1 See, e.g., International Economic Report Transmitted to the Congress: Message from President Ford, 76 DEP't STATE BULL. 129, 130 (1977); Rogers, U.S. Foreign Policy in a Technological Age, 64 id., at 198, 200-01 (1971); Maritime Briefings: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1973) (statement of Ronald A. Webb, Director of the Office of Maritime Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State); United States-Canadian Relations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 5 (1976) (statement of Richard D. Vine, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs).

2 See Bourne, Procedure in the Development of International Drainage Basins: The Duty to Consult and to Negotiate, 10 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 212 (1972); Sztucki, International Consultations and Space Treaties, in Proceedings Of The 17Th Colloquium On The Law Of Outer Space 147 (M. Schwartz ed., 1975).

3 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr.

4 1949, preamble, 63 Stat. 2241, TIAS No. 1964, 34 UNTS 243; 43 AJIL Supp. 159. NATO members are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 4 Paul-Henri Spaak and Joseph Luns have been particularly emphatic. See, e.g., Spaak, The Political Future of NATO , 7 NATO LETTER, NO. 12, at 1, 4-5 (1959); Luns, Introduction, in TRANSATLANTIC CRISIS: EUROPE AND AMERICA IN THE ‘ 7 0 's 9, 12 (J. Godson ed., 1974). The efforts of the first four Secretaries General are outlined in F. Beer, integration and disintegration in Nato 30-37 (1969). For the relevant treaty provisions and collective pronouncements, see section II, infra.

5 Text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Co-operation in NATO (Dec. 13, 1956), in Nato Information Service, Nato Facts And Figures, App.5, at 308, 316 (1976). The three were Dr. Gaetano Martino (Italy), Mr. Halvard Lange (Norway), and Mr. Lester M. Pearson (Canada), all Foreign Ministers of their countries. For the various possible meanings of “Consultation” In The Alliance, See H. Cleveland, Nato : The Transatlantic Bargain 19 (1970).

6 “Decisionmakers” in NATO would include high-level national and international officials with important NATO responsibilities. In general, these would be the heads of state, foreign ministers, and NATO permanent representatives of member states, plus the NATO Secretary General and perhaps a few other top NATO officials. On the role of national and international decisionmakers in the shaping of international law, see McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 AJIL356, 357-58 (1955).

7 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 3, Art. 4.

8 The provision appears in id., Art. 12. A right of withdrawal, implied by the nature of a treaty, is recognized in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 56(1) (b), UN Doc. A/CONF.39/27, 63 AJIL 875 (1969), 8 ILM 679 (1969). On its applicability to political alliances, see Fitzmaurice, Law of Treaties: Second Report, [1957] 2 Y.B. INT'l l. Comm'N. 16, 38-39; T. Elias, The Modern Law Of Treaties 106 (1974); compare Report of the Int'l L. Comm'n. on the work of its 18th session, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 172, 251, 61 AJIL 417 (1967).

9 Report of the Committee of Three, supra note 5, at 318-19. The report drew in part on a 1951 report of another three-person NATO committee.

10 Id . at 323.

11 Resolution on the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-military Co-operation in NATO (Dec. 13, 1956), in id., Ann. II, at 335.

12 The Future Tasks of the Alliance: Report of the Council (Harmel Report, Dec. 14, 1967), In Nato Facts And Figures, supra note 5, App. 6, at 336, 337.

13 Id. at 339.

14 Declaration on Atlantic Relations, June 26, 1974, para. 11, in id., App. 7, at 340, 342, and in 71 DEP't St. 42, 44 (1974).

15 Stein & Carreau, Law and Peaceful Change in a Subsystem: “Withdrawal” of France from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 62 AJIL 577, 608, 613 (1968) (emphasis in the original).

16 In addition to the 1956, 1967, and 1974 pronouncements, the North Atlantic Council has endorsed the principle of intensified consultations on several occasions. See, e.g., the Council's communiqués of May 10, 1961, para. 10, in Nato , Texts Of Final Communiques 1949-1974, At 136, 137-38 (1975); Dec. 15, 1962, para. 7, in id. at 147, 148; May 24, 1963, para. 7, in id. at 150, 151. Nonmandatory language was used.

17 Kissinger news conferencE, 71 Dep'T State Bull. 37, 39 (1974).

18 Kissinger's disclaimer regarding the legal effect of a declaration is in id. at 37. The French position is reported in Atlantic News, June 19, 1974, at 1, and June 20, 1974, at 2. See also the remarks of U.S. Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler, in 71 DEP't State Bull. 171, 172 (1974) (“consultation should not be viewed as a legally binding obligation“), and of Kissinger in id. at 629, 632 (“you can't wave a paper at somebody and tell him he's obliged to consult if he doesn't want to consult“).

19 Id. at 37, 38.

20 See Neff, Nato Political Consultation: Fact Or Myth?, 23 Nato Rev., No. 1, At 7 (1975).

21 Compare Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AJIL 296 (1977).

22 The Atlantic Alliance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Security and International Operations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 7, at 230 (1966).

23 60 DEP't State Bull. 250, 252 (1969).

24 72 id., at 886, 888 (1975).

25 Id., No. 2011, Feb. 1978, at 16.

26 See L. Sloss, Nato Reform: Prospects And Priorities 6 (3 The Washington Papers, 1975).

27 This simplified outline of the military budget consultation procedure is based on Nato Facts And FigureS, supra note 5, at 113^15, and on an interview with David Kyd, head of the Nato Press Service, July 5, 1978.

28 Nato Facts And Figures, supra note 5, at 112.

29 North Atlantic Council Resolution on Important Changes in National Defence Efforts, Oct. 5, 1955, paras. 3, 7, 8, NATO Doc. C-M(55) 82 (Final) (unclassified). The consultations are actually conducted by NATO 's Defence Planning Committee.

30 On the legal effect of “legislative” Council resolutions, see text at note 15, supra.

31 See Senate Hearings, supra note 22, pt. 1, at 26; pt. 4, at 146, 147; pt. 6, at 194 (1966).

32 See H. Cleveland, supra note 5, at 113-16; 16 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 22176-77 (1967).

33 See Yochelson, , The American Military Presence in Europe: Current Debate in the United States, 15 Orbis 784, 788 (1971);Google Scholar Kohl, The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System and V'.S.-European Relations: Patterns of Policy-Making, 28 World Politics 1, 27-30 (1975).

34 See 7 Canadian Parl. DEB., H. C , 28th Parl., 1st Sess. 7724, 7905-06 (1969); 9 id. at 9306.

35 Id. at 9327, 9382.

36 See 22 Nato Rev., NO. 4, at 13, 14 (1974); 882 British Parl. DEB., H. C. (5th ser.) 1352-53 (1974).

37 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, Cmnd. No. 5976, at 13 (1975).

38 See Atlantic News, Sept. 21, 1977, at 1-2.

39 See id., July 10, 1974, at 1-2. The Dutch NATO commitment was reduced by 20,000 men.

40 Nato Press Release (75) 16, Sept. 26, 1975; interview with David Kyd, head of the Nato Press Service, July 7, 1978.

41 Interview with David Kyd, supra note 27; see also 26 Nato Rev., NO. 1, at 17 (1978).

42 French naval forces had already been withdrawn.

43 Individual allies could have kept their military facilities in France if they had agreed to place them under French operational control.

44 See, e.g., the French aide-memoire to Canada, in 3 CANADIAN PARL. DEB., H. C, 27th Parl, 1st Sess. 2917-18 (1966); French aide-mémoire to the United States, 54 DEP't STATE BULL. 617-18 (1966), and the U.S. response, id. at 617. See also the statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, id. at 695. The French did not ask NATO to remove its political headquarters, though the allies ultimately decided that the civilian headquarters should follow the military to Belgium. France did continue to participate not only in Nato political activities, but in some defense matters. See H. Cleveland, supra note 5, at 102-03.

45 See text at note 8 supra. Stein & Carreau, supra note 15, at 620, 639, conclude that even if France was entitled to withdraw its military cooperation under the doctrine of changed circumstances, it had a good faith duty to submit a reorganization proposal to the Council.

46 Interview with David Kyd, supra note 27; see also R. Hill, Political Consultation In Nato : Parliamentary And Policy Aspects 79 (Canadian Dep't of Nat'l Defence ORAE Mem. No. M72, 1975).

47 Rousseau, Chronique des Faits Intemationaux, 70 Revue GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 736, 760-61 (1966).

48 See the declaration by the 14 NATO allies other than France, stressing the need to consult and act together, 3 CANADIAN PABL. DEB., H. C , 27th Pari., 1st Sess. 2875 (1966). See also the statement by U.S. Under Secretary of State George Ball regarding French unilateralism, 54 DEP't State Bull. 613, 616 (1966).

49 See Staff Of Sen. Comm. On Foreign Relations, 93D Cong., 1St Sess., U.S. Security Issues In Europe: Burden Sharing And Offset, Mbfr And Nuclear Weapons 19-20 (Comm. Print 1973); Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm, on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad and the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Internat'l Law and Organization of the Sen: Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 156-57 (1974) (statement of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger); Comm. On Defence Questions And Armaments Of The Western European Union Assembly, Communications And Crisis Management In The Alliance 20 (1977).

50 Report of the Comm. On Defence Questions And Armaments, supra note 49.

51 The enhanced radiation warhead would kill enemy troops without causing extensive damage to inanimate objects. On the NATO consultations, see Atlantic News, Sept. 28, 1977, at 4; id., Oct. 14, 1977, at 1; id., Dec. 10, 1977, at 2; id., Mar. 22, 1978, at 4; id., Mar. 24, 1978, at 1.

52 U.S. consultations appear in H. CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 128; N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1974, at 1, col. 5; id., Mar. 1, 1979, at A13, col. 6.

53 See 11 Keesing's contemporary archives 16479 (1958). The British Government had already warned that it would send in destroyers if necessary.

54 See 19 id. at 26028, 26030 (1973); Atlantic News, May 23, 1973, at 1.

55 See Stern, Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus, Foreign Policy, NO. 19, at 34, 62-64 (1975); Rudnick, NATO and the Cyprus Crisis, The Round Table, NO. 266, at 182, 187 (1977). For a report of postinvasion Nato consultations, see R. Hill, Political Consultations In Nato 27 (6 Wellesley Papers 1978). When Turkey Sent the Sismick I into the Aegean Sea for geologic soundings in July 1976, serious tension with Greece again resulted. There were no North Atlantic Council consultations because the matter was considered essentially a bilateral affair. Atlantic News, July 20, 1976, at 3.

56 See Defense Agreement with Iceland Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, May 5, 1951, Art. 7, 2 UST 1195, TIAS No. 2266, 205 UNTS 173.

57 See Bjarnason, Iceland's Position in NATO , 15 Atlantic Community Q. 393, 400-01 (1977).

58 35 Facts on File 387 (1975) refers to Portuguese willingness to resume talks with the United States on this issue. R. HILL, supra note 55, at 95, poses the North Atlantic Council discussion hypothetically. The author, however, was in a position to know whether the discussion occurred, and presumably stated it hypothetically to avoid public confirmation of matters not officially on the public record.

59 André de Staercke, who was the Belgian permanent representative to NATO at that time and dean of the NATO ambassadorial corps, characterized the discussion as notification rather than consultation. Interview with Ambassador de Staercke, July 6, 1978. To the same effect: interview with Peter Collins, political officer in the U.S. delegation to NATO , July 14, 1978.

60 Interview with Peter Collins, supra note 59; Atlantic News, July 11, 1975, at 3; id., July 30, 1975, at 1-2. It will be recalled that the French measures of March 1966 included the closing of allied military installations. There were no prior consultations. See text at note 43, supra. That case, however, involved a violation of an explicit procedural norm.

61 See The Times (London), Dec. 8, 1962, at 8, col. 3; id., Dec. 14, 1962, at 8, col. 4 and 12, col. 1. The Final Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council ministerial session, Dec. 15, 1962, note 16 supra, at 147, 148 (1975), refers to a discussion of adequate and balanced forces, nuclear and conventional, and to a need for closer alignment between Nato military requirements and national force plans.

62 See H. Tbewhitt, Mcnamara 175 (1971).

63 See F. BEER, supra note 4, at 16; M. BALL, Nato And The European Movement 140 (1959); G. Liska, Nations In Alliance: The Limits Of Interdependence 79 (1962). For the wise men's recommendations on consultation, see text at note 9, supra.

64 As I noted at the beginning of this article, efforts such as CSCE and MBFR that require detailed coordination to be effective are not particularly significant to a normative study of prior consultations. Consequently, they are mentioned only briefly in this section.

65 See Secretary of State Dean Rusk's statement in Senate Hearings, supra note 22, pt. 5, at 161 (1966); H. CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 70 (reporting President Nixon's pledge to consult) and at 177; statement by President Carter, DEP't STATE BULL., No. 2014, May 1978, at 31.

66 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 UST 1313, TIAS No. 5433, 480 UNTS 43.

67 See Report of the Comm. on Defence Questions and Armaments, The Moscow Test Ban Treaty and Its Effects on the Western Alliance, Assembly of the Western European Union Doc. 288, in Proceedings Of The 9 Th Ordinary Session, Pt. 2, Vol. 3, at 79, 88 (1963).

68 Assembly Of The Western European Union, Collected Texts Adopted And Replies Of The Council, 9th Ordinary Sess., At 15 (1963).

69 See H. Cleveland, supra note 5, at 67.

70 Id. at 68, noting that the allies were only brought up to date several weeks later.

71 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 UST 483, TIAS No. 6839, 729 UNTS 161. On the consultations, see H. CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 68-69; F. BEER, supra note 4, at 24-25; Lyon, Beyond NATO ?, 24 INT'L J. (Canada) 268, 271 (1974). E. Goodman, The Fate Of The Atlantic Community 383 (1975), says that the “allied consultation was in the nature of a tardy effort to make amends for oversights in a deal originally struck by the superpowers.” But, given the forceful objections by the allies after they had been bypassed in 1966, this is tantamount to saying that the United States was acquiescing in an assertion by the allies of a right to be consulted. Customary international law is created by just such a process.

72 See H. Cleveland, supra note 5, at 59; J. Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story Of Salt 96-99 (1973).

73 Brosio, Consultation and the Atlantic Alliance, 16 SURVIVAL 115, 117 (1974) (referring also to the multilateral CSCE and MBFR negotiations); interview with André de Staercke, supra note 59.

74 J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 72, at 120-30, 137-38. The Newhouse book is an insider's account of the SALT I negotiations.

75 Id. at 141.

76 Id. at 176-86, 203, 214-18, 223-24, 234-56.

77 See Smart, Perspectives from Europe, in Salt: The Moscow Agreements And Beyond 185, 190 (M. Willrich & J. Rhinelander eds., 1974). Compare J. Schaetzel, The Unhinged Alliance: America And The European Community 52 (1975).

78 See Smart, supra note 77; Buchan, The United States and the Security of Europe, in 8 CRitical Choices For Americans, Western Europe: The Trials Of Partnership 297, 305 (D. Landes ed., 1977). The SALT I agreement was the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with Protocol, May 26, 1972, 23 UST 3462, TIAS No. 7504 (no longer in force). The initial ABM agreement, negotiated in tandem with Salt I, is the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, 23 UST 3435, Tias No. 7503.

79 See E. Goodman, supra note 71, at 389.

80 June 22, 1973, 24 UST 1478, TIAS No. 7654.

81 See E. Goodman, supra note 71, at 390; R. HILL, supra note 55, at 23; Hassner, How Troubled a Partnership, 24 INT'L J. (Canada) 166, 178 (1974). Shortly before the agreement was signed, Henry Kissinger said that when the interests of the European allies were directly affected by U.S. bilateral negotiations with other superpowers, the United States had been scrupulously consulting them. Kissinger, The Year of Europe, 68 DEP't STATE BULL. 593, 597 (1973). His definition of consultation, however, did not always coincide with that of the European allies.

82 Protocol to the Treaty of May 26, 1972, on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3, 1974, 27 UST 1645, TIAS No. 8276.

83 The Kissinger-Nixon briefings are reported in Atlantic News, June 18, 1974, at 3; id., June 20, 1974, at 1; id., June 21, 1974, at 1; id., June 26, 1974, at 1; id., June 27, 1974, at 2. The Moscow visit involved broad strategic arms limitation discussions as well as the signing of the two agreements.

84 Interview with Stephen J. Ledogar, director, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political- Military Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Aug. 2, 1978. The bilateral U.S.-Soviet talks on a proposed agreement prohibiting chemical weapons have involved some coordination between the United States and those allies represented at the Geneva disarmament conference, but no political consultations at Nato headquarters in Brussels. Ibid.

85 See, e.g., Vance, Comment, in The New Atlantic Challenge 366, 367 (R. Mayne ed., 1975). Cf. R. HILL, supra note 55, at 73, reflecting the expectation of a knowledgeable Canadian official. Interestingly, when Belgium planned to enter into disarmament talks with Poland, it consulted its NATO allies first. See H. Cleveland, supra note 5, at 22.

86 See Atlantic News, Mar. 23, 1977, at 1; statement of President Carter, Dep'T State Bull., No. 2011, Feb. 1978, at 16, 17, 26 NATO REV., NO. 1, at 29 (1978); statement of George S. Vest, Ass't Secretary of State for European Affairs, in DEP't STATE BULL., No. 2012, Mar. 1978, at 27, 29. The European insistence on closer consultations, and U.S. compliance, were brought out also in an interview with Stephen J. Ledogar, supra note 84. The Guadeloupe four-power summit in January 1979 was a confirmation of, and a possible deviation from, the principle of close NATO consultations. It stemmed from President Carter's inclination to draw into his counsels at an early stage those NATO allies that would be most acutely affected by the impending SALT III negotiations, but it excluded all other NATO allies. The departure from pan-NATO consultation was temporary, as the NATO Nuclear Planning Group was to discuss the SALT III issues in April.

87 See E. GOODMAN, supra note 71, at 376; R. HILL, supra note 55, at 95.

88 See R. HILL, supra note 55, at 73 (giving Canadian practice as an example). The negotiations produced the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 UST 701, TIAS No. 7337.

89 See Fabiani, Biobgical Weapons Ban Near After Years of East-West Effort, 20 NATO REV., Nos. 1 & 2, at 20-23 (1972). The negotiations produced the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 UST 583, TIAS No. 8062.

90 See Fabiani, The Caracas Conference on the Law of the Sea, June-August 1974, 22 NATO REV., NO. 3, at 22, 23; Atlantic News, Mar. 8, 1978, at 1.

91 See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 UST 571, TIAS No. 8061, 94 LNTS 65. The United States became a party at the same time it ratified the Biological Weapons Treaty.

92 See Luns, Progress Report on NATO , 6 Nato Letter, NO. 12, at 3, 8 (1958); P.-H. Spaak, why nato ? 35 (1959).

93 See R. HILL, supra note 55, at 17.

94 7 Nato Letter, NO. 1, at 11 (1959).

95 Id., No. 3, at 6-7 (1959).

96 Id., No. 4, at 13 (1959).

97 Id., No. 6, at 15 (1959); id., No. 8, at 9 (1959).

98 See 13 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 18163, 18223 (1961).

99 These events are recounted, without mention of prior NATO consultations, in id., at 18274-75, 18277-78, 18307-10; A. SCHlesinger, A Thousand Days 393-400 (1965); T. Sorensen, Kennedy 593-96 (1965). See also A. Buchan, Crisis Management 36-39 (The Atlantic Papers, Nato Series, No. 2, 1966).

100 See F. BEER, supra note 4, at 18-19.

101 See the Final Communiqués of North Atlantic Council Ministerial sessions, Dec. 10, 1971, and May 31, 1972, in NATO , TEXTS OF FINAL COMMUNIQUES 1949-1974, at 266 and 276 (1975).

102 See Atlantic News, Jan. 12, 1977, at 3.

103 Interviews with Orme Wilson, political affairs counselor, U.S. delegation to NATO , July 10, 1978, and with Francis J. Seidner, public affairs adviser, Bureau of European Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Aug. 1, 1978. See also N.Y. Times, May 30, 1978, at Al, col. 5 (city ed.).

104 See R. HILL, supra note 55, at 127.

105 See H. CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 133, 136, 140; R. HILL, supra note 55, at 92-93. Hill notes that the allies did not expect extensive consultations from West Germany during its Ostpolitik phase. See also Secretary of State Dean Rusk's statement in Senate Hearings, supra note 22, pt. 5, at 161 (1966), mentioning discussions among the four major allies during the post-Berlin crisis period, but indicating that the other allies were merely briefed on them. The West German Government failed to consult all the allies before deciding to hold a presidential election in Berlin. See H. CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 22.

106 See H. CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 20-21. It had been routine for the United States to send warships through the Dardanelles occasionally, in order to show that the Black Sea is an international body of water. The State Department wished to say that this was just another routine visit, and thought NATO consultations would belie that. Ibid.

107 Interview with Andre de Staercke, supra note 59. The United States had already announced a massive retaliation policy relating to a Soviet attack on Western Europe. The 1954 announcement applied to a Communist attack anywhere, if the attack could start a general war. Secretary Dulles did acknowledge that the United States would consult its NATO allies if it actually had to retaliate massively. See R. OSGOOD, LIMITED WAR 208-13 (1957). This appears to have been a recognition of the U.S. obligation under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. See text at note 7, supra. A similar pledge to the NATO allies, relating to the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world, was made by the United States and the United Kingdom in 1962. See H. Cleveland, supra note 5, at 15-16.

108 Staff of Senate Comm. on Government Operations, Basic Issues, in The Atlantic Alliance 7, 21 (H. Jackson ed., 1967). See also H. Cleveland, supra note 5, at 47.

109 See J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 72, at 91.

110 One form of true emergency central to NATO 's raison d'etre—an armed attack on Western Europe—has not occurred. As was discussed in the text at notes 49-50, supra, there is a formal NATO consultative procedure for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in such an emergency.

111 See Dulles, Developing NATO in Peace, 34 DEP't State Bull. 706, 709-10 (1956); M. BALL, supra note 63, at 137.

112 Interview with André de Staercke, supra note 59. See F. BEER, supra note 4, at 13; Brosio, supra note 73, at 115, noting President Eisenhower's outburst at the British- French conduct.

113 See Prime Minister Macmillan's statement of July 17, 1958, in 6 NATO LETTER, No. 8, at 10-11 (1958); Luns, supra note 92, at 8-9; F. BEER, supra note 4, at 29; Jordan & Newman, The Secretary-General of NATO and Multinational Political Leadership, 30 INT'L J. (Canada) 732, 754 n.55 (1975).

114 See A. BUCHAN, supra note 99, at 24; F. BEER, supra note 4, at 16, 22.

115 See Neff, supra note 20, at 8; R. HILL, supra note 55, at 89.

116 For an account of the U.S. decision making process regarding the Cambodian incursion, see M. & B. KALB, Kissinger 154-64 (1974).

117 See A. Buchan, Nato In THE 1960'S, at 119 (rev. ed. 1963).

118 See A. Buchan, supra note 99, at 34-35.

119 See R. HILL, supra note 55, at 71, putting the situation hypothetically but in such a manner as to suggest that there was no consultation. See also R. ROWAN, THE FOUR DAYS OF MAYAGUEZ 66-70, 88-92, 140-44, 172-80 (1975), discussing the U.S. decision-making without mentioning NATO consultation.

120 See A. SCHLESINCER, supra note 99, at 803; A. Buchan, supra note 99, at 33-34, 41. Nevertheless, the President did consider the effects on NATO of the decisions he was making. See R. kennedy, thirteen days 98-99 (1969).

121 Interview with Andre de Staercke, supra note 59. The exchange between Acheson and de Gaulle is set forth in E. ABEL, THE MISSILE CRISIS 112 (1966).

122 Statement of H. C. Green, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, in 3 Canadian Parl. Deb., H. C , 25th Parl., 1st Sess. 2699 (1962).

123 Quoted in M. & B. Kalb, supra note 116, at 490.

124 Id. at 490-93; interview with André de Staercke, supra note 59.

125 Interview with André de Staercke, supra note 59.

126 See Neff, supra note 20, at 7-8; M & B. KALB, supra note 116, at 497. Some responsible U.S. Government officials assessed the Soviet threat somewhat differently than did the Secretary of State, and he assessed it differently than did the President. See M. & B. Kalb, supra note 116, at 497-98.

127 Interview with André de Staercke, supra note 59; M. & B. KALB, supra note 116, at 499; Kissinger, The United States and a Unifying Europe: The Necessity for Partnership, 69 DEP't STATE BULL. 777, 779 (1973); statement of Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, in United States-Europe Relations and the 1973 Middle East War: Hearings Before the Subcomms. on Europe and on the Near East and South Asia of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 31-32, 48-49, 57 (1974). See also R. HILL, supra note 55, at 26-27.

128 Interview with Stephen J. Ledogar, supra note 84.

129 The Netherlands and Norway were first informed of the impending Paris meeting at the May Nato summit meeting in Washington. Het Parocjl, June 16, 1978 (translation by U.S. mission to Nato ).

130 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, press briefing, May 30, 1978, in Dep't STATE BULL., NO. 2016, July 1978, at 5.

131 The Carter decision was made immediately after President Sadat announced that he would not resume direct peace talks with Israel, and involved little or no input even from President Carter's own foreign policy advisers. See 38 FACTS ON FILE 581, 601-02 (1978); Washington Post, Aug. 18, 1978, at A6, cols. 3-4. The allies expected only to be informed of developments in Middle East talks. See Atlantic News, July 26, 1978, at 4.

132 See statements of Paul Martin, Canadian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in 3 Canadian Parl. Deb., H.C., 26th Pari, 2d Sess. 3307, and 4 id. at 3479-80 (1964). France recognized the People's Republic in 1964, but Canada did not do so until 1970.

133 See Brosio, supra note 73, at 116.

134 Interview with Orme Wilson, supra note 103; R. HILL, supra note 46, at 40. See also Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1978, at A9, col. 1.

135 This may also be true regarding acts closer to home than those discussed in the text. On a number of occasions the allies let their desire to be disassociated from any contacts with Franco Spain override any desire they may have had to be consulted before an individual ally took a step involving Spain. For example, the United States simply kept its allies informed (that being all they wanted) as it negotiated a friendship and cooperation treaty with Spain. See statement of Robert J. McCloskey, Ambassador at Large, in Spanish Base Treaty: Hearings Before the Senate Coram, on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 9 (1976); Final Communiqué of the Defence Planning Comm., May 23, 1975, para. 5, in Nato Final CommuniquÉS 1975, at 11, 12. When the Federal Republic of Germany explored the possibility of establishing Spanish bases in 1959, it consulted only the major allies. See G. LISKA, supra note 63, at 74-75. The United Kingdom would not normally consult the allies before drafting a note to Spain concerning Gibraltar. R. HILL, supra note 55, at 97.

136 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 3, Art. 2.

137 See text at notes 10-11, supra. The 1974 Declaration on Atlantic Relations, supra note 14, says that the allies “will work to remove sources of conflict between their economic policies and to encourage economic co-operation with one another.“

138 See Brosio, supra note 73, at 116.

139 See G. Wright, NATO in the New International Order, 36 BEHIND THE HEADLINES, No. 4, at 5 (1978).

140 See Export Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Trade and Commerce of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 50-51, 61 (1976); Extension of the Export Administration Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 174-75 (1976).

141 One instance in which there may have been circumvention was the license granted in 1975 by Rolls Royce to the People's Republic of China for the manufacture of Spey jet engines. The license may have substantially accelerated the development of Chinese propulsion design and production technology, according to a CIA statement in House Hearings, supra note 140, pt. 2, at 8 (1976). The proposed deal had been submitted to COCOM in 1973, but had been withdrawn after some members expressed reservations. It was not resubmitted, but the United Kingdom did consult at least some of the allies bilaterally. See Rolls-Royce Deal: Its Political and Military Meaning, excerpted from Business China, Feb. 6, 1976, in id. at 26-27; Financial Times, Dec. 23, 1975, at 4, col. 5.

142 Interview with James Sampas, CCMS Project Officer, July 5, 1978.

143 On the limitations of CCMS, see Kyba, Environmental Co-operation To Meet Political Objectives, International Perspectives, July-Aug. 1977, at 11.