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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 July 2014
Between 1927 and 1932, the policy-making elite of the British Government was presented with a difficult problem. Postwar attempts to explain the origins of the First World War had resulted in the belief that arms production and competition had largely been responsible for instigating the conflict. Such a view became accepted by the general public in Britain. Specifically, the pre-1914 naval competition between Germany and Great Britain was thought to be one of the key events that had contributed directly to the outbreak of the war. Such fears concerning naval armaments were touted by peace activists as having been instrumental in assuring the success of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–22. Yet, this simple explanation does not adequately illustrate the intricate and complex connections that were made between naval armaments and other issues related to Britain's international affairs. Rather than the simple possession of naval arms, British leaders feared that other pressing issues would lead to a re-occurrence of hostilities. Questions concerning world oil supplies, reparations, war debts, tariffs, the value of the pound and the gold standard, and, particularly, belligerent rights and freedom of the seas, were all viewed as having the potential to generate another international conflict. Thus, the existence of armaments themselves was not Britain's primary security problem from the perspective of the policy-making elite. Rather, their common cause was how to protect Britain's position as the center of a world economic system. Safeguarding Britain's own stable position as a focus that provided leadership for the rest of the world was seen as the logical step to ensuring global stability. In order to create an atmosphere of goodwill and security that was necessary to prevent volatile issues from exploding, the British governing elite treated naval arms talks and naval armaments as a form of currency in the realm of international relations.
1 Classic works on the British political and policy-making elite are Chaput, Rolland A., Disarmament in British Foreign Policy (London, 1935)Google Scholar; Steiner, Zara, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 1969)Google Scholar; idem., “Elitism and Foreign Policy: The Foreign Office Before the Great War,” in Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895–1939, eds. B. J. C. McKercher and D. J. Moss (Edmonton, 1984), pp. 19–56; Dilks, David, “The British Foreign Office Between the Wars,” in McKercher, and Moss, , Shadow and Substance, pp. 181–202Google Scholar; Watt, D. C., Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (South Bend, 1965)Google Scholar.
2 See for instance, Lukowitz, David, “British Pacifists and Appeasement: The Peace Pledge Union,” Journal of Contemporary History (January 1974): 115–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Barker, Rachel, Conscience, Government and War: Conscientious Objection in Britain, 1939–45 (London, 1982)Google Scholar; Thompson, J. A., “Lord Cecil and the Pacifists in the League of Nations Union,” Historical Journal 20 (1977): 949–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Birn, Donald S., “The League of Nations Union and Collective Security,” Journal of Contemporary History (July 1974): 178–201Google Scholar.
3 Interwar British diplomacy concerning naval affairs must always be linked to imperial defence and the attempt to maintain Britain's position as a preeminent world power. See, e.g., Ferris, John R., “The Symbol and the Substance of Seapower: Great Britain, the United States and the One-Power Standard, 1919–1921,” in Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s: The Struggle for Supremacy ed. McKercher, B. J. C. (London, 1991), pp. 55–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar and idem., “‘The Greatest Power on Earth’: Great Britain in the 1920s,” The International History Review 13 (November 1991): 726–50; McKercher, B. J. C., “Belligerent Rights in 1927–1929: Foreign Policy Versus Naval Policy in the Second Baldwin Government,” The Historical Journal 29 (1986): 963–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and French, David, The British Way in Warfare, 1688–2000 (London, 1990)Google Scholar.
4 About the tension between Britain and other nations over these issues, see “British Financial Crisis: Its Effects on Financial Situation in the United States,” 2 November 1931, Foreign Office Archives (FO), 371/15128/6428/41, Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, London; Wheeler-Bennett, John W. and Latimer, Hugh, Information on the Reparation Settlement (London, 1930)Google Scholar; Dayer, Roberta A., “Anglo-American Monetary Policy and Rivalry in Europe and the Far East, 1919–1931,” in McKercher, , Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s, pp. 158–86Google Scholar: Venn, Fionna, “A Futile Paper Chase: Anglo-American Relations and Middle East Oil, 1918–1934,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 1 (1990): 164–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Veatch, Arthur C., “Oil, Great Britain and the United States,” Foreign Affairs 9 (1931): 665–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Salter, Arthur, “England's Dilemma: Free Trade or Protection,” Foreign Affairs 10 (1932): 189–201CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Aldcroft, Derek H., The Inter-War Economy: Britain, 1919–1939 (London, 1970)Google Scholar; Glynn, Sean and Oxborrow, John, Interwar Britain: A Social and Economic History (Plymouth, 1976)Google Scholar; and Kennedy, Greg C., “The 1930 London Naval Conference and Anglo-American Maritime Strength, 1927–1930,” in Arms Limitation and Disarmament, ed. McKercher, B. J. C. (Westport, 1992), pp. 149–72Google Scholar. For negative accounts of the British struggle to retain Great Power status, see Barnett, Correlli, The Collapse of British Power (London, 1972)Google Scholar and Kennedy, Paul M., The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (London, 1988)Google Scholar; idem., The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (New York, 1976).
5 See Barry D. Hunt, “Of Bits and Bridles: Sea Power and Arms Controls Prior to World War II,” an unpublished paper given at the Naval Arms Limitations and Maritime Security Conference, Halifax, Nova Scotia, June 1990.
6 Anderson, David G., “British Rearmament and the ‘Merchants of Death,’” Journal of Contemporary History 29 (1994): 5–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7 John R. Ferris, “Power, Culture and Strategy: The Rise and Fall of British Power, 1815–1940,” an unpublished paper given at the Second International Strategy Conference, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Feb.7–9 1991, pp. 33–34; This statement is supported by Cecil, Viscount, “Facing the World Disarmament Conference,” Foreign Affairs 10 (1931): 13–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar; SirChamberlain, Austen, “The Permanent Basis of British Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 9 (1931): 535–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Kerr, Philip, “Navies and Peace: A British View,” Foreign Affairs 8 (1929): 20–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The question of individual desires for peace versus realities of power is also one of the themes in the collection of essays edited by Chatfield, Charles and van den Dungen, Peter, Peace Movements and Political Cultures (Knoxville, 1988)Google Scholar.
8 For an introduction to some of the men thought to have been influential and supportive of the peace movement's goals see Ceadel, Martin, Pacifism in Britain 1914–1945: the Defining of the Faith (Oxford, 1980)Google Scholar; Hinton, James, Protests and Visions: Peace Politics in Twentieth-Century Britain (London, 1989): 75–133Google Scholar; Berkman, Joyce, “Pacifism in England, 1914–1939” (Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University, 1967)Google Scholar.
9 Captain (RN)Dewar, Alfred C., “The Road to Rearmament,” Brassey's Naval Annual, 1937 (hereafter cited as Brassey's), p. 69Google Scholar.
10 Kyba, Patrick, Covenants Without the Sword: Public Opinion and British Defence Policy, 1931–1935 (Waterloo, Ontario, 1986), p. 11Google Scholar. It is important to note that Locarno was not an arms limitation agreement. It was a security arrangement that was a crucial antecedent to the establishment of the Disarmament Preparatory Commission.
11 Thompson, J. A., “Lord Cecil and the Pacifists in the League of Nations Union,” pp. 949–59Google Scholar.
12 See, Fanning, Richard W., “The Geneva Naval Conference of 1927: Disarmament in the 1920s and 1930s” (Ph.D. Thesis, Indiana University, 1988), pp. 23–30Google Scholar, idem., “The Coolidge Conference of 1927: Disarmament in Disarray,” in McKereher, Arms Limitation and Disarmament, pp. 105–28.
13 Watt, Donald Cameron, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900–1975 (London, 1984), pp. 50–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
14 For the purposes of this study Imperial defence is that policy which has as its primary objective the defence of Britain's vital global trade routes. “The Interdependence of Home Defence and Commerce Protection,” pp. 190–96 and “The Interdependence of Home Defence and Trade Defence,” pp. 196–203, both in Brassey's, 1939. See also Ferris, John R., Men, Money, and Diplomacy: The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919–1926 (Ithaca, 1989)Google Scholar.
15 Embassy communication, American Embassy in London to U.S. Secretary of State Stimson, describing discussion with member of FO head of American Department, Robert Craigie, May 24, 1929, Herbert Hoover Presidential Papers (hereafter cited as HHPP) 998, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, IA.
16 Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, was Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and British Delegate to the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, until his resignation in August 1927. He was also one of the founding members of the League of Nations Union.
17 It was at once apparent that there was a wide divergence of principle between the naval and military sides: Cap). Alfred C. Dewar, “The Road to Rearmament,” and Rear-Admiral (RN), H. G. Thursfield, “Fifteen Years of Naval Treaty-Making,” pp. 71–83, Brassey's, 1937; and CID Papers, CD? Paper 998-B, “Historical Survey of the Negotiations Since the War for the Limitation of Naval Armament,” June 1930, P.R.O., Kew, London, CAB 4/18.
18 “The public in England were looking forward to some alleviation from the burden of expenditure on the Fighting Services through the medium of the International discussions on the limitation of armaments...” Lord Salisbury (Lord Privy Seal), CID Minutes, 224th meeting, April 4, 1927, CAB (Cabinet Archives, PRO) 2/5, p. 2.
19 Ibid. The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference was to prepare the “mechanics of a disarmament convention so that the Conference to be called eventually would have only to come to agreement upon the figures to be inserted in the framework of the convention thus drafted.” See Chaput, , Disarmament in British Foreign Policy, p. 134Google Scholar.
20 CID Minutes, 224th meeting, CAB 2/5, April 4, 1927, p. 3–4.
21 Ibid, p. 4. Lord Salisbury thought: “There were, of course, very good reasons why we should refuse to accept such a principle, but it might be impolitic to take such a course, having regard to public opinion in Europe generally, and more particularly in England.” p. 2.
22 Ibid, p. 6.
23 Kyba, , Covenants Without the Sword, p. 19Google Scholar.
24 Lynch, Cecelia, “A Matter of Controversy: The Peace Movement and British Arms Policy in the Interwar Period,” in McKercher, , Arms Limitation and Disarmament, ch. 4, p. 70Google Scholar.
25 Memorandum by SirChamberlain, Austen, September 7/1927, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939 (hereafter cited as DBFP) Series IA, Vol. IV, No. 202, pp. 357–58Google Scholar. It is worth noting that women, and their positions and influence regarding the subject of disarmament, were taken into serious consideration by both Cecil and members of the Foreign Office. Telegram from Mr. London to SirChamberlain, A., April 6, 1927, DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, No. 120, pp. 191–92Google Scholar. Memorandum by Mr.Lampson, Locker, November 21, 1927, DBFP, Series IA, Vol. IV, no. 228, p. 447Google Scholar.
26 Telegram from Chamberlain to London (member of the British delegation in Geneva), April 11, 1927, DBFP, Series IA, Vol. HI, No. 211, p. 142.
27 Foreign Office (FO), 800, Austen Chamberlain Papers, Vol. 260, Telegram, Cecil to Chamberlain, April 12, 1927.
28 Chamberlain to London, July 19, 1927, Ibid, No. 463, pp. 698. Also, Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard (British Ambassador in Washington), August 2, 1927, DBFP, Series IA, Vol. Ill, No. 494, pp. 718–19, hints that the recall was in order for the CID and Cabinet to correct the weak position which Cecil had been advocating at the Geneva Naval Conference, and ensure that Cecil “understood” Britain's position concerning cruisers and parity with the USN.
29 CID Minutes, Minutes of the 228th Meeting, July 7, 1927, CAB 2/5.
30 Ibid and CED Minutes, Minutes of the 229th meeting, July 14, 1927, CAB 2/5.
31 Chamberlain was specifically referring to the Geneva Protocol of 1924 that asked for Britain to consider in advance the definition of military assistance which it would be disposed to give under Article 16 (of the Covenant of the League of Nations), and further, that Britain would remain the judge of the type and the extent of the military measures it would take (in particular blockade) during a time of war. Chamberlain dispatch to Tyrrell (permanent under-secretary, Foreign Office), September 18, 1927, DBFP, Series IA, Vol. Ill, No. 206, p. 363.
32 Cecil, Viscount, A Great Experiment (London, 1941): 358–63Google Scholar.
33 The problem was further enhanced by the question of the Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, who all depended upon Britain and the RN for protection of their high seas interests. See Donald C. Watt, Personalities and Policies, pp. 149–55; and Twomey, Paul, “Small Power Security Through Great Power Arms Control?—Australian Perceptions of Disarmament, 1919–1930,” War and Society 8 (May 1990): 71–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
34 On the Geneva Naval Conference see McKercher, B. J. C., The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924–1929: Attitudes and Diplomacy (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 65–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For the unease over the general security arrangement and Britain's continued refusal to approve any agreement that resembled the Geneva Protocol of 1924, see letter from the British Delegation in Geneva to Tyrrell (British Ambassador to France July 1928-April 1934), September 22, 1927, DBFP, Series IA, Vol. IV, No. 208, pp. 366–69.
35 The British government was very concerned about the negative publicity they would receive after Cecil's resignation, especially in the US, as well as in Great Britain. Memo from Craigie (FO, American Department) on the “Effect on Public Opinion in the U.S. of Lord Cecil's Resignation from the Government,” DBFP, Series IA, Vol. IV, No. 212, pp. 382–84.
36 Chamberlain to London (Geneva), July 7, 1927, DBFP, Series IA, Vol. Ill, No. 406, pp. 649–50.
37 Chamberlain to London (Geneva), July 29, 1927, DBFP, Series IA, Vol. Ill, No. 478, p. 707.
38 Chamberlain to Howard, July 30, 1927, DBFP, Series IA, Vol. III, No. 482, p. 710.
39 Lynch, “A Matter of Controversy,” pp. 70–71. Admiral Sir Charles Madden, who had succeeded Lord Beatty as the First Sea Lord on July 30, was particularly keen on the idea of a one Power standard and maintained that under no circumstances should Britain be bound to a position of inferiority, with respect to the cruiser question and the freedom of the seas issue. See CID Minutes of Meetings, Minutes of Meeting 236, July 5, 1928, CAB 2/5.
40 “There is no doubt that the possibilities presented by a pact to renounce war captured public attention in Britain, the United States, and other countries for most of 1928. But the negotiation of the pact, with all of the work it entailed for the diplomats, really served to divert the public and the press in Britain and the United States from the more critical political differences that separated the two countries.” McKercher, , The Second Baldwin Government, p. 128Google Scholar (the rest of this paragraph is based on ch. 5).
41 McKercher, , The Second Baldwin Government, pp. 113–20Google Scholar.
42 FO, 800, Vol. 262, Letter Chamberlain to Howard, January 6, 1929.
43 Ibid.
44 Lord Cushendun memorandum, February 20, 1929, DBFP, Series IA, Vol. VI, No. 370, p. 657.
45 Barry D. Hunt, “British policy on the Issue of Belligerent and Neutral Rights, 1919–1939,” in New Aspects of Naval History: Selected Papers Presented at the Fourth Naval History Symposium, United States Naval Academy, 25–26 October 1979, ed., Craig L. Symonds (Annapolis, 1981), pp. 279–90; and McKercher, “Belligerent Rights in 1927–1929.”
46 Walters, F. P., A History of the League of Nations (London, 1960), pp. 125–26, 274–75Google Scholar. Also McKercher, , Second Baldwin Government, p. 198Google Scholar. In a Cabinet Committee set up to investigate the question of the Optional Clause, the finding was adverse to the signing of the treaty. The only member of the committee who disagreed with the finding was Lord Cecil.
47 Not having a large army or any real ability to act against continental enemies militarily, the RN and the blockade were seen as being the traditional and most effective way of bringing economic pressure to bear on an enemy during a time of war. See David French, The British Way in Warfare, and also see CID Papers, Nos. 966-B, November 11, 1929; 970-B, November 19, 1929; 973-B, November 12, 1929, all in CAB 4/19.
48 Ibid. See also FO, 800, Vol. 263, Telegram, Chamberlain to Howard, February 16, 1929: “The greatest reserve in handling all these questions is necessary at the present time if we are to have any chance of ultimate agreement and the less they become the subject of public discussion the better it will be.”
49 Lord Cushendun memorandum, March 13, 1929, DBFP, Series IA, Vol. VI, No. 376, p. 670.
50 Ibid. Also see Northedge, F. S., The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920–1946 (London, 1986), pp. 119–21Google Scholar.
51 The Salisbury Committee was a committee which was to study Policy on Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, under the chairmanship of the Lord Privy Seal. Cadogan memorandum, March 13, 1929, DBFP, No. 379, p. 676. Cadogan was a member of the Foreign Office and would become its head in 1938.
52 Cadogan memorandum, March 15, 1929, DBFP, Series IA, Vol. VI, No. 379, pp. 677–78.
53 Ibid, p. 681.
54 Ibid.
55 Taylor, A. J. P, The Trouble Makers: The Dissent Over Foreign Policy, 1792–1939 (London, 1957)Google Scholar; Ceadel, Martin, Pacifism in Britain, p. 85Google Scholar, Ceadel points out that the peace movement was in for a surprise, as it began to realize that Labour M.P.s were not ‘pacifists,’ but “an isolated form of pacifism;” James Hinton, Protests and Visions, pp. 76–77, points out that although the Labour Party depended heavily on members of the Union for Democratic Control (UDC, an anti-Lloyd George and anti-war movement from the First World War) for guidance on questions of foreign policy, the party was suspicious of the League of Nations, and saw it as an outgrowth from the Treaty of Versailles, which was a “peace to end all peace”; Cecil, , A Great Experiment, pp. 188–90Google Scholar; Carlton, David, MacDonald Versus Henderson: The Foreign Policy of the Second Labour Government (London, 1970)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Richardson, D., The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s (London, 1989)Google Scholar; Baker, P. Noel, The First World Disarmament Conference, 1932–33 and Why it Failed (Oxford, 1979), pp. 28–53Google Scholar.
56 CID Papers, Paper 966-B, “Optional Clause,” November 11, 1929, from the First Sea Lord, Charles E. Madden, CAB 4/19.
57 CID Papers, Paper 970-B, “Optional Clause,” November 19, 1929, CAB 4/19.
58 CID Papers, Paper 973-B, “The Optional Clause,” November 26, 1929, CAB 4/19.
59 See Greg C. Kennedy, “The 1930 London Naval Conference,” pp. 154–55.
60 MacDonald's desire to keep questions concerning naval disarmament and British security, particularly with respect to the United States, in his own hands is discussed in Carlton, MacDonald vs. Henderson, and is a reoccurring theme in the MacDonald Diary as well: see Diary entries of November 20 and December 3, 1929, MacDonald MSS, PRO, 30/69/1753. Henderson was bent on directing policy aimed at general disarmament and League issues. MacDonald's ideas found a receptive listener in the newly elected US President Herbert Hoover.
61 From the beginning of MacDonald's term in office it was clear that he would ensure that the Admiralty would be “be more cooperative than had been the case in the past,” on issues concerning disarmament. Dawes to Stimson, June 18, 1929, HHPP, 998.
62 MacDonald was extremely upset and depressed over the unemployment issue, and was constantly searching for solutions to the problem. He hoped that money saved through naval limitation would help the situation, but that the limitation would not impair Britain's security or sovereignty. Diary entry, 24 December, 1929, MacDonald MSS, Also see, O. Kennedy, “The 1930 London Naval Conference,” pp. 150–51.
63 Kennedy, , “The 1930 London Naval Conference,” p. 151Google Scholar.
64 The following description of events is based on McKercher, B. J. C., “From Enmity to Cooperation: The Second Baldwin Government and the Improvement of Anglo-American Relations, November 1928-June 1929,” Albion 24 (Spring 1992): 64–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
65 Diary entry, September 23, 1929, MacDonald MSS, PRO, 30/69/1753.
66 Dawes to Stimson, July 10, 1929, HHPP, 998.
67 Kennedy, “The 1930 London Naval Conference,” pp. 154–55.
68 On which newspapers were pro- or anti-disarmament see Kyba, Patrick, Covenants Without the Sword, pp. 16–51Google Scholar.
69 Diary entry, October 27, 1929, MacDonald MSS, PRO, 30/69/1753.
70 Ibid, Diary entry, February 2, 1930.
71 Ibid, Diary entry, February 12, 1930. The French delegation to the London Naval Conference presented obstructionist proposals, usually in response to Italian demands. The inability of the two nations to arrive at some type of common ground caused much annoyance and distress for Mac-Donald. In the end neither nation would officially ratify the London Naval Treaty.
72 Ibid, Diary entry, February 14, 1930.
73 Ibid, Diary entry, February 16, 1930.
74 Kennedy, , “The 1930 London Naval Conference,” p. 155Google Scholar.
75 Diary entry, January 18, 1932, MacDonald MSS, PRO, 30/69/1753. First Lord of the Admiralty, A. V. Alexander, had similar views: “I think you can go too quickly in this matter unless you can get other countries in Europe to go just as quickly as you. You find a steady decline in our naval expenditure and a steady rise in almost every other country, and you begin to ask whether it is a sane policy.” Quoted in Chaput, , Disarmament in British Foreign Policy, p. 216Google Scholar.
76 Ibid, Diary entry, March 31, 1932. The Daily Herald was the official labour newspaper at this time, with 49% of the shares being held by the Trade Union Congress, Butler, David and Butler, Gareth, British Political Facts, 1900–1985 (London, 1986), p. 482CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
77 Quoted in Cecelia Lynch, “A Matter of Controversy,” note 4.
78 David French, “Rationality and Irrationality in the Political Economy of British Defence Policy: The Pre-1914 and Pre-1939 Eras Compared,” an unpublished paper, presented at the Second International Strategy Conference, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, February 7–9, 1991, pp. 21–22.
79 CID Papers, Paper No. 99 IB, “Memorandum by Sir Robert Vansittart, Permanent under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,” May 17, 1930.
80 Vansittart memo, Nov.16, 1927, DBFP, Series IA, Vol. IV, No. 226, pp. 440–441.