1 Art. Ill, Sect. 3 of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund, which entered into force on December 27, 1945 and were amended effective July 28, 1969. References hereinafter to an Article are to a provision of this Agreement unless otherwise indicated.

2 Art. V, Sect. 3.

3 See Gold, Joseph, Voting and Decisions in the International Monetary Fund: An Essay on the Law and Practice of the Fund, 17–30 (1972)Google Scholar (hereinafter referred to as Voting and Decisions).

4 Art. XIL Sect. 2 (e).

5 Art. XII, Sect. 3 (i).

6 Art. XXIII, Sect 1.

7 Art. XXIV, Sect. 2 (b) .

8 Art. XII, Sect. 5(d).

9 Voting and Decisions, 123–51.

10 Id., 151–55.

11 See Gold, Joseph, The “Dispensing” and “Suspending” Powers of International Organizations, 19 Netherlands Int. L. R., 189–99 (1972)Google Scholar (hereinafter referred to as The “Dispensing” and “Suspending” Powers of International Organizations).

12 Art. XVI, Sect. 1:

(a) In the event of an emergency or the development of unforeseen circumstances threatening the operations of the Fund, the Executive Directors by unanimous vote may suspend for a period of not more than one hundred twenty days the operation of any of the following provisions:

(i) Article IV, Sections 3 and 4(b)

(ii) Article V, Sections 2, 3, 7, 8(a) and (f)

(iii) Article VI, Section 2

(iv) Article XI, Section 1

(b) Simultaneously with any decision to suspend the operation of any of the foregoing provisions, the Executive Directors shall call a meeting of the Board of Governors for the earliest practicable date.

(c) The Executive Directors may not extend any suspension beyond one hundred twenty days. Such suspension may be extended, however, for an additional period of not more than two hundred forty days, if the Board of Governors by a four-fifths majority of the total voting power so decides, but it may not be further extended except by amendment of this Agreement pursuant to Article XVII.

(d) The Executive Directors may, by a majority of the total voting power, terminate such suspension at any time.

13 Art. XXIX, Sect. 1:

In the event of an emergency or the development of unforeseen circumstances threatening the operations of the Fund with respect to the Special Drawing Account, the Executive Directors by unanimous vote may suspend for a period of not more than one hundred twenty days the operation or any of the provisions relating to special drawing rights, and the provisions of Article XVI, Section 1(b), (c) and (d), shall then apply.

14 See e.g., Art. VII(b) of the Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation (IFC). See also Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), Arts. 126, 149, 157, 212, inter alia; International Cocoa Agreement, 1972, Art. 61.

15 Wilfred Jenks, C., Unanimity, the Veto, Weighted Voting, Special and Simple Majorities and Consensus as Modes of Decision in International Organizations in Cambridge Essays in International Law: Essays in Honour of Lord Mcnair 49 (1965)Google Scholar.

16 See 2 Schermers, Henry G., International Institutional Law 341—12, 344–45 (1972)Google Scholar.

17 Art. XII, Sect. 3(g). A quorum for any meeting exists, however, if it is attended by a majority of the directors representing not less than one-half of the voting power (Art. XII, Sect. 3(h)).

18 Art. XII, Sect. 3(e).

19 Art. XVI, Sect. 1(d).

20 7 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1170 (1971).

21 IMF, Press Release No. 853, August 20, 1971 in 23 International Financial News Survey 261 (1971) (hereinafter referred to as IFNS). See also International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the Fiscal Year Ended April 30, 1972, at 38 (1972) (hereinafter referred to as Annual Report, 19—).

22 23 IFNS 417–18 (1971).

23 Decision No. 3463-(71/126), December 18, 1971, Selected Decisions of the International Monetary Fund and Selected Documents, Sixth Issue, 12–15 (1972) (hereinafter referred to as Selected Decisions). See also 23 IFNS 419 (1971); Annual Report, 1972, at 85–87.

24 See Gold, Joseph, The Legal Structure of the Par Value System, 5 Law and Policy in International Business 192–200 (1973)Google Scholar.

25 Art. IV, Sects. 3 and 4 (b) .

26 Art. V, Sects. 2, 3, 7, 8 (a) and (f) ; Art. VI, Sect. 2.

27 Annual Report, 1972, at 44–46; 1973, at 52–53.

28 For other possible reasons, see The “Dispensing” and “Suspending” Powers of International Organizations 197–99.

29 Rules and Regulations, Rule 0–3.

30 Art. XXV, Sect. 2 (b) (i).

31 See Communiqué issued by the Committee on Reform of the International Monetary System and Related Issues (Committee of Twenty) at the conclusion of their meeting in Rome (January 17–18, 1974), paragraph 4 (3 IMF Survey 23 (1974)).

32 Art. XVII(a):

Any proposal to introduce modifications in this Agreement, whether emanating from a member, a governor or the Executive Directors, shall be communicated to the chairman of the Board of Governors who shall bring the proposal before the Board. If the proposed amendment is approved by the Board the Fund shall, by circular letter or telegram, ask all members whether they accept the proposed amendment. When three-fifths of the members, having four-fifths of the total voting power, have accepted the proposed amendment, the Fund shall certify the fact by a formal communication addressed to all members.

33 Art. XVII(b):

Notwithstanding (a) above, acceptance by all members is required in the case of any amendment modifying

(i) the right to withdraw from the Fund (Article XV, Section 1);

(ii) the provision that no change in a member’s quota shall be made without its consent (Article III, Section 2);

(iii) the provision that no change may be made in the par value of a member’s currency except on the proposal of that member (Article IV, Section 5(b)).

34 See, for example, Art. V, Sect. 3(a)(iii); Art. XII, Sect. 5(a); Art. XXIV, Sect. 2(b).

35 See Wheare, K. C., The Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth 58–88 (1960)Google Scholar.

36 Hoyt, Edwin C., The Unanimity Rule in the Revision of Treaties: A Re-examination 1–6 (1959)Google Scholar.

37 See International Monetary Fund, Reform of the International Monetary System: A Report by the Executive Directors to the Board of Governors 22–26 (1972) (hereinafter referred to as Report on Reform); First Outline of Reform, paras. 6, 9, and 12, International Monetary Fund, Summary Proceedings of the Twentyeighth Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, 1973, at 357–59 (hereinafter referred to as Summary Proceedings, 19—).

38 Art. XVIII(a) and (b) of the original Articles of Agreement:

(a) Any question of interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement arising between any member and the Fund or between any members of the Fund shall be submitted to the Executive Directors for their decision. If the question particularly affects any member not entitled to appoint an executive director it shall be entitled to representation in accordance with Article XII, Section 3(j).

(b) In any case where the Executive Directors have given a decision under (a) above, any member may require that the question be referred to the Board of Governors, whose decision shall be final. Pending the result of the reference to the Board the Fund may, so far as it deems necessary, act on the basis of the decision of the Executive Directors.

39 Apart from the organizations of the World Bank Group, see the Agreements Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, Art. XIII, Sect. 1; the African Development Bank, Art. 61; the Asian Development Bank, Art. 60; the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, Art. 25.

40 Art. XVIII(a) and (b):

(a) Any question of interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement arising between any member and the Fund or between any members of the Fund shall be submitted to the Executive Directors for their decision. If the question particularly affects any member not entitled to appoint an executive director it shall be entitled to representation in accordance with Article XII, Section 3(j).

(b) In any case where the Executive Directors have given a decision under (a) above, any member may require, within three months from the date of the decision, that the question be referred to the Board of Governors, whose decision shall be final. Any question referred to the Board of Governors shall be considered by a Committee on Interpretation of the Board of Governors. Each Committee member shall have one vote. The Board of Governors shall establish the membership, procedures, and voting majorities of the Committee. A decision of the Committee shall be the decision of the Board of Governors unless the Board by an eighty-five percent majority of the total voting power decides otherwise. Pending the result of the reference to the Board the Fund may, so far as it deems necessary, act on the basis of the decision of the Executive Directors.

41 Special Drawing Rights in the International Monetary Fund: Hearing on S. 3423 and H.R. 16911, before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., May 13, 1968, at 23 (1968).

42 To Establish, a Facility Based on Special Drawing Rights in the International Monetary Fund: Hearings on H.R. 16911, before the House Coram, on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., May 1 and 2, 1968, at 170–72 (1968).

43 Art. XII, Sect. 3(k), which refers to the power of the Executive Directors to appoint committees. The power of the Board of Governors is implied.

44 Rules and Regulations, Rule C-11.

45 Art. XII, Sect. 5(d).

46 The Group of Ten consists of ten members that participate directly or through their central banks in the Fund’s General Arrangements to Borrow. The ten members are the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden (Selected Decisions, 70–81).

47 The Group of Ten, Report to Ministers and Governors by the Group of Deputies, July 1966, paras. 1 and 90.

48 Resolution No. 27–10 on the Establishment of a Committee on Reform of the International Monetary System and Related Issues, Report on Reform, 75–78; Summary Proceedings, 1972, at 353–56.

49 Resolution No. 27–10, para. 5(c).

50 Para. 5 (see supra note 31).

51 Art. XX, Sect. 1.

52 Art. XVII(a).

53 Note also the work of the Executive Directors on the draft charter of a proposed International Investment Insurance Agency, World Bank, International Development Association: Annual Report, 1970, at 32; 1971, at 35; 1973, at 69.

54 See Broches, A., Development of International Law by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at its Fifty-Ninth Annual Meeting held at Washington, D.C., April 22-24, 1965 (Washington, 1965), at 34 Google Scholar.

55 Id., at 34.

56 Id., at 37.

57 See Report of the Study Group on the Creation of Reserve Assets: Report to the Deputies of the Group of Ten, May 31, 1965, transmitted by R. Ossola, Chairman of the Study Group, para. 127, sub-para, entitled “Weighted Voting with Ordinary Majority” (herinafter referred to as Ossola Report).

58 Art. XXIV, Sect. 1(b). See also Establishment of a Facility Based on Special Drawing Rights in the International Monetary Fund and Modifications in the Rules and Practices of the Fund: A Report by the Executive Directors to the Board of Governors Proposing Amendment of the Articles of Agreement, Sect. 7 (1968).

59 See, however, Ossola Report, supra note 75, paras. 127, 158.

60 Voting and Decisions, 133–51.