¹ See, e.g., Rubenfeld, Jed, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1971, 2017–18 (2004)Google Scholar (“The existing international governance organizations are famous for their undemocratic opacity, remoteness from popular or representative politics, elitism, and unaccountability. International governance institutions and their officers tend to be bureaucratic, diplomatic, technocratic— everything but democratic.”); Stein, Eric, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AJIL 489, 491 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (international organizations are “considered ‘undemocratic’ since they operate with little transparency or public and parliamentary scrutiny”); Vagts, Detlev F., International Agreements, the Senate, and the Constitution, 36 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 143, 154 (1997)Google Scholar.

² See, e.g., Dahl, Robert A., Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View, in Democracy’s Edges 19, 22 (Shapiro, Ian & Hacker-Gordon, Casiano eds., 1999)Google Scholar; Kaiser, Karl, Transnational Relations as a Threat to the Democratic Process, 25 Int’l Org. 706, 714 (1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“As the number and activities of international organizations expand, an area grows in which major decisions are made without much democratic control by the peoples and institutions which are affected or which support these activities financially.”); McGinnis, John O., Medellin and the Future of International Delegation, 118 Yale L.J. 1712, 1714 (2009)Google Scholar. At the same time, states participating in international organizations gain traction on problems that would be difficult or impossible for them to address individually. See, e.g., Hathaway, Oona A., International Delegation and State Sovereignty, 71 Law & Contemp. Probs. 115 (2008)Google Scholar; Keohane, Robert O., Macedo, Stephen & Moravcsik, Andrew, Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 Int’l Org. 1, 4 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“This is the state of the current debate: critics of multilateralism point to the ways in which international institutions undermine democracy; defenders respond by stressing pragmatic benefits.”).

³ Curtis A. Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System 100 (2013) (identifying concern that international organizations will empower the executive branch at the expense of the legislature); José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers 396 (2005) (same); Dan Sarooshi, International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers 15 (2005) (same).

⁴ See, e.g., Stein, supra note 1, at 490 (“A new level of normative activity superimposed on national democratic systems makes citizen participation more remote, and parliamentary control over the executive, notoriously loose in foreign affairs matters, becomes even less effective.”).

⁵ See, e.g., Moe, Terry M. & Howell, William G., The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J. L. Econ. & Org. 132, 161–65 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution (1990) (titling chapter 5 “Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Executive Initiative and Congressional Acquiescence”).

⁶ This perception of Congress has been forged largely through analyses of its performance during national security crises that may, or actually do, involve military action. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 5, at 117–33. Some commentators argued that presidential dominance, built up by wars and crises, has eroded Congress’s ability to check executive dominance in foreign and domestic affairs alike. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound (2010); Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (2010).

⁷ See, e.g., Levinson, Daryl J., Empire-Building, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 955–56 (2005)Google Scholar; Stephan, Paul B., Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 NW. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 681, 697–99 (1997)Google Scholar.

⁸ see Bradley, Curtis A. & Morrison, Trevor W., Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411 (2012)Google Scholar.

⁹ see Moe & Howell, supra note 5, at 144–46; Bradley & Morrison, supra note 8, at 438–44; Mortenson, Julian Davis, Executive Power and the Discipline of History, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 377, 412–16 (2011)Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Benvenisti, Eyal, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 167, 188–89 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (describing courts’ “extreme deference to the executive” in foreign affairs as “enabl[ing] a sizable amount of executive activity, having major ramifications on domestic interests, to remain completely beyond judicial reach and effective public scrutiny”); Stein, supra note 1, at 531 (describing lack of parliamentary scrutiny of International organizations).

¹¹ See, e.g., Abbott, Kenneth & Snidal, Duncan, Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. Conflict Resol. 3, 18 (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (suggesting that International financial institutions offer the executive branch a way to circumvent Congress’s preferences on distributing foreign aid); see also Alvarez, supra note 3, at 396 (“[T]reaty-making may enhance the power of executive branches within governments, at the expense of national parliaments or legislatures, and sometimes permits the executive branch to accomplish legal changes that it alone could not accomplish or, in those states that accord treaties superior status to a national constitution, even to take legal actions otherwise not authorized to any branch of government.”).

¹² As treaties cover an increasingly broad and diverse range of subjects, wars and crises are making up a smaller share of the foreign affairs field. See, e.g., Stewart, Richard B., U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law? 68 Law & Contemp.Probs. 63, 63–64(2005)Google Scholar (observing “explosive development of a great variety of International economic and social regulatory regimes” in recent decades).

¹³ See, e.g., Hathaway, Oona A., Treaties’ End, 117 Yale L.J. 1236, 1308–12 (arguing that congressional-executive agreements approved by majorities of both houses are more democratic than treaties approved by two-thirds of the Senate)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McGinnis, supra note 2; Bradley, Curtis A., International Delegations, The Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 Stanford L. Rev. 1557 (2003)Google Scholar; Julian Ku & John Yoo, Taming Globalization 87–112 (2012). An exception is Anne-Marie Slaughter, who describes growing efforts to develop international networks of legislatures and legislators to influence International organizations. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 104–30 (2004).

¹⁴ Stein, supra note 1, at 531 (“At the national level, experience has shown that the legitimacy of a state’s adhesion to an IGO [intergovernmental organization], grounded in the act of approval by an elected legislature, dissipates quickly as the national delegation, appointed and instructed by the national executive, often acts within the organization in alliance with other delegations and IGO staff, and finds itself with little actual supervision by, or accountability to, the legislature.”).

¹⁵ More precisely, the Bank does not impose obligations on member states unless they borrow from it. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Policy Guidance and Compliance: The World Bank Operational Standards, in Commitment and Compliance:The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System 289 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). For other examples of International organizations that do not impose binding obligations, see, for example, Commitment and Compliance, supra; Bradley, Curtis A. & Kelley, Judith G., The Concept of International Delegation, 71 Law. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 14–16 (2008)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Dep’t of the Treasury, Department of the Treasury Compilation of Legislative Mandates Applying to U.S. Participation in the IFIS (10th ed. 2010).

¹⁷ See infra part II.

¹⁸ These constitutional debates have received surprisingly little attention in the literature about the Bank. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.

¹⁹ Daryl Levinson and Rick Pildes argue that the dynamics between Congress and the president are largely determined by whether government is divided or unified by political party. Levinson, Daryl J. & Pildes, Richard H., Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311 (2006)Google Scholar. Political party affiliation appears to be relatively unimportant to understanding dynamics regarding the Bank. Congress has enacted numerous voting and negotiation instructions during periods of unified government. The most prominent fight over the constitutionality of Congress’s legislated instructions took place during a period of unified government at the beginning of President Obama’s first term. And Congress has legislated instructions that have been energetically implemented during periods of divided government.

²⁰ See infra part III.

²¹ See infra part IV.

²² See infra part V.

²³ See infra part VI (addressing the generalizability of the Bank example).

²⁴ Other commentators have argued that International organizations may enhance liberal democratic governance even if they do undermine legislatures. see Keohane, supra note 2 (arguing that participation in International organizations enhances democracy by limiting the power of special interest factions, protecting individual rights, and improving the quality of democratic deliberation); Raustiala, Kal, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, 6 J. Int’l Econ. L. 841 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ See, e.g., Nzelibe, Jide, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1217, 1249 (2006)Google Scholar.

²⁶ See, e.g., Beermann, Jack, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61,88(2006)Google Scholar (“riders...often fly below the political radar, placed in the bill by a few connected members of Congress”); McGarity, Thomas, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 Duke L.J. 1671 (2012)Google Scholar (describing riders as “the tools of special-interest lobbyists with access to key congressional players”).

²⁷ See supra note 9.

²⁸ As Kathryn Lavelle describes, shifting constellations of interest groups have both supported, and sought to influence, the Bank and the IMF since their establishment in 1945. Quite often these interest groups have demanded that Congress pursue policy changes at the Bank and the IMF as a condition of their support for funding these institutions. The extent to which Congress has embraced these demands for change has varied over time. To explain this variation, Lavelle focuses on exogenous shifts in the International political economy and on internal changes in how Congress operates. Kathryn Lavelle, Legislating International Organization (2011).

²⁹ Cf. Barr, Michael S. & Miller, Geoffrey P., Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 Eur. J. Int’l L. 15, 32–33 (2006)Google Scholar (describing how public disagreement among U.S. agencies over negotiations concerning international financial regulation can help the public identify key issues in dispute and can contribute to more reasoned decision making).

³⁰ Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 UNTS 39; Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 UNTS 134 [hereinafter IBRD Agreement].

³¹ World Bank, The World Bank Annual Report 2011: Year in Review 2 (2011).

³² Since 1946, members have paid into the Bank about $11 billionin capital. This amount represents only a small fraction of each member’s capital stock subscription; the rest is subject to call should the Bank become unable to pay its obligations. IBRD Agreement,supra note 30, Art. II, §5. The callable capital has helped the Bank to maintain a triple-A rating since 1959. see World Bank,How IBRD Is Financed, at http://go.worldbank.org/LAG4BZ1VD1; Sarah Babb, Behind the Development Banks 35 (2009).

³³ In fiscal year 2011, the Bank’s profits totaled $996 million. World Bank, supra note 31. This income covers the IBRD’s operating expenses, goes into reserves to strengthen the Bank’s balance sheet, and provides an annual transfer to the IDA. see World Bank, supra note 32.

³⁴ see http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215526322295/BankGovernors.pdf (listing names and titles of IBRD and IDA governors).

³⁵ IBRD Agreement, supra note 30, Art. V, §2(a). The board can delegate nearly all of its powers to the executive directors. Id., Art. V, §2(a), (b).

³⁶ The Board of Governors meets too rarely and is “too large a body to do more than ratify proposals put to it and serve as a general indicator of trends of thought.” Edward S. Mason & Robert E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods 63 (1973).

³⁷ The Bretton Woods Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 79-171, §3(a), 59 Stat. 512 (1945) [hereinafter BWAA].

³⁸ IBRD Agreement, supra note 30, Art. V, §4(b).

³⁹ Id., §4(g).

⁴⁰ Id., §3(a), (b).

⁴¹ World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Subscriptions and Voting Power of Member Countries (June 30, 2013), at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215524804501/IBRDCountryVotingTable.pdf (noting that the United States casts 297,459 votes out of a total of 1,956,440 votes, or 15.2 percent).

⁴² Id. (noting that Palau casts 594 votes out of a total of 1,956,440 votes, or 0.03 percent).

⁴³ IBRD Agreement, supra note 30, Art. VIII(a) (requiring approval of amendments by members having 85 percent of total voting power).

⁴⁴ Id., Art V, §5(a), (b); see also infra note 51.

⁴⁵ see Cogan, Jacob Katz, Representation and Power in International Organization: The Operational Constitution and Its Critics, 103 AJIL 209 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gwin, Catherine, U.S. Relations with the World Bank, 1945–1992, in 2 The World Bank: Its First Half Century 195, 246 (Kapur, Devesh, Lewis, John Prior & Webb, Richard eds., 1997)Google Scholar (“This prerogative was initially granted not only because the United States was the Bank’s largest shareholder but also because it was the key guarantor and principal capital market for Bank bonds.”).

⁴⁶ The Bank’s president, officers, and staff “owe their duty entirely to the Bank and to no other authority”; the Bank’s members are obligated to “respect the International character of this duty” and to “refrain from all attempts to influence any of them in the discharge of their duties.” IBRD Agreement, supra note 30, Art. V, §5(c).

⁴⁷ Id., §5(a).

⁴⁸ Mason & Asher, supra note 36, at 383.

⁴⁹ IDA loans, or “credits,” typically carry no or low interest charges, have grace periods of five to ten years, and are repaid over a period of twenty-five to forty years. The IDA also provides some outright grants. World Bank,What Is IDA?, at http://go.worldbank.org/ZRAOR8IWW0.

⁵⁰ Mason & Asher, supra note 36, at 380–81 (“As an International organization affiliated with the World Bank, IDA is an elaborate fiction. Called an ‘association,’ and possessed of Articles of Agreement, officers, governmental members galore, and all the trappings of other International agencies, it is as yet simply a fund administered by the World Bank.”); Libby, Ronald T., International Development Association: A Legal Fiction Designed to Secure an LDC Constituency, 29 Int’l Org. 1065 (1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵¹ Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association, Art. VI, Jan. 26, 1960, 11 UST 2284, 439 UNTS 249; see also International Development Association Act, Pub. L. No. 86-565, §3, 74 Stat. 293 (June 30, 1960).

⁵² Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association, supra note 51, Art. VI, §3; World Bank Group Finances: IDA Voting Power, at https://finances.worldbank.org/Shareholder-Equity/IDA-Voting-Power/4g6v-z4mt.

⁵³ Most of the literature on the Bank assumes that Congress has the authority to issue such instructions. Jonathan Sanford, for example, observes without comment that “the President and Congress both have this power [to instruct the executive director] and both are inclined to use it.” Sanford, Jonathan Earl, U.S. Policy Toward the Multilateral Development Banks: The Role of Congress, 22 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 1, 15 (1988)Google Scholar (emphasis added); see also Nielson, Daniel L. & Tierney, Michael J., Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Reform, 57 Int’l Org. 241, 255–56 (2003)Google Scholar (“Also, Congress can dictate the votes of the director by statute (subject to veto and overrides, of course).”). Thomas Franck and Edward Weisband observe that the “making... of... country-by-country rules” regarding votes in the International financial institutions is “clearly more appropriate to the executive than the legislative branch,” but they do not directly assess the instructions’ constitutionality. Thomas M. Franck & Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress 93(1979). Ian Bowles and Cyril Kormos briefly consider and ultimately reject constitutional objections to legislated instructions. Bowles, Ian A. & Kormos, Cyril F., Environmental Reform at the World Bank: The Role of the U.S. Congress, 35 Va. J. Int’l L. 777, 813–19 (1995)Google Scholar. Kathryn Lavelle mentions the dispute over a signing statement issued by President Obama in 2009 but does not address other signing statements or debates over the scope of the president’s exclusive negotiation authority. see Lavelle, supra note 28, at 166.

⁵⁴ U.S. Const. Art. II, §§2, 3; see also David J. Barron, Office of Legal Counsel,Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act 4–5 (June 1, 2009), at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2009/section 7054.pdf.

⁵⁵ see Banco Nacional de Cubav. Sabbatino 376 U.S.398,410(1964);Goldwaterv. Carter 444 U.S.996,1007 (1979) (Brennan J., dissenting); Bradley, Curtis A. & Goldsmith, Jack L., Foreign Relations Law 479 (4th ed. 2011)Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 35 (1960); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225, 235 (1839).

⁵⁷ See, e.g., Corwin, Edward S., The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1984, at 208 (5th Rev. ed. 1984)Google Scholar (“[W]hile the President alone may address foreign governments and be addressed by them, yet in fulfilling these functions he is, or at least may be, the mouthpiece of a power of decision that resides elsewhere.”). Putting this question in the framework that Justice Jackson sets out in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the question is whether the president’s power is “preclusive” and allows him to “take[ ] measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress” regarding the positions that he or other members of the executive branch will stake out. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952); see also Barron, David J. & Lederman, Martin S., The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 691–98 (2008)Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1993).

⁵⁹ Compare Henkin, Louis, Foreign Affairs and the US Constitution 249 (2d ed. 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“Attempts by Congress to instruct U.S. representatives [to International organizations] are highly questionable as a matter of constitutional separation of powers, and are usually only hortatory or are likely to be treated as such by the President.”), and Powell, H. Jefferson, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 527, 558–59Google Scholar (arguing that the executive branch has the exclusive authority to determine the time, scope, and objectives of all negotiations), with Damrosch, Lori Fisler, Treaties and International Regulation, 98 Asil Proc. 349, 351(2004)Google Scholar (describing the Justice Department’s position that statutes cannot direct the president to vote a certain way in an International forum as “wrong as a matter of democratic political theory, historical experience, common sense, and constitutional law”); see also Bowles & Kormos, supra note 53, at 813–19; Edward Swaine, International Organizations (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (suggesting that the constitutional analysis may depend on the type of instruction at issue).

⁶⁰ Moe & Howell, supra note 5, at 145; Bradley & Morrison, supra note 8.

⁶¹ See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Mortenson, supra note 9, at 377–78; see also Spiro, Peter, War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1338, 1355 (1993)Google Scholar (describing how war powers law is developed by “an accretion of interactions among the branches, that gives rise to basic norms governing the branches’ behavior in the area”).

⁶² Cf. Barron & Lederman, supra note 57, at 697 (arguing that Congress has enacted restrictions on the conduct of military campaigns “too often, and Presidents challenged their legality too infrequently..., for anything like a tradition of preclusive power to have taken root”); Barron, David J. & Lederman, Martin S., The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, 1101 (2008)Google Scholar (arguing that this history of congressional regulation coupled with executive acquiescence also “casts doubt on the functionalist contention that a President cannot possibly conduct a war so long as he understands himself to be subject to legislatively imposed restrictions”).

⁶³ Robert B. Holland III, Op-Ed., The Real World Bank Scandal, Wall ST. J., Apr. 20, 2007, at A 15 (former U.S. executive director describing legislatively mandated voting requirements as “mind-numbing and influence diminishing”); telephone interview with Jan Piercy, former U.S. Executive Director of the World Bank (May 7, 2012) (explaining that other executive directors have little reason to accept modifications to loan terms proposed by the United States when there is no chance that accepting the U.S. proposal would shift the U.S. vote).

⁶⁴ BWAA, supra note 37, §12.

⁶⁵ Id.

⁶⁶ Id., §13.

⁶⁷ See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 2211 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 79th Cong. 253 (1945) [here inafter Hearings on H.R. 2211 ] (statement of Dean Acheson, assistant secretary of state).

⁶⁸ See, e.g., Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy 129–43 (1969); Lavelle, supra note 28, at 39–61.

⁶⁹ See Hearings on H.R. 2211, supra note 67, at 734–35 (statement of Ralph Flanders, president of the Federal Reserve Bank, Boston, and chairman, Research Committee, Committee for Economic Development); Lavelle, supra note 28, at 46–61.

⁷⁰ Hearings on H.R. 2211, supra note 67, at 735.

⁷¹ Id. at 743.

⁷² W. Randolph Burgess, president of the American Bankers Association, praised the amended bill and noted that it included several of the ABA’s recommendations. Burgess Praises Bretton Changes, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1945, at 21.

⁷³ see Ackerman, Bruce & Golove, David, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 799, 861–96 (1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁴ Bretton Woods Agreements Act: Hearings on H.R. 3314 Before the S.Comm. on Banking & Currency, 79th Cong. 533 (1945) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 3314 ].

⁷⁵ Id. at 537.

⁷⁶ Id. at 224.

⁷⁷ National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, Report on Participation of the United States in the Fund and Bank to october 31, 1946, H.R. Doc. No. 80-53, at 8 (1947) (submitted by the president to Congress on January 13, 1947).

⁷⁸ Id. at 9.

⁷⁹ See infra notes 194–96 (discussing reasons for this gap).

⁸⁰ 118 Cong. Rec. 2045 (1972).

⁸¹ An Act to Provide for Increased Participation by the United States in the International Development Association, Pub. L. No. 92-247, 86 Stat. 60 (1972) (codified at 22 U.S.C. 284(k)).

⁸² H.R. Rep. No. 92-772, at 8 (1972); see also Staff of the Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., U.S. Policy and Multilateral Banks:Politicization and Effectiveness 9 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter 1977 Staff Report].

⁸³ see Schoultz, Lars, Politics, Economics, and U.S. Participation in Multilateral Development Banks, 36 Int’l Org. 537, 556 (1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mason & Asher, supra note 36, at 747.

⁸⁴ As foreign affairs scholars have noted, by drafting statutory text with vague terms, Congress delegates significant authority to the executive branch to interpret it. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6.

⁸⁵ An Act to Provide for Increased Participation by the United States in the International Development Association, Pub. L. No. 92-247, 86 Stat. 60 (1972).

⁸⁶ 1977 Staff Report, supra note 82, at 10.

⁸⁷ An Act to Provide for Increased Participation by the United States in the International Development Association, Pub. L. No. 93-373, §3, 88 Stat. 445 (1974).

⁸⁸ Id.

⁸⁹ Schoultz, supra note 83, at 558. The executive branch could have argued that it is the executive director, not the governor, who votes on loans—but it chose not to invoke this technicality as a reason for disregarding the legislation.

⁹⁰ 1977 Staff Report, supra note 82, at 8.

⁹¹ 120 Cong. Rec. 22,030 (1974).

⁹² An Act to Provide for Increased Participation by the United States in the Inter-American Development Bank, Pub. L. No. 94-302, §§103, 211, 90 Stat. 591 (1976).

⁹³ Franck & Weisband, supra note 53, at 85; Cohen, Stephen B., Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices, 76 AJIL 246 (1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁴ Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America 282–83 (1981); Franck & Weisband, supra note 53, at 92.

⁹⁵ IDB and AFDF Authorization: Hearing on H.R. 9721 Before the S. Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1976).

⁹⁶ IBRD Agreement, supra note 30, Art. IV, §10; see also Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association, supra note 51, Art. V, §6 (same).

⁹⁷ See, e.g., Ibrahim F.I.Shihata, The World Bank in A Changing World 65–79 (1991); Catherine Weaver, The Hypocrisy Trap(2008) (describing how good governance and corruption came to be understood as appropriate topics for the Bank to address); Sarfaty, Galit, Why Culture Matters in International Institutions: The Marginality of Human Rights at the World Bank, 103 AJIL 647, 658–65 (2009)Google Scholar (describing fierce contests and evolution in perspectives about whether the Bank’s Articles of Agreement permit the Bank to directly address human rights).

⁹⁸ An Act to Provide for Increased Participation by the United States in the Inter-American Development Bank, supra note 92, §§103, 211.

⁹⁹ Schoultz, supra note 83, at 559.

¹⁰⁰ Gwin, supra note 45, at 225.

¹⁰¹ International Development Institutions Authorizations, 1977: Hearings on H.R. 5262 Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Dev. Inst. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., & Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 9, 48 (1977).

¹⁰² An Act to Provide for Increased Participation by the United States in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Development Fund, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 95-118, §701(a)(1), (f), 91 Stat. 1067 (1977). The language closely tracks a prohibition on bilateral military assistance to human rights violators adopted in 1973. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.

¹⁰³ see Schoultz, supra note 94, at 292–300.

¹⁰⁴ Schoultz, supra note 83, at 564.

¹⁰⁵ Id. at 565.

¹⁰⁶ Schoultz, supra note 94, at 295.

¹⁰⁷ Id. at 295–98.

¹⁰⁸ Robert Putnam has argued that domestic constraints can enhance a state’s International bargaining position when, for example, that state’s legislature must ratify the negotiated agreement before it can enter into force. Putnam, Robert D., Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 Int’l Org. 427 (1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Congress’s ex ante voting instructions do not track this two-step model. They come closest when the U.S. executive director can credibly argue that, unless the other executive directors agree to a particular decision, Congress might withhold the next round of funding for the Bank.

¹⁰⁹ see 1977 Staff Report, supra note 82, at 11–16 (describing other examples of such instructions).

¹¹⁰ An Act Making Appropriations for Foreign Assistance and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-481, §611, 92 Stat. 1591 (1978).

¹¹¹ Quoted in BABB, supra note 32, at 185.

¹¹² See subsection “Monitoring the Executive Branch” in part V, below.

¹¹³ Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney do not take this point into account when they model the relationship between the Bank and its member states in principal-agent terms. see Nielson & Tierney, supra note 53. Nielson and Tierney acknowledge Congress’s importance by modeling it as a separate and independent principal of the Bank. But Congress is not a proximate principal of the Bank. Congress must work through the executive branch to influence the Bank, and as this article explains, the executive branch has many tools available to neutralize Congress’s efforts to shape Bank policy. Because Nielson and Tierney focus on environmental reform at the Bank— where Congress enjoyed remarkable success in motivating the executive branch (and ultimately in influencing the Bank), see infra part III—they do not consider the possibility that the executive branch might resist Congress’s efforts.

¹¹⁴ Gwin, supra note 45, at 244–45, 263; BABB, supra note 32.

¹¹⁵ See, e.g., KOH, supra note 5, at 128 –31 (describing appropriations limitations as an imperfect tool with many defects that nevertheless “remains one of Congress’s few effective legal tools to regulate presidential initiatives in foreign affairs”); Moe & Howell, supra note 5, at 147–48 (describing Congress’s constitutional power to appropriate money as a “very real” but not “crippling constraint” on presidents).

¹¹⁶ They also illustrate how Congress can shrink the universeof actions that the president might take unilaterally. see Moe & Howell, supra note 5.

¹¹⁷ Compare sources cited supra note 9 (describing collective action problems and high transaction costs of congressional action).

¹¹⁸ Cf. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 8, at 446 (noting that Congress can more easily push back against the executive branch by using “soft law” tools that are not subject to the collective action problems that beset the formal legislative process); see also Chafetz, Josh, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. Rev. 715 (2012)Google Scholar (describing soft law tools in greater detail). Chafetz notes that withholding money is easier than appropriating it because either the House or Senate, acting alone, can withhold money. Id. at 725. As this part explains, however, the point goes even further: some individual members of Congress can credibly threaten to withhold money.

¹¹⁹ Although internal House and Senate rules prohibit substantive provisions in appropriations legislation, these rules are often waived. Lazarus, Richard J., Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 Geo. L.J. 619, 636–37 (2006)Google Scholar.

¹²⁰ In contrast, failure to pass a new authorization statute preserves the status quo. Id. at 634; see also Krutz, Glen S., Hitching A Ride: Omnibus Legislating in the U.S. Congress 2 (2001)Google Scholar

¹²¹ Krutz, supra note 120, at 3–4.

¹²² Id. at 4, 32–35.

¹²³ Id. at 2.

¹²⁴ This discussion brackets the questions raised earlier about whether congressional action is necessary for international organizations to be democratically accountable.

¹²⁵ See supra note 108. The Reagan administration actively and repeatedly sought reduced funding from Congress for other International organizations—most notably, the United Nations—precisely to enhance the United States’ leverage. Alvarez, José E., Legal Remedies and the United Nations’ á la Carte Problem, 12 Mich. J. Int’l L. 229 (1991)Google Scholar.

¹²⁶ Schoultz, supra note 83, at 567.

¹²⁷ Bartram S. Brown, The United States and the Politicization of the World Bank 175 (1992).

¹²⁸ An Act Making Appropriations for Foreign Assistance and Related Programs, Title III, Pub. L. No. 94-11, 89 Stat. 17, 23 (1975).

¹²⁹ H. Comm. On Banking, Currency & Housing, Increased U.S. Participation in the Inter-American Development Bank, H.R. Rep. No. 94-541, at 17 (1975) (reprinting text of letter from Ortiz Mena to Treasury Secretary William E. Simon).

¹³⁰ see Letter from Robert S. McNamara, World Bank President, to W. Michael Blumenthal, Treasury Secretary (July 5, 1977), reprinted in Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong. 535–36 (1978).

¹³¹ Schoultz, supra note 83, at 567.

¹³² Sanford, supra note 53, at 50.

¹³³ see Lavelle, supra note 28, at 100; Schoultz, supra note 83, at 568–69.

¹³⁴ see John Felton, Freeze on Vietnam Loans Ends Effort to Restrict U.S. Funds for World Bank, Cong. Q., Nov. 3, 1979, at 2504 (describing conferees as “argu[ing] heatedly among themselves about who was more opposed to Vietnam, and who disliked McNamara the most”).

¹³⁵ Id.

¹³⁶ IBRD Agreement, supra note 30, Art. III, §2.

¹³⁷ Brown, supra note 127, at 187; Schoultz, supra note 83, at 570.

¹³⁸ Felton, supra note 134, at 3.

¹³⁹ see 125 Cong. Rec. 34,414–15 (1979) (at Representative Young’s request, reprinting newspaper article that quotes the text of the letter).

¹⁴⁰ Id.

¹⁴¹ Id.

¹⁴² William Clark, Robert McNamara at the World Bank, Foreign Aff., Fall 1981, at 167.

¹⁴³ see Robert Wade, Greening the Bank: The Struggle over the Environment, 1970 –1995, in 2 The World Bank, supra note 45, at 611, 658; Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders 129 (1998).

¹⁴⁴ Wade, supra note 143, at 658–59.

¹⁴⁵ Come and Get Me: Argentina Is Putting International Arbitration to the Test, Economist, Feb. 18, 2012, at 38.

¹⁴⁶ Wade, supra note 143, at 667.

¹⁴⁷ Lazarus, Richard J., The Greening of America and the Graying of United States Environmental Law, 20 Va. Envtl L.J. 75, 85–87 (2001)Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁸ Babb, supra note 32; id. at 110–14.

¹⁴⁹ Id. at 117–20.

¹⁵⁰ Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth 113 (1994); Environmental Impact of Multilateral Development Bank–Funded Projects: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Dev. Inst. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., & Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. (1983).

¹⁵¹ Environmental Impact of Multilateral Development Bank–Funded Projects, supra note 150, at 1–119.

¹⁵² Id. at 489–535.

¹⁵³ Id. at 522, 528, 535.

¹⁵⁴ Joint Resolution Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-190, §540(a)(1)–(4), 99 Stat. 1185, 1309–10 (1985).

¹⁵⁵ Id., §540(a)(6), 99 Stat. at 310.

¹⁵⁶ Joint Resolution Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591, §539, 100 Stat. 3341, 3341-232 to 3341-236 (1986).

¹⁵⁷ Joint Resolution Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, §537(a), 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-161 to 1329-64 (1987).

¹⁵⁸ No signing statements accompanied the signing of Pub L. No. 99-190,99 Stat. 1185 (1985) (containing provisions described supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text); Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341 (1986) (containing provisions described supra note 156 and accompanying text); Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987) (containing provisions described supra note 157 and accompanying text).

¹⁵⁹ See generally Wade, supra note 143, at 665–72; Babb, supra note 32, at 187–91.

¹⁶⁰ Rich, supra note 150, at 145 (1994).

¹⁶¹ Foreign Assistance and Related Programs: Appropriations for 1987: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong. 595 (1986) (prepared statement of Treasury Secretary James A. Baker III identifying “the privatization of burdensome and inefficient public enterprises,” “growth oriented tax reform,” “improvement of the environment for both domestic and foreign direct investment,” and “trade liberalization and the rationalization of import regimes” as desired policy changes).

¹⁶² Gwin, supra note 45, at 232.

¹⁶³ BABB, supra note 32, at 132.

¹⁶⁴ 1 Devesh Kapur, John Prior Lewis & Richard Webb, The World Bank:Its First Half Century 626–27 [hereinafter 1 The World Bank].

¹⁶⁵ Wade, supra note 143, at 668; Babb, supra note 32, at 128 –31.

¹⁶⁶ Wade, supra note 143, at 663.

¹⁶⁷ Rich, supra note 150, at 126–46.

¹⁶⁸ Lazarus, supra note 147, at 85– 87.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Wade, supra note 143, at 664 (“Leading the fight to reform the Bank’s environmental performance would also earn [Senator Kasten] electoral credit from the strong environmental movement back home in Wisconsin without incurring the wrath of Wisconsin’s environmentally unfriendly industries.”).

¹⁷⁰ Draft Recommendations on the Multilateral Banks and the Environment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Dev. Inst. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., & Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 11 (1984) (“In appearing before you in June 1983, I could honestly say that I was unaware of particular problems in these aspects of the [multilateral development bank] programs.”).

¹⁷¹ Statement by President Ronald Reagan upon Signing H.R. 1777, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1547 (Dec. 28, 1987) (objecting on constitutional foreign policy grounds to provisions that require the initiation of foreign negotiations and the termination of the U.S.-Soviet Embassy Agreements, and that prohibited diplomatic contact with the Palestine Liberation Organization).

¹⁷² Philippe Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge 198–201 (1989); Wade, supra note 143, at 674–75.

¹⁷³ See supra note 102.

¹⁷⁴ Human Rights and U.S. Policy in the Multilateral Development Banks: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Int’l Dev. Inst. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., & Urban Affairs, 97th Cong. 48 (1981) (statement of Ernest B. Johnston Jr., senior deputy assistant secretary of state) (“In casting our future votes..., we will observe statutory requirements of the International Financial Institutions Act.”).

¹⁷⁵ Id. at 37 (statement of Walter J. Stoessel Jr., under secretary of state for political affairs), 49–50.

¹⁷⁶ Id. at 25 (statement of Ernest B. Johnson Jr., senior deputy assistant secretary of state).

¹⁷⁷ Id. at 142 (statement of Representative Jerry M. Patterson).

¹⁷⁸ Id. at 25 (statement of Ernest B. Johnston Jr., senior deputy assistant secretary of state).

¹⁷⁹ John M. Goshko, Administration Reiterates Aim of Scuttling Carter Rights Policies, Wash. Post, July 10, 1981, at A 12.

¹⁸⁰ Id.

¹⁸¹ See supra note 148 and accompanying text.

¹⁸² An Act Making Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-181, §1004, 97 Stat. 1153, 1286 (1983).

¹⁸³ Human Rights and U.S. Voting Policy in the Development Banks: The Case of Chile: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Dev. Inst. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., & Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 60 (1985).

¹⁸⁴ Id. at 65 (prepared statement of Elliott Abrams).

¹⁸⁵ Id. at 69.

¹⁸⁶ Id.

¹⁸⁷ Current Directions for United States Policy Toward Chile: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Dev. Inst. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., & Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 33 (1987).

¹⁸⁸ The Bank’s first general capital increase, in 1959, provided the Bank with more callable capital but did not require additional paid-in capital from member states. 1 The World Bank, supra note 164, at 12.

¹⁸⁹ Id. at 2–3.

¹⁹⁰ Id. at 1120.

¹⁹¹ see An Act to Permit Investment of Fund of Insurance Companies Organized Within the District of Columbia in Obligations of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Pub. L. No. 83-513, 68 Stat. 494 (1954) (permitting insurance companies organized within the District of Columbia to buy IBRD securities); An Act to Further Amend Section 5136 of the Revised Statutes, as Amended, with Respect to Underwriting and Dealing in Securities Issued by the Central Bank for Cooperatives, Pub. L. No 82-305, 66 Stat. 49 (1952); An Act to Amend the National Bank Act and the Bretton Woods Agreement Act, Pub.L. No. 81-142, 63 Stat. 298 (1949) (authorizing national banks to purchase IBRD securities).

¹⁹² Babb, supra note 32, at 27; Mason & Asher, supra note 36, at 88.

¹⁹³ See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

¹⁹⁴ 1 The World Bank, supra note 164, at 1131; Schoultz, supra note 83, at 544–45.

¹⁹⁵ See generally, e.g., Franck & Weisband, supra note 53 (describing Congress’s growing activism in the wake of the Watergate scandal and the Vietnam War).

¹⁹⁶ Lavelle, supra note 28, at 97–98; Gwin, supra note 45, at 220.

¹⁹⁷ Cf. Barron & Lederman, supra note 57, at 952.

¹⁹⁸ Signing statements asserting constitutional problems are sometimes, but not always, a prelude to the executive branch’s non-enforcement of, or noncompliance with, the legislated provision. See, e.g., Bradley, Curtis A. & Posner, Eric A., Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 Const. Comment. 307, 343 (2006)Google Scholar; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Presidential Signing Statements Accompanying the Fiscal Year 2006 Appropriations Acts, Study No. B-308603 (2007) (reviewing nineteen provisions singled out in signing statements issued by President George W. Bush and finding that ten provisions were executed as written, six were not, and three were not triggered); McGinnis, John, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 293, 310 n.81 (1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (describing noncompliance with legislated provision regarding composition of U.S. delegation to specified International meetings).

¹⁹⁹ See, e.g., Bowles & Kormos, supra note 53 (discussing merits of constitutional objections to legislated instructions but not mentioning signing statements). Bruce Rich, a leader in the reform efforts, never mentions signing statements in his book. see Rich, supra note 150.

²⁰⁰ Devins, Neal & Prakash, Saikrishna, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 507, 545 (2012)Google Scholar.

²⁰¹ see Fisher, Louis, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 273, 288 (1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (describing presidents and their legal advisersas able to “indulge in confrontations with Congress” onconstitutional questions, whereas executive agencies “cannot risk these types of collisions with the [congressional] committees that authorize their programs and provide funds”).

²⁰² Babb, supra note 32, at 13–15.

²⁰³ See, e.g., Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics 76 (2007).

²⁰⁴ 155 Cong. Rec. H7907 (daily ed. July 9, 2009).

²⁰⁵ Telephone interview with anonymous source familiar with U.S. participation in multilateral development banks over the years (Mar. 13, 2012).

²⁰⁶ Wade, supra note 143, at 680; Rich, supra note 150, at 148–53.

²⁰⁷ An Act Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-167, §522, 103 Stat. 1195 (1989) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §262(h)) (requiring the use of the voice and vote of the United States to oppose assistance by the Bank for the production or extraction of any commodity or mineral for export if the competition would injure U.S. producers).

²⁰⁸ Id., §533 (requiring vigorous promotion of programs to address global climate change by specified means, including by augmenting and expanding the professional staff of the Bank with the requisite expertise).

²⁰⁹ Id., §563 (requiring opposition to loans to countries that have been designated by the secretary of state as state sponsors of terrorism).

²¹⁰ Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101- 167, §561, 103 Stat. 1195 (1989).

²¹¹ International Development and Finance Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-240, §§407(b), 501, 512, 103 Stat. 2492 (1989).

²¹² Id., §521.

²¹³ Id.

²¹⁴ George H. W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, 2 Pub. Papers 1573 (Nov. 21, 1989).

²¹⁵ Bush, George H. W., Statement on Signing the International Development and Finance Act of 1989, 25 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 1973 (Dec. 25, 1989)Google Scholar.

²¹⁶ Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1991; Hearings on H.R. 5114 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 101st Cong. 169, 180–81 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 5114 ] (“This is an area in which we have received a substantial mandate from Congress to press for wide-ranging reforms over the past several years. At last count, we had thirty-five separate legislative provisions encouraging us to promote more rapid progress toward one or another environmental objective.”).

²¹⁷ Id. at 195.

²¹⁸ Id. at 193.

²¹⁹ Wade, supra note 143, at 686–87.

²²⁰ Hearings on H.R. 5114, supra note 216, at 192 (statement of Senator Leahy).

²²¹ Bowles & Kormos, supra note 53, at 793.

²²² Id.

²²³ Bush, George H. W., Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991, 26 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 1770 (Nov. 12, 1990)Google Scholar (expressing concern about provisions that “purport to direct, or forbid, negotiations with foreign governments or entities” and that “require the executive branch... to present specific positions to International organizations”). The statute includes provisions requiring the U.S. executive director to encourage greater reliance on field offices in assessing project proposals and to hold open hearings in the borrowing country during project identification and preparation. see An Act Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 1979 (1990).

²²⁴ See, e.g., Clinton, William J., Statement on Signing the Department of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2001, 36 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 3153 (Dec. 21, 2000)Google Scholar (objecting to provisions regarding Kyoto protocol); Clinton, William J., Statement on Signing the Holocaust Victims Redress Act, 34 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 263, 263 (Feb. 23, 1998)Google Scholar (objecting to a provision that “purports to direct the President on how to pursue negotiations with foreign states”).

²²⁵ see Clinton, William J., Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2001, 36 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 2809 (Nov. 13, 2000)Google Scholar; Clinton, William J., Statement on Signing the Global AIDS and Tuberculosis Relief Act of 2000, 36 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 1906, 1907 (Aug. 28, 2000)Google Scholar (objecting to “provisions [that] seem to direct the Administration on how to proceed in negotiations related to the development of the World Bank AIDS Trust Fund”); Clinton, William J., Statement on Signing Consolidated Appropriations Legislation for Fiscal Year 2000, 35 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 2458 (Dec.6,1999)Google Scholar; Clinton, William J., Statement on Signing the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, 34 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 2108 (Nov. 2, 1998)Google Scholar; Clinton, William J., Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 948 (May 9, 1994)Google Scholar.

²²⁶ See, e.g., An Act Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-306, §§514, 526, 108 Stat. 1608, 1633 (1994).

²²⁷ See, e.g., Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 2001: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 106th Cong. 311 (2000) (“Under legislative sanctions imposed in 1998, we are required to oppose (i.e., abstain or vote ‘no’) any multilateral lending to India except for loans that support basic human needs. In April 2000, we abstained on one IBRD loan and one IDA credit... in accordance with this mandate.”) (response by Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers to question for the record).

²²⁸ See, e.g., Bush, George W., Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, 43 Weekly Comp.Pres.Docs 1638(Dec.26,2007)Google Scholar; Bush, George W., Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006, 41 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs 1718 (Nov. 14, 2005)Google Scholar; U.S. Government Accountability Office, supra note 198, at 33–34 (finding that the Treasury Department implemented voice-and-vote instructions not with standing constitutional objection made in signing statement).

²²⁹ see Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-8, §§7026, 7030(b), 7070(e), 7071(b), 123 Stat. 524 (2009).

²³⁰ see An Act Making Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, §§1110–12, 1404, 123 Stat. 1859 (2009).

²³¹ See id., §§1112(d), 1404.

²³² Barack Obama, Statement on Signing the Omnibus Appropriations Act 2009, 2009 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 145 (Mar. 11, 2009); see Barack Obama, Statement on Signing the Supplemental Appropriations Act 2009, 2009 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 501 (June 24, 2009).

²³³ Bob Davis & Greg Hitt, Major IMF Contribution Faces Resistance in U.S. Congress, Wall St. J., June 10, 2009, at A 6.

²³⁴ See, e.g., Anne Flaherty, Democrats Irked by President’s Signing Statement: Obama Criticized George W. Bush for Doing the Same, Boston Globe, July 22, 2009, at 8.

²³⁵ 155 Cong. Rec. H 7907 (daily ed. July 9, 2009); see supra note 204 and accompanying text. Representatives Frank and Obey, along with two other colleagues, sent a letter to President Obama reiterating both the complaint about the signing statement and the accompanying threat to cut funding. see Letter from Barney Frank and David Obey to President Obama (July 21, 2009), reprinted in Press Release, House Financial Services–Democrats, House Chairs Warn President of Dangers of Signing Statements (June 21, 2009), at http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/press/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=515.

²³⁶ see 155 Cong. Rec. H7907 (daily ed. July 9, 2009) (reproducing amendment offered by Representative Kirk on behalf of Representative Granger); id. at H7913 (recording 429-2 vote in favor).

²³⁷ Id. at H7908 (statement of Representative Kirk).

²³⁸ Telephone interview with Edwin (Ted) Truman, former Treasury Department Assistant Secretary for international Affairs (1998–2001) and Counselor to the Secretary (2009) (Mar. 13, 2012).

²³⁹ Id.

²⁴⁰ Id.

²⁴¹ See id. (statement of Representative Frank) (“I’ve been told by Treasury they intend to abide by them.”).

²⁴² See the U.S. and the G-20: Remaking the International Economic Architecture: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. 36 (2009) (responding to a question for the record, Geithner stated, “Treasury takes very seriously its responsibility to carry out the legislative mandates that apply to U.S. participation in the six [international financial institutions].”).

²⁴³ Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 16, at 1.

²⁴⁴ Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, §§7026(c), 7030(b), 7070(i), 7071(b)(1), 7089(e),123 Stat. 3034 (2009); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, §§7025, 7029(b), 7042(j)(1), 7046(d)(4),125 Stat. 786 (2011).

²⁴⁵ Compare Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, §7026, 123 Stat. 524, with Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, §7026(c), with Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, §7025(c) (containing identical provisions regarding loans for commodities or minerals that compete with U.S. producers); compare Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2009, §7030,with Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, §7030(b) (containing nearly identical language regarding loans that would require user fees or services charges on poor people for primary education or primary health care); compare Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, §7070(e)(1), with Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, §7042(j), and Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, §7070(i) (regarding loans to Zimbabwe); compare Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, §7071(b), with Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, §7071(b), and Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, §7044(b) (regarding loans to Burma).

²⁴⁶ see Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, §7089; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, §7046(d)(4).

²⁴⁷ Charlie Savage,Obama Takes New Route to Opposing Parts of Laws, N.Y. Times, Jan.9, 2010, at A10 (quoting White House spokesperson Ben LaBolt).

²⁴⁸ See infra notes 274–75 and accompanying text.

²⁴⁹ James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy 115 (1994).

²⁵⁰ McCubbins, Mathew D. & Schwartz, Thomas, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. j. Pol. Sci. 165, 168 (1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵¹ Id. at 166.

²⁵² Stewart,supra note 12, at 80. For an example of how administrative law procedures can be applied to an international regime, see Barr & Miller, supra note 29, at 29–31.

²⁵³ see Schoultz, supra note 83, at 546.

²⁵⁴ Wade, supra note 143, at 614–15 (describing shortcomings in the Bank’s reporting regime before 1987 as “too weak to pick up more than egregious cases of damage, and perhaps not all of those”); see also Rich, supra note 150, at 113 n.*.

²⁵⁵ Compare, e.g., Nielson & Tierney, supra note 53, with Gutner, Tamar, World Bank Environmental Reform: Revisiting Lessons from Agency Theory, 59 Int’l Org. 773, 778–79 (2005)Google Scholar.

²⁵⁶ IBRD Agreement, supra note 30, Art. III, §2.

²⁵⁷ see 22 U.S.C. §288(a), (d); Exec. Order No. 9751, 11 Fed. Reg. 7713 (July 11, 1946); Exec. Order No. 11966, 42 Fed. Reg. 4331 (Jan. 19, 1977).

²⁵⁸ There were some exceptions in the Bank’s very early history: in 1948 and 1949, IBRD officials testified voluntarily before several congressional committees. Sanford, Jonathan & Goodman, Margaret, Congressional Oversight and the Multilateral Development Banks, 29 Int’l Org. 1055, 1056 n.2 (1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵⁹ Id. at 1060–61; see also Staff of S. Comm. On Foreign Relations, 111th CONG., Report on the International Financial Institutions: A Call for Change 18 (Comm. Print 2010) [hereinafter A Call for Change] (citing the Government Accountability Office’s lack of access to Bank officials to complete report requested by members of Congress).

²⁶⁰ see 22 U.S.C. §288a(b), d(b).

²⁶¹ see Sanford & Goodman, supra note 258, at 1059–61.

²⁶² A Call for Change, supra note 259, at 3 (noting that Senator Lugar met personally with the head of each multilateral development bank); Bowles & Kormos, supra note 53, at 808 n.212.

²⁶³ Interview with Nilmini Gunaratne Rubin, former Senior Professional Staff Member for Senator Richard Lugar (Mar. 29, 2012).

²⁶⁴ See, e.g., Bowles & Kormos, supra note 53, at 801; Wade, supra note 143, at 727; Udall, Lori, The World Bank and Public Accountability, in The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, Ngos, And Grass Roots Movements 403 (Fox, Jonathan A. & Brown, L. David eds., 1998)Google Scholar.

²⁶⁵ Shihata, Ibrahim F.I, The World Bank Inspection Panel 22–23 (2d ed. 2000)Google Scholar.

²⁶⁶ see A Call for Change, supra note 259.

²⁶⁷ see World Bank, News and Broadcast, World Bank Broadens Public Access to Information (July 1, 2010), at http://go.worldbank.org/L3HF51WOX0.

²⁶⁸ see IBRD Resolution 93-10 (1993); IDA Resolution 93-6 (1993); see also Bowles & Kormos, supra note 53, at 801–07 (describing legislated instructions and threats to cut funding, specifically in relation to the establishment of the Inspection Panel).

²⁶⁹ See generally Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 15, at 292; Nielson & Tierney, supra note 53 (describing Inspection Panel as an example of fire-alarm oversight).

²⁷⁰ Congressional hearings, like threats to cut funding, are not subject to the collective action problems that beset legislating. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 8, at 446.

²⁷¹ Babb, supra note 32, at 69.

²⁷² BWAA, supra note 37, §4(b)(5), (6).

²⁷³ See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §262r-6 (2006) (requiring annual reports on actions that borrowing countries have taken to strengthen governance and reduce bribery and corruption).

²⁷⁴ D. Roderick Kiewiet & Mathew D. Mccubbins, The Logic of Delegation 31–32(1991)(“The agent has incentives to shade things... or to Reveal information in some other strategic manner.... Even if agents can some how be constrained to be truthful in their reports, the principal will still not know what they are not reporting.”).

²⁷⁵ Hawkins, Darren G., Lake, David A., Nielson, Daniel L. & Tierney, Michael J., Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory, in Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Hawkins, Darren G., Lake, David A., Nielson, Daniel L. & Tierney, Michael J. eds., 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“If the principal observes an unsatisfactory outcome, it cannot tell for sure whether this was the result of slack by the agent, in which case the latter should be sanctioned, or some unfortunate event that disrupted the best efforts of a sincere agent, who should not be punished.”).

²⁷⁶ See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, International Environmental Oversight: U.S. Agencies Follow Certain Procedures Required by Law, But Have Limited Impact (2008); U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, More Effective United States Participation Needed in World Bank and International Development Association, Rep. B-161470 (1973); A Call for Change, supra note 259; 1977 Staff Report, supra note 82.

²⁷⁷ See, e.g., International Environmental Oversight, supra note 276, at 25–26 (describing sources).

²⁷⁸ Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, §581, 118 Stat. 3, 202–04 (2004) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §262o-3) (requiring online posting of all negative votes and abstentions made by U.S. executive directors at any multilateral development institution); Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109-102, §599B, 119 Stat. 2172, 2241–43 (2005) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §262o-4(e)) (requiring online posting of explanations of U.S. positions on proposals that would have a significant effect on the environment).

²⁷⁹ World Bank, The World Bank Policy on Access to Information, para. 23 (July 1, 2010), at http://go. world bank.org/L3HF51WOX0. Verbatim transcripts of board meetings, as well as statements of executive directors and staff in the context of board meetings, remain unavailable to the public under the new policy for a period often years. Id., para. 33.

²⁸⁰ A related question (one that is beyond the scope of this article) is whether legislatures in other member states can replicate Congress’s success. To the extent that Congress is aided by the United States’ disproportionate influence over the Bank, Congress’s successes may be difficult for other legislatures to replicate.

²⁸¹ See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s constitutional authority relevant to the Bank’s work).

²⁸² See generally Lancaster, supra note 203, at 62–109 (describing shifts in congressional approaches to foreign aid policy over time).

²⁸³ Lindsay, supra note 249, at 40–43.

²⁸⁴ Victoria Nourse,Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 Geo. L.J. 1119, 1125 (2011) (“There is nary a political scientist who does not believe that the electoral connection—whether viewed as a rosy aim to further the public good or a craven attempt to extract interest-group rents—is Congress’s most distinctive feature.”).

²⁸⁵ Moe & Howell, supra note 5, at 147.

²⁸⁶ Bradley & Kelley, supra note 15, at 16.

²⁸⁷ see J. Lawrence Broz & Michael Brewster Hawes, US Domestic Politics and International Monetary Fund Policy, in Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, supra note 275, at 77, 77 n.2.

²⁸⁸ See subsection “Constitutional Confrontation” in part IV, above.

²⁸⁹ This process has been followed for the other organizations that make up the World Bank Group as well as for the IMF, regional development banks, the WTO, and commissions established by the North American Free Trade Agreement, including the Commission for Environmental Cooperation and the Commission for Labor Cooperation.

²⁹⁰ For example, compare the International Cotton Institute (participation approved by legislation) with the International Coffee Organization (participation approved by two-thirds of the Senate).

²⁹¹ Cf. Hathaway, supra note 13 (making this same point regarding the pattern for International agreements gen erally, not just those that create International organizations).

²⁹² See, e.g., Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681– 856 (following Senate consent to ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21); Great Lakes Fishery Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 557, 70 Stat. 242 (following Senate consent to ratification of the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries, U.S.-Can., Sept. 10, 1954,6 UST 2836); International Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act of 1957, Pub. L. 85-177, 71 Stat. 453 (following Senate consent to ratification of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, 8 UST 1093, 276 UNTS 3).

²⁹³ International Coffee Agreement, Aug. 28, 1957, Pub. L. 85-177, 14 UST 1911.

²⁹⁴ See generally Robert H. Bates, Open-Economy Politics: The Political Economy of the World Coffee Trade 125–27 (1997).

²⁹⁵ International Coffee Agreement Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-23, §2, 79 Stat. 112 (1965).

²⁹⁶ Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-634, §302, 82 Stat. 1345 (1968).

²⁹⁷ Coffee Agreement Act of 1968, Continuation, Pub.L.No. 91-694, §3,84 Stat. 2077 (1971);An Act to Continue Until the Close of September 30, 1973, the International Coffee Agreement Act of 1968, Pub.L. No. 92-262, 86 Stat. 113 (1972).

²⁹⁸ See supra note 41.

²⁹⁹ GA Res. 64/248 (Feb. 5, 2010); Report of the Secretary-General, Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236, UN Doc. A/64/220 (Sept. 23, 2009); Basic Facts About the United Nations 28–29 (2011).

³⁰⁰ World Health Assembly, Scale of Assessments for 2012–2013 (May 24, 2011), at http://apps.who.int/gb/ ebwha/pdf_files/WHA64/A64_R21-en.pdf.

³⁰¹ World Trade Organization, Members’ Contributions to the WTO Budget and the Budget of the Appellate Body for the Year 2011, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/contrib11_e.htm.

³⁰² Organization of American States, Program-Budget of the Organization 2012, Annex II, tbl.A, at http://www.oas.org/consejo/sp/CAAP/docs/Approved%20Program%20Budget%202012%20ENG%20_%20No%20posts.pdf; 2008 Annual Report of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, App. 2, at http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles 2/AnnualReports/IATTC-Annual-Report-2008.pdf.

³⁰³ UN Charter, Arts. 27, 108; IBRD Agreement,supra note 30, Art. VIII. The United States also has the capacity to veto individual loans made by the Inter-American Bank’s Fund for Special Operations, which, like the IDA, extends concessional loans on below-market terms. Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, Art. IV, §§1, 9, Apr. 8, 1959, 10 UST 3029, 389 UNTS 69.

³⁰⁴ Convention on International Civil Aviation, Art. 50, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 UNTS 295.

³⁰⁵ Constitution of the International Labour Organization, Art. 7, June 28, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712, TS No. 874.

³⁰⁶ Cogan, supra note 45, at 257, 261.

³⁰⁷ Id. at 257– 62.

³⁰⁸ Kingsbury, Benedict, Kirsch, Nico & Stewart, Richard B., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 15, 38–39 (2005)Google Scholar.

³⁰⁹ International Monetary Fund,IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx.

³¹⁰ Cogan, supra note 45.

³¹¹ Patricia A. Wertman & Pamela Hairston, The IMF And “Voice and Vote” Amendments: A Compilation (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1998); U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 16.

³¹² 22 U.S.C. §262o-2(a)(9) (2006).

³¹³ 22 U.S.C. §262o-2(a)(4) (2006).

³¹⁴ Broz & Hawes, supra note 287, at 103.

³¹⁵ David Gartner, Uncovering Bretton Woods, 44 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. (forthcoming).

³¹⁶ Alvarez, supra note 3, at 10.

³¹⁷ Gwin, supra note 45, at 269.

³¹⁸ See, e.g., Lavelle, supra note 28, at 6; Gwin, supra note 45, at 269–70.

³¹⁹ Gwin, supra note 45, at 269–70.

³²⁰ McGinnis, supra note 2, at 1714.

³²¹ Id. at 1714, 1725 n.43; Dahl, supra note 2, at 30.

³²² See supra note 2 and accompanying text.