1 Halliday, Terence C. & Cappell, Charles L., Indicators of Democracy in Professional Associations: Elite Recruitment, Turnover, and Decision Making in a Metropolitan Bar Association, 1979 A.B.F. Res. J. 697.Google Scholar

2 Corinne Lathrop Gilb, Hidden Hierarchies: The Professions and Government at ch. 4 (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).Google Scholar

3 For an indication of bar association involvement in programs for judicial change between 1970 and 1980, see the results of a national survey of bar associations reported in Terence C. Halliday, Lawyers, Legislatures, and Legal Rationalization in the United States, 1970–80, a paper read to the annual meeting of the Law and Society Association, 1983.Google Scholar

4 For current empirical evaluations of the extent to which state and major metropolitan associations engage in enforcement of professional ethics and the control of unauthorized practice, see the results of two national surveys: Rhode, Deborah L., Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1981); and Terence C. Halliday, Professions and the Limits of the Monopoly Motif, paper read to the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, September, 1983.Google Scholar

5 Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis ch. 2, 49–52 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).Google Scholar

6 Bucher, Rue, & Strauss, Anselm, Professions in Process, 66 Am. J. Soc. 325 (1961).Google Scholar

7 Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).Google Scholar

8 Larson, supra note 5, at 177.Google Scholar

9 For a discussion of legalism as the ideology of the American bar, see Judith N. Shklar, Legalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).Google Scholar

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11 Larson, supra note 5, at 175.Google Scholar

12 Auerbach, supra note 7.Google Scholar

13 Id. atch.4.Google Scholar

14 Id. at 229.Google Scholar

15 Albert P. Melone, Lawyers, Public Policy and interest Group Politics (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977).Google Scholar

16 Id. atchs. 2, 3.Google Scholar

17 Id. at 79–80.Google Scholar

18 Id. at 211.Google Scholar

19 Id. at 201.Google Scholar

20 The original data sets, comprising the biographies of CBA leaders, the collation of documentary materials on legislative issues (committee reports, correspondence, and transcripts), and the coding of 200 leadership debates on legislation, were collected and supervised by Terence Halliday in the early stages of the Chicago Bar Project. Additional data on clients of CBA leaders and a further coding of the legislative issues was directed by Charles Cappell. We also relied on data collected from a random survey of 777 Chicago attorneys, John P. Heinz & Edward O. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar (New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1982).Google Scholar

21 Halliday & Cappell, supra note 1.Google Scholar

22 Auerbach, supra note 7, at ch. 4.Google Scholar

23 Melone, supra note 15, at ch. 4.Google Scholar

24 Charles L. Cappell, Professional Projects and the Private Production of Law ch. 2 (Ph.D. Diss., University of Chicago, 1982).Google Scholar

25 By exact breakdown the upper-status group included 34 of the board with lawyer fathers, 25 with fathers who worked in the other professions or in technical fields, 33 with fathers who were managers or executives.Google Scholar

26 The four schools were combined in one category rather than two categories that distinguished the two Catholic schools from the two non-Catholic ones for the following reasons: the small sample size limits the number of cells we can include in the table; in a separate analysis that made such a distinction, background effects on attendance at DePaul-Loyola versus Kent-Marshall were small.Google Scholar

27 Goodman, Leo A., The Analysis of Systems of Qualitative Variables When Some of the Variables Are Unobservable. Part I—A Modified Latent Structure Approach, 79 Am. J. Soc. 1179. (1974); id., Exploratory Latent Structure Analysis Using Both Identifiable and Unidentifiable Models, 61 Biometrika 215 (1974).Google Scholar

28 Ladinsky, Jack, Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice, and Legal Institutions, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 47 (1963); Jerome E. Carlin, Lawyers on Their Own: A Study of Individual Practitioners in Chicago (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1962); Erwin O. Smigel, The Wall Street Lawyer: Professional Organization Man? (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969).Google Scholar

29 Heinz & Laumann, Legal Profession, supra note 10.Google Scholar

30 All these models were estimated using an algorithm made available by Clifford Clogg, Unrestricted and Restricted Maximum Likelihood Latent Structure Analysis: A Manual for Users (University Park: Population Research Office, Pennsylvania State University, 1977).Google Scholar

31 The basic set of parameters to be estimated in the three-class model contains 23 parameters. The rank of the matrix of partial derivatives of the estimated manifest probabilities with respect to the basic set equals 22. By restricting the parameter p ₄₁ ^AX=0 (a terminal estimate obtained in the unrestricted model), the ranks of the two matrices are equal, and the model is locally identified. This restriction decreases the degrees of freedom from 17 to 16. See Clogg, supra note 30, and Goodman, Exploratory Latent Structure Analysis, supra note 27, for details.Google Scholar

32 Robert T. Swaine, The Cravath Firm and Its Predecessors, 1819–1947, 2 vols. (New York: privately printed at Ad Press, 1946–48).Google Scholar

33 Latent structure analysis produces probabilities for a respondent being in each of the three latent classes given a certain profile of the manifest variables. The modal conditional probability is the largest of these three values. The technique estimates these probabilities so that all the observed association among the manifest variables would disappear were there such a latent variable in the analysis. By assigning an individual to the latent class with the highest conditional probability of membership, we are able to actually create this theoretical variable. Take, e.g., those individuals whose parents were U.S. born, who themselves were Chicago born, whose fathers were professionals, and who attended the University of Chicago. Given this constellation of factors, latent structure analysis estimates that such an individual has a probability equal to .7882 of being a member of the local aristocracy, latent class 2 (see table 1). This is the largest conditional probability for any of the three classes. Table 1 shows that 6 board members actually possessed this set of characteristics. Latent structure analysis estimated that .7882 of these 6 individuals belong to latent class 2. If we classify all these board members into latent class 2, we would misclassify (1 - .7882), or .2118 of the individuals with such joint attributes; in this case approximately 1.27 persons would be misclassified. We can compute the estimated total number and percent of misclassifications by repeating this procedure. For the three-class latent model with the estimated modal conditional probabilities as given in table 1, we would correctly allocate 80.56% of the board members. This reasonably high value indicates that our latent variable, status class, can stand as a statistically reliable proxy for the pattern of association between the four background variables, and that little distortion is created by actually assigning members to classes on the basis of the largest estimated conditional probability. (Compare the estimated theoretical proportions reported at the bottom of table 2 to the actual proportions produced reported in table 3.).Google Scholar

34 Halliday & Cappell, supra note 1, at 740–44.Google Scholar

35 Powell, Michael, Anatomy of a Counter-Bar Association: The Chicago Council of Lawyers, 1979 A.B.F. Res. J. 501, 538.Google Scholar

36 The size distributions of Chicago law firms at 5-year intervals beginning with 1955 were obtained from the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory. Any board member who was employed by one of the largest 15 law firms identified at each 5-year interval and who served on the board during the 5-year period was considered employed by one of the largest firms in Chicago.Google Scholar

37 Halliday & Cappell, supra note 1, at 735–40.Google Scholar

38 A client profile was constructed for every Chicago law firm having a partner or associate on the CBA Board of Managers from 1965 to 1974. Using information obtained from the sources cited below, we compiled a list of each law firm's publicly reported clients. Each client was then classified in 1 of 23 industrial categories by its principal product or activity as reported in Standard and Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives. Each law firm was assigned a score of 0 or 1 for each of the industries, indicating the presence or absence of a client tie. Finally every individual board member was assigned a score for each industry based on the affiliation of his firm or on the board member's status as house counsel. Sources included: The Becker Guide, published annually since 1965 with varying title, e.g., The A.G. Becker Guide to Publicly Held Corporations in the Chicago Area, 1966 Edition (Chicago: A.G. Becker & Co., 1966), and The Becker Guide to Publicly Held Corporations in the Chicago Area 1974–75 (10th ed. Chicago: A. G. Becker & Co., 1974); Spencer Phelps Harris, ed., The Legal Connection: Corporations and Law Firms (Menlo Park, Cal.: Data Financial Press, 1979); Outside Counsel: Inside Director: Lawyers on the Boards of American Industry (New York: Law Journal Press, 1973, 1974): Outside Counsel: Inside Director: The Directory of Lawyers on the Boards of American Industry (New York: Law Journal Press, 1977; Law Journal Seminars-Press, 1979); Standard and Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives, 3 vols. (New York: Standard & Poor's Corporation, published annually since 1928).Google Scholar

39 Soref, Michael, Social Class and a Division of Labor Within the Corporate Elite: A Note on Class, Interlocking, and Executive Committee Membership of Directors of U.S. Industrial Firms, 17 Soc. Q. 360 (1976).Google Scholar

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41 Dye, Thomas, DeClercq, Eugene, & Pickering, John, Concentration, Specialization, and Interlocking Among Institutional Elites, 54 Soc. Sci. Q. 8, 20, 26 (1973).Google Scholar

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45 Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 409–27 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973).Google Scholar

46 Powell, supra note 35, at 532, 533, 540. Table 1 reported that 60% of the CCL leaders attended an elite law school (the only local school in that category being the University of Chicago); table 2 reported that CCL members were predominantly employed in firms of more than 30 lawyers; table 3 reported that CCL members were practicing law for business and professional clients; table 4 reported that Jewish lawyers and those with no religious preference were overrepresented in the CCL while Catholic lawyers were underrepresented.Google Scholar

47 Auerbach, supra note 7, at ch. 8.Google Scholar

48 Halliday, Terence C., The Idiom of Legalism in Bar Politics: Lawyers, McCarthyism, and the Civil Rights Era, 1982 A.B.F. Res. J. 911, indicates that even the Chicago Bar Association, which has received much criticism over its stance during the Cold War, may have had a considerably more complex and elaborate orientation to the abrogation of individual rights than Auerbach and other critics have allowed. While some bar association leaders and committees did reflect the temper of the times, others like the Civil Rights Committee strenuously sought to check the excesses of Congress and the Illinois legislature.Google Scholar

49 Auerbach, supra note 7, at 233.Google Scholar

50 In re George Anastaplo 18 Ill. 2d 182, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954), 348 U.S. 946 (1955), 163 N.E.2d 429 (1960), 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Auerbach, supra note 5, at 251–53; Herman Kogan, The First Century, The Chicago Bar Association 1874–1974, at 229–31 (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1974).Google Scholar

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53 Committees of the Chicago Bar Association (as revised and constituted 1956–1957), 38 Chi. B. Rec. 129, 134 (1956). Descriptions and duties of CBA's various committees are published regularly in Chicago Bar Record.Google Scholar

54 Christensen, Barlow F., The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors—or Even Good Sense? 1980 ABF Res. J. 159.Google Scholar

55 Id. at 162–65.Google Scholar

56 Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Kellogg, 338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N.E.2d 519 (1949). The full opinion of the court appeared in 31 Chi. B. Rec. 73 (1949).Google Scholar

57 Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Trademark Service Corp., 31 Chi. B. Rec. 85 (1949) (committee refers in its annual report to its recommendation that CBA file a bill of complaint against Trademark Service); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Stevens, 40 Chi. B. Rec. 500, 501 (1959) (committee comments on in its annual report).Google Scholar

58 Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Clausen, mentioned in Report of the Committee on Unauthorized Practice, 34 Chi. B. Rec. 54, 88 (1952); id., 40 Chi. B. Rec. 500, 501 (1959).Google Scholar

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60 Chicago Bar Ass'n v. United Taxpayers of America, 312 Ill. App. 243 (1941), commented on in 28 Chi. B. Rec. 117 (1946).Google Scholar

61 Statement of Committee on Unauthorized Practice in Opposition to H.R. 1601, 84th Congress, and Similar Legislation, CBA Board of Managers Transcripts file no. 55–93, May 9, 1955.Google Scholar

62 Id.Google Scholar

63 Annual Report of the Committee on Unauthorized Practice, 42 Chi. B. Rec. 502 (1961).Google Scholar

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69 From the results of the survey of the Chicago bar, it was estimated that the value of the average conditional probability at which the cluster of legal specialists containing personal injury plaintiff attorneys linked with the cluster of practitioners containing personal injury defense attorneys was below. 10. In contrast, personal injury plaintiff attorneys linked with divorce attorneys at a value near .60. Laumann & Heinz, Organization of Lawyers' Work, supra note 10, at 236 fig. 1.Google Scholar

70 Laumann & Heinz, Specialization and Prestige, supra note 10, at 184–85, 169–71 table 2.Google Scholar

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74 Id.Google Scholar

75 Report of the Committee on Personal Injury Practice Re Proposed Legislation to Prohibit Solicitation of Legal Business Arising out of Personal Injury or Death, CBA Board of Managers Transcripts, file no. 54–75, June 14, 1954.Google Scholar

76 Id.Google Scholar

77 Report of Legislative Committee Re Proposal to Prohibit Solicitation of Legal Business, CBA Board of Managers Transcripts, file no. 56–87, Sept. 13, 1956.Google Scholar

78 Id., Aug. 6, 1956.Google Scholar

79 Id., Dec. 27, 1956.Google Scholar

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86 Milton L. Rakove, Don't Make No Waves—Don't Back No Losers: An Insider's Analysis of the Daley Machine 225, 227 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975).Google Scholar

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