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British Social Policy and the Second World War
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 July 2014
Extract
Writing just before the outbreak of the Second World War, Joseph Schumpeter remarked that English socialism, in contrast to European socialism, was at bottom an ethical creed. For socialist intellectuals, the Fabians for instance, there was no difference between slums and the House of Lords. Both were bad things and ought to be eliminated. I do not suggest that by the time Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy was published in 1942 this was by any means a new idea. The briefest survey of the speeches or writings of George Lansbury or James Keir Hardie, not to mention those of the Webbs and Bernard Shaw, would show the same attitude. They dwelt less in terms of the people's need than of the people's rights. By and large, they talked not of what could be done, but of what should be done. Accordingly, they sneered at the social legislation of the New Liberalism as a plaster bandage which did nothing to heal the working man's wounds, but made them hurt less. They saw clearly that national insurance and old age pensions were prompted less by recognition of the moral imperative behind the public welfare than by fear on the part of the nation's rulers of a politically aroused working class which might effect a parliamentary revolution through the agency of the Labour party, or, indeed, after the war, a violent revolution
The only criticism that need be made of Schumpeter's analysis of the extent of the permeation of English socialism is that he did not see by the end of the 1930s how far it had gone. My own research suggests that by the time of the outbreak of the second World War, socialism — or social justice in the sense that the physical and economic welfare of the ordinary citizen was the unquestioned responsibility of the state — had become the creed of the ordinary English citizen. He took for granted that it was society's business to support him when unemployed and that in old age the state should provide him with a pension. Sidney Webb's national minimum had become part of the ethical furniture of the mind of the working man.
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- Copyright © North American Conference on British Studies 1971
References
NOTES
* This paper was presented at the Conference on British Studies session at the meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association on August 27, 1971. It derives from research for the last volume of the writer's history of British welfare institutions, the “British Social Service State.”
1 See for instance: Abrams, Philip, “The failure of Social Reform, 1918-1920,” Past and Present, No. 24 (April, 1963), 43–64.Google Scholar
2 This is manifest in the sour, popular response to an early war poster, quickly withdrawn, in which the British population was exhorted to stand up to the Germans. “Your courage … will bring us victory.” Harrisson, Tom, War Begins at Home (London, 1940), 96–100.Google Scholar
Mass Observation was founded in 1937 and first came to public attention through a comprehensive sociological dissection, on Lynd methodology, of Bolton, called “Worktown.” During the war it maintained a national panel of about 1500 respondents whom it regularly questioned on morale and popular attitudes while producing also special reports through interviews and eavesdropping on conversations in crowds. Its methods, in effect, combined those now used by Nielson and Lubell.
3 On the Tories, see for instance: Harrisson, Tom, “The House of Uncommons,” New Statesman and Nation, July 22, 1939.Google Scholar
4 See for instance: the paperback pamphlet, “Mass Murder or Planned Protection,” June 5, 1939. This was a demand for the government to provide huge public shelters for the entire working class population.
5 For the classic and hilarious statement of the slogan, “I have no doubt the war will be won, but it will be won without me,” see: Waugh, Evelyn, Put out More Flags (London, 1942).Google Scholar
6 Harrisson, , War, 173.Google Scholar
7 Charles, , Moran, Baron, Churchill, The Struggle for Survival (Boston, 1966), 13, 265.Google Scholar
8 The Times, July 1, 1940.
9 Calder, Angus, The People's War: Britain 1939-1945 (New York, 1969), 138–9.Google Scholar
10 Mass Observation, “Social Security and Parliament,” Political Quarterly, XIV (July-September, 1943), 252.Google Scholar
11 Harrisson, Tom, “The House of Common Sense,” New Statesman and Nation, April 12, 1941.Google Scholar
12 Bullock, Alan, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin (London, 1967), II, 2–5.Google Scholar
13 For example of Bevin's thinking, see his speech in the House of Commons on the conscription of women: House of Commons Debates, CCCLXXVI (December 4, 1941), cols. 1329-48Google Scholar; on the Bill, Catering Wages, see H. of C. Deb., CCCLXXXV (February 9, 1943), cols. 1201-11Google Scholar; speech at Southport, October 9, 1940, on Trade Unions and the War; his statemnet on old age pensions, New Statesmen and Nation, December 21, 1940.
14 Report of the Chief Medical Officer of the Ministry of Health, 1939-45 (London, 1946)Google Scholar. This astonishing fact became apparent even during the blitz. PEP, Planning, Health in Wartime, No. 170 (April 29, 1941).Google ScholarPubMed
15 Cole, G. D. H., “Before Dawn,” New Statesman and Nation, May 17, 1941.Google Scholar
16 Harrisson, Tom, “Human Planning,” New Statesman and Nation, September 27, 1941Google Scholar; Anon., “The Silent Revolution,” New Statesman and Nation, February 14, 1942Google Scholar; Harrisson, Tom, “The Implications of Grantham,” New Statesman and Nation, April 4, 1942Google Scholar; Mass Observation, “Social Security and Parliament,” Political Quarterly, XIV (July-September, 1943), 245–55.Google Scholar
17 In the summer of 1942 even Churchill's popularity fell for the first time below 80%. However, the rise and fall in the popular response to the question, “In general, do you approve or disapprove of Mr. Churchill as Prime Minister?” reflects almost entirely the success of British arms in the struggle against the Nazis. The treatment of Beveridge by the Coalition Cabinet appears to have had no effect on the public's approval of the Prime Minister.
Although public opinion clearly favored Labour as a party over the Conservatives only Tom Harrisson of Mass Observation, among political commentators, flatly predicted that Labour would win in the next election. (Harrisson, Tom, “Who Will Win?,” Political Quarterly, XV (January-March, 1944), 23.Google Scholar) Harrisson reports that after making this prediction at a research meeting he received a series of communications from Labour journalists demanding explanations.
18 British Institute of Public Opinion, “The Beveridge Report and the Public,” n.d. [February, 1943]Google Scholar; Beveridge Papers, Bundle 20, “Letters on Beveridge Report and visit to the U.S.A.,” 1943, Library of the London School of Economics.
19 Mass Observation noted a sense of relief, like a religious conversion. People reported a weight lifted from the mind, being able to sleep, etc. Mass Observation, “Social Security and Parliament,” Political Quarterly, XIV (July-September, 1943), 247–52.Google Scholar
20 In October, 1944, when the government White Paper on National Insurance, the Coalition's answer to Beveridge, was finally published accompanied by a blast of publicity the B.I.P.O. discovered that although a majority had heard of the paper 55% of the sample knew nothing about the document or were unable to answer any questions on it and only 20% could make detailed comments on it. Cantril, Hadley, ed., Public Opinion, 1935-1946 (Princeton, 1951), 362.Google Scholar
Eight months later when the Coalition was dissolved only 7% of a B.I.P.O. sample expected social security to be an election issue and after the election a very small proportion of Labour votes, 9%, maintained that Labour policies in any field were their reason for choosing that party. Only 8% of Liberal voters gave Beveridge as a reason for their voting decision. Ibid., 196-8.
21 The apparent revival of concern for public welfare among Members of Parliament did nothing to change the popular attitude toward politicians, who continued to be regarded as selfish or indolent or at best putting party above country. Only about a third of a B.I.P.O. sample questioned in August, 1944, believed that British politicians had their country at heart. 35% felt that politicians served only themselves and 22% felt they were chiefly for the party. Further questioning indicated that just 31% believed that there was any difference between the parties in this regard. Cantril, , ed., Opinion, 574Google Scholar. By way of comparison it should be mentioned that in June, 1944, only 5.8% or respondents in a Fortune Poll in the United States felt that their Congressman was doing a “poor job.” Cantril, , ed., Opinion, 133.Google Scholar
22 A B.I.P.O. poll taken two weeks after the debate on the Beveridge Report showed, as might have been expected, that a substantial proportion of the population, 47%, was dissatisfied with the government's response. But more surprising was the fact that 29% approved of the government's attitude and 24% did not even know what it was. Cantril, , ed., Opinion, 361.Google Scholar
A rough indication of the rapidly declining public concern with the report may be shown by the diminishing number of references under the heading, “Reconstruction, Social, Beveridge Report,” in the Index to The Times.
23 This phenomenon has appeared again most recently in a national debate over Britain's entrance into the Common Market. Between August and October. 1971, well before the critical vote in the House of Commons, public interest in the question died away even though political leadership was still preoccupied with it. While there has been no evidence that popular opinion approves the association with Europe, the public clearly regards it as a settled question, with the result that M.P.s attempting to poll their constituencies have been unable to get ballots returned and pressure groups trying to mobilize crowds for demonstrations could persuade no one to turn out. See: The Economist's lead article “It's Not Over Yet,” September 25, 1971.