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Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Jonathan I. Charney
Jonathan I. Charney*
Affiliation:
Vanderbilt University
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Extract

Disputes with foreign policy implications have often been brought to the federal courts. These cases call attention to the tension between the authority of the political branches to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and the authority of the courts to render judgments according to the law. How this tension is resolved, in turn, bears directly on the commitment of the United States to the rule of law.

Type
Distribution of Constitutional Authority
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 83 , Issue 4 , October 1989 , pp. 805 - 813
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1989

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References

1 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936).

2 U.S. Const. Art. II, §§1 and 3.

3 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

4 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

5 376 U.S. 398 (1964).

6 453 U.S. 654(1981).

7 175 U.S. 677, 700(1900).

8 See Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States Government to Violate Customary International Law, 80 AJIL 913 (1986).