1 The documentary basis of this article is a collection made by the writer of several hundred pages of extracts drawn from many and various sources. These sources include a number of German pamphlets on the “Freedom of the Seas,” notably the one by Meurer (to which repeated reference is made in the text), German periodicals of various sorts, including newspapers as well as magazines, resolutions and petitions adopted by the political parties, chambers of commerce and other public bodies in Germany, speeches of leading German statesmen and politicians, articles and lectures by German authorities on international law, etc. A considerable number of them were drawn from Das annexionistische Deutschland, by S. Grumbach, Lausanne, 1917.

2 See article in the Berliner Tageblatt, March 2, 1918. Captain Persius appears, however, to be skeptical as to whether freedom of the seas in time of war can ever be attained. “In times of peace,” he remarks, “it has never been questioned,” thus differing from most German publicists on this matter.

3 See N. Y. Times Current History, Vol. VII, Part 1, November, 1917, p. 345.

4 As reported in the Preussische Kreuzzeitung, February 19, 1916.

5 The Sealed North Sea (a Compilation of Popular Lectures on Sea-Lore, 1915, No. 105).

6 Extract from a letter written by Herr Dernburg, former German Colonial Secretary and propagandist, read at a German meeting at Portland, Me., on April 17, 1915. See N. Y. Times Current History, II, pp. 279–281.

7 From a speech delivered on January 9, 1915, at the Republican Club, New York, by Herr Dernburg.

8 Excerpt from the Anti-annexationist petition of the New Fatherland League presented to the Imperial Chancellor and the members of the Reichstag early in June, 1915.

9 See Daily Review of the Foreign Press, September 24, 1916.

10 See London Times, February 17, 1919, p. 9.

11 See infra, p. 217.

12 See Der Bund der Völker, 1918, pp. 149–155.

13 See pamphlet by Schultze-Gaevernitz, entitled Frei Meere, 1915. For the views of Stier-Somlo, see his pamphlet (1917) entitled Die Freiheit der Meere und das Völkerrecht, pp. 119 ff.

14 Letter of Herr Dernburg, April 17, 1915, op. cit.

15 Extracts and abstracts of an article in The New Europe for June 27, 1918, entitled “Herr Dernburg’s Economic Outlook.” This article is based on an article of Dernburg’s in the Neue Freie Presse for May 19, 1918, on “Wilson’s Raw Materials Boycott vs. the United States.”

16 See N. Y. Times Current History, October, 1918, pp. 69–70.

17 See London Times, February 3, 1919, p. 9.

18 See Meurer, Das Program, etc., pp. 10, ff.

19 I.e., the rights of the capture of prizes, blockade and contraband.

The following passages from Niemeyer and Triepel may serve to illustrate the text:

“If we wish to be honest, then we must admit that the main purpose of our regulations does not lie in the restrictions imposed by the [Paris] Declaration upon the arbitrary will of war, but in the recognition accorded to exorbitant war privileges. These privileges find their highest expression in the following unholy trinity: right of capture at sea, right of contraband and right of blockade. The right of capture at sea sanctions the brutal treatment of private property; the rights of contraband and of blockade accord the same treatment to neutral commerce. The restrictions contained in the Declaration consist in reality in the exclusion of privateering, in the immunity of enemy goods on neutral vessels, and’ in the demand for effective blockades.”—Niemeyer, Die Prinzipien des Seekriegsrechts, 1909, p. 15.

“Capture at sea, contraband and blockade are like three keyboards of an instrument on any of which one may play at will in order always to produce the same sound.

“If necessary, contraband may be given up, if blockade be kept. And one may drop blockade as well as capture at sea, if contraband remains.”—Triepel, Die Freiheit des Meeres, 1917, p. 35.

For a fuller exposition of Triepel’s views, see note at the end of this article.

20 As expressed in his pamphlet entitled, Das Programer Meeresfreiheit, 1918, passim.

21 In reply to the question, “Shall Germany contend for the abolition of the right of capture at sea, or, as an alternative, consent to it?” Meurer (Das Program, etc., p. 49) answers: “Yes, provided a satisfactory and simultaneous regulation of the rights of blockade and contraband shall take place excluding a reappearance of the right of capture at sea in a different form. For the whole world is agreed that there exists a connection between these rights, and knows well that these questions ought not to be segregated by means of waterproof bulkheads.”

22 Speaking of commercial blockade, Meurer (op. cit., p. 60) says: “The core of the right of blockade is rotten; the right of blockade is a defiance of neutrality; it is the legal form for brutal acts of violation against neutrals and their trade. Commercial blockade originated at a time when the principle of neutrality was not yet developed, and when a belligerent was the leviathan who swallowed everything in sight. It is high time that the principle of neutrality should begin to assert its natural rights. The belligerent presses the neutral nations into his service by blockading commercial intercourse, and he injures them by placing restrictions upon their trade. The practice of confiscation lends emphasis to the application of blockade, and thus the right of capture at sea and the right of blockade pull on the same string; both constitute rights of capture. The belligerent lays his hands upon private property, in one case in the possession of enemy subjects, in the other, even on the property of neutrals. It is the same spirit, only somewhat more brutal, in the case of blockade, because it is directed even against neutral nations. For that reason whoever is in favor of the abolition of the right of capture at sea can no longer defend the right of blockade.”

23 The theory of continuous voyage, Meurer (op. cit., p. 65) characterizes as a “bluff for the purpose of covering up one’s weakness through an artificially created fear among neutral nations.”

24 Meurer, , Das Program der Meersfreiheit , 1917, pp. 86–87 Google Scholar.

25 In his pamphlet entitled Freiheit der Meere und der Kunftige Fridensschlus, published in 1917, the German publicist Triepel sets up the following thesis:

“The complete doing away of the rights of contraband and blockade is a Utopia. The abolition of the right of capture of prizes, without at the same time doing away with the rights of contraband and of blockade, would be not only a futile innovation, but one decidedly injurious to Germany. For the rights of capture, contraband and blockade are three fetters of maritime trade so ingeniously welded together, that as soon as one is loosened or destroyed the other lays hold so much the more firmly.”

“Triepel dedicates to the proving of this thesis more detailed explanations. He tries to show that, in the first place, there is not the least prospect that the institution of contraband will ever disappear from the law of warfare. If the right of capture should be abolished but that of contraband be retained, then the conception of contraband, which up to the present has referred only to neutral property, would be applied also to that of the enemy. This enemy property would then fall a prey to the opponent, not as booty but as contraband. There would then arise the danger that by the great extension of the idea of contraband sea-booty might again be introduced, by means of which the maritime commerce of the enemy could be crippled just as much as by the right of capture. The abolition of the right of capturing prizes, without the abolition of the right of declaring contraband, would be advantageous to the sea-power which could manipulate the weapon of the capture of contraband goods the more readily. As long as the geographical situation and the proportions of power have not changed, Germany will derive more harm than benefit from such a freedom of the seas. The prospects for an abolition of blockade are just as slight. If, moreover, the right to capture prizes should be abolished but not that of blockade, the result would be ineffectual. For blockade would then signify to the adversary nothing else than capture. Ships would fall a prey to the enemy either as prizes or as blockade-runners. The blockade would destroy the enemy’s commerce by its very existence. Therefore a blockading sea-power could, if necessary, dispense with the right of capture, for one military measure could be substituted for another. The abolition of the right of capturing prizes would have to be followed, as a logical conclusion, by the abolition of the right of blockade. In England the correct deduction was made that, because they could not dispense with blockade, neither could they with the capturing of prizes. At any rate, the retention of the right of blockade would make the abolition of the right of capture an illusion. On the other hand, the abolition of the right of blockade with the retention of the right of capture would not have the least advantage for Germany. Yes, even if both institutions should be abolished, there would be no gain; for at once sharper emphasis would be laid upon other means of warfare, upon substitutes for blockade. The suppression of the introduction of contraband goods might very successfully replace blockade; even the mere prohibition of the right to import contraband goods might operate as a blockade. The same effect might be attained by the extension of the conception of contraband; likewise by the obliteration of the distinction between absolute and relative contraband. At any rate, the abolition of blockade could without the least difficulty be rendered ineffectual by the energetic application of the right to declare contraband. The problem would work out just as in the case of trying to abolish the capture of prizes. Capture, contraband, and blockade are like the three keyboards of an instrument, on any one of which one can at pleasure play the same melody. If necessary, contraband could be renounced if it were permitted to retain blockade; both blockade and capture could be given up if contraband remained. A renunciation of the capture of prizes is, therefore, according to Triepel, only possible if both blockade and contraband are abolished without leaving either a trace or a substitute. And that, he says, is impossible of realization. Substitutes for the one or the other would always be present. Moreover, Triepel does not lose sight of the possibility that England in a future naval war might be more vulnerable than it has so far been. In that case the Germans would be fools if they should rob themselves of the right of capture and of blockade. Consequently, Triepel comes to the conclusion that the abolition of the right of capture would bring Germany no advantage, but perhaps also no detriment. Citation from Nippold, , Die Gestaltung des Völkerrechts nach dem Weltkriege , 1917, pp. 279–281 Google Scholar.

I was unfortunately unable to procure a copy of Triepel’s important pamphlet in time for the preparation of this article.