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William Pitt and the Generals: Three Case Studies in the Seven Years‘ War1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 July 2014

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Extract

British historians agree that from 1756 to 1761 William Pitt was the driving force behind England's victories in the Seven Years' War. Historians are divided, however, in their assessment of Pitt's relations with his generals. Basil Williams concisely stated one position when he linked success with Pitt's “wise choice of commanders on land and sea.” Julian S. Corbett best represents the opposite opinion. “It is commonplace,” he observed, “to credit him [Pitt] with a remarkable talent for choosing commanders. Yet surely no great War Minister ever appointed so many bad ones.”

The lines for debate are clear, and the question is vital for a general interpretation of Pitt's career and England's role in the war. Surprisingly, modern students of the elder Pitt have uncritically followed the opinion represented by Williams, and they have disregarded Eric McDermott's call in 1955 for a fresh examination of the “Great Commoner” and civil-military relations during the war. This essay deals with the question by telling the story of three English military operations on the French coast in 1757 and 1758. They are important in themselves for what they reveal about military planning and execution. More important, the story supports Corbett's conclusion by shedding light on the relationship between Pitt in London and the commanders in the field.

Pitt came to power when the country's military fortunes were at their lowest point. General Braddock's defeat in western Pennsylvania and the loss of Minorca, the Royal Navy's best base in the Mediterranean, punctuated the pre-war hostilities with France. At home, the armed services were undermanned, and abroad the search for allies left England with Prussia to face the combined forces of France, Austria and Russia.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © North American Conference on British Studies 1971

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Footnotes

1

An earlier version of this essay was read at the annual meeting of the Conference of British Studies, Pacific Northwest Section, at Portland State University, Portland, Oregon, March 6, 1971.

References

NOTES

2 Williams, Basil, The Whig Supremacy, 1714-1760 (2nd ed., Oxford, 1962), p. 358.Google Scholar

3 Corbett, Julian Strafford, England in the Seven Year's War. A Study in Combined Strategy (2 vols., London and elsewhere, 1907), I, 376.Google Scholar

4 McDermott, Eric S.J., “The Elder Pitt and His Admirals and Generals, a paper presented at the Joint Session of the American Military Institute and the American Historical Association at the annual meeting of the AHA, 29 December 1955, Washington, D.C., printed in Military Affairs, 20 (1956): 6568.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 For sound analyses of England's strategic problems, see Pares, Richard, “American versus Continental Warfare, 1739-63,” English Historical Review, 51 (1936): 429–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Richmond, Herbert William, Statemen and Sea Power (Oxford, 1946), pp. 123–40.Google Scholar

6 For the concept of an “expedition” see the six essays by the anonymous author, “Germano Britannicus,” PRO [Public Record Office, London], Papers of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (30/8/—), 30/8/85, Pt. 2, fols. 256-75.

7 George II to Mordaunt, 5 August 1757, PRO 30/8/85, Pt. 1, fols. 13-17, and George II to Hawke (with covering letter from Pitt), 5 August 1757, secret; in Great Britain, Department of State, Army, The Report of the General Officers Appointed … to Inquire into the Causes of the Failure of the Late Expedition to the Coast of France. … With an Appendix Containing the Papers Referred to in the Said Report. … (London, 1758), pp. 73–76, 8081.Google Scholar

8 The expenditions were “major” because of their important mission and because the services sent between fifteen and twenty per cent of their total forces to the French coast. The army provided about 8,460 men for the first raid, 9,400 for the second and 10,925 for the third. The navy contributed 11,600, 10,700 and 4,405 seamen, respectively.

9 The king apparently selected the commanders. See Ligonier to Pitt, 9 July, 1757, PRO 30/8/48, fol. 100.

10 For Pitt's efforts to maintain close control, see the orders in note 7 and Pitt to Admiralty, Pitt to Secretary of War, Pitt to Marlborough, and George II to Marlborough, all 20 May 1758, SP [Shelbume Papers, Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan] 37:8-11; see also, George II to Bligh, 18 July 1758, PRO 30/8/85, Pt. 1, fols. 64-70.

11 Pitt to Hawke and Mordaunt, 15 September 1757, Report, pp. 98-99

12 “A Council of War held on Board His Majesty's Ship Neptune at Anchor off the Isle of Aix, September 25, 1757,” PRO 30/8/78, Pt. 1, fols. 90-92.

13 William Petty (1737-1805), Lord Shelburne, afterwards 1st Marquis of Lansdowne, was an officer in the 20th Regiment of Foot at Rochefort. He summed up the problem in these terms: “An army individually never likes fighting, and when there is a loophole for it very qiuckly adopts the opinion collectively,” (autobiographical fragment in Petty-Fitzmaurice, Edmond George, 1st Fitzmaurice, Baron, Life of William Earl of Shelburne … [2nd ed., 2 vols., London, 1912], I, 74Google Scholar).

14 The French were astonished that the English had left without destroying more. One of the defenders at Rochefort wrote, “in truth … we got off well,” (Dubalt to Morin, 20 February 1758, PRO 30/8/85, Pt. 1, fols. 48-51).

15 “Paper signed by the General Officers, 11 May 1758,” Add. MS. [Additional Manuscript, British Museum, London] 32,988, fol. 39.

16 Ibid.

17 Ligonier to (Germain?), 12 January 1758, Germain Papers [Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan]. The king also used his prerogative in dismissing Mordaunt, Gonway and Cornwallis from his staff.

18 Important sources for the operation on 5-11 June are: Marlborough to Pitt, 11 June (with post script of 12 June) 1758, SP 37:38; Howe to Pitt, 12 June 1758, SP 37:40; untitled MS., 1 July 1758. PRO 30/8/78, Pt. 2, fols. 159-62; and Porter, John, “An Account by an Eye-Witness of the Expedition against St. Malo in May and June, 1758,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 58 (June, 1914): 755–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also, Binet, H., “La défense des cotes de Bretagne au XVIIIe siècle. Etudes et documents. Ve sèrie: les descentes sur les côtes de la Manche en 1758,” 5 Pt., Revue de Bretagne, n.s. 47 (1912): 236–53, 304–311, 352–58Google Scholar; and 48 (1912): 5-23, 80-93.

19 Pitt to Marlborough, and Pitt to Howe, 21 June 1758, SP 37:46, 48; Marlborough to Pitt, Howe to Pitt, 24 June 1758, SP 37:55-56; Howe, Richard, “Provisions wanting …,” SP 3757Google Scholar; Pitt to Marlborough, Pitt to Howe, 23 June 1758, SP 37:51-52; Pitt to Marlborough, 26-27 June 1758, SP 37:61.

20 Untitled MS., 1 July 1758, PRO 30/8/78, Pt. 2, fols. 162-63; Marlborough to Pitt, and Howe to Pitt 30 June 1758, SP 37:63-4.

21 Carswell, John and Dralle, Lewis Arnold (eds.), The Political Journal of George Bubb Doddington, (Oxford, 1965), p. 373Google Scholar; Fitzmaurice, , Life of Shelburne, I, 75.Google Scholar

22 Marlborough died of dysentery, 20 October 1758, at Munster. Sackville was accused of failing to obey orders in the Battle of Minden, 1 August 1759, and on 10 September he was dismissed from the service. On 5 April 1760 he was found guilty as accused and barred from further military service to the Crown.

23 Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 July 1758, Add. MS. 32,881, fol. 329.

24 Beatson, Robert, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain from 1727 to 1783 (2nd ed., 6 vols., London, 1804), II, 173–74.Google Scholar

25 Minute of Cabinet, 17 July 1758, SP 37:92. Sources for the operation are: Bligh to Pitt, 7 August 1758, SP 37:113; Howe to Pitt, 8 August 1758, SP 37:114; “Narrative of the Second Attack on Cherbourg,” enclosed in MacDowell to Sackville, 16 August 1758, and Irwine to Sackville, 21 September 1758, in Great Britain, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on the Mauscripts of Mrs. Stopford-Sackville, of Drayton House, Northamptonshire (2 vols., London, 19041910), I, 293301Google Scholar; Bligh to Pitt, 15 August 1758, SP 37:120.

26 Howe to Pitt, 16, 19 August, and 1 September 1758, SP 37:123, 125, 134.

27 Howe to Pitt, 7 September 1758, and Bligh to Pitt, 8 September 1758, SP 37; 141-42.

28 Bligh to Pitt, 8 September 1758, SP 37:142.

29 For a detailed study of the French movements against Bligh, see Loyer, Pierre, “La défense des côtes de Bretagne pendant la Guerre de Sept Ans: la battaille de Saint-Cast,” 2 Pts., La review maritime, n.s., No. 156 (December, 1932): 721–39Google Scholar, and No. 157 (January, 1933): 75-98; and “Le combat de St. Cast an Diocese de Brieue en Bretagne le 11e Septr 1758,” PRO State Papers 87/31, fols. 19-22 (a copy of the French commander's official account of the French movements from 5 through 11 September 1758).

30 A unique first-hand account of the British action on September 11 is William Tryon to unknown (Charles Hotham or Henry Clinton?), 12 September 1758, on board the Richard and Ann Transport in St. Cast Bay, Clinton Papers [Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan]Google ScholarPubMed. Other primary reports of the action are Howe to Pitt, 12 September 1758, and Bligh to Pitt, 13 September 1758, SP 37: 145-46. For the British loses, see the reports, 11 and 12 September 1758, in SP 37:145, 151.

31 Pitt to Newcastle, 17 September 1758, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 18 September 1758, and Newcastle to Yorke, 19 September 1758, Add. MS. 32,884, fols. 23, 79, 61.

32 Ligonier to Pitt, 18 September 1758, PRO 30/8/48, fol. 126.