1 See Abel, Richard L., The Sociology of American Lawyers: A Bibliographic Guide, 2 Law & Pol'y Q. 335 (1980).Google Scholar

2 David Campbell, Penny Smith, & Philip A. Thomas, Annotated Bibliography on the English Legal Profession and Legal Services: 1960–78 (Cardiff, Wales: University College Cardiff Press, 1980); Royal Commission on Legal Services, Final Report (2 vols. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Report]; Royal Commission on Legal Services in Scotland, Report (2 vols. Edinburgh: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980).Google Scholar

3 See the reports published by the Professional Organizations Committee of the Province of Ontario; H. W. Arthurs & Brian D. Bucknall, Bibliographies on the Legal Profession and Legal Education in Canada (Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, 1968).Google Scholar

4 Roman Tomasic & Cedric Bullard, Lawyers and Their Work in New South Wales: Preliminary Report (Sydney, Austl.: Law Foundation of New South Wales, 1978); see generally the publications of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission.Google Scholar

5 The Working Group on Comparative Study of Legal Professions, of which I am a member, is preparing overviews and bibliographies for a number of European legal professions in order to overcome language barriers and foster comparative research. Most of the studies in the existing literature have been national monographs, with a few notable exceptions, e.g., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Lawyers and Their Society: A Comparative Study of the Legal Profession in Germany and the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973); Frederick H. Zemans, ed., Perspectives on Legal Aid: An International Survey (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979); Bryant Garth, Neighborhood Law Firms for the Poor: A Comparative Study of Recent Developments in Legal Aid and in the Legal Profession (Alphen aan den Rijn, Neth.: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980); Erhard Blankenburg, ed., Innovation in the Legal Services (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1980); Mauro Cappelletti, ed., Access to Justice and the Welfare State (Alphen aan den Rijn, Neth.: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1981).Google Scholar

6 Eliot Freidson, The Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); Margali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Abel, Richard L., The Rise of Professionalism, 6 Brit. J.L. & Soc'y 82 (1979) (review essay on Larson).Google Scholar

7 There are exceptions, as shown by the lengthy bibliography to the first volume under review. In addition to those largely descriptive accounts, at least one sociologist has been concerned with professions in the Third World: Terence J. Johnson, Professions and Power (London: Macmillan Press, 1972); id., Imperialism and the Professions: Notes on the Development of Professional Occupations in Britain's Colonies and New States, 20 Soc. Rev. Monographs 281 (1973).Google Scholar

8 C. J. Dias et al., Lawyers in the Third World: Comparative and Developmental Perspectives (Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies; New York: International Center for Law in Development, 1981).Google Scholar

9 Dennis O. Lynch, Legal Roles in Colombia (Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies; New York: International Center for Law in Development, 1981).Google Scholar

10 Because my object is to regroup and reanalyze the empirical data, I necessarily will scant the other contributions. My debt to Robin Luckham's masterful synthesis, The Political Economy of Legal Professions: Towards a Framework for Comparison (ch. 12), in Dias et al., supra note 8, is enormous, and if I have not tried to summarize his powerful arguments it is simply because I feel unequal to the task. I also will say little about the more prescriptive essays in this book by Dias and Paul (chs. 1, 13, 14). I share their goals and fully agree that it is essential to organize the oppressed before they can take effective legal action; indeed, organization may render legal action superfluous. I was disturbed, however, that the essays omitted any discussion of the economic bases of power, and I wonder whether Dias and Paul believe that political and social equality can be attained while control of the means of production remains in the hands of capital.Google Scholar

11 Larson, supra note 6. For an analysis of how the British and American legal professions achieved this goal, see id.; Brian Abel-Smith & Robert Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts: A Sociological Study of the English Legal System 1750–1965 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); Abel, Richard L., Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 1117; id., Lawyers, in Leon Lipson, ed., Handbook of Law and Social Science (forthcoming).Google Scholar

12 Although lawyers like to exaggerate their historical continuity with remote forebears—American and especially English lawyers delight in invoking traditions that originated hundreds of years ago—the legal profession as we know it did not appear until the mid-nineteenth century in England and the end of that century in the United States.Google Scholar

13 Rogelio Perez Perdomo, Jurists in Venezuelan History, in Dias et al., supra note 8, 76, at 77. This is, in part, a reflection of the greater role of the public profession in Continental legal systems. But lawyers also have dominated political life in the United States ever since the Revolution. This has been less true in England. See David Podmore, Solicitors and the Wider Community (London: Heinemann, 1980).Google Scholar

14 Racism is not a monopoly of the Third World. Black lawyers were excluded from the American Bar Association until well after World War II: Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America 65–66 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). Only citizens were allowed to qualify as British solicitors until 1974, conveniently excluding most racial minorities: 1 Report, supra note 2, at ¶ 35.31.Google Scholar

15 Perez Perdomo, supra note 13, at 77; Lynch, supra note 9, at 16 (this book is summarized in ch. 2 of Dias et al., supra note 8).Google Scholar

16 Yash P. Ghai, Law and Lawyers in Kenya and Tanzania: Some Political Economy Considerations, in Dias et al., supra note 8, 144, at 149; Medard R. K. Rwelamira, The Tanzania Legal Profession, in Dias et al., supra note 8, 204, at 212.Google Scholar

17 K. G. Machado & Rahim Said, The Malaysian Legal Profession in Transition: Structural Change and Public Access to the Legal System, in Dias et al., supra note 8, at 248. In the United States, by contrast, although some colonial lawyers (including members of the elite) qualified at the English bar, the practice dwindled in the eighteenth century and ceased entirely after the Revolution.Google Scholar

18 Beverly D. Houghton, Women Lawyers in Ghana, in Dias et al., supra note 8, at 123. Sex discrimination, whether by law or mores, is just as common in advanced capitalist states. For instance women were not admitted to Harvard Law School until 1950. See Joel Seligman, The High Citadel: The Influence of Harvard Law School 7 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1978); see generally Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Women in Law (New York: Basic Books, 1981).Google Scholar

19 The useful neologism is Karl Llewellyn's. See K. N. Llewellyn & E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941).Google Scholar

20 See James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers, ch. 5 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1950); Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, chs. 8, 12 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973); Robert B. Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, in Donaid Fleming & Bernard Bailyn, eds., Law in American History 405 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971); id. The Law School: Legal Education in America, 1850–1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, forthcoming); Abel, Lawyers, supra note 11.Google Scholar

21 See Hurst, supra note 20, at 314; Segal, Robert M. and Fei, John, The Economics of the Legal Profession: An Analysis by States, 39 A.B.A. J. 110, 114 (1953).Google Scholar

22 Perez Perdomo, supra note 13, at 80.Google Scholar

23 Machado & Said, supra note 17, at 251. The Sudan had 248 lawyers for a population greater than 18 million, or more than 70,000 for each lawyer. See Salman M. A. Salman, Legal Profession in the Sudan: A Study of Legal and Professional Pluralism, in Dias et al., supra note 8, 226, at 242–44. Tanzania had 350 lawyers for 15.5 million people, or 1 for 44,000. See Rwelamira, supra note 16, at 213. And Kenya had 500 for a population of 13.3 million, or 1 for 26,000. See Amos O. Odenyo, Professionalism and Change: The Emergent Kenyan Lawyer, in Dias et al., supra note 8, 177, at 192. For the ratios of other contemporary countries and some thoughts on their meaning, see Marc Galanter, Larger Than Life: Mega-law and Mega-lawyering in the Contemporary United States, in Robert Dingwall & P. S. C. Lewis, eds., The Sociology of the Professions: Lawyers, Doctors, and Others (London: Macmillan, forthcoming).Google Scholar

24 Robin Luckham, Imperialism, Law and Structural Dependence: The Ghana Legal Profession, in Dias et al., supra note 8, 90, at 115.Google Scholar

25 Odenyo, supra note 23, at 181. For an overview of the ways in which a variety of American occupations excluded competitors, see Friedman, Lawrence M., Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing, 1890–1910: A Legal and Social Study, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 487 (1965). For a study of the ongoing efforts of the American legal profession in this regard, see Rhode, Deborah L., Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1981).Google Scholar

26 Ghai, supra note 16, at 171.Google Scholar

27 Perez Perdomo, supra note 13, at 82.Google Scholar

28 E.g., id. at 83. For an account of the proliferation of law schools in the United States, see Stevens, Two Cheers, supra note 20; id., The Law School, supra note 20; for the efforts of elite law schools to stem the tide, see First, Harry, Competition in the Legal Education Industry (pt. 1), 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 311 (1978).Google Scholar

29 Rwelamira, supra note 16, at 213. In Britain, between 1965 and 1978, the number of solicitors increased by 67 percent while the number of barristers increased by 106 percent; see 1 Report, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 18.41, 18.55; 2 Report, supra note 2, at tables 1.6, 1.12. In the United States, the number of lawyers has nearly doubled in the last two decades, from 285,933 in 1960 (see York, John C. & Hale, Rosemary D., Too Many Lawyers? The Legal Services Industry: Its Structure and Outlook, 26 J. Legal Educ. 1 n.3 (1973)), to more than 500,000 today.Google Scholar

30 Salman, supra note 23, at 230–44.Google Scholar

31 In 1972, 54 percent of the high school graduating class in the U.S. enrolled in institutions of higher education. W. Vance Grant & C. George Lind, Digest of Education Statistics 1979, at 93 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979).Google Scholar

32 Lynch, supra note 9, at 26–28. In the 1920s, more than half of all law students were enrolled in part-time schools. See Stevens, Two Cheers, supra note 20, at 496–97.Google Scholar

33 Lynch, supra note 9, at 83 n.12, 91.Google Scholar

34 Id. at 91. The Association of American Law Schools also pursued the former strategy in the United States. See First, supra note 28.Google Scholar

35 Machado & Said, supra note 17, at 248–54.Google Scholar

36 Id. at 261–62.Google Scholar

37 Id. at 264.Google Scholar

38 Id. at 253.Google Scholar

39 See Stevens, Two Cheers, supra note 20; First, supra note 28; Auerbach, supra note 14.Google Scholar

40 Luckham, supra note 10, at 302–3. Land law was also the mainstay of the legal profession in the United States in much of the nineteenth century. See Friedman, supra note 20, and it continues to provide more than half the income of English solicitors, 1 Report, supra note 2, at ¶ 21.73.Google Scholar

41 Ghai, supra note 16, at 150–51.Google Scholar

42 Id.; Rwelamira, supra note 16, at 207. Ghana always has had a unified court structure; it admitted lawyers to the primary courts in the 1930s. See Luckham, supra note 24, at 115. The contemporary movement toward delegalization may express similar political suspicions. See Richard L. Abel, Delegalization: A Critical Review of Its Ideology, Manifestations, and Social Consequences, in Erhard Blankenburg, Ekkehard Klausa, & Hubert Rottleuthner, eds., Alternative Rechtsformen und Alternativen zum Recht, Band VI, Jahrbuch für Rechssoziologie und Rechtstheorie (Opladen, W. Ger.: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1979); Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in Richard L. Abel, ed., The Politics of Informal Justice, vol. 1, The American Experience 267 (New York: Academic Press, 1982).Google Scholar

43 Ghai, supra note 16, at 161; Rwelamira, supra note 16, at 212.Google Scholar

44 Odenyo, supra note 23, at 191; Rwelamira, supra note 16, at 220.Google Scholar

45 Salman, supra note 23, at 242–44. This shows that attempts by one segment of the profession to exercise supply control can frustrate the efforts of another to create demand; compare the struggles between the two branches of the divided English profession. Abel-Smith & Stevens, supra note 11.Google Scholar

46 Machado & Said, supra note 17, at 263. A number of writers have commented on the strong cultural aversion that people in many Far Eastern societies have to involvement with the formal legal system. See, e.g., Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in Arthur Taylor von Mehren, ed., Law in Japan: The Legal Order in a Changing Society 41 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Pyong-Choon Hahm, The Korean Political Tradition and Law: Essays in Korean Law and Legal History, Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, Monograph Series No. 1 (Seoul: Hollym Corp., 1967); Sybille Van der Sprenkel, The Legal Institutions of Manchu China: A Sociological Analysis (London: University of London, Athlone Press, 1962).Google Scholar

47 Ghai, supra note 16, at 152–53; M. P. K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1967); Coldham, Simon, Land Control in Kenya, 1978 J. Afr. L. 63; id., Effect of Registration of Title upon Customary Land Rights in Kenya, 1978 J. Afr. L. 91.Google Scholar

48 Ghai, supra note 16, at 162. That lawyers are quite unnecessary for most land transactions is shown by the fact that these are handled by escrow agents and realtors in California and other American states and by nonlawyers in several Australian states. Julian Disney et al., Lawyers 503 (Sydney, Austl.: Law Book Co., 1977).Google Scholar

49 Ghai, supra note 16, at 162.Google Scholar

50 Machado & Said, supra note 17, at 252; Luckham, supra note 24, at 115; Lynch, supra note 9, at 28 n.132, 96. For descriptions of similar practices in the United States, see Jerome E. Carlin, Lawyers on Their Own: A Study of Individual Practitioners in Chicago (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1962); Reichstein, Kenneth J., Ambulance Chasing: A Case Study of Deviation and Control Within the Legal Profession, 13 Soc. Probs. 3 (1965). Recently, the United States Supreme Court has directed state supreme courts and bar associations to liberalize their rules concerning advertising and, to a lesser degree, solicitation. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); In re R—M. J—, 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982). The American Bar Association has urged compliance with these decisions. ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rules 7.1–3 (Proposed Final Draft, May 30, 1981). Australia also has liberalized its rules. See Advertising by Solicitors, Law Soc'y J., June 1980, at 309.Google Scholar

51 I discuss the interrelationship between demand creation and distribution further in Abel, Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, supra note 11, text accompanying nn.131–75.Google Scholar

52 Id. at text accompanying nn.122–52; Abel, supra note 1, at 366–73; Zemans, supra note 5; Garth, supra note 5; Blankenburg, supra note 5.Google Scholar

53 Odenyo, supra note 23, at 199; Lynch, supra note 9, at 101; Salman, supra note 23, at 245; Committee on Legal Services to the Poor in the Developing Countries, International Legal Center, Legal Aid and World Poverty: A Survey of Asia, Africa, and Latin America (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977).Google Scholar

54 The budget of the Legal Services Corporation, at its high point in 1981, was $321.3 million. Senate Votes $321.3 Million LSC Reauthorization, Proposes Restrictions, Legal Services Corporation News, July-Aug. 1980, at 1. The projected legal aid budget in Britain for 1979–80 was ¶110 million. See Glasser, Cyril, The Royal Commission: The Remuneration of the Profession and Legal Aid, 1979 Legal Action Group Bull. 201, at 203.Google Scholar

55 Legal services lawyers in the United States aggressively attacked governmental action. See Earl Johnson, Jr., Justice and Reform: The Formative Years of the OEO Legal Services Program (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1974); Joel F. Handler, Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, & Howard S. Erlanger, Lawyers and the Pursuit of Legal Rights (New York: Academic Press, 1978). They elicited considerable hostility as a result. See Harry P. Stumpf, Community Politics and Legal Services: The Other Side of the Law (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1975); Agnew, Spiro T., What's Wrong with the Legal Services Program, 58 A.B.A. J. 930 (1972); Abel, Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, supra note 11, at text accompanying nn.271–72.Google Scholar

56 Machado & Said, supra note 17, at 260.Google Scholar

57 Reginald Herbold Green, Professions, Professionalism and the Law: Some Reflections by a Political Economist, in Dias et al., supra note 8, 275, at 277.Google Scholar

58 The state is less important as an employer of lawyers than for the work that such employment generates in the private sector. Although criminal prosecution is the most obvious example, the regulatory activities of the state probably have greater quantitative impact. See Kees Schuyt, Kees Groenendijk, & Ben Sloot, Access to the Legal System and Legal Services Research, in B.-M. Blegvad, C. M. Campbell, C. J. Schuyt, eds., 1977 European Yearbook in Law and Sociology 98 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977); but see Pashigian, B. Peter, The Market for Lawyers: The Determinants of the Demand for and Supply of Lawyers, 20 J.L. & Econ. 53 (1977). The daily activities of economic enterprises, no less than those of estranged couples, are strongly influenced by the ever present possibility of state action. Cf. Mnookin, Robert H. & Kornhauser, Lewis, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979).Google Scholar

59 The same is true for the medical profession. See Larson, supra note 6, at chs. 1–3.Google Scholar

60 Perez Perdomo, supra note 13, at 77.Google Scholar

61 Lynch, supra note 9, at 23. The increase in home ownership in England in the last 50 years enormously strengthened the economic base of solicitors, who depend on conveyancing for more than half of their income. See 1 Report, supra note 2, at ¶ 4.2.Google Scholar

62 Luckham, supra note 24, at 100; id., supra note 10, at 290.Google Scholar

63 Machado & Said, supra note 17, at 256. Affinities of class and ethnicity also have influenced client choice of lawyers in the United States. Though this practice has somewhat diminished in recent years, Wall Street firms hire associates and choose as partners lawyers whose social backgrounds match those of the corporate executives and wealthy individuals they serve. Erwin O. Smigel, The Wall Street Lawyer: Professional Organization Man? (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969); Paul Hoffman, Lions in the Street: The Inside Story at the Great Wall Street Law Firms (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1973). Similarly, small businesses and middle- and working-class individuals often choose lawyers from their own ethnic group. See Carlin, supra note 50.Google Scholar

64 Ghai, supra note 16, at 156.Google Scholar

65 Luckham, supra note 24, at 104–5; id., supra note 10, at 311.Google Scholar

66 Luckham, supra note 24, at 103–4; Odenyo, supra note 23, at 190; Rwelamira, supra note 16, at 216; Salman, supra note 23, at 242; Lynch, supra note 9, at 23. For analyses of the subject matter distribution of the work of lawyers in the United States, showing the influence of economic, social, and legal variables. See Carlin, supra note 50; id., Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966); Joel F. Handler, The Lawyer and His Community: The Practicing Bar in a Middle-Sized City (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967); Laumann, Edward O. & Heinz, John P., The Organization of Lawyers' Work: Size, Intensity, and Co-Practice of the Fields of Law, 1979 A.B.F. Res. J. 217; Heinz, John P. & Laumann, Edward O., The Legal Profession: Client Interests, Professional Roles, and Social Hierarchies, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 1111 (1978).Google Scholar

67 Luckham, supra note 24, at 103–4; Ghai, supra note 16, at 156, 160; Odenyo, supra note 23, at 189; Rwelamira, supra note 16, at 216. Solo and small firm practice has been declining in both the United States and Britain in favor of larger partnerships and salaried positions for lawyers. See Schwartz, Murray L., The Reorganization of the Legal Profession, 58 Tex. L. Rev. 1269 (1980); Galanter, supra note 23; Abel, Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, supra note 11, at text accompanying nn.205–9.Google Scholar

68 Ghai, supra note 16, at 156, 160; Perez Perdomo, supra note 13, at 85; Machado & Said, supra note 17, at 266; Odenyo, supra note 23, at 190. On tokenism in New York law firms, see James J. Fishman & Anthony S. Kaufman, eds., Practicing Law in New York City (New York: Council of New York Law Associates, 1975).Google Scholar

69 Ghai, supra note 16, at 161; Rwelamira, supra note 16, at 213–14.Google Scholar

70 Machado & Said, supra note 17, at 253. In Colombia, the entire profession falls within the top 1 percent of the population. Lynch, supra note 9, at 43. In the United States, by contrast, because supply control generally has been less complete, many lawyers barely eke out a living, notwithstanding the high median income of the profession as a whole and the astronomical salaries of senior partners in large firms, house counsel, and a few successful personal injury plaintiffs' attorneys. See Carlin, supra note 50; Illinois State Bar Association, Economics of Legal Services in Illinois: A 1975 Special Bar Survey, Ill. B.J., Oct. 1975, at 73; Steven Langer, 1978 Salary Survey, Juris Doctor, Aug.-Sept. 1978, at 23; Siegfried, John J., The Effect of Size on the Economics of Legal Practice, Legal Econ., Fall 1976, at 23; York & Hale, supra note 29.Google Scholar

71 Luckham, supra note 24, at 109; Lynch, supra note 9, at 44–45. This is equally true in both the United States. See Stevens, Robert, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 Va. L. Rev. 551 (1973), and Britain, 2 Report, supra note 2, at table 2.1.Google Scholar

72 Rwelamira, supra note 16, at 215. More than half the places in the law school at Kuala Lumpur are reserved for Malaysians. Machado & Said, supra note 17, at 255–57, 264. The impact of affirmative action by American law schools has been small (see references cited in Abel, supra note 1, at 359–62) perhaps partly because of the influence of Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See Ramsey, Henry Jr., Affirmative Action at American Bar Association Approved Law Schools: 1979–1980, 30 J. Legal Educ. 377 (1980). Britain has rejected completely any such strategy to remedy the years of racial discrimination, see 1 Report, supra note 2, at ¶ 35.29.Google Scholar

73 Lynch, supra note 9, at 44–45.Google Scholar

74 Perez Perdomo, supra note 13, at 80; Machado & Said, supra note 17, at 257. American lawyers also are concentrated in the cities (Bette H. Sikes, Clara N. Carson, & Patricia Gorai, eds, The 1971 Lawyer Statistical Report (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1972); William L. Blaine, Where to Practice Law in California: Statistics on Lawyers' Work (Berkeley, Cal.: California Continuing Education of the Bar, 1976)), and only recently have begun to follow the residential exodus to the suburbs. Barlow F. Christensen, Lawyers for People of Moderate Means: Some Problems of Availability of Legal Services 133 (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1970). The distribution of lawyers in Britain also renders them physically inaccessible to significant portions of the population (see Abel, Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, supra note 11, at text accompanying nn.106–8) though this is changing as urban solicitors open up branch offices in residential areas. See Lee Bridges et al., Legal Services in Birmingham (Birmingham, Eng.: Institute of Judicial Administration, University of Birmingham, 1975); Alan Paterson, The Legal Profession in Scotland (paper presented to the Working Group for Comparative Study of Legal Professions, Oxford, 1981). Nearly three-fourths of all barristers remain in London, and another sixth are located in four provincial cities, leaving less than 13 percent to serve the rest of England. 1 Report, supra note 2, at table 33.2.Google Scholar

75 Cf. Carlin, Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 66, at ch. 1.Google Scholar

76 Ghai, supra note 16, at 156, 160; Machado & Said, supra note 17, at 266.Google Scholar

77 Ghai, supra note 16, at 156.Google Scholar

78 Rwelamira, supra note 16, at 213.Google Scholar

79 Odenyo, supra note 23, at 188.Google Scholar

80 Machado & Said, supra note 17, at 256. The same has been true for categories that have suffered discrimination in the United States. Thus both Jews (see Auerbach, supra note 14, at 184–88) and Blacks (see Marion S. Goldman, A Portrait of the Black Attorney in Chicago (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1972)) sometimes have concentrated disproportionately in government.Google Scholar

81 Lynch, supra note 9, at 44–45, 49, 92–93, 97. For an analysis of the American data, see Frances Kahn Zemans & Victor G. Rosenblum, The Making of a Public Profession, at chs. 3, 5 (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1981).Google Scholar

82 Odenyo, supra note 23, at 192. Elite lawyers have dominated bar associations in the United States. Albert P. Melone, Lawyers, Public Policy and Interest Group Politics (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977); Halliday, Terence C. & Cappell, Charles L., Indicators of Democracy in Professional Associations: Elite Recruitment, Turnover, and Decision Making in a Metropolitan Bar Association, 1979 A.B.F. Res. J. 697; Powell, Michael, Anatomy of a Counter-Bar Association: The Chicago Council of Lawyers, 1979 A.B.F. Res. J. 501; Auerbach, supra note 14; Heinz, John P. et al., Diversity, Representation, and Leadership in an Urban Bar: A First Report on a Survey of the Chicago Bar, 1976 A.B.F. Res. J. 717. For Britain, see Abel, Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, supra note 11, at text accompanying nn.307–17.Google Scholar

83 Houghton, supra note 18, at 135. Women also have gravitated toward the public sector in the United States because government jobs allow them more control over the demands on their time. See Epstein, supra note 18.Google Scholar

84 Odenyo, supra note 23, at 196. A number of commentators have characterized professional discipline of lawyers in the United States as a mechanism for maintaining and legitimating stratification. Carlin, Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 66, at ch. 9; Shuchman, Philip, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral Code, 37 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 244 (1968); Abel, Richard L., Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules? 59 Tex. L. Rev. 639 (1981); id., Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, supra note 11.Google Scholar

85 Lynch, supra note 9, at 23.Google Scholar

86 See, e.g., 1 Report, supra note 2, at ¶ 5.7; Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, supra note 84, at 669–70.Google Scholar

87 Luckham, supra note 24, at 115; id., supra note 10, at 290. Cf. Laumann & Heinz, supra note 66, at 225.Google Scholar

88 Luckham, supra note 24, at 97–98; see also id., The Ghana Legal Profession: The Natural History of a Research Project, in Robin Luckham, ed., Law and Social Enquiry: Case Studies of Research 110 (Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies; New York: International Center for Law in Development, 1981).Google Scholar

89 Ghai, supra note 16, at 156.Google Scholar

90 Odenyo, supra note 23, at 182.Google Scholar

91 Luckham, supra note 10, at 335; Lynch, supra note 9, at 24. For the dismal record of lawyers under fascism, see Udo Reifner, ed., Das Recht des Unrechtsstaates: Arbeitsrecht und Staat-srechtswissenschaften im Faschismus (1981).Google Scholar

92 Lynch, supra note 9, at 64. Notwithstanding the efforts of public interest and poverty lawyers (see Handler et al., supra note 55; Burton A. Weisbrod, Joel F. Handler, & Neil K. Komesar, eds., Public Interest Law: An Economic and Institutional Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978)), the vast majority of attacks on the legality of government action in the United States have been launched by capital, e.g., Mark J. Green & Norman Waitzman, Business War on the Law (rev. 2d ed. 1981).Google Scholar

93 Perez Perdomo, supra note 13, at 77. In Kenya and Tanzania, this was a deliberate strategy to forestall challenges to government action. Ghai, supra note 16; Rwelamira, supra note 16.Google Scholar

94 Perez Perdomo, supra note 13, at 83.Google Scholar

95 Lynch, supra note 9, at 64. According to John Ehrlichman, President Nixon apparently felt a similar freedom to discuss pending cases with Chief Justice Burger. John Ehrlichman, Privileged Communication: The Nixon Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981).Google Scholar

96 Odenyo, supra note 23, at 183. See also Williams, David V., State Coercion Against Peasant Farmers: The Tanzanian Case, 20 J. Legal Pluralism 95 (1982); Robert Martin, Personal Freedom and the Law in Tanzania (1974).Google Scholar

97 Luckham, supra note 24, at 97; Ghai, supra note 16, at 170.Google Scholar

98 Ghai, supra note 16, at 165–66. Several recent studies suggest that fascist regimes in radically divergent social settings and at different historical periods have used informality both to legitimate the state and to defuse potential legal challenges. Udo Reifner, Individualistic and Collective Legalization: The Theory and Practice of Legal Advice for Workers in Prefascist Germany, in Richard L. Abel, ed., The Politics of Informal Justice, vol. 2, Comparative Studies 81 (1982); John O. Haley, The Politics of Informal Justice: The Japanese Experience, 1922–1942, in id. at 125; Heleen F. P. letswaart, The Discourse of Summary Justice and the Discourse of Popular Justice: An Analysis of Legal Rhetoric in Argentina, in id. at 149. Administrative tribunals also play a much larger role than courts under advanced capitalism. In the United States, there are more than twice as many administrative law judges than there are federal district court judges, Marquardt, Ronald G. & Wheat, Edward M., Hidden Allocators: Administrative Law Judges and Regulatory Reform, 2 Law & Pol'y Q. 472, 473 (1980). In Britain in 1978, there were six times as many hearings by administrative tribunals than there were contested civil cases in the Crown Courts. 1 Report, supra note 2, at ¶ 15.1, 15.28.Google Scholar

99 Lynch, supra note 9, at 96 n.32. The role seems to resemble that of the Washington lawyer. See Joseph C. Goulden, The Superlawyers: The Small and Powerful World of the Great Washington Law Firms (New York: Weybright & Talley, 1971); Mark J. Green, The Other Government: The Unseen Power of Washington Lawyers (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1975).Google Scholar

100 Odenyo, supra note 23, at 182. The state also is taking an increasingly active role in supervising legal education in the United States. E.g., U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education, Bureau of Postsecondary Education, Division of Eligibility and Agency Evaluation, Nationally Recognized Accrediting Agencies and Associations (March 1977); and in Britain, 1 Report, supra note 2, at chs. 38–39.Google Scholar

101 Ghai, supra note 16, at 168.Google Scholar

102 Lynch, supra note 9, at 56.Google Scholar

103 Id. at ch. 9.Google Scholar

104 Schuyt, Groenendijk, & Sloot, supra note 58. Only this could explain the extraordinary (if perhaps slightly exaggerated) statistic that every sixth person you pass on the streets in Washington, D.C., is a lawyer.Google Scholar

105 Thus the creation of the new property created new business for lawyers, if it did nothing else. See Reich, Charles A., The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964).Google Scholar

106 Lynch, supra note 9, at 30; cf. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Law in Modern Society: Towards a Criticism of Social Theory 193 (New York: Free Press, 1976).Google Scholar

107 Lynch, supra note 9, at 75; Luckham, supra note 24, at 97.Google Scholar

108 In the legal professions of advanced capitalist states, a similar loss of independence is a concomitant of the growth of salaried lawyers. Schwartz, supra note 67; Abel, Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, supra note 11, at text accompanying nn. 186–204, 223–26.Google Scholar

109 Rwelamira, supra note 16, at 213.Google Scholar

110 Ghai, supra note 16, at 162.Google Scholar

111 Machado & Said, supra note 17, at 266.Google Scholar

112 Ghai, supra note 16, at 160, 164; Luckham, supra note 24, at 104–5; Lynch, supra note 9, at 54, 67 n.37. The American profession is notorious for its revolving door between public service and private practice. See Goulden, supra note 99; Green, supra note 99.Google Scholar

113 Salman, supra note 23, at 246.Google Scholar

114 Houghton, supra note 18, at 130.Google Scholar

115 Odenyo, supra note 23, at 188.Google Scholar

116 Machado & Said, supra note 17, at 256.Google Scholar

117 Rwelamira, supra note 16, at 213; Machado & Said, supra note 17, at 264. There occasionally has been talk of imposing a mandatory obligation on American lawyers to render pro bono services, but nothing ever has been done. See F. Raymond Marks with Kirk Leswing & Barbara A. Fortinsky, The Lawyer, the Public, and Professional Responsibility, at ch. 14 (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1972); Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Toward a Mandatory Contribution of Public Service Practice by Every Lawyer: Recommendations and Report of the Special Committee on the Lawyer's Pro Bono Obligations (New York: Association of the Bar of the City of New York, [1979]). Compare American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 8.1 (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980), with American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 6.1 (Proposed Final Draft, May 30, 1981).Google Scholar

118 Although all the authors in the books under review disclaim any allegiance to that ideology, it persists in creeping back in: “Of course the modernization of state legal systems may be an inevitable and necessary phenomenon. For better or worse, the modern state needs increasingly complex law to organize a wide variety of activities, national and transnational. Sophisticated legal specialists are undoubtedly useful human resources.” Clarence J. Dias & James C. N. Paul, Lawyers, Legal Professions, Modernization and Development, in Dias et al., supra note 8, 11, at 17. For a taste of the lengthy debates over this issue, see Trubek, David M. & Galanter, Marc, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. Rev. 1062; Seidman, Robert B., The Lessons of Self-Estrangement: On the Methodology of Law and Development, 1 Research L. & Soc. (1978); Merryman, John Henry, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 Am. J. Comp. L. 457 (1977); Brun-Otto Bryde, The Politics and Sociology of African Legal Development (Hamburg: Institut für Internationale Angelegenheiten der Universität Hamburg, 1976); Robert B. Seidman, The State, Law and Development (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978); Williams, David V., The Authoritarianism of African Legal Orders: A Review and Critique of Robert B. Seidman's The State, Law and Development, 5 Contemp. Crises 247 (1981); Snyder, Francis G., Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory, 14 Law & Soc'y Rev. 723 (1980).Google Scholar

119 Luckham, supra note 24, at 101, The program of adjudication, consolidation, and registration of land in Kenya frequently was justified by the claim that large-scale farming was more efficient, but the empirical evidence is inconclusive at best, and the claim seems rather a rationalization advanced by the emergent class of wealthy landowners. See generally Sorrenson, supra note 47.Google Scholar

120 Luckham, supra note 24, at 102.Google Scholar

121 Salman, supra note 23, at 230. It also could be argued that the incredibly rapid pace of economic growth in Japan since the war was achieved with little help from formal law and that the substantial expansion of the Chinese economy occurred despite legal chaos.Google Scholar

122 Luckham, supra note 10, at 300; Perez Perdomo, supra note 13, at 81.Google Scholar

123 Luckham, supra note 24, at 109.Google Scholar

124 Rwelamira, supra note 16, at 210. The dramatic decline in the number of private lawyers following the nationalization of key sectors of the economy is further confirmation. See text accompanying note 49 supra. For data suggesting a strong correlation between levels of private economic activity and quantities of lawyer business, see Blaine, supra note 74.Google Scholar

125 Cf. Friedrich Engels, Letters on Historical Method, in Irving Howe, ed., Essential Works of Socialism 149–60 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976).Google Scholar

126 I elaborate this argument using data drawn from June Starr's Dispute and Settlement in Rural Turkey: An Ethnography of Law (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978) in my The Rise of Capitalism and the Transformation of Disputing: From Confrontation over Honor to Competition for Property, 27 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 223 (1979). In doing so, I draw heavily upon Marc Galanter's seminal article, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974).Google Scholar

127 Luckham, supra note 24, at 108. Accounts of land litigation in India support a similar view, e.g., Robert Kidder, The Dynamics of Litigation: A Study of Civil Litigation in South Indian Courts (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1971).Google Scholar

128 Perez Perdomo, supra note 13, at 82.Google Scholar

129 Luckham, supra note 24, at 99–100.Google Scholar

130 Lynch, supra note 9, at 26 n.113, citing Lawrence M. Friedman, On Legal Development, 24 Rutgers L. Rev. 11, 41–44 (1969). Examples are legion: the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute in the United States; the transfer of Swiss Codes to Turkey, German codes to Japan, French codes to Ethiopia; the Restatement of African Law Project, and so forth.Google Scholar

131 Ghai, supra note 16, at 172.Google Scholar

132 Dias and Paul still seem to hold, if with many qualifications, that lawyers are significantly responsible for social, economic, and political inequalities and therefore can play a central role in reducing or eliminating such inequalities. Observations on Lawyers in Development and Underdevelopment, in Dias et al., supra note 8, at 337; Lawyers, Legal Resources and Alternative Approaches to Development, in id. at 362. I have argued against this position in Socializing the Legal Profession: Can Redistributing Lawyers' Services Achieve Social Justice? 1 Law & Pol'y Q. 5 (1979).Google Scholar

133 Lynch, supra note 9, at 26. This is one interpretation of Larson's concept of collective mobility. See Larson, supra note 6, at ch. 6.Google Scholar

134 Lynch, supra note 9, at 76. Western legal professions are even more obsessed with image. See Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, supra note 84, at 667 n. 164; id., Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, supra note 11, at n.237 and accompanying text.Google Scholar

135 Machado & Said, supra note 17, at 253; Lynch, supra note 9, at 43. Western lawyers have similar problems in justifying their economic privileges. See Abel, Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, supra note 11, at text accompanying nn.281–98.Google Scholar

136 Larson, supra note 6, at 12.Google Scholar

137 Perez Perdomo, supra note 13, at 86; Lynch, supra note 9, at 28. I believe it is this threat to the legitimacy of the profession, and especially to the legitimacy of its elite, rather than direct economic competition, that explains the strenuous efforts of the American Bar Association and the Association of American Law Schools to raise the barriers to entry in order to exclude lawyers from lower-class and immigrant backgrounds. See Stevens, Two Cheers, supra note 20; Auerbach, supra note 14; First, supra note 28.Google Scholar

138 Katz, Jack, Lawyers for the Poor in Transition: Involvement, Reform, and the Turnover Problem in the Legal Services Program, 12 Law & Soc'y Rev. 275, 279–83 (1978).Google Scholar

139 Luckham, supra note 24, at 103–4. English solicitors, for whom conveyancing is so important, thus may have lost not only business but also status with the decline in the real estate market.Google Scholar

140 Odenyo, supra note 23, at 187; see also Ghai, supra note 16; Rwelamira, supra note 16; Machado & Said, supra note 17.Google Scholar

141 Machado & Said, supra note 17, at 265.Google Scholar

142 Luckham, supra note 24, at 90–92; Luckham, supra note 10, at 295–96. Notwithstanding its pretensions to being cosmopolitan, Luckham found the Ghanaian legal profession quite provincial. Luckham, supra note 24, at 117–18.Google Scholar

143 There are similar divisions within Western professional associations of lawyers. See Abel, Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, supra note 11, at nn.309–11 and accompanying text.Google Scholar

144 In the United States, universities entered legal education in the 1880s and quickly became dominant. See Stevens, Two Cheers, supra note 20; in Britain, this did not occur until the 1960s. See 1 Report, supra note 2, at ch. 38; William Twining, The Benson Report and Legal Education: A Personal View, in Philip A. Thomas, ed., Law in the Balance: Legal Services in the Eighties 186 (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982).Google Scholar

145 Odenyo, supra note 23, at 184–85.Google Scholar

146 Although I do not wish to minimize the redistributive consequences of state-supported legal services, I believe they are at least as significant as a means of legitimation. See Abel, supra note 132.Google Scholar

147 Lynch, supra note 9, at 101 n.43; Odenyo, supra note 23, at 199. Similarly, it was the professional elite that supported the OEO Legal Services Program, both when it was launched and later when it was attacked.Google Scholar

148 See generally Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, supra note 84.Google Scholar

149 Odenyo, supra note 23, at 192.Google Scholar

150 Lynch, supra note 9, at 24 n.99.Google Scholar

151 Even Western professional associations have had to relinquish significant power as lawyers have become more dependent on the state to create demand. See Abel, Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, supra note 11, at text accompanying nn. 320–21.Google Scholar

152 Rwelamira, supra note 16, at 216–17.Google Scholar

153 Salman, supra note 23, at 244.Google Scholar

154 Lynch, supra note 9, at 24 n.199.Google Scholar

155 Perez Perdomo, supra note 13, at 80.Google Scholar

156 Luckham, supra note 10, at 327.Google Scholar

157 Luckham, supra note 24, at 96; id., supra note 10, at 294.Google Scholar

158 Ghai, supra note 16, at 155. The same may be true in the United States. See Barbara A. Cur-ran, The Legal Needs of the Public: The Final Report of a National Survey, at ch. 6 (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1977); Casper, Jonathan D., Having Their Day in Court: Defendant Evaluations of the Fairness of Their Treatment, 12 Law & Soc'y Rev. 237 (1978).Google Scholar

159 Ghai, supra note 16, at 157, 168–69; see also id., Notes Towards a Theory of Law and Ideology: Tanzanian Perspectives, 13 Afr. L. Stud. 31 (1976).Google Scholar

160 Luckham, supra note 24, at 97. The role of lawyers may be most significant, however, in legitimating the adversary process itself. Thus the American Trial Lawyers Foundation proclaims: “the adversary system provides the best method we have been able to devise to determine truth in cases in which the facts are in dispute.” Commission on Professional Responsibility, Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation, The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct 5 (Public Discussion Draft, Washington, D.C.: Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation, June 1980).Google Scholar