* The views expressed herein are the personal views of the author. He wishes to express his thanks to Judge Jasper Y. Brinton, formerly President of the Court of Appeals of the Mixed Courts of Egypt, for material furnished and valuable suggestions made in connection with the article's preparation.

1 See Hoskins, H. L., The Middle East 99 (N. Y., 1954);Google Scholar George, Stitt, A Prince of Arabia 16 (London, 1948);Google Scholar George, Antonius, The Arab Awakening 19 (Philadelphia, 1938);Google Scholar and Liebesny, H. J., “International Relations of Arabia,” 1 Middle East Journal 149 (1947).Google Scholar

2 See 2 Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades 436-437 (Cambridge University Press, 1952).

3 The union of Egypt and Syria to form the United Arab Bepublic was proclaimed officially on Feb. 21, 1958. N. Y. Herald Tribune (European ed.), Feb. 26, 1958, p. 2. Text of Proclamation in Egyptian Economic and Political Review, March, 1958, p. 26; for Provisional Constitution, see ibid., April, 1958, p. 23, and 13 Comunità Internazionale 409 (1958). Egypt only has a coastline on the Gulf.

4 On March 19, 1958, Iraq and Jordan announced the terms of their new federal constitution, which recognizes King Faisal of Iraq as the senior monarch of the Arab Union. New York Herald Tribune (European ed.), March 20, 1958, p. 2. Text of Constitution in 13 Comunità Internazionale 413 (1958). On May 27, 1958, King Faisal of Iraq was sworn in as President of the Arab Union when the Federal Parliament held its first session in Amman, Jordan. Washington Post and Times Herald, May 28, 1958, p. A5. On Aug. 2, 1958, King Husayn of Jordan announced the formal dissolution of the Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan. The Union had been de facto terminated by the Iraqi revolt of July 14, 1958. See New York Times, Aug. 3, 1958, pp. 1 and 10.

5 Background paper on the Gulf of Aqaba, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel (Jerusalem, May, 1956), p. 5.

6 Article on the Gulf of Aqaba in Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 2 (14th ed.).

7 Hoskins, op. cit., at p. 61, states that Egypt's status as a British protectorate “existed in most essentials since 1877 and in all since 1914.” The Anglo-Egyptian agreement of Sept. 7, 1877, “ t o all intents envisaged Great Britain as the protector of Egyptian territorial interests.” Ibid., p. 60. It was in 1882, however, that British troops actually occupied Egypt. See Selak, O. B., Jr., “The Suez Canal Base Agreement of 1954,” 49 A.J.I.L. 487-505 at 490 (1955)Google Scholar. On Dec. 18, 1914, Great Britain declared the abolition of Ottoman suzerainty over Egypt (108 Brit, and For. State Papers 185 (1914-Part II ) ) , an act accepted retroactively to Nov. 5, 1914, by the Turkish Republic, successor state to the Ottoman Empire, through the Treaty of Lausanne of July 23, 1923 (117 ibid. 543-591 at 549 (1923)).

8 For text of agreement, see 99 ibid. 482-484 (1905-1906).

9 U.N. Security Council, 4th Year, Official Records, Spec. Supp. No. 3; 6 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International 299-308 (1950); Hurewitz, J. C., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. II, pp. 299-304 (Princeton, 1956);Google Scholar Israeli Foreign Ministry Background Paper on Gulf of Aqaba, op. cit., pp. 3-6.

10 Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, Royal Inst, of Int. Affairs, Info. Papers No. 19, pp. 8-9 (London, 1952).

11 A contrary view is expressed by L. M. Blocmfleld, Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba in International Law (Toronto, Canada, 1957). Blocmfleld asserts that Turkey never recognized that an area south of a line drawn from Tabah to Suez, the South Sinai Peninsula, formed a part of Egypt, and states that Egypt was merely given administrative rights over this area by the 1906 agreement (p. 139). He concludes (p. 164) that therefore Egypt “does not enjoy territorial water rights in the Gulf of Aqaba.” Although he admits that neither Turkey nor the United Kingdom have made claims with respect to this area in recent times, he asserts that “this does not necessarily imply a renunciation in International Law of such claim, if it exists.” (p. 142.) He suggests a U.N. trusteeship over this area to assure the maintenance of the international character of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba (p. 165). Inasmuch as the agreement of 1906 concerned only the fixing of an administrative line between Egypt, then a part of Turkey, and Palestine, also a part of Turkey, it is difficult to see why a distinction should be made between the northern and southern parts of the Sinai Peninsula. In any event, Egypt since 1922 appears to have exercised undisputed sovereignty over the whole peninsula.

12 Stewart Perowne, The One Remains 10 (London, 1954).

13 Article on Gulf of Aqaba in Encyclopedia Britannica, “Vol. 2 (14th ed.).

14 11 C. V. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads 189 and 227 (5th ed., Delhi, 1933). On the birth of Saudi Arabia, see Benoist-Mechin, Ibn Saud, ou La Naissance d'un Royaume (Paris, 1955), trans, into English by Denis Weaver, under the title, Arabian Destiny (London, 1957).

15 Aitchison, op. cit., p. 229.

16 Ibid., p. 230. And see exchange of notes between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabian governments of Oct. 3, 1943, Treaty Series No. 13 (1947), Cmd. 7064 (British), and 145 Brit, and For. State Papers 157-158 (1943-1945).

17 A “ Memorandum on the Application of the Mandate for Palestine in Trans-Jordan “ was approved at Geneva, September 16, 1922, and provided that: “Trans- Jordan … comprises all territory lying to the east of a line drawn from a point two miles west of the town of Aqaba on the Gulf of that name up the center of the Wadi al-Arabah, Dead Sea and River Jordan to its junction with the River Yarmuk; thence up the center of that river to the Syrian frontier.” League of Nations Official Journal, November, 1922, p. 1390; 17 A.J.I.L. Supp. 172 (1923); 1 Hudson, International Legislation 120-121 (Wash., D. C, 1934).

18 See Jordanian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement of April 3, 1949, U.N. Doe. S/1302, as corrected April 21, 1949, U.N. Security Council, 4th Year, Official Records, Spec. Supp. No. 1, Art. V, and Map I of Annex I ; also U. S. Dept. of State, Documents and State Papers, Vol. I, No. 14 (May, 1949), pp. 806-809, at 807. See also Raphael Patai, The Kingdom of Jordan 48 (Princeton, 1958).

19 See article by Harry|Gilroy, “ ‘Pearl of Negev’ may Earn its Name,” in N. Y. Times, April 11, 1954, which refers to Israel's “five mile strip on the Gulf of Aqaba.“

20 See Verbatim Record of the 659th Meeting of the Security Council, Doc. S/P.V. 659 (Feb. 15, 1954), p. 53.

21 Note of 29 Sha'ban 1376, corresponding to March 31, 1957.

22 See U.N. Doc. A/3575, April 15, 1957, p. 3.

23 Decree No. 6/4/5/3711, May 28, 1949, Umm al-Qura (Mecca), May 29, 1949; 43 A.J.I.L. Supp. 155 (1949) ; Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas, United Nations Legislative Series, “Vol. I, p. 89 (N. Y., 1951). Italics added.

24 Decree of Jan. 15, 1951, Al-Waqayih al-Misriyah (Official Journal), Vol. 78, No. 6, Jan. 18, 1951; Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas, op. tit., Vol. I, p. 307.

25 Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea, United Nations Legislative Series, p. 522 (N. T., 1957).

26 Territorial Waters Decree of 24 Elul 5715 (Sept. 11, 1955), Talkut Hapirsumim (Official Gazette), No. 442, Sept. 22, 1955; U.N. General Assembly, Doc. A/ON.4/99/ Add. 1, p. 16; 50 A.J.I.L. 1001 (1956); Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1956, Vol. II, p. 54(A/CN.4/ Ser.A/1956/Add. 1).

27 See Boutros-Ghali, B. Y., “The Arab League, 1945-1955,” International Conciliation, No. 498, pp. 406-421 (May, 1954, but written and published in the spring of 1955).Google Scholar

28 J. C. Hurewitz, “Unity and Disunity in the Middle East,” ibid., No. 481, p. 240 (May, 1952); U.N. Press Release SC/1567, Jan. 28, 1954. 29 According to Hoskins, op. cit. 70, Egyptian measures against Israeli shipping in the Gulf were undertaken in the summer of 1950, when ‘ ‘ the Egyptian Government proceeded to install shore batteries near the tip of the Sinai Peninsula to command the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. Prom this point of vantage control could be exercised over all shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba and vessels could be prevented from passing to the emergent Israeli port of Elath.” The same writer states that the Egyptian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs justified Egypt's action by asserting that “Egypt's sovereignty over navigation in her territorial waters is affirmed by international law.“

30 Egyptian Delegate Azmi summarized the Egyptian position in the Security Council on March .12, 1954. He stated that since “ a n armed struggle has taken place between Egypt and other Arab States on the one side and Israel on the other … the description to be given this state of affairs is not affected by the absence of a declaration of war of the traditional kind or by the lack of recognition of Israel by the Arab States, and there can be no doubt that a war has taken place between Egypt and Israel.“ He stated further that ‘ ‘ an armistice, an agreement between belligerents, has never been considered to put an end to a state of war or to create a state of peace, even that type of armistice agreements which have come to be known as ‘capitulation armistices,' where obviously no likelihood of further recourse to arms exists, for example the 1871 and 1918 armistices with Germany.” Citing English and American authorities, including a U. S. Court of Claims decision (Walter v. The Government of the United States of America, June 28, 1948), he asserted “ i t is clear from the foregoing that an armistice does not end a war, since it is recognized that a state of war does not end until a peace treaty has been ratified.“ On Egypt's visit and search measures, Mr. Azmi asserted that Egypt was exercising a legitimate right of self-defense which the duty of self-preservation gives to belligerent nations. U.N. Security Council, Verbatim Record, 641st Meeting, March 12, 1954, S/P.V. 661, pp. 10-15.

31 An editorial in the Egyptian Gazette of March 7, 1957, at p. 2, entitled ‘ ‘ Tiran and the Law,” asserted that “since the Armistice Agreement was signed in 1949 ships of all nationalities have used the Tiran Strait with no obstruction on the part of Egypt… . Egypt has only insisted on stopping ships flying the Israeli flag because they do not belong to a ‘neutral’ state, and, as such, cannot be considered as exercising the right of innocent passage … international law is divided into two sections— the Law of War and the Law of Peace. What should be applied (with respect to Israeli shipping) in the case of Tiran Strait and the Suez Canal is the Law of War and not the Law of Peace … Egypt has officially announced that she is in a state of war with Israel, and by the mere fact of signing the Armistice Agreement, which ended the fighting, both sides admitted that the state of war exists … the agreement itself says that it is only a prelude to the conclusion of peace.“ The editorial added that “the Tiran Strait falls in the same category as the Dardanelles (which) lead to the Black Sea. Both the Gulf of Aqaba and the Black Sea border on more than one state. But there is one difference between the Gulf of Aqaba and the Black Sea. In the case of the Black Sea the States bordering on it have been there from time immemorial but the state of Israeli is still a newcomer in the Gulf of Aqaba and has not so far received recognition of the states which control the Gulf … the right of innocent passage through the Dardanelles in time of peace was only introduced by a series of international treaties after years of war. The last of these treaties was the Montreux Convention of July 20, 1936, which, while accepting the principle of free navigation, gave Turkey the right to prohibit passage of ships of any state at war with her.“

32 The article, entitled ‘’ The Trouble About Aqaba,'’ appeared in the Egyptian Economic and Political Review, February, 1957, Military Section, pp. XI-XII. It asserted that until the question of Israel's right to occupy Elath is settled, “the fundamental issue as to whether the waters of Aqaba are or are not an international waterway cannot be discussed… . Egypt is a belligerent, and the recent Israeli aggression … underlines the state of war that exists between her and the Israelis. In such circumstances the Gulf of Aqaba must inevitably play a major military part in her security and the security of her long Bed Sea and Sinai coastline… . Egypt (has) legitimate rights of self-defense … the Israeli argument that Egypt is blocking an international waterway is defeated by the Israelis themselves, who have so far failed to give the world any precise indications as to the exact location of their allegedly legal boundaries… . Whether Elath is or is not Israeli territory remains a subject of debate. ” … The fact that Israel today occupies Elath can be partly traced to the circumstances and motives affecting Britain when the Mandate boundaries were established in 1919. Aware of the military and political importance of the Gulf of Aqaba … Britain arranged that the Palestine Mandate territory include Elath and a few hundred yards of frontage on the Gulf to separate Egypt and the new Amirate of Trans-Jordan. With the British withdrawal from Palestine in 1948, Israeli forces occupied Elath, where they have remained ever since, a serious threat to Arab security and an unlawful obstacle violating the freedom of passage between Egypt and Jordan. “Israeli action in the South came after the Armistice Agreement of February 24th and in clear violation of its terms … the Israelis were determined to secure a foothold on the Gulf of Aqaba … for only an outlet on the Gulf could enable them to gain access to the Bed Sea and beyond to the Indian Ocean without being compelled to go through the Suez Canal… . In addition, the subsoil of the Negev contained a variety of important mineral deposits … ” … the Southern Negev was since June 1948 under Jordanian control … the British forces in Aqaba (were) the main Jordanian defense … although the British Government had repeatedly expressed the view that Israel had no claim or right to occupy the area of the Southern Negev, orders came from London on March 10 (1949) … that British forces were not to interfere … unless attacked … Jordanian forces were faced with an intolerable situation on the night of March 10, and withdrew. The next morning unopposed Israeli forces occupied (Elath).“

33 Israeli Delegate Abba Eban summarized the Israeli position in the Security Council on July 26, 1951, when he refered to what he called “The illegitimacy of the Egyptian blockade” and “the contradiction between this practice and the Armistice Agreement.” He asserted that “this Armistice Agreement is not a mere suspension of hostilities, leaving belligerent rights intact. This Agreement, as its own text constantly reiterates, is a permanent and irrevocable renunciation of all hostile acts… . It is vain for Egypt to hark back to a previous era in which The Hague regulations of 1907 defined an armistice as a mere suspension of hostilities… . What is the relevance of this traditional concept of armistice to a specific Armistice Agreement whose text recognizes neither war nor belligerency and declares instead that: ‘This Agreement … shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the parties is achieved… . ‘ “ Mr. Eban further asserted that Egypt “manufactured” the “theory of a state of war” for the “sole purpose of creating a ‘legal’ pretext for the Suez blockade,” and concluded with the statement that “my Government instructs me to declare that Israel is in no state of war with Egypt and denies that Egypt has the least right to be at war with Israel.” U.N. Security Council, Official Records, 549th Meeting, July 26, 1951, S/P.V.549, pp. 3-12.

34 U.N. Doc. 8/3168/Add. 1 (Jan. 29, 1954), p. 3.

35 U.N. Doc. S/2322.

36 U.N. Doc. 8/3168/Add. 1 (Jan. 29, 1954), p. 2.

37 Hoskins, op. cit. 70.

38 A1-Akhbar (Cairo daily), Sept. 11, 1955.

39 N. Y. Herald Tribune (European ed.), Sept. 13, 1955, p. 3; Great Britain, Parl. Deb. (Hansard), House of Commons, Official Report, Vol. 545, No. 48, Nov. 7, 1955, Col. 1454; and see comment by Moshe, Perlmann, “The Middle East in the Summer of 1955,” 6 Middle Eastern Affairs 258-270, at 258-259 (1955).Google Scholar

40 Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1956-15 June 1957, General Assembly, 112th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 1 (A/3594), pp. 8-10.

41 36 Dept. of State Bulletin 327-328 (1957); The Times (London), Feb. 4, 1957, p. 8. The two U.N. resolutions called attention to earlier resolutions on the same subject of Nov. 2, 4, 7 and 24, 1956, and Jan. 19, 1957. See Annual Report of Sec. Gen., op. cit. 8-22.

42 N. Y. Herald Tribune (European ed.), Jan. 5-6, 1957, p. 1, and Feb. 21, 1957, p. 1. See also Annual Report of Sec. Gen., op. cit. 22.

43 N. Y. Herald Tribune (European ed.), Feb. 9-10, 1957, p. 1.

44 General Assembly, 11th Sess., Off. Records, 666th Plenary Meeting, March 1, 1957 (A/P.V. 666), p. 1275. Mrs. Meir summed up Israel's policy re the Gulf and the Straits as follows: “The Government of Israel believes that the Gulf of Aqaba comprehends international waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto, in accordance with the generally accepted definition of those terms in the law of the sea … Israel will do nothing to impede free and innocent passage by ships of Arab countries bound to Arab ports, or any other destination… . Israel will protect ships of its own flag exercising the signs of free and innocent passage on the high seas and in international waters. Interference, by armed force, with ships of Israel flag exercising free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits of Tiran will be regarded by Israel as an attack entitling it to exercise its inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter… . “ Ibid. 1276. 45 3 6 Dept. of State Bulletin 389 (1957).

46 Ibid. 433 (1957); General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Records, 666th Plenary Meeting, March 1, 1957 (A/P.V. 666), p. 1278.

47 Dept. of State Bulletin 432 (1957); General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Records, 666th Plenary Meeting, March 1, 1957 (A/P.V. 666), pp. 1277-1278.

48 Dept. of State Bulletin 482-489 (1957).

49 See, for example, the comments of Lebanese Foreign Minister Charles Malik, General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Records, 659th Plenary Meeting (A/P.V. 659), Feb. 22, 1957, pp. 1193-1197; and of Iraqi Foreign Minister Fadil Jamali, ibid., 661st Plenary Meeting (A/P.V. 661), Feb. 26, 1957, pp. 1215-1221.

50 Citing U.N. Doc. A/3512 (Jan. 24, 1957), par. 24.

51 General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Records, 665th Plenary Meeting (A/P.V.665), March 1, 1957, pp. 1267-1274.

52 Ibid., 666th Plenary Meeting (A/P.V.666), March 1, 1957, p. 1280.

53 General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Records, 667th Plenary Meeting (A/P.V.667), March 4, 1957, p. 1284.

54 Ibid., 665th Plenary Meeting (A/P.V.665), March 1, 1957, p. 1271.

55 Ibid., 667th Plenary Meeting (A/P.V.667), March 4, 1957, pp. 1287-1288.

56 Ibid. 1288.

57 Ibid. 1296.

58 Ibid. 1303.

59 lbid.

60 Ibid. 1296. For earlier statement, see ibid., 660th Plenary Meeting (A/P.V.660), Feb. 26, 1957, p. 1203.

61 Ibid., 644th Plenary Meeting (A/P.V.644), Jan. 28, 1957, p. 974.

62 Ibid., 649th Plenary Meeting (A/P.V.649), Feb. 1, 1957, p. 1041.

63 Ibid., 667th Plenary Meeting (A/P.V.667), March 4, 1957, pp. 1301-1302.

64 Ibid., 668th Plenary Meeting (A/P.V.668), March 8, 1957, p. 1314.

65 Barrett, McGurn, “Guarding the Gulf of Aqaba,” N. Y. Herald Tribune (European ed.), April 23, 1957, p. 4.Google Scholar See report of Secretary General on basic points for presence and functioning in Egypt of U.N.E.F. (U.N. Doc. A/3375), and Report of Secretary General on arrangements concerning status of U.N.E.F. in Egypt (U.N. Doc. A/3526).

66 U.N. Doc. A/3499, Jan. 15, 1957.

67 Note 21 above.

68 For text of Constantinople Convention, see 3 Moore's Digest 264-266; 3 A.J.I.L. Supp. 123 (1909). By letter dated April 12, 1957, to the Secretary General, the Saudi delegate to the United Nations presented this point of view to that body. It was contained in an attached memorandum, which asserted that “the Gulf of Aqaba cannot be considered an open waterway and any attempt at giving it an international character will constitute an encroachment on the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia and a threat to its territorial security.” The memorandum added that “Israeli planes and ships some four months ago attacked positions inside Saudi Arabia, at the time when Israel forces were occupying the Egyptian territory at Sharm al-Shaikh. This proves Israel intends to force a right of passage through the Gulf, threatening the security of the area.“ U.N. Doc.A/3575 (April 15, 1957), p. 3.

69 N. Y. Herald Tribune (European ed.), March 30-31, 1957, p. 3.

70 Letter dated May 7, 1957, from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the Secretary General, U.N. Security Council (S/3825, May 9, 1957). This was followed by several letters to the President of the Security Council, alleging Israeli naval and/or air demonstrations in Saudi territorial waters in the Gulf, as follows: May 27, 1957 (S/3833, May 28, 1957); June 5, 1957 (S/3835, June 6, 1957); June 19, 1957 (S/3841, June 20, 1957) ; June 24, 1957 (S/3843, June 25, 1957); July 2, 1957 (S/3846, July 2, 1957); and July 10, 1957 (S/3849, July 11, 1957). By letter dated June 10, 1957, to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that: “The Government of Israel has noted a series of complaints by Saudi Arabia alleging that Israel naval vessels have violated Saudi Arabian territorial waters and have attacked Saudi coastal positions along the shore of the Gulf of Aqaba, and that Israel military aircraft have circled over Saudi Arabian positions. “The Government of Israel denies these allegations categorically. The incidents alleged have never taken place. Israel naval forces are under strict instructions not to violate the territorial waters of Saudi Arabia and not under any circumstances to attack other vessels or coastal positions… . Israel aircraft are under strict orders to respect the airspace of all other countries… . The Government of Israel, so far from interfering in any way with the traditional pilgrimage, has declared its desire to place all possible facilities at its disposal… . Never on a single occasion has Israel prejudiced the Mecca pilgrimage in any way, nor has she any intention of doing so.” U.N. Doe. A/3838 (June 10, 1957), p. 1.

71 Al-Bilad al-Saudiyah, June 13, 14, and 27. Al-Bilad of June 29 published the text of the note from Saudi Arabia to the United States Government.

72 General Assembly, 12th Sess., Official Records, 697th Plenary Meeting (A/P.V.697), Oct. 2, 1957, p. 233.

73 N. Y. Herald Tribune (European ed.), March i, 1958, p. 1.

74 See note 32 above.

75 See note 18 above.

76 See remarks of Mr. Pearson, General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Records, 660th Meeting (A/P.V.660), Feb. 26, 1957, p. 1203, and remarks of Mr. Shukairy, ibid., 12th Sess., 697th Plenary Meeting (A/P.V.697), Oct. 2, 1957, p. 233.

77 See Art. IV, par. 3, and Art. V, par. 2, of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement, and Art. II, par. 2, of the Jordan-Israeli Armistice Agreement. The former Agreement is cited in note 9 above; the latter in note 18 above.

78 A/P.V.697, op. cit. 233.

79 2 Oppenheim, International Law: Disputes, War and Neutrality 546-551 (7th ed., 1952, Sir H. Lauterpacht).

80 3 Hyde, International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States 1783 (1945 ed.). The Hague Regulations were annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, 2 Malloy's Treaties 2287.

81 50 A.J.I.L. 880-906 (1956).

82 Ibid. 884.

83 Ibid. 886.

84 Ibid. 904, 906.

85 Ibid. 906. In this connection see the address made by Department of State Legal Adviser, Herman Phleger, at the 49th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, April 29, 1955, wherein he observed, referring to the Korean Armistice Agreement, that it was “more like a treaty of peace than an armistice agreement. But that seems to be the style now. The armistice terminating hostilities between Israel and the surrounding countries, and that concluding the Indo-China hostilities, are of the same nature.” 1955 Proceedings, American Society of International Law 98.

86 March 8, 1957, p. 11.

87 The writer cited the resolution, the particularly relevant sections of which are as follows: “The Security Council… . Considering that since the Armistice regime … is of a permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or requires to exercise the right of visit, search and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defense; “Finds that the maintenance of the practice mentioned … is inconsistent with the establishment of permanent peace in Palestine; “Finds further that such practice is an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit, search and seizure; “Further finds that the practice cannot in the prevailing circumstances be justified on the grounds that it is necessary for self-defense; “And further noting that … sanctions applied by Egypt to certain ships which have visited Israel ports represent unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas … ; “Calls upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound… . “ U.N. Doc. S/2322.

88 Blocmfield, op. cit. 164.

89 Baxter, E. R., ‘ ‘ Passage of Ships Through International Waterways in Time of War, ‘ ” 31 Brit. Year Book of Int. Law 187-216, at 208 (1954).Google Scholar

90 See article on the Conference by Arthur H. Dean, above, p. 607. The Conference was unable to reach agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea. One of the resolutions, adopted by the Conference on April 27, 1958, requests the U.N. General Assembly to study, at its 13th session (1958), the advisability of convening a second international conference of plenipotentiaries to consider further this question and other questions left unsettled by the Conference (A/Conf.13/L.56, April 30, 1958, p. 9).

91 A/Conf. 13/L.53 (April 29, 1958), p. 2.

92 Smith, H . A., The Law and Custom of the Sea 6 (2nd ed., N. Y., 1950).Google Scholar

93 A/Conf. 13/L.52, p. 2.

94 Ibid., p. 3.

95 Ibid., pp. 2-3.

96 lbid., p. 5.

97 Ibid., p. 1. Article 2 adds that: ‘ ‘ The sovereignty of a coastal State extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.” Hid.

98 See Smith, op. cit. 33-37; and Selak, C. B., Jr., “Pishing Vessels and the Principle of Innocent Passage,” 48 A.J.I.L. 627 (1954).Google Scholar

99 A/Conf. 13/L. 52, pp. 5-9.

100 A/Conf. 13/L. 53, p. 2.

101 Op. cit. 45-46 et seq.

102 Kunz, Josef L., ‘’ Continental Shelf and International Law: Confusion and Abuse,” 50 A.J.I.L. 828, 829 (1956)Google Scholar, citing John Colombos, C., The International Law of the Sea 56 (3rd ed., London, 1954).Google Scholar

103 A/Conf. 13/L. 52, p. 9.

104 104 Ibid., pp. 3-4.

105 105 A/Conf. 13/L. 56, p. 8.

106 106 See 51 A.J.I.L. 186-188 (1957).

107 Ibid. 205.

108 1 Oppenheim, International Law: Peace 508-9 (7th ed., H. Lauterpaeht, 1948).

109 “ The Territoriality of Bays , “ 3 Brit. Year Book of Int. Law 42-54, at 49 (1922- 23).

110 Note 107 above.

111 See Report of the International Law Commission, loc. cit., Art. 7, 51 A.J.I.L. 186-188 (1957). Judge Lauterpaeht has pointed out that: “The expression ‘territorial bay’ must not be allowed to obscure the facts (1) that the waters contained in territorial bays, and in the territorial portions of bays not entirely territorial, are not territorial waters and part of the maritime belt (territorial sea), but national (internal) waters, and (2) that the limit of the national waters is the datum line for the measurement of the maritime belt.” Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit. 458, footnote. Perhaps a more useful term for bays referred to as “territorial b a y s “ would be “internal bays,” and for bays referred to as “non-territorial bays,” “open bays.“

112 1 Hyde, International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States 475 (2nd rev. ed., Boston, 1945).

113 23 A.J.I.L. Spec. Supp. 274 (1929).

114 Established by the Central American States by the Convention of Dec. 20, 1907 1 Hackworth's Digest 702; 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 231 (1908).

115 Anales de la Corte de Justicia Centroamericana (1916-1917), Vols. V, VI and VII; 11 A.J.I.L. 674-730 (1917); P. C. Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction 398-410 (N. T., 1927). Judge Lauterpacht has cautioned that the decision has force only with respect to the three states concerned, and has observed that while the United States appears to have acknowledged the territorial character of the Gulf, the attitude of other states is not known. Op. cit. 460-461, footnote 6.

116 General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Records, 666th Plenary Meeting (A/P.V. 666), March 1, 1957, p. 1281.

117 The Gulf of Fonseca is approximately 50 miles in length and 30 in breadth. The distance between headlands is approximately 19 1/3 miles, although islands at the entrance reduce the distance to 8 miles, or 4 miles, if the Farallon Islands are considered to be the Nicaraguan boundary of the Gulf.

118 Note 68 above.

119 Notes 23 and 24 above.

120 Note 103 above; p. 840 below.

121 The London Times Special Correspondent, cited above, note 86, has observed with respect to the closed-sea argument: “At a time when the whole area was subject to Turkish sovereignty, this argument might have been tenable. This is no longer the case. The Gulf is enclosed by the shores of four independent states—Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.“

122 See notes 98 and 99 above.

123 Erik, Brüel, International Straits, Vol. II , pp. 265-266 (Copenhagen and London, 1947).Google Scholar

124 Ibid. 271.

125 J . C., Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. I , p. 54 (Princeton, 1956).Google Scholar For text of treaty, Bee ibid. 54-61.

126 l Moore's Digest 665.

127 Brüel, op. cit. 291-295. On the regime of the Turkish Straits, see also Higgins and Colombos, The International Law of the Sea 142-146 (2nd rev. ed., 1951, by C. John Colombos).

128 7 International Legislation 386-399 (1941); Hurewitz, op. cit., Vol. II , pp. 197- 203; 173 League of Nations Treaty Series 213-241 (1936-37); 31 A.J.I.L. Supp. 1 (1937).

129 Ibid., and Brüel, op. cit. 388-424.

130 Brüel, op. cit. 424r-425.

131 Higgins and Colombos, op. cit. 127-128.

132 l Moore's Digest 660; citation to Wheaton's International Law (Dana's ed.).

133 Notes 23, 24 and 25, above.

134 A/Conf. 13/L. 52 (April 28, 1958), p. 6; below, p. 838.

135 U.N. Docs. A/3500 (Jan. 15, 1957), par. 14, and A/3512 (Jan. 24, 1957), par. 24.

136 U.N. Doc. A/3512 (Jan. 24, 1957), par. 24.

137 Secretary General Hammarskjold has noted this fact in his report to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/3512, Jan. 24, 1957, as have Mr. Pearson of Canada and Mr. Shukairy of Saudi Arabia at the 11th Session of the General Assembly, note 76 above.

138 Notes 112 and 113 above. This view would seem also to be implicit in the remarks of the Special Correspondent of the London Times, March 8, 1957, note 121 above.

139 Note 105 above; p. 867 below.

140 Art. 4(1) provides that: “ In localities where the coast line is dReply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.“ Art. 5(2) provides that: “Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with Article 4 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which previously had been considered as part of the territorial sea or the high seas, a right of innocent passage, as provided in Articles 14 to 23, shall exist in those waters.“

141 Note 99 above; see pp. 837-840 below.

142 In this connection, see Smith, op. cit, 23-24.

143 3A/Conf. 13/L. 52 (April 28, 1958), pp. 5 and 9.