1 See Hamidel-Ahdab, Abdul, Arbitration with the Arab Countries 13 (2d ed. 1999)Google Scholar; see also Libyan Am. Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Libyan Arab Republic (1977), 20 ILM 1, 41 (1981) [hereinafter LIAMCO award].

2 See LIAMCO award, supra note 1, at 41.

3 See Thomas W. Lippman, Understanding Islam: An Introduction to the Moslem World 121 (1982). Lippman notes that in the view of historians, Ali’s decision to submit to arbitration the issue of his rightful claim to leadership “illustrat[ed] his lack of fitness for the Caliphate”; not only was the issue deemed nonarbitrable by the Kharijites in Iraq (the earliest Islamic sect), who then revolted (“Ali had no right to submit to arbitration an issue that had been decided by God”), but Ali’s refusal to accept the award undermined his authority and support. Id.; see also Hitti, Philip K., History of the Arabs from the Earliest Times to the Present 181–82 (10th ed. 1970)Google Scholar.

4 For present purposes, “Islamic states” are the members of the Organization of Islamic Countries.

5 Indeed, as early as 1900, Bahrain was the site of a commercial arbitration center of which European merchants made frequent use. See Ali Radhi, Hassan, State Courts and Arbitration in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries, ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. Bull., May 1992, Spec. Supp., at 57, 57 Google Scholar.

6 Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice cites “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” as a source of international law, in addition to international conventions, customary international law, and, as subsidiary sources, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.

7 See Samir Saleh, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East: A Study in Shari’a and Statute Law 24 n.22 (1984) (“The Capitulations . . . were treaties by which Ottoman rulers conferred on European powers, among other advantages, the privilege of exercising extra-territorial jurisdiction within the boundaries of some states of the Ottoman Empire (Syria, Lebanon, Egypt) over the nationals of European powers. In practice consuls of foreign powers were entrusted by virtue of capitulatory treaties with the dispensing of justice in criminal, civil and commercial matters to their nationals.”).

8 See, e.g., Petroleum Dev. (Trucial Coast) Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 1 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 247 (1952).

9 The parties’ contract referred disputes arising under it first to arbitration by two arbitrators, and then to an umpire if those two arbitrators could not agree. The parties appointed arbitrators, who heard the case but could not agree on an award, whereupon Lord Asquith was appointed umpire to decide the case. See id. at 247.

10 Id. at 250.

11 Id. at 247.

12 Id. at 250–51.

13 Mat 251.

14 Id.

15 Ruler of Qttar v. Int’l Marine Oil Co., 20ILR 534,545 (1957) (The referee, Sir Alfred Bucknill, held: “I need not set out the evidence before me about the origin, history and development of Islamic Law as applied in Qatar or as to the legal procedure in that country. I have no reason to suppose that Islamic Law is not administered there strictly, but I am satisfied that the law does not contain any principles which would be sufficient to interpret this particular contract”).

16 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 27 ILR 117,169 (1963) (holding that, insofar as ARAMCO’s rights would not be “secured in an unquestionable manner by the law in force in Saudi Arabia,” Saudi laws must be “interpreted or supplemented by the general principles of law, by the custom and practice in the oil business and by notions of pure jurisprudence”).

17 See Sadek El-Kosheri, Ahmed, Is There a Growing International Arbitration Culture in the Arab-Islamic Juridical Culture? in International Dispute Resolution: Towards an International Arbitration Culture 47, 48 (Jan van den Berg, Albert ed., 1998)Google Scholar:

18 The case that arguably presaged this second phase of international dispute resolution in the Islamic world is the Sapphire arbitration, which involved a concession agreement between a Canadian corporation, Sapphire International Petroleums, Ltd., and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), a state organ. Sapphire Int’l Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., 35ILR136 (1967). NIOC refused to participate fully in the arbitration, but the sole arbitrator, Swiss federal judge Pierre Cavin, nevertheless heard the dispute, applied general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and rendered an award in favor of Sapphire. “GARes. 3201 (S-VI) (May 1,1974) (proclaiming states’ individual right to control, and exploit, their natural resources, “including the right to [the] nationalization or transfer of ownership to its nationals”).

20 GA Res. 3281 (XXIX) (Dec. 12,1974) (proclaiming each state’s right to “nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent”). An earlier resolution, “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,” similarly had urged an “appropriate compensation” standard for expropriations, but made it clear that such compensation must be “in accordance with international law.” GA Res. 1803 (XVII) (Dec. 14, 1962).

21 In November 1973, Arab leaders issued a joint resolution calling for the continued “use of oil as an economic weapon.” Paust, Jordan J. & Blaustein, Albert P., The Arab Oil Weapon—A Threat to International Peace, 68 AJIL 410, 411 (1974)Google Scholar.

22 For example, petroleum accounted for 99.8 percent of Libya’s total exports in 1969. See von Mehren, Robert B. & Nicholas Kourides, P., International Arbitration Between States and Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 AJIL 476, 477 n.4 (1981)Google Scholar.

23 Michael Reisman, W., International Arbitration and Sovereignty, 18 Arb. Int’l 231, 233 (2002)Google Scholar.

24 See Norton, Patrick M., A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AJIL 474, 478 (1991)Google Scholar.

25 See id.

26 Although developing countries, many of them oil producing, began nationalizing natural-resource concessions and public utilities in the 1950s (for example, Iran, 1951; Egypt, 1956; Indonesia, 1957), they stepped up the number and frequency of takings in the 1960s and 1970s (for example, Cuba, Iraq, and Sri Lanka, 1961; Algeria, from 1963; Syria, 1964; Peru, 1968; Bolivia and Zambia, 1969; Chile, 1970; Libya, from 1970; Saudi Arabia, 1972; and Kuwait, from 1973). See LIAMCO award, supra note 1, at 49–50.

27 The Libyan nationalization cases in which Libya refused to participate—BP, TOPCO, and LIAMCO—epitomized the era’s ideological, political, and legal clashes between developed and developing states, and signaled the failure of developing states’ attempts, through the UN General Assembly, to weaken the standard of compensation for expropriation. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 ILR 297 (1979) (sole arbitrator held that Libya’s expropriation of BP’s properties and interests in Libya was arbitrary, discriminatory, and confiscatory, and thus violated both international and Libyan law); Texas Overseas Petroleum Co. [TOPCO] v. Libyan Arab Republic, 17ILM 1 (1978) (sole arbitrator held that Libya’s expropriation was unlawful and that restitutio in integrum was the preferred remedy in both Libyan and international law); LIAMCO award, supra note 1 (sole arbitrator found no “purely discriminatory” intent behind Libya’s nationalization of LIAMCO’s oil concessions, but ruled that Libya was bound by its contractual obligations under the concession agreements, and awarded LIAMCO just over $80 million, plus costs and interest). For an extensive analysis of the three Libyan nationalization cases, see von Mehren & Kourides, supra note 22.

The AMINOIL arbitration, Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil Co. (AMINOIL), 21 ILM 976 (1982), arguably marked the end of the second phase of international arbitration as it relates to the Islamic world. The AMINOIL arbitration was particularly significant in that (1) its tribunal explicitly rejected General Assembly resolutions, including the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, supra note 20, that purported to weaken the customary international law standard of compensation for expropriation, and (2) the Kuwaiti government participated fully, appointing an agent, who was aided by international arbitration experts. Moreover, Kuwait was ordered to pay a relatively small amount for breaching a long-term oil concession, in marked contrast to Libya’s experience in the three oil arbitrations of the 1970s in which it declined to appear and defend itself.

A second event signaling the start of the “modern era” for Islamic states and international arbitration was the establishment of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in 1981, as part of the resolution of the 1979–81 hostage crisis between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. From its inception, the Tribunal rather consistently has reconfirmed the classic standard of “prompt, adequate and effective” or “full” compensation for expropriation, thus further setting at naught some developing states’ efforts, by means of General Assembly resolutions, to weaken that standard. See Brower, Charles N. & Brueschke, Jason D., The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 478–88 (1998)Google Scholar; see also supra notes19, 20, and accompanying text.

28 See Salacuse, Jeswald W., Direct Foreign Investment and the Law in Developing Countries, 15 ICSID Rev.—Foreign Investment L.J. 382 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 Brower, Charles N., Brower, Charles H. II, & Sharpe, Jeremy K., The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication System, 19 Arb. Int’l (forthcoming 2003)Google Scholar (“The global adjudication system is the legal framework within which international investment and other commercial disputes are resolved by binding and final arbitration, as regulated, however, by national legislation and judiciaries; the two components of the system being linked through international agreements, principally the New York Convention.”) (citing the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature June 10,1958,21 UST 2517, 330 UNTS 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]).

30 The first bilateral investment treaty ever signed (in 1959) was between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan. A very large number of the roughly two thousand bilateral investment treaties concluded since then likewise have involved Islamic states, and many such treaties have been between Islamic states. See Dolzer, Rudolf & Stevens, Margrete, Bilateral Investment Treaties 267–326 (1995)Google Scholar.

31 See Paulsson, Jan, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID Rev.—Foreign Investment L.J. 232 (1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 See supra note 29. While five of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have become party to the New York Convention (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia), all six have agreed to enforce each other’s arbitral awards. See Zainal, Yousif, The Prevalence of Arbitration in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries, 18 J. Int’l Arb. 657, 658 (2001)Google Scholar; see also infra note 35 (noting Qatar’s recent accession to the New York Convention). All GCC countries have ratified the Conventions on Enforcement of Judgments, Delegations and Judicial Notices in the GCC States, common Article 12 of which provides that arbitral awards shall be enforced in contracting states. See Zainal, supra, at 658–59.

33 Islamic states also have become party to bilateral and multilateral investment treaties (including the related Washington Convention, which provides a specialized system for arbitration of investment disputes). See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 UST 1270, 575 UNTS 159 [hereinafter Washington Convention].

34 See Aboul-Enein, M. I. M., The Development of International Commercial Arbitration Laws in the Arab World, 65 Arb. 314, 314 (1999)Google Scholar.

35 More recent recruits include Albania (2001), Azerbaijan (2000), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1993), Brunei Darussalam (1996),Guinea (1991),Iran (2001),Kazakhstan (1995),Kyrgyzstan (1996),Lebanon (1998),Mali (1994), Mauritania (1997), Oman (1999), Qatar (2003), Saudi Arabia (1994),Turkey (1992), and Uzbekistan (1996). Earlier adherents include Algeria (1989), Bahrain (1988), Djibouti (1983), Egypt (1959), Indonesia (1982), Jordan (1980), Kuwait (1978), Malaysia (1986), Morocco (1959), Syria (1959), and Tunisia (1967). See <http://www.uncitral.org>.

36 New York Convention, supra note 29, Arts. 11(3) (“The Court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”), III (“Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon,” subject to certain limited defenses expressed in Article V: incapacity; improper notice or inability to present one’s case; the award deals with matters beyond the parties’ submission to arbitrate; improper composition of the tribunal; the award is not yet binding; the subject matter of the dispute is inarbitrable; or the award is contrary to public policy).

37 See Saleh, supra note 7, at 333–34, 380. Lebanese law was similarly deficient in that arbitration clauses in contracts were deemed mere promises to execute future arbitration agreements and thus were insufficient to enable parties to compel the initiation of arbitration proceedings. See id. at 126.

38 Djibouti Code of International Arbitration, Law No. 79/AN/94, Statement of Principles, princs. 2, 4 (Feb. 13, 1984), 25 ILM 2, 2–3 (1986) [hereinafter Djibouti Statement of Principles]; see also Chatterjee, S. K., The Djibouti Code of International Arbitration,]. Int’l Arb., Mar. 1987, at 57, 64Google Scholar.

39 New York Convention, supra note 29, Arts. rV(l), V(l) (e).

40 See Saleh, supra note 7, at 172, 192, 247–48, 322, 364, 415.

41 See supra note 36.

42 See Lew, Julian D. M., The Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and Awards in the Middle East, 1 Arb. Int’l 161, 172–75 (1985)Google Scholar.

43 See Saleh, Samir, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the States of the Arab Middle East, in Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration 340, 341–42 (Lew, Julian D. M. ed., 1986)Google Scholar; El Mernissi, Mohamed, Arbitration in Morocco: Realities and Perspectives, 19 J. Int’l Arb. 179, 182 (2002)Google Scholar.

44 See Albert Jan Van Den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards A Uniform Judicial Interpretation 361 (1981); see also Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generate de l’lndustrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969,974 (2d Cir. 1974) (interpreting the Convention’s public policy defense narrowly).

45 See El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries, supra note 1, at 201. Other national courts performing the same function include Bahrain’s Supreme Civil Appeals Court and Djibouti’s Commission for Arbitration Appeals. See id. at 151; Chatterjee, supra note 38, at 65.

46 In Hong Kong, for instance, any application seeking enforcement or annulment of an international arbitral award is directed to the judge in charge of the “Construction and Arbitration List.” See Kaplan, Neil, Arbitration in Asia: Developments and Crises, 19 J. Int’l Arb. 163, 166 (2002)Google Scholar. This procedure no doubt accounts, in part, for Hong Kong’s past success as a forum for international arbitration.

47 New York Convention, supra note 29, Art. 1(3). Indeed, most states parties to the New York Convention have made this reservation. See <http://www.asser.nl/ica/nyca-eng.htm>.

48 See Hamid El-Ahdab, Abdul, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the Arab Countries, 11 Arb. Int’l 169, 175 (1995)Google Scholar.

49 Snow v. Kuwait (Minister of Public Works) (House of Lords 1984), 10Y.B. Com. Arb. 508 (1985); see also van den Berg, Albert Jan, Does the New York Convention of 1958 Apply Retroactively ? Decision of the House of Lords in Government of Kuwait v. Sir Frederic [sic] Snow, 1 Arb. Int’l 103 (1985)Google Scholar.

50 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, UN Doc. A/40/17, Annex 1 (1985), reprinted in 24 ILM 1302 (1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law].

51 “It was the Afro-Asian Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) which was responsible for the initiation of the study by UNCITRAL that led to the formulation of the Model Law.” Sornarajah, M., The UNCITRAL Model Law: A Third World Viewpoint, J. Int’l Arb., Dec. 1989, at 7, 8.Google Scholar

52 Paulsson, Jan, Third World Participation in International Investment Arbitration, 2 ICSID Rev.—Foreign Investment L.J. 19, 23 (1987)Google Scholar.

53 See M. I. M. Aboul-Enein, Reflections on the New Egyptian Law on Arbitration, 11 Arb. Int’l 75, 75 (1995).

54 See <http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm> (listing states whose arbitration laws are based on the UNCITRAL Model Law); see also Yesilirmak, Ali, The Turkish International Arbitration Law of 2001, 19 J. Int’l Arb. 171, 171 (2002)Google Scholar; Gharavi, Hamid G., The 1997 Iranian International Commercial Arbitration Law: The UNCITRAL Model Law á L Tranienne, 15 Arb. Int’l 85 (1999)Google Scholar; Jafarian, Mansour & Rezaeian, Mehrdad, The New Law on International Commercial Arbitration in Iran, J. Int’l Arb., Sept. 1998, at 31 Google Scholar. Jafarian and Rezaeian have noted that

Id. at 34.

55 Sornarajah, supra note 51, at 9.

56 See Comair-Obeid, Nayla, Recent Developments in International Arbitration in Lebanon, 65 Arb. 74 (1999)Google Scholar; Nassar, Adel, International Arbitration in Lebanon, 10 Arb. Int’l 295 (1994)Google Scholar.

57 See Hamid El-Ahdab, Abdul, The Qatari Arbitration Act—A Study, J. Int’l Arb. June 1993, at 143 Google Scholar.

58 See El-Ahdab, supra note 1, at 81.

59 Aboul-Enein, supra note 34, at 316.

60 See El-Ahdab, supra note 48, at 175–76. Algerian and Lebanese laws permit their respective courts to enforce awards (1) that have been annulled by courts of the state in which the award was made, or (2) that may be defective under the laws of the state in which the award was made, but that are consonant with the laws of the enforcing state. See id. at 175; but see Brower, Brower, & Sharpe, supra note 29 (discussing problems relating to courts’ enforcement of foreign arbitral awards that have been annulled elsewhere). In addition, Tunisia’s 1993 arbitration law allows parties to waive, partially or fully, the possibility of setting aside arbitral awards in Tunisia, provided that all parties have their domicile, habitual residence, or seat outside Tunisia. See Recent Developments in Arbitration Law and Practice: Tunisia, 19 Y.B. Com. Arb. 462, 462 (1994).

61 See Aboul-Enein, supra note 34, at 314.

62 See Mernissi, supra note 43, at 183. Mernissi reported that Morocco’s minister of justice had asked him “to draw up a new legal framework for the alternative settlement of disputes on the basis of the work of UNCITRAL, international practice and pertinent foreign experience.” Id.

63 “The United Arab Emirates is also developing its own law on commercial arbitration, which is currently in draft form and is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law.” Zainal, supra note 32, at 658.

64 See Aboul-Enein, supra note 34, at 318–19.

65 See id. at 320. Article 65 of Sudan’s Constitution mandates that all laws conform to Islamic precepts. Nevertheless, because Article 4 of Iran’s Constitution similarly requires that “all... laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria,” that state’s recent adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law demonstrates that such a provision need not be a bar to modern arbitration legislation.

66 See Saleh, supra note 7, at 327, 370, 434. These states filled legislative gaps with Islamic law, which, though steeped in the principles of arbitration, has little to say about the specifics of arbitration.

67 See id. at 201, 298.

68 See id.

69 See id. at 297, 376.

70 Libya, for example, enacted a law in 1970 (which it subsequently repealed) forbidding the settlement by arbitration of disputes arising from administrative contracts. See Aboul-Enein, supra note 34, at318. In 1997, Egypt amended its 1994 arbitration law “to put a definitive end to that persisting tendency against the arbitrability of administrative contracts”—subject, however, to the approval of the appropriate minister. Recent Developments in Arbitration Law and Practice: Egypt, 23 Y.B. Com. Arb. 563, 564 (1998).

71 See Mernissi, supra note 43, at 180; Saleh, supra note 7, at 160, 204.

72 In 1963, following its loss in the ARAMCO arbitration, see supra note 16 and accompanying text, Saudi Arabia issued a decree prohibiting arbitration of any dispute to which the government or any ministry or agency of the government was a party and that involved natural or juridical persons. This infamous Decree No. 58 “constituted an impenetrable barrier to any arbitration in Saudi Arabia.” El-Ahdab, supra note 1, at 561. Saudi Arabia’s 1976 agreement with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, however, and its accession in 1980 to the Washington Convention (both of which provide for such arbitration) have rendered Decree No. 58 largely inoperative and provide the means to circumvent the otherwise applicable jurisdiction of the “Grievance Board.” See infra note 77 and accompanying text; El-Ahdab, supra note 1, at 562–63; Washington Convention, supra note 33, Art. 52.

73 See Yesilirmak, Ali, Jurisdiction of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes over Turkish Concession Contracts, 14 ICSID Rev.—Foreign investment L. J. 390, 391 (1999)Google Scholar.

74 See Grant, Tom, Turkey Embraces Arbitration as Step Toward Global Economic Integration, 74 N.Y. ST. B.J. 46, 48 (2002)Google Scholar.

75 See Undersecretariat of Treasury, General Directorate of Foreign Investment, EDI Inflows to Turkey, at <http://www.investinginturkey.gov.tr/english/ybs/geneling.htm> (May 1, 2002).

76 See Saleh, supra note 7, at 282.

77 See id. at 310.

78 Djibouti Statement of Principles, supra note 38, princ. 3, 25 ILM at 3.

79 Sornarajah, supra note 51, at 20. Sornarajah similarly argues that the “so-called lex mercatoria is a creation of a coterie of Western scholars and arbitrators who have loaded it with norms entirely favourable to international business.” Id. at 17 (footnote omitted). More serious, perhaps, is the complaint that international arbitration’s “dominant Western discourse in strict technocratic terms... serves to obscure arbitration’s political capacities as a medium capable of disempowering state legislative potentials and delegitimizing public regulatory interventions in the market.” Shalakany, Amr A., Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 Harv. Int’l L.J. 419, 430 (2000)Google Scholar. This concern is a legitimate one, and not just for developing states. Indeed, arbitration has given rise to controversy under the North American Free Trade Agreement and bilateral investment treaties. These disputes often raise important public policy considerations, and their resolution in private arbitrations, divorced from many of the normal legal and political checks, is a significant concern to some elements of civil society. Public hearings, publicly available pleadings, and an established right of amicus interventions, however, certainly can ameliorate some of these concerns by rendering more transparent and informed the international arbitration of disputes affecting states’ important public and regulatory policies. See NAFTA s Investment Chapter: Dynamic Laboratory, Failed Experiments and Lessons for the FTAA, 97 ASIL Proc. (forthcoming 2003) (remarks of Charles N. Brower).

80 Khamis Al-Alawi, Ali Bin, International Arbitration According to Islamic Jurisprudence in the Field of Commerce and Investment, 5/6 Lebanese Rev. Arab & Int’l Arb. 33, 35 (1997)Google Scholar.

81 African-Asian Legal Consultative Committee, Report of the Seventeenth, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Sessions Held in Kuala-Lumpur (1976), Baghdad (1977) AND DOHA (1978) (published 1978) [hereinafter AALCC Report] (quoted in Sornarajah, supra note 51, at 8); but see Karl-Heinz, Bockstiegel, Settlement of Disputes Between Parties from Developing and Industrial Countries, 15 ICS Idrev.—Foreign Investment L.J. 275, 286 (2000)Google Scholar (noting that “the present rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and of the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) are regularly examined by experts both from the industrial and the developing worlds and have both most recently been adopted in modern versions from the beginning of 1998”).

82 AALCC REPORT, supra note 81.

83 In addition, the African-Asian Legal Consultative Committee and Malaysia agreed to establish the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration. See<http://www.rcakl.org.my>. Similarly, the eight Euro-Arab Chambers of Commerce have created the System of Conciliation, Arbitration and Expertise, headquartered in Paris, “which may be used in any international commercial relationship which involves, directly or indirectly, an Arab country.” Emmanuel Gaillard, Introductory Note, Euro-Arab-Chambers of Commerce: Rules of Conciliation, Arbitration and Expertise, 24 ILM 1119(1985). The English Court of Appeal recently put its imprimatur on an award rendered by a tribunal under the Euro-Arab Arbitration System in London, which had applied Shari ‘a law in awarding damages to a Saudi national in arbitration against an American firm. The Court of Appeal reversed a High Court decision holding that the Euro-Arab Arbitration System was incompetent to correct a final award rendered by an arbitral tribunal under its auspices. See Munshi, Mahtab, English Court of Appeal Upholds Euro-Arab Arbitration System Award, 31 Int’l Bus. L. 91 (2003)Google Scholar.

A subregional arbitration center is the Commercial Arbitration Center of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which commenced operations in Bahrain in 1995. See Kreindler, Richard H., Arbitration Under the G. C. C. Commercial Arbitration Center Rules in the Context of Banking and Finance Disputes, 8 Lebanese Rev. Arab & Int’l Arb. 9 (1998)Google Scholar.

The 1993 Treaty on the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHBLA Treaty) led to the creation of another sub-regional arbitration center, the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration, headquartered in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. This center plays judicial and administrative roles in organizing and managing arbitration in the sixteen (mostly Islamic) African states parties to the OHBLA Treaty. In 1999, the organization’s council of ministers enacted a modern Uniform Arbitration Act, which is incorporated automatically into those states’ national laws. See Asouzu, Amazu A., International Commercial Arbitration and African States: Practice, Participation and Institutional Development 126–28, 172–73 (2001)Google Scholar.

Another subregional, but specialized, arbitration body is the Judicial Tribunal of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, which provides final and binding adjudication of disputes arising between or among its member states, affiliated companies, and the organization. The Tribunal was established in May 1978 and is headquartered in Kuwait. See Protocol of the Judicial Tribunal of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (Muhammad Khalil Khalil trans., 1983) (on file with authors).

84 See Atallah, Borham, The Arab Regional Arbitration Centres, in Proceedings of the First Euro-Arab Arbitration Conference 66, 68 (Kemicha, Fathi ed., 1987)Google Scholar. A perennial complaint is the paucity of Islamic arbitrators in international arbitration, a problem compounded by the fact that even when both parties are from developing states, they often appoint Western arbitrators, far removed from regional influences, to resolve their dispute. See Paulsson, supra note 52, at 33. The Euro-Arab Chambers of Commerce arbitration system is helping to remedy this problem. Articles 3 and 4 of its Rules of Conciliation, Arbitration and Expertise, 24 ILM 1119,1124 (1985), provide that the organization’s arbitration boards comprise equal numbers of Arab and non-Arab members.

85 See Atallah, supra note 84, at 69.

86 See id. at 71.

87 See Aboul-Enein, supra note 53, at 75 (noting that the Cairo Regional Centre suggested a new law based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, received a favorable response from the minister of justice, and then drafted the new law).

88 See Aboul-Enein, supra note 34, at 315 (“Even before the Egyptian Law was enacted, its draft was considered by some of the Arab states that enacted their laws before 1994.”).

89 See e-mail from M. I. M. Aboul-Enein to authors (Mar. 2, 2003) (on file with authors); see also Kemicha, Fathi, The Emergence of New Arbitration Centres in the Arab World, in Law of International Business and Dispute Settlement in the 21st Century: Liber Amicorum Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel 371, 373 (Briner, Robert, Yves Fortier, L., Peter Berger, Klaus, & Bredow, Jens eds., 2001)Google Scholar.

90 See Jalili, Mahir, Amman Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration,]. Int’l Arb., Mar. 1990, at 139, 139.Google Scholar

91 See supra note 33.

92 See Jalili, supra note 90, at 141. Tribunals may allow pleadings and testimony in other languages, provided that Arabic translations are made. See id.

93 See Kemicha, supra note 89, at 373; Zainal, supra note 32, at 659 n.2; Hobeika, Louis G., Arbitration in the Arab World, 14/15 Lebanese Rev. Arab & Int’l Arb. 8, 8 (2000)Google Scholar; Recent Developments in Arbitration Law and Practice: Bahrain, 20 Y.B. Com. Arb. 583,583 (1995).

94 See UN Doc. A/31/17 (1976), reprinted in 15 ILM 701 (1976).

95 See Hamid El-Ahdab, Abdul, Why Create the Arab Association for International Arbitration? J. Int’l Arb., Mar. 1992, at 29, 31Google Scholar (“The role of the AAAI is indeed to help the ICC in this task by communicating the case law, academic writings and legislation of Arab countries in a regular manner and by co-operating with it as regards the . . . performance of awards in these countries.”).

96 Id.

97 Bedjaoui, Mohammed, The Arab World in ICC Arbitration, ICC Int’l CT. Arb. Bull., May 1992, Spec. Supp., at 7,13 Google Scholar.

98 Id.

99 For example, arbitration has been used to resolve nearly 2.6 million claims against Iraq, albeit without Iraq’s full participation, arising from its unlawful August 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait. A large portion of these claims has been made by other Islamic states on behalf both of themselves and of their nationals. To date, the UN Compensation Commission, a subsidiary organ of the UN Security Council, has awarded claimants approximately $44 billion of the $151.4 billion they have sought, and has already paid them approximately $17.6 billion from a fund established through the sale of a portion of Iraq’s oil. See Status of Claims Processing (Apr. 9,2003), at <http://www.unog.ch/uncc/status.htm>.

As a further example, Yemen and Eritrea arbitrated a dispute concerning sovereignty over the Hanish islands in the Red Sea. Eritrea v. Yemen, First Stage, Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Perm. Ct Arb. Oct 9, 1998), at <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ ENGLISH/RPC/#Eritrea>. Thereafter, the speaker of Yemen’s Parliament indicated that his government might call upon Saudi Arabia to arbitrate a 75–year-old border conflict, a course of action upon which the two states had agreed if negotiations failed. See Yemen May Try Arbitration to Settle Border Disputes with Saudi Arabia, Arabic News (Oct. 12, 1998), at<http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/981012/1998101225.html>; see also Halwan Al-Enazy, Askar, “The International Boundary Treaty” (Treaty of Jeddah) Concluded Between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni Republic on June 12, 2000, 96 AJIL 161 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Similarly, the United Arab Emirates has petitioned Iran to arbitrate its claim to Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb—the disputed Persian Gulf islands that three decades ago gave rise to Libya’s nationalization of BP’s oil concessions. See supra note 27; UAE Warns Gulf States of Iran (June 7,1999), at <http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/990607/1999060755.html>.

This greater participation in international arbitration reflects an even broader willingness on the part of Islamic states to submit important legal disputes to impartial, third-party decision. As an example, such states have been increasingly active in proceedings at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), with pending cases including the Oil Platforms case between Iran and the United States concerning U.S. military action directed at Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf; the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia; the Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie case between Libya, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and United States, on the other, concerning the bombing of PanAm Flight 103; the Frontier Dispute case between Benin and Niger; and the Ahmadou Sadio Diallo Case between Guinea and the Democratic Republic of the Congo concerning an application for diplomatic protection.

Recently adjudicated or settled ICJ cases involving Islamic states include Sovereignty over Pulau Litigan and Pulau Sipidan between Malaysia and Indonesia concerning two islands off the coast of Borneo, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain, Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 between Iran and the United States concerning the United States’ downing of an Iran Air Airbus (settled) (see Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States, 90 AJIL 278 (1996)), Territorial Dispute between Libya and Chad (1994 ICJ Rep. 6 (Feb. 3)), Continental Shelf between Libya and Malta (1985 ICJ Rep. 13 (June 2)), and Continental Shelf between Libya and Tunisia (1982 ICJ Rep. 18 (Feb. 24)). Over the past four decades, no state has brought more discrete cases to the ICJ than Libya.

Materials concerning the ICJ and its cases are available online at <http://www.icj-cij.org>.

100 Giorgio Bernini, Is There a Growing International Arbitration Culture? in International Dispute Resolution, supra note 17, at 41, 44.

101 EL-AHDAB, supra note 1, at 20.