This article explores the advantages and disadvantages of referring discovery matters in complex cases to special masters. In the first section Brazil explains how the results of his earlier research into the discovery system exposed problems that the appointment of masters might help solve. He then describes the kinds of pretrial tasks and roles federal courts have assigned to special masters and the ways that using a master can expedite and rationalize the case development process. In the second half of the article, the author assesses the major objections to delegating judicial responsibilities to masters and the problems that frequent appointments might cause. Along the way, Brazil offers practical suggestions to judges about how to avoid potential difficulties and how to maximize the effectiveness of this increasingly popular procedure.

This article reports on the experience of Special Masters appointed to regulate pretrial phases of a large civil antitrust suit. It describes techniques for expediting discovery, determining claims of privilege in production of documents, establishing stipulations of undisputed facts, and controlling and resolving disputes arising in discovery. It suggests a “managerial” approach to pretrial that is flexible and experimental and that may be useful in controlling the pretrial phase of other “big” cases.

In litigation, judges often disqualify attorneys who violate American Bar Association (ABA) disciplinary standards. Many practitioners, judges, and scholars are growing increasingly hostile to these disqualifications. In this article the author criticizes the view that the standard for court-ordered disqualification should be roughly equivalent to ABA standards for withdrawal or ineligibility to accept a case. He argues that the remedy of disqualification should only rarely be used, even when it is clear that an ABA disciplinary standard has been violated. He criticizes the view that the standard for court-ordered disqualification should be roughly equivalent to ABA standards for withdrawal or ineligibility to accept a case. And he canvasses the Second Circuit's development of a new standard of disqualification—the trial taint test—as well as some recent developments that undercut that standard.

Most studies of the legal profession, done in metropolitan settings, have indicated that the profession is characterized by deep divisions associated with varying practice patterns, professional status, and orientation. But the sources of division within the bar include more than the specialization and stratification that are typical of the bar in metropolitan settings. Community context also appears to be a source of division. It determines not only the character of a lawyer's cases and clients but also the manner in which practice is conducted. This comparison of practice patterns in Missouri of rural lawyers with those in a middle-sized city (Springfield) revealed that while the small town context protects the bar from the centrifugal forces of stratification found in larger settings, it also has elements that challenge the professional independence of the practitioner. The small town or rural practitioner is very much a part of the local life, and thus local opinion and values have a salience for practice patterns not typical of larger settings. In addition, these rural lawyers are less likely to be engaged exclusively in law practice.

Overall, the data suggest that the legal profession is divided not only by specialization and its attendant internal stratification but also by the size and character of the local context. In contrast to the view that the profession is a homogeneous professional subculture, we found that the bar may better be thought of as a rather loose-knit group with tenuous collegial ties whose professionalism is under constant challenge from the community in which law practice occurs.

The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard usually is understood to mean that the plaintiff must show that the probability that the defendant is in fact liable exceeds 1/2. Several commentators and at least one court have suggested that in some situations it may be preferable to make each defendant pay plaintiff's damages discounted by the probability that the defendant in question is in fact liable. This article analyzes these and other decision rules from the standpoint of statistical decision theory. It argues that in most cases involving only one potential defendant, the conventional interpretation of the preponderance standard is appropriate, but it notes an important exception. The article also considers cases involving many defendants, only one of whom could have caused the injury to plaintiff. It argues that ordinarily the single defendant most likely to have been responsible should be liable for all the damages, even when the probability associated with this defendant is less than 1/2. At the same time, it identifies certain multiple-defendant cases in which the rule that weights each defendant's damages by the probability of that defendant's liability should apply.