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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 July 2014
One of the most dramatic events of the entire Civil War occurred on May 5, 1646, when the English King unceremoniously appeared in the camp of the Covenanting army. Although not unexpected, despite Scottish protestations to the contrary, this bold move could conceivably have transformed the war's character. That it had so little impact on the final outcome resulted not from the high hopes of the participants, Scots, Royalists, and French, but from inadequate planning and the failure to realistically anticipate consequences. Before very long the recognition that Charles' flight to the Scots was a massive blunder for all those involved became embarrassingly evident. The King was to be held virtual prisoner by the Covenanters, yet the Scots would gain little from their prize possession. How it came about that these two parties participated in such an act of desperation is the subject of this essay.
The Covenanters' willingness in 1646 to resort to extreme measures resulted from the recognition that their position in England had seriously deteriorated. They had originally intervened in the Civil War on the side of Parliament because they feared that a triumph for Royalism would provide the King with another chance to impose a settlement on Scotland. It was hoped in Edinburgh that the favorable resolution of the conflict, which their highly regarded army was sure to bring, would allow the Scots to shape the terms of the peace, and ultimately to play a permanent role in English affairs. Of great importance to the Kirk was the establishment in England of a Presbyterian church similar to their own model. Here too, Scottish ministers, with their greater experience, would exert an ongoing influence in England.
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