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Reprise on Manhart

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

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Extract

In early 1979 I expressed the view that the Supreme Court, in City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, erred in a fundamental way and that if the decision continued to stand, it should at least be confined as narrowly as possible to minimize the damage it did. Subsequently, four of my University of Chicago colleagues have taken me to task, alleging error in my interpretation of the governing statutes and failure to give adequate consideration to the accumulating demographic learning relevant to the subject matter. I remain unpersuaded. With slight modifications induced by their discussion of the demographic literature, I continue to stand on my original analysis. But their statement was careful and ambitious and deserves the compliment of an explicit effort to refute at least its major points.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 1980 

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References

1 435 U.S. 702 (1978).Google Scholar

2 Kimball, Spencer L., Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 1979 A.B.F. Res. J. 83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Brilmayer, Lea, Richard W. Hekeler, Douglas Laycock, & Teresa A. Sullivan, Sex Discrimination in Employer-sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 505 (1980).Google Scholar

4 Id. at 508.Google Scholar

5 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).Google Scholar

6 Brilmayer et al., supra note 3, at 510.Google Scholar

7 E.g., see id. at 528, 534.Google Scholar

8 Burger, C.J., made this point in his dissent in Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 727–28 (1978).Google Scholar

9 Brilmayer et al., supra note 3, at 512.Google Scholar

11 Id. at 512–13.Google Scholar

12 Kimball, supra note 2, at 105–6 n.54.Google Scholar

13 E.g., see Brilmayer et al., supra note 3, at 524.Google Scholar

14 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976).Google Scholar

15 E.g., see Edwin W. Patterson, Legal Protection of Private Pension Expectations (Home-wood, III.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1960).Google Scholar

16 Kimball, supra note 2, at 113.Google Scholar

17 Brilmayer et al., supra note 3, at 540 n.175.Google Scholar

18 Kimball, supra note 2, at 108.Google Scholar

19 Brilmayer et al. seem to suggest that stability over a century would be necessary. Supra note 3, at 558. That is far longer than necessary. They seem to be confusing annuities with life insurance, but even there, there are devices available to make more recent mortality data available, at least in participating policies.Google Scholar

20 Id. at 529.Google Scholar