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2 Nils Christie, Limits to Pain 13–18 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1981; Oxford: Martin Robertson & Co., 1982).Google Scholar

3 Walker, supra note 1, at viii.Google Scholar

4 Id. at 23.Google Scholar

5 Id. at 35, 55, 67, 90.Google Scholar

6 Christie, supra note 2, at 35.Google Scholar

7 Id. at 10–11.Google Scholar

8 Walker, supra note 1, at 117.Google Scholar

9 Christie, supra note 2, at 39, 45.Google Scholar

10 Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions ix (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).Google Scholar

11 Christie, supra note 2, at 5.Google Scholar

12 Id. at 90.Google Scholar

13 Id. at 112–13, 109.Google Scholar

14 Id. at 15–16.Google Scholar

15 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in 1 The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. John Bowring, 1, 83 (Edinburgh: William Tait, [1838]).Google Scholar

16 Hart, Herbert L. A., Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England and the United States, 52 Nw. U.L. Rev., 433, 447 (1957).Google Scholar

17 Christie, supra note 2, at 25, 28. Christie, unlike Walker (see below), does not deal separately with incapacitation or prevention as a justification for punishment, merely referring to it briefly in his chapter “Treatment of Crime” and noting that “study after study” has “documented” the vague usage of the concept of dangerousness, difficulties in regard to prediction, and “the usual lack of treatment success.”Id. at 25–26.Google Scholar

18 Id. at 29, 31, 33.Google Scholar

19 Id. at 52, 45, 28, 46–47.Google Scholar

20 Id. at 36.Google Scholar

21 Id. at 19, 5.Google Scholar

22 Id. at 11.Google Scholar

23 Id. at 105.Google Scholar

24 Id. at 73–74.Google Scholar

25 Id. at 75–80, 90.Google Scholar

26 Id. at 81–91.Google Scholar

27 Id. at 115, 92–98, 113.Google Scholar

28 Id. at 100–105.Google Scholar

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30 Christie, supra note 2, at 102–4.Google Scholar

31 Id. at 6.Google Scholar

32 Id. at 18–19.Google Scholar

33 Id. at 48.Google Scholar

34 Id. at 15.Google Scholar

35 Id. at 5.Google Scholar

36 2 James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 107 (London: Macmillan, 1883; New York: Burt Franklin, n.d.).Google Scholar

37 Courtney Stanhope Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law 2 (13th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929).Google Scholar

38 Christie, supra note 2, at 6.Google Scholar

39 Id. at 105–9.Google Scholar

40 Evelyn Ruggles-Brise, The English Prison System 3 (London: Macmillan, 1921). Ruggles-Brise was chairman of the British Prison Commission for over a quarter of a century, president of the International Prison Commission, and a notable penal reformer.Google Scholar

41 Christie, supra note 2, at 115.Google Scholar

42 Id. at dust jacket, 111.Google Scholar

43 Id. at 113.Google Scholar

44 Walker, supra note 1, at viii.Google Scholar

45 Id. at 65.Google Scholar

46 Id. at 189.Google Scholar

47 Id. at 166, 10, 188, viii.Google Scholar

48 Jan Morris, The Oxford Book of Oxford 330, 331 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).Google Scholar

49 Walker, supra note 1, at 46–64, esp. 63, 64, 55.Google Scholar

50 Id. at 36.Google Scholar

51 Id. at 65–87, esp. 76–80, 79. A curious thing may be noted here. In making the point that although “[it] is usual to distinguish ‘general’ from ‘individual’ (or ‘special’) deterrence,” they are essentially “attempts to do the same thing,” Walker adds that the difference between them “is surely exaggerated by Zimring and Hawkins.”Id. at 68 & n.5. This is curious because precisely the point that there is no significant difference was first made in Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon J. Hawkins, Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control 72–74 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).Google Scholar

52 Walker, supra note 1, at 26–27, 190.Google Scholar

53 Id. at 24. He mentions this in connection with the committee whose work was reported in Andrew Von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments: Report of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration (New York: Hill & Wang, 1976).Google Scholar

54 Walker, supra note 1, at 25–26 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

55 Id. at 26, 38–40, 190.Google Scholar

56 Id. at 38–45.Google Scholar

57 Id. at 28–30, 44.Google Scholar

58 Id. at 88–113.Google Scholar

59 Id. at 23. The book also contains chapters dealing with four topics relevant to the main subject but not discussed in this review. The topics are: the justification of the inclusion of a type of conduct in the criminal law; the justifications for reducing or increasing sentences in the light of mitigating or aggravating circumstances; the stigmatic effects of being found guilty and sentenced by a criminal court; and prisoners' rights.Google Scholar

60 Id. at 30, 32.Google Scholar

61 Id. at viii, 30.Google Scholar

62 Id. at 30.Google Scholar

63 Nigel Walker, Behaviour and Misbehaviour: Explanations and Non-explanations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell & Mott, 1977).Google Scholar

64 Walker, supra note 1, at 189.Google Scholar

65 Id. at viii.Google Scholar

66 Frederick Exley, A Fan's Notes: A Fictional Memoir 30 (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).Google Scholar

67 Conrad, John P., What the Doers Think, 1 Prison Service J. 23 (1960); id., Crime and Its Correction: An International Survey of Attitudes and Practices 3–5 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).Google Scholar

68 Christie, supra note 2, at 48.Google Scholar

69 The description of those beliefs given here is based largely on many years of intimate acquaintance and discussion with ordinary citizens. I am encouraged in this by the fact that in nominating “the feature of sentencing policy which offenders themselves most resent,” Walker says, “I base this on regular discussions over more than ten years with mixed classes of prisoners and university students.” Walker, supra note 1, at 127 &n. 14.Google Scholar

70 F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies 27 (2d ed. rev. London: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1927).Google Scholar

71 Walker, supra note 1, at 50.Google Scholar

72 Id. at 190.Google Scholar

73 Id. at 39.Google Scholar

74 See essays by Mabbott, Armstrong, Baier, and Mundle, in H. B. Acton, ed., The Philosophy of Punishment (London: Macmillan, 1969), and by Feinberg, infra note 80.Google Scholar

75 Walker, supra note 1, at 43.Google Scholar

76 K. G. Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits Back, in Acton, supra note 74, at 138, 14).Google Scholar

77 Id. at 155–56.Google Scholar

78 Walker, supra note 1, at 38.Google Scholar

79 Id. at 40.Google Scholar

80 Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 55, 56 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970).Google Scholar

81 Id. at 81.Google Scholar

82 Walker, supra note 1, at 190.Google Scholar

83 Id. at 20.Google Scholar

84 Lionel W. Fox, The English Prison and Borstal Systems 131, 133 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952).Google Scholar

85 Bruno Salmiala, Contribution to discussion of The Purpose of Punishment, reported in Yearbook of the Northern Association of Criminalists (1947-48), cited in Fox, supra note 83, at 131.Google Scholar

86 Margery Fry, Arms of the Law 21 (London: Victor Gollancz, 1951).Google Scholar

87 C. W. K. Mundle, Postcript (1968), appended to id., Punishment and Desert, in Acton, supra note 76, at 65, 81. Thomas Nagel, incidentally, writes of retribution as one of those “primitive moral sentiments” with which such considerations as decency, humanity, and compassion “have to compete.” Nagel, supra note 10, at xii-xiii.Google Scholar