1 See the following statement: “Ordinarily, my offices are at Mexico City. But real vocations are carried beyond the place of work. Even in bed, even with a fever, I am functioning. Besides, one doesn't practice this profession, one breathes it constantly.” Albert Camus, The Fall 130–31, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1956).Google Scholar

2 As confirmed by the data reported in this article, the cultural image of the legal profession is strongly masculine. Although this may be unjust, unfortunate, and increasingly inaccurate, it provides a basis for the decision to use masculine pronouns in this article to refer to both genders. This is also consistent with the rules of statutory drafting. See Black's Law Dictionary, s.v. “he.”.Google Scholar

3 See Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death ch. 1 (New York: Free Press, 1973).Google Scholar

4 For a description of an early version of this inquiry and its educational context, see Marvin W. Mindes, Forcing an Identity Crisis on Law Students: What Happened When One Class Was Compelled to Meet the Public Face to Face, 2 Learning & L. 44 (Fall 1975).Google Scholar

5 This first group of face-to-face interviews was with strangers to whom the interviewers were not identified as law students, selected by the students on the bases of rough demographic quotas and convenience. Interview sites included airports, train stations, buses, college cafeterias, bars, and laundromats. Later groups also included quotas of friends and relatives who students felt would be truthful.Google Scholar

6 “Highest ranking” means those adjectives that according to the respondents apply to the highest proportion of lawyers.Google Scholar

7 Factor analysis is, as explained in the text in sec. IV at note 69 infra concerning EFAP, a statistical procedure that seeks out a smaller number of underlying constructs or artificial variables that account for as much of the variation in response as possible. These artificial variables or “factors” consist of tables of “loadings” showing the extent to which each of the actual variables (here the adjectives) correlates with each factor. The adjectives that correlate most heavily on a factor, to the exclusion, ideally, of strong correlations with any other factors, constitute that factor, which is then named, more or less arbitrarily, according to what the underlying unity appears to mean. The varimax rotation program referred to here assumes “orthogonality”—that the constructs have zero correlation with each other. The result can be a number of clearly distinguished factors, but these constructs are distorted in their makeup since in empirical reality the factors are correlated rather than completely independent of each other.Google Scholar

8 See Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion pt. 3 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1922).Google Scholar

9 See Orrin E. Klapp, Heroes, Villains, and Fools: The Changing American Character 14–16 (San Diego, Cal.: Aegis Publishing Co., 1979).Google Scholar

10 See, e.g., Everett C. Hughes, Men and Their Work 38–41 (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958); Hall, Oswald, Types of Medical Careers, 55 Am. J. Soc. 243 (1949); Klapp, supra note 9, at 9.Google Scholar

11 Paul Bohannon, Conscience Collective and Culture, in Emile Durkheim et al., Essays on Sociology and Philosophy 77, ed. Kurt H. Wolff (New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1964); Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method ch. 10 (8th ed. New York: Free Press, 1964).Google Scholar

12 Georg Simmel, Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms 141–213, ed. Donald N. Levine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).Google Scholar

13 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958). Like his classification of leadership types into charismatic, traditional, and bureaucratic, this was a pure case rather than an empirical average.Google Scholar

14 Robert Ezra Park, Human Communities: The City and Human Ecology 24, 223–32 (New York: Free Press, 1952).Google Scholar

15 Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961).Google Scholar

16 Charles Horton Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922).Google Scholar

17 George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, ed. Arthur E. Murphy (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1959).Google Scholar

18 Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).Google Scholar

19 See Charles S. Suchar, Social Deviance: Perspectives and Prospects (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1978).Google Scholar

20 Hughes, supra note 10, at 23.Google Scholar

21 David Riesman, Abundance for What? and Other Essays 456 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1964).Google Scholar

22 Donald E. Super, The Psychology of Careers ch. 6 (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).Google Scholar

23 Theodore Caplow, The Sociology of Work 134 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964). Stereotyping is a basic, automatic social process. See Warren G. Bennis & Philip E. Slater, The Temporary Society 66 (New York: Harper & Row, Harper Colophon Books, 1969). It is also an aspect of human verbal processes. John Dewey & Arthur F. Bentley, in Knowing and the Known 147 (paperback ed. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), emphasize that naming is “itself directly a form of knowing, where knowing is itself directly a form of behavior …. Naming does things. It states …. Naming selects, discriminates, identifies, locates, orders, arranges, systematizes.” They also state: “A name is in effect a truncated definition” (id. at 160).Google Scholar

24 Barbara A. Curran, The Legal Needs of the Public: The Final Report of a National Survey 265 (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1977).Google Scholar

25 See, e.g., Luke 11:52; Arthur Bryant, The Age of Chivalry: The Atlantic Saga 501 (New York: New American Library, 1970), where he summarizes fourteenth-century English opinion: “Of all who enforced the lord's rights, the lawyer was the most hated.” The most often quoted statement, purporting to reflect fifteenth-century opinion, but presumed to state a contemporary sixteenth-century view is, “The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers.” William Shakespeare, II King Henry VI, act 4, sc. 2, line 73. Concerning the colonial period see Jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionary America 203–6 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), and Robert Detweiler, Ben Franklin's “Dirty Pettifoggers,” 59 A.B.A.J. 1165 (1973). On the other side of the coin, status and prestige of lawyers show little change over the years. See Tyree, Andrea & Smith, Billy G., Occupational Hierachy in the United States: 1789–1969, 56 Soc. Forces 881 (1978).Google Scholar

26 Andrew S. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 91, 105 (1968). See also James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers 249–52 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1950).Google Scholar

27 The classic work about ambivalence toward rulers, priests, and other authorities is James George Frazer, The New Golden Bough: A New Abridgment of the Classic Work, ed. Theodor H. Gaster (New York: Criterion Books, 1959).Google Scholar

28 See, e.g., Rufus Choate, The Position and Functions of the American Bar, address delivered before Harvard Law School, July 3, 1845, in Addresses and Orations of Rufus Choate 133–66 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1878).Google Scholar

29 See, e.g., Fred Rodell, Woe unto You, Lawyers! (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Pageant-Poseidon, 1972); Percival E. Jackson, Look at the Law: The Law Is What the Layman Makes It 254–88 (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1940).Google Scholar

30 See Curtis, Charles P., The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1951); James M. Beck, May It Please the Court 94–96 (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970). Compare Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1975).Google Scholar

31 Shaffer, Thomas L., Lawyers, Counselors, and Counselors at Law, 61 A.B.A.J. 854, 855 (1975).Google Scholar

32 Hubert J. O'Gorman, Lawyers and Matrimonial Cases: A Study of Informal Pressures in Private Professional Practice ch. 6 (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).Google Scholar

33 Id. at ch. 2.Google Scholar

34 Jonathan D. Casper, Lawyers Before the Warren Court: Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, 1957–66 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

35 Jerome E. Carlin, Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966); id., Lawyers on Their Own: A Study of Individual Practitioners in Chicago (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1962). See also Ladinsky, Jack, Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice, and Legal Institutions, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 47 (1963);Heinz, John P. & Laumann, Edward O., The Legal Profession: Client Interests, Professional Roles, and Social Hierarchies, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 1111 (1978).Google Scholar

36 See Donald D. Landon, Lawyers and Localities: The Interaction of Community Context and Professionalism, paper delivered at Annual Meeting of Law and Society Association, Amherst, Mass., 1981 (forthcoming in 1982 A.B.F. Res. J.); Richard S. Wells, The Legal Profession and Politics, 8 Midwest J. Political Sci. 166 (1964); Joel F. Handler, The Lawyer and His Community: The Practicing Bar in a Middle-sized City ch. 3 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967).Google Scholar

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38 The same pattern may be much more universal, extending to occupation- or aspiration-related typologies in general. See James A. Davis, Undergraduate Career Decisions: Correlates of Occupational Choice 221–26 (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965), and text below at sec. V. An earlier investigation of the relationship between values and career choice found the same configuration, identifying three relatively independent dimensions of value orientation: people-oriented, reward-oriented, and self-expressive or intrinsic reward orientation. Business and law careers were disproportionately high on “extrinsic reward” orientation. Morris Rosenberg, Occupations and Values (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957). A more recent study found a similar basic pattern of values, which is divided into people orientation, enterprise, and intellectualism. Ralph Underhill, Occupational Values and Post-College Career Change (dissertation, Dept. Sociology, University of Chicago, 1967). Underhill applied these clusters in a much more complex way across the 20 career choices studied. He found that while “high enterprise is also the single best predictor of choice for law, [p]eople orientation … is also a high predictor and it is in fact the combination of a high score on enterprise with a high score on people orientation which really predicts law.”Id. at 70. Contra, Davis, supra, who found that people orientation showed no relationship to law as a career choice. He found that freshmen who chose law were “set off from students in general by a high interest in making money and a low interest in originality.”Id. at 140. In this, law attracts high academic performers with an atypical value pattern. Id. at 152. These studies do not deal with the issue of how career choices, once made, affect values (emphasized by Caplow, supra note 23, for example).Google Scholar

39 Curran, supra note 24, at 265.Google Scholar

40 Missouri Bar Prentice-Hall Survey: A Motivational Study of Public Attitudes and Law Office Management (n.p.: Missouri Bar, 1963).Google Scholar

41 Curran also showed that the public's belief in lawyers' willingness to engage in unethical or illegal activities to help clients was not significantly affected by spectacular public events such as Watergate. Barbara A. Curran & Francis O. Spalding, The Legal Needs of the Public: Preliminary Report of a National Survey 96 (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1974); Curran, supra note 24, at 231–32.Google Scholar

42 For a description of respondent selection and other procedures followed, see Don A. Dillman, Mail and Telephone Surveys: The Total Design Method (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Wiley-Interscience, 1978); Robert M. Groves & Robert L. Kahn, Surveys by Telephone: A National Comparison with Personal Interviews (New York: Academic Press, 1979). The response rate was 70 percent, within the traditional range. For a description of population, see appendix A. Because of biases in our respondent selection process within households, the means for all quantitative variables were compared across the weighted and unweighted samples. In most cases the means were the same to the first decimal place, and none of the differences were significant at the .05 level. On this basis we have restricted our analysis to the unweighted sample.Google Scholar

43 Heinz, Compare John P. et al., Diversity, Representation, and Leadership in an Urban Bar: A First Report on a Survey of the Chicago Bar, 1976 A.B.F. Res. J. 717, 721 n. 3.Google Scholar

44 For analysis of response and description of population, see appendix B.Google Scholar

45 Comparison was by a two-tailed chi-square test. The tabulation shows the questions and the summarized answers provided by our public respondents, with the Curran results in parentheses.Google Scholar

46 See text at pp. 179–80 supra.Google Scholar

47 In addition, lawyers may tend to exaggerate the effect of critical mass-media depictions of lawyers and assume a “hypodermic effect,” i.e., that a given message will affect everyone in the same way. This assumption is contrary to recent research which emphasizes that viewers' responses are strongly affected by such factors as individual differences, social characteristics, and small-group influences. More important for our argument, the assumption does not explain why lawyers expect the public to overreact and to see unfavorable depictions of lawyers as convincing. Of course, television tends to overemphasize the dramatic, a characteristic it shares with movies, radio, and newspapers, as well as fiction, folk tales, myths, and ballads.Google Scholar

48 See appendix A below. This finding is consistent with the findings of other public surveys. In addition, most public respondents to our survey who had used lawyers described their lawyers as considerably better than lawyers in general. A client's tendency to particularize or distinguish his own lawyer from his picture of lawyers in general fits into the stereotype concept. An antilawyer person might stipulate that “some of my best friends are lawyers.”.Google Scholar

49 See Donald Byrne, Attitudes and Attraction, in Leonard Berkowitz, ed., 4 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 35–38 (New York: Academic Press, 1969).Google Scholar

50 Since lawyers have special professional values, what seems immoral to the client may not be such to the lawyer, including, for example, what is justified bluffing or false-carding and what is a lie. But beyond such simple situations is the sometimes complex issue of what is a justified legal fiction, understood by all to be saying something different from what it seems to, and what is a blatant fraud. And rather than a mere fiction that the client can be led to accept, our legal system often involves the lawyer's redefinition of a client's situation to fit the legal formulations seen as helpful to the client's interests. Kidder described this process as follows:. [T]he individual facts, which the client thinks of as intimately integrated into the justice of his position, must be sorted out, categorized, and constantly rearranged into alternative configurations. Many of the client's most basic assumptions about the relevance of events and facts will be shattered by the lawyer's decision to discard peripheral or legally irrelevant details. As this occurs, the client must tenderly be disabused of his sense of the inherent justness and coherence of his case. In place of his initial expectations, the client is asked to help create what to him appears as a twisted, dishonest, opportunistic deception which he is told is necessary for his success in court. To the client, the lawyer's actions seem designed to make them both accomplices in a prolonged lie. Kidder, Robert L., Formal Litigation and Professional Insecurity: Legal Entrepreneurship in South India, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 11, 26 (1974). See, in general, Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). Kidder refers to a litigation context. However, a similar wrenching of perspectives with a similar result may occur in tax planning or administrative matters. Compare Kenneth P. Fisher & Gail S. Humphreys, Costly Misconceptions of Law and Legal Services: The Small Business Owner vs. the Chicago Personal Property Tax, 1978 A.B.F. Res. J. 545. The writers report that clients perceived the tax reduction process as irregular and corrupt; and lawyers on the whole failed to disabuse their clients of this notion and tell them that the procedures were really routine and legitimate.Google Scholar

51 With regard to other lawyers this is what can be called cooperative competition—a regulated and restrained aggression with major cooperative elements. However, the regulation is often weak and the restraints may sometimes break down, particularly in urban settings. The other lawyer may also be invisible, hypothetical, or nonexistent.Google Scholar

52 See Newcomb, Theodore M., An Approach to the Study of Communicative Acts, 60 Psych. Rev. 393 (1953);McLeod, Jack M. & Chaffee, Steven H., Interpersonal Approaches to Communication Research, 16 Am. Behavioral Scientist 469 (1973).Google Scholar

53 See, e.g., Fisher & Humphreys, supra note 50.Google Scholar

54 Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory 370–85 (rev. ed. New York: Free Press, 1954).Google Scholar

55 Heinz & Laumann, supra note 35, at 1139.Google Scholar

56 Macaulay, Stewart, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 Law & Soc'y Rev. 115, 163 (1979).Google Scholar

57 David C. McClelland, Power: The Inner Experience 22 (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1975). This feeling becomes a rationale for role-centered morality in Charles Fried's The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale L.J. 1060 (1976) and it is also used by Curtis, supra note 30. See in general Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Human Rights 1 (1975), and Simon, William H., The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29, esp. 106–13.Google Scholar

58 Mindes, Marvin W., Proliferation, Specialization, and Certification: The Splitting of the Bar, 11 U. Tol. L. Rev. 273 (1980). The evidence presented here indicates that although it may bring economic benefits to some, this tactic is otherwise doomed to failure: the basic image structure of the bar is too strong and its roots too deep for voluntary divorce or separation to exempt any group from the general perspective. Also, the earlier depth lay interview subjects were asked whether they distinguished lawyer types in different specialties or looked for different personal characterstics in lawyers that they would hire for different purposes: almost no distinctions were elicited. An indication that lawyers too recognize this basic symbolic unity, despite their increasing cleavages and stratifications (see authorities cited in note 35 supra), is that their expressed concern with central issues of the justice system (which many have no contact with) is increasing sharply. Poll, Law: What's Important to Lawyers, 68 A.B.A.J. 38 (1982).Google Scholar

59 See Douglas E. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge? ch. 1 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1974); Mindes, Marvin W., Lawyer Specialty Certification: The Monopoly Game, 61 A.B.A.J. 42 (1975). Work on the legal profession follows a substantial tradition in the sociology of the professions. See, e.g., Caplow, supra note 23, and Eliot Freidson, The Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1970).Google Scholar

60 Compare Watson, supra note 26, at 113, 130.Google Scholar

61 Herbert H. Hyman, Interviewing in Social Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).Google Scholar

62 Lee J. Cronbach, Essentials of Psychological Testing 496 (3d ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1970).Google Scholar

63 Hyman, supra note 61, at 169, 184.Google Scholar

64 Id. at 182.Google Scholar

65 John Madge, The Tools of Social Science 272 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1965).Google Scholar

66 Robert L. Kahn & Charles F. Cannell, The Dynamics of Interviewing 144 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957).Google Scholar

67 Anne Anastasi, Psychological Testing (4th ed. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1976).Google Scholar

68 Jum C. Nunnally, Psychometric Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967).Google Scholar

69 Karl G. Joreskog & Dag Sorbohm, EFAP Two: Exploratory Factor Analysis Program (Chicago: National Educational Resources, Inc., 1978).Google Scholar

70 One adjective, informal, although most closely related to the Helper, did not load adequately on any factor and was dropped from subsequent analysis.Google Scholar

71 Karl G. Joreskog & Dag Sorbohm, LISREL Four: Analysis of Linear Structural Relationships by the Method of Maximum Likelihood (Chicago: National Educational Resources, Inc., 1978).Google Scholar

72 In this model, each adjective was preassigned, as indicated by the prior analysis, to a specific factor. This procedure set the loadings for an adjective on the other two factors at zero and left the covariance to be explained by the two elements mentioned in the text immediately preceding this footnote. See note 7 supra.Google Scholar

73 Covariance is a measure of to what extent two items or sets vary together. Covariances are a simpler measure of the interrelationships measured by correlations.Google Scholar

74 This shape shifting of the images is strongly reminiscent of the same quality of mythological figures. See Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968).Google Scholar

75 This model imposes a single factor structure on all sets of data and allows the interfactor variances to vary about a weighted mean of 1.00. The model shows weak loadings and particularly large variances for the Hero factor (rho = .92, chi-square = 659.29, with df = 506).Google Scholar

76 “Tricky” and “Helpful” as used in this portion of the text do not refer to the specific adjectives, but rather to the sums of characteristics that constitute the Trickster and Helper images. When used in this manner they are distinguished by initial capitals, in contrast to the actual variables, which are in italics.Google Scholar

77 The following are the results of reliability tests on combined scores in table 4 and the prolawyer attitude scales used in table 5 infra. Google Scholar

Reliability tests basically ask: do the items that are to be grouped together measure the same thing? They are a way of looking at the internal consistency of a measure, similar to looking at the average of the pair-wise correlations of the items it includes. This table shows the unity of most of the image groups to be moderately high, except for two of the Hero measures, which are only fair but usable as indicators. The prolawyer attitude scales have a satisfactory reliability, particularly considering that the statements go both ways, are diverse in specific content, and were not devised as an analytic scale.Google Scholar

78 See Cronbach, supra note 62, at 504, where he states:. A person who presents too perfect a picture of himself may be expressing his fear that others are critical and punitive, and that he can maintain their respect only by keeping his halo bright. Unless there is some obvious motive for deceit, the psychologist should suspect that the person who presents so perfect a facade on the test maintains a similar facade in all his social relations. The facade of perfect control and freedom from impulse is a brittle one and can be maintained only at considerable cost. This is consistent with the comments in Barry A. Goodfield, Do Lawyers Have Problems Being People? 5 Barrister 13 (Winter 1978).Google Scholar

79 E.g., a lawyer's self-description as a Hero had a .30 correlation (prob. <.001) with the number of hours he spent in legal practice each week, a much stronger correlation than any image had with other practice variables. The variability of responses to the Hero items, as measured by standard deviations, is also consistently low when compared across the four sets of data to the other images.Google Scholar

80 For reliability see note 77 supra.Google Scholar

81 Such disjuncture is assumed to be more characteristic of other cultures. See Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications, trans. Mark Sainsbury et al. (complete rev. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).Google Scholar

82 See note 41 supra.Google Scholar

83 See text at sec. IIIB supra.Google Scholar

84 See in general Kurt Lewin, Inter-Group Conflicts and Group Belongingness, in id., Resolving Social Conflicts: Selected Papers on Group Dynamics pt. 3, ed. Gertrud Weiss Lewin (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948); Louis Wirth, The Ghetto (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928); Kenneth B. Clark, The Pyschology of the Ghetto, in id., Dark Ghettos: Dilemmas of Social Power ch. 4 (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); Thomas F. Pettigrew, A Profile of the Negro American (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1964); Andrew M. Greeley, Why Can't They Be Like Us? America's White Ethnic Groups, esp. ch. 4, at 10–13 (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1975). In chapter 10, “Intellectuals as an Ethnic Group,” Greeley makes a comparison similar to that advanced in the text. See also Goffman, supra note 18, at ch. 4. Tricksters and Trickster-Heroes are particularly characteristic of minority folklore. See text at note 136 infra.Google Scholar

85 Park, Robert E., Human Migration and the Marginal Man, 33 Am. J. Soc. 881 (1928). The marginal man, according to Park, is particularly able to play the role of social innovator, since he has more freedom than others from limiting connections and can accept and develop new opportunities. He thus can “secularize relations which were formerly sacred.”Id. at 888. This conforms to an analysis of the centrality of the lawyer in the development of Renaissance Europe. See Bouwsma, William J., Lawyers and Early Modern Culture, 78 Am. Historical Rev. 303 (1973).Google Scholar

86 George A. Theodorson & Achilles G. Theodorson, A Modern Dictionary of Sociology, s.v. “marginal man” (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., Apollo Edition, 1969). One critical difference, of course, between the position of the bar and the traditional minority position is that established lawyers have a higher class and status than the general population, and the lawyer in his professional role usually asserts a superior position. Thus there is an ameliorating vertical distance in addition to a horizontal difference in the lawyer-lay relationship. Younger lawyers and others who have not achieved success may be more vulnerable to the characteristics of exaggerated mistrust and self-hatred than others. Carlin's two studies, supra note 35, support this thesis.Google Scholar

87 When Doctor Faustus asked why Lucifer wanted his soul, Mephostophilis replied, “To the unhappy, it is a comfort to have companions in misfortune.” Christopher Marlowe, Doctor Faustus, scene 5, lines 38–42.Google Scholar

88 Heinz & Laumann, supra note 35.Google Scholar

89 See Daniel L. Huebner, Scapegoating the Attorney, a Displacement of Marital Anguish, 9 J. Contemp. Psychotherapy 112–15 (1977). One authoritative and generally favorable book on the English and American bars describes acting the role of scapegoat as a valuable service that lawyers render to corporate executives and other clients. Quintin Johnstone & Dan Hopson, Jr., Lawyers and Their Work: An Analysis of the Legal Profession in the United States and England (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1967).Google Scholar

90 See What Bothers Lawyers, 67 A.B.A.J. 1450 (1981).Google Scholar

91 Missouri Bar Study, supra note 40, at 66.Google Scholar

92 Id.Google Scholar

93 Id. at 67.Google Scholar

94 Id. at 66.Google Scholar

95 Id. at 67.Google Scholar

96 Id. at 68.Google Scholar

97 Hosticka, Carl J., We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care About What Is Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 Soc. Prob. 599 (1979).Google Scholar

98 Id. at 604.Google Scholar

99 Id. at 606; compare Brenda Danet, Hoffmann, Kenneth B., & Kermish, Nicole C., Obstacles to the Study of Lawyer-Client Interaction: The Biography of a Failure, 14 Law & Soc'y Rev. 905 (1980).Google Scholar

100 See Reed, John P., The Lawyer-Client: A Managed Relationship, 12 Acad. Management J. 67 (March 1969).Google Scholar

101 See Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Lawyers and Their Society: A Comparative Study of the Legal Profession in Germany and in the United States 67, 112 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973). This is commonly linked with the market distribution of legal services. See, e.g., K. N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Law and Its Study 144 (New York: Oceana Publications, 1951). Compare, however, Frances X. Sutton et al., The American Business Creed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), which describes a viewpoint having strong resemblances to that examined in this article. On the other hand, there are some indications of increased business dissatisfaction with the outlook and practices of the corporate bar. See, e.g., Milton R. Wessel, The Rule of Reason: A New Approach to Corporate Litigation (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1976).Google Scholar

102 An articulated version of this professional phenomenon is found in F. W. Hanley & F. Grunberg, Reflections on the Doctor-Patient Relationship, Canadian Med. A.J., June 2, 1962, at 1022, reprinted in Professionalization 203, ed. Howard M. Vollmer & Donald L. Mills (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).Google Scholar

103 See Wasserstrom, supra note 57; Simon, supra note 57, at 53–59; Noonan, John T. Jr., Professional Ethics or Professional Responsibility? review of Freedman, supra note 30, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 363 (1977);Luban, David, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 454.Google Scholar

104 See authorities, note 59 supra.Google Scholar

105 Compare Hosticka, supra note 97.Google Scholar

106 See Aaron V. Cicourel, Basic and Normative Rules in the Negotiation of Status and Role: The Ethnomethodological Paradigm, in Recent Sociology No. 2: Patterns of Communicative Behavior 4, ed. Hans Peter Dreitzel (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1970); Rosenthal, supra note 59. However, the lawyer's special perspective may affect the direction of his influence even when he is subordinate. Thus Donnell found that while corporate executives agreed with the idea that house counsel should to some extent be the keepers of the corporate conscience and encourage their employers to adhere to higher moral standards, few lawyers agreed with this and some rejected it completely. John D. Donnell, The Corporate Counsel: A Role Study 82–84, 208 item 5 (Bloomington: Bureau of Business Research, Graduate School of Business, Indiana University, 1970).Google Scholar

107 See generally Landon, supra note 36; Kidder, supra note 50, at 16.Google Scholar

108 Talcott Parsons, Social Structure and Personality ch. 2 (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).Google Scholar

109 Plato, Phaedrus 237d-238e.Google Scholar

110 See Gary Watson, Free Agency, 72 J. Philosophy 205 (1975).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

111 The problem of implementation of Helper behavior in the law is discussed briefly at p. 228 infra.Google Scholar

112 Cf. Reich, Steven, California Psychological Inventory: Profile of a Sample of First Year Law Students, 39 Psychol. Rep. 871 (1976).Google Scholar

113 Robert Ezra Park, Society 18 (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955).Google Scholar

114 Klapp, Orrin E., Hero Worship in America, 14 Am. Soc. Rev. 53 (1949).Google Scholar

115 See Robert Jay Lifton, Protean Man, in id., History and Human Survival ch. 15 (New York: Random House, 1970). Many of the other characteristics and problems of lawyers discussed in this article are also widespread, at least in our culture, but are peculiarly aggravated by the lawyers' professional patterns.Google Scholar

116 See Morris Rosenberg, Conceiving the Self (New York: Basic Books, 1979).Google Scholar

117 Id. at 61–62.Google Scholar

118 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethics in the Practice of Law 80 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978).Google Scholar

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120 Hurst, supra note 26.Google Scholar

121 For almost all lawyers, such focus on the dramatic court encounter is largely Walter Mitty-like dream work rather a description of occupational reality. Lawyers may be clearer on the image than the public is, although the public agrees generally. See Missouri Bar Study, supra note 40, at 36. Even psychologists, in their law-related research, focus primarily on the criminal trial process. Loh, Wallace D., Psycholegal Research: Past and Present, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 659, 678 (1981). The criminal defense image, even though largely mythic rather than descriptive of most criminal proceedings, is specially compelling. This image becomes particularly troublesome when points founded on the dramatic mythology of the role are generalized to other lawyer activities; and the image interferes with rational examination of the rules applicable to lawyer conduct in such other areas. See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 30, and Freedman, supra note 30.Google Scholar

122 See generally Kenneth E. Boulding, The Power of Nonconflict, 33 J. Soc. Issues 22 (No. 1, 1977); James T. Tedeschi, Gerald G. Gaes, & Alba N. Rivera, Aggression and the Use of Coercive Power, 33 J. Soc. Issues 101 (No. 1, 1977); Thomas W. Milburn, The Nature of Threat, 33 J. Soc. Issues 126 (No. 1, 1977). The focus on threat fits the discussion, in the text following note 83, of the lawyer's normal paranoia. In discussing reactions to a paranoid individual, Lemert summarizes as follows: “His size, physical strength, cunning, and anecdotes of his outrages are exaggerated, with a central thematic emphasis on the fact that he is dangerous.” Edwin M. Lemert, Paranoia and the Dynamics of Exclusion, in Earl Rubington & Martin S. Weinberg, eds., Deviance: The Interactionist Perspective: Text and Readings in the Sociology of Deviance 106, 113 (2d ed. New York: Macmillan Co., 1973). Compare Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, in id., The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays 3 (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1967).Google Scholar

123 See Milburn, supra note 122, at 135–36.Google Scholar

124 Frankel, supra note 119, at ch. 4, The Adversary Judge.Google Scholar

125 Quoted in Griswold, Erwin N., In Praise of Bar Examinations, 60 A.B.A.J. 81, 82 (1974).Google Scholar

126 Quoted in id.Google Scholar

127 See Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), esp. ch. 7, Conflict—The Unifier, at 121–37; Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Structure of the Group, m id., Conflict, trans. Kurt H. Wolff [and] The Web of Group-Affiliations, trans. Reinhard Bendix, with foreword by Everett C. Hughes, at 87 (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).Google Scholar

128 See Missouri Bar Study, supra note 40, at 93–105; Richard Rockwell, A Study of the Law and the Poor in Cambridge, Massachusetts (Cambridge, Mass.: Community Legal Assistance Office, 1968); Messerman, Robert H., The Image of Lawyers and the Legal Profession as Perceived by Undergraduate Business Law Students, 10 Bus. L. Rev. 21 (Spring 1977). Compare Curran, supra note 24, at 234–39, and Sarat, Austin, Studying American Legal Culture: A Review of Survey Evidence, 11 Law & Soc'y Rev. 427, 437 (1977).Google Scholar

129 See Mindes, supra note 58.Google Scholar

130 See Macaulay, supra note 56, at 163; Brakel, Samuel Jan, Legal Aid in Mental Hospitals, 1981 A.B.F. Res. J. 21.Google Scholar

131 See generally W. Lloyd Warner, The Living and the Dead: A Study of the Symbolic Life of Americans (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959); McClelland, supra note 57; Parsons, supra note 108.Google Scholar

132 This refers, consonant with the context of this study, to the dominant Western culture subsequent to the Hellenic and Talmudic advents. The specific form and full universality of the nuclear family on a broader basis are unclear. See George Peter Murdock, The Common Denominator of Cultures, in Ralph Linton, ed., The Science of Man in the World Crisis 123, 141 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945); Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Family, in Ino Rossi, et al., eds., Anthropology Full Circle 300 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977). In general, any analysis drawing as this article does on evidence from many disciplines, is bound to tread on specialized academic toes and seem to deal cavalierly with issues that are the subject of fervent contention among the specialists. But looking at things in a larger context often gives a different meaning to specialized data.Google Scholar

133 Robin Fox, The Red Lamp of Incest: What the Taboo Can Tell Us About Who We Are and How We Got That Way (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1980).Google Scholar

134 See Campbell, supra note 74.Google Scholar

135 See Erich Neumann, The Great Mother: An Analysis of the Archetype, trans. Ralph Mannheim (2d ed. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972); Robert Graves, The White Goddess: A Historic Grammar of Poetic Myth (New York: Creative Age Press, 1948).Google Scholar

136 See, e.g., Paul Radin, The Trickster: A Study in American Indian Mythology (new ed. New York: Schocken Books, 1972); Joseph L. Henderson, Ancient Myths and Modern Man, in Carl G. Jung, ed., Man and His Symbols (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1969); Norman O. Brown, Hermes the Thief: The Evolution of a Myth (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1947); Jan de Vries, The Problem of Loki, 43 Folklore Fellows Communications, No. 110 (1933).Google Scholar

137 See David Bakan, The Duality of Human Existence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971); Jeffrey Burton Russell, The Devil: Perceptions of Evil from Antiquity to Primitive Christianity (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977); Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).Google Scholar

138 See Alan C. Filley, Personal Styles of Conflict Resolution, in id., Interpersonal Conflict Resolution (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresfhan & Co., 1975), and authorities cited therein; Richard W. Wallen, The Three Types of Executive Personality, Dun's Rev. and Mod. Industry, Feb. 1963, at 54. This version of our image pattern coincides with Donnell's empirically derived classification of corporate house counsel. Donnell identifies three polarized resolutions of house counsels' dilemmas, corresponding to Trickster, Hero, and Helper, respectively: the lawyer's lawyer, who is detached, independent, and evasive when asked for substantive recommendations; the lawyer-executive, who directly uses power and authority and feels he should be a corporate policeman; and the ministering lawyer, the passive adviser who gives emotional support. Donnell, supra note 106, at 111–17. One such service-oriented professional “compared himself to the old-time general practitioner in medicine whose bedside manner and demonstrated concern for the patient were his most important stock-in-trade.”Id. at 116.Google Scholar

139 Klapp, supra note 9.Google Scholar

140 Compare Simon, supra note 57, and Bouwsma, supra note 85. See also Richard Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism in American Life (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1966). Lévi-Strauss writes of the “true feeling of repulsion which most societies have toward bachelorhood.”Supra note 132, at 305.Google Scholar

141 Riesman, supra note 21, at 456.Google Scholar

142 Rosenkrantz, Paul et al., Sex-Role Stereotypes and Self-Concepts in College Students, 32 J. Consulting & Clinical Psych. 287 (1968). See also Inge K. Broverman et al., Sex-Role Stereotypes: A Current Appraisal, 28 J. Soc. Issues 59 (No. 2, 1972). Compare Burke, Peter J. & Tully, Judy C., The Measurement of Role Identity, 55 Soc. Forces 881 (1977).Google Scholar

143 See McClelland, supra note 57, at 186–92; Heinz L. Ansbacher & Rowena R. Ansbacher, eds., The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler: A Systematic Presentation in Selections from His Writings ch. 2 (New York: Basic Books, 1956).Google Scholar

144 Aristotle's Poetics 52, trans. S. H. Butcher, with introductory essay by Francis Fergusson (New York: Hill & Wang, Dramabooks, 1961).Google Scholar

145 See C. M. Bowra, The Heroic Outlook, in id., The Greek Experience (New York: New American Library, Mentor Books, 1959); Philip E. Slater, The Glory of Hera: Greek Mythology and the Greek Family (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).Google Scholar

146 See Klapp, Orrin E., The Clever Hero, 67 J. Am. Folklore 21 (1954).Google Scholar

147 See Donald D. O'Dowd & David C. Beardslee, College Student Images of a Selected Group of Professions and Occupations (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University, 1960). Compare Davis, supra note 38. Consistent with Reich, supra note 112, lawyers may combine inward caution with public risk taking.Google Scholar

148 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 136, at 78–79.Google Scholar

149 See authorities cited in note 137 supra.Google Scholar

150 Compare Smith, Alexander B. & Niederhoffer, Arthur, The Psychology of Power: Hubris v. Chutzpa in the Criminal Court, 19 Crime & Delinquency 406 (1973).Google Scholar

151 Shakespeare, supra note 25.Google Scholar

152 American Bar Association, Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Discussion Draft) (Chicago: American Bar Association, Jan. 30, 1980); id., Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Proposed Final Draft) (Chicago: American Bar Association, May 30, 1981). See generally Review Symposium: Model Rules of Professional Conduct, ed. James Lindgren, 1980 A.B.F. Res. J. 921.Google Scholar

153 See Laumann, Edward O. & Heinz, John P., Specialization and Prestige in the Legal Profession: The Structure of Deference, 1977 A.B.F. Res. J. 155. The general issue is dealt with in a recent article under the concept of “role purity.”Abbott, Andrew, Status and Status Strain in the Professions, 86 Am. J. Soc. 819 (1981). Abbott looks at “purity” from the theoretical perspective as dealing with the degree of intellectual abstraction and ability to ignore nonprofessional problems. From the point of view of this article he defines a special Hero perspective as representing status, and then proceeds to conflate two types of impurity or disorder, the dangerous and the interpersonal, which correspond roughly to the Trickster and Helper positions. This seems to be a distortion of empirical reality when applied to the legal profession, particularly since conflict, ambiguity, and disorder tend to be positively valued by lawyers as compared to other groups. See, e.g., Donnell, supra note 106, at ch. 5. The nature of the actual division probably depends on what professional cluster or grouping is being looked at. The prediction based on the examination in this article is that while lawyers have a national culture that differs substantially from other professions', the specific value configuration represented will differ somewhat from subgroup to subgroup within the bar.Google Scholar

154 See McClelland, supra note 57, at 18. This figure appears in a number of subcultural mother stereotypes. Social work, juvenile institutions, schools, psychiatry, and welfare programs have been attacked as barely disguised control programs. These attacks heightened as an ideological offshoot of the Great Society era. See, e.g., Frances Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: Random House, Vintage Boks, 1972); Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); Ivan D. Illich, Dechooling Society, ed. Ruth Anshen (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); Thomas S. Szasz, The Manufacture of Madness: A Comparative Study of the Inquisition and the Mental Health Movement (New York: Harper & Row, 1970). The controlling helper image, as a pejorative, has been more recently used in assaults on the professions generally, including law and medicine. See, e.g., Ivan Illich et al., Disabling Professions (London: Marion Boyars Publishers, 1977). Compare Rosenthal, supra note 59, and Freidson, supra note 59.Google Scholar

155 The win-lose assumptions can be questioned. Compare Paul Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice 88–90 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), distinguishing “authority in fact” (based on mutual dependence), which is just, and “authority in principle” (by definition or position), which is unjust. Authority based on the division of labor and situationally valuable expertise is rationally inescapable. Moreover, the lawyer himself needs autonomy and, like anyone rendering a service, may need some degree of control over the service relationship and arena in order to function. Accord, Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 11 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1959).Google Scholar

156 Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.Google Scholar

157 Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.Google Scholar