To many seventeenth century observers, the political role of towns in the English Civil War was clear enough. Clarendon, for example, referred to the “great towns and corporations, where besides the natural malignity, the factious lecturers and emissaries from the Parliament had poisoned the affections.” Thomas Hobbes was even more specific: “The City of London and other great towns of trade, having in admiration the prosperity of the Low Countries after they had revolted from their monarch the king of Spain were inclined to think that the like change of government here would to them produce the like prosperity.” In similar fashion, the anonymous author of the 1648 tract Persecutio Undecima saw the commercial interests of the urban areas, especially London, as one of the significant factors in the calling of the Long Parliament and the subsequent outbreak of war.

British historians have long recognized the activities of Robert Harley in the field of political propaganda. J.M. Price, for example, writes that, “as lord treasurer and as a politician /Harley was/ not unmindful of the power of the press.” P. M. Handover concurs: “The minister who most skillfully exploited printed propaganda was Robert Harley.” J.O. Richards adds that “no politician had a larger coterie of writers than Harley.” W.T. Morgan and Laurence Hanson are still more emphatic: the former suggests that Harley had a “clearer conception than any other statesman of the period of the important part of the press might be made to play in politics;” the latter, that Harley “was one of the first politicians to realize how vital was a good press to the prestige of government.” Yet, despite this general agreement, there remains a dearth of concrete facts about Harley's use of political propaganda.

The role of party in the first half of George III's reign has proved a topic of constant interest to historians. The subject has been examined from a variety of angles, not the least important of which is the relationship between party development and public opinion. Much of the explanation of party development has centered on the House of Commons, and a few attempts have been made to integrate the House of Lords into the story. Less effort has been made, however, to ascertain what, if any, role the upper house played in partisan attempts at influencing public opinion. This essay is an attempt to show how the opposition peers of this period took advantage of one of the privileges of their house, the right of written dissent, in a conscious effort to influence a wider audience, and to demonstrate how this contributed to the growth of party.

In late 1912 British domestic social politics were dominated by the noisy dispute between David Lloyd George and the British Medical Association over the details of the national health insurance act. Led by the B.M.A., doctors bitterly opposed the insurance scheme and threatened to boycott panel medical service. The profession's inept political maneuvers and the skillful gamemanship of Lloyd George have been well documented by Bentley Gilbert, as well as Alfred Cox and William Braithwaite, two participants in the controversy. Yet, the story of the medical profession's relationship with the insurance act remains unfinished. Almost nothing is known about what followed the political collapse of the B.M.A. after medical benefit became a reality in January 1913. The post-January period, however, was nearly as tumultuous as 1912, and certainly more important to the efficient working of the insurance act which was for the next thirty-five years to provide health care to Britain's laboring poor. This essay will examine the conditions and politics of medical practice during the initial year of national health insurance in Britain.