality in the states and institutions constituting the European Union (formerly, the Community), Nicholas, Emiliou The Principle of Proportionality in European Law (1995).Google Scholar

256 Jeremy, McBride Proportionality and the European Convention on Human Rights, in The Principle of Proportionality in The Laws of Europe 23, 23 (Evelyn, Ellis ed., 1999).Google Scholar

257 European Convention, supra note 234, Art. 15(1).

258 Marc-André, Eissen The Principle of Proportionality in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in The European System for The Protection of Human Rights 125, 126 (Macdonald, R. St. J. Matscher, F. & Petzold, H. eds., 1993).Google Scholar

259 Olsson v. Sweden (No. 1), 130 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31–32, para. 67 (1988); see also the subsequent cases cited in Eissen, supra note 258, at 127 n.8.

260 See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 5 (1976); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 5 (1981); Leander v. Sweden, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 6 (1987); Open Door & Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 246-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 8 (1992).

261 “The margin of appreciation can come into play whenever a case raises a Convention issue that requires a balancing of interests…. In principle the margin of appreciation is relevant to the (numerous) elements of the Convention in respect of which a proportionality test is applied.” T. Jeremy, Gunn Deconstructing Proportionality in Limitations Analysis , 19 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 465, 487 (2005)Google Scholar (quoting Pieter van, Dijk & van Hoof, G. J. H. Theory and Practice of The European Convention on Human Rights 85 (3d ed. 1998)Google Scholar).

262 Handyside v. United Kingdom, supra note 260.

263 Id at 22, para. 48 (emphasis added).

264 Yutaka, Arai-Takahashi The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in The Jurisprudence of the ECHR 236 (2002)Google Scholar; see, e.g., Stubbings v. United Kingdom, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 55; Stoll v. Switzerland, App. No. 69698/01, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1089, 1105, para. 43 (2007) (4th sec).

265 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, supra note 260.

266 W., para. 53.

267 Id, para. 61.

268 Niemietz v. Germany, 251-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 25 (1992).

269 Id, para. 37.

270 Id.

271 Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) v. Turkey, 2003–11 Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 134.

272 Exodus 21:23–25. For an excellent discussion of proportionality as a limitation on the scope of biblical countermeasures, see Alan, M. Dershowitz The Genesis of Justice 253–57 (2000)Google Scholar. According to Professor Morris J. Fish, “the lex talionis of the Old Testament marked a turning point in the evolution of lawful punishment. It introduced a policy of restraint and it sanctified proportionality as a moral principle of punishment.” Morris, J. Fish An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punishment , 28 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 57, 57 (2008)Google Scholar. The lex talionis appears three times in the Old Testament: in Exodus, as “eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise”; in Leviticus, as “fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth”; and, in Deuteronomy, as “life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.” Exodus 21:24–25, Leviticus 24:20, Deuteronomy 19:21; see also Matthew 5:38. One of the principal innovations of the Old Testament, in this respect, is to introduce the symmetry of its formulation for that of Hammurabi’s Code, a millennium earlier, which authorized the punishment of an innocent person (the perpetrator’s son or daughter) for the action of the wrongdoer. See Deuteronomy 24:16: “The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall children be put to death for the fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin.” The Old Testament’s formulation is also believed to have been intended to facilitate a measure of monetary compensation. Fish, supra, at 60.

273 Holy Quran 5:45: “Life for life, eye for eye, nose for nose, ear for ear, tooth for tooth, and wounds equal for equal.”

274 Sykes, supra note 20, at 403.

275 “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 15, June 14, 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF. 151 /5/Rev. 1 (1992), 31 ILM 874, 879 (1992).

276 Mads, Andenas & Stefan, Zleptnig Proportionality and Balancing in WTO Law: A Comparative Perspective , 20 Cambridge Rev. Int’l Aff. 71, 72 (2007).Google Scholar

277 Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R (adopted Apr. 30, 2008), 47 ILM 475 (2008).

278 Id, 47 ILM at 503, para. 146.

279 Id., para. 160 n.313, 47 ILM at 515 (quoting Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID No. ARB/05/07, at 20, para. 67 (Mar. 21, 2007), available at <http://worldbank.org/icsid>).

280 Geoffrey, Cowley with Karen, Springen The Biology of Beauty , Newsweek, June 3, 1996, at 60Google Scholar; see also Raj, Persaud Science Rewrites the Rules of Attraction , Fin. Times (London), Apr. 30, 2005, at 3.Google Scholar