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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 July 2014
Within the last generation there has been a vast outpouring of scholarship on the characteristics of British imperial policy in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The older orthodoxy that the mid-Victorian years were dominated by a commitment to laissez faire and free trade has been demolished. In the new era scholars quarrel over how “imperial” was “informal empire.” This article is not intended to add to this controversy, but rather to provide insight into the character of British policy in one area, Persia, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, with particular emphasis on American efforts to build railways and British responses to this attempted intrusion into an exclusive British-Russian sphere of influence.
For both Russia and Britain Persia had great strategic significance. Like Afghanistan, “the walls of the Indian garden,” Persia was important primarily in relation to the defense of the Indian Empire. Russian expansion to the borders of Persia, a weak state, posed the threat that the country would fall under Russian influence and what had been a buffer would become a menace.
British interest in Persia thus involved a strong strategic component which affected economic policy. Unlike Afghanistan it was seen as a promising market for British goods, particularly if transportation to the interior of Persia could be opened up on the Karun River and if British capital could be attracted to build a network of railways which could be a further basis for controlling the Persian economy and thus contributing to British influence at the Persian court. At the same time Britain was determined to thwart Russian plans for railways in the north which could be used to transport troops to the borders of Persia and eventually beyond. Each power assumed the malevolent intent of the other and each was determined to frustrate these foul plans.
1 The 19th century English diplomatist Richmond Shakespeare as quoted by Thornton, A. P., For The File on Empire (New York, 1968), p. 136.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 Further details on this subject are provided in my article on “British Policy on Railways in Persia, 1870–1900,” which will appear in Kedourie, Elie, ed., Middle Eastern Studies, in 1989.Google Scholar
3 Public Record Office, FO 633/8, Cramer to Morley, April 11, 1901. See also Galbraith, John S. and al-Sayyid-Marsot, Afaf Lutfi, “The British Occupation of Egypt: Another View,” Middle East Studies 9 (1978); 479–80.Google Scholar
4 British Library, Add. MSS 43924, Dilke's Diary, June 1, 1882, Dilke Papers.
5 BL, Add. MSS 43925, Dilke's Diary, Dilke Papers, Feb. 14, 1884.
6 Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond, The Life of Lord Granville, 1815–1891, 2 vols. (London, 1905), 2: 153–54.Google Scholar
7 For an account of the revenues of Persia, see PRO, FO 539/72, Picot to Duran, August 31, 1895, enclosure in Memo by Duran, Sept. 27, 1895.
8 Algar, Hamid, Mirza Malkum Khan (Berkeley, 1973), p. 115.Google Scholar
9 Blunt, Wilfrid, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt (London, 1903), p. 82.Google Scholar
10 Frechtling, Louis E., “The Reuter Concession in Persia,” The Asiatic Review 14 (July 1938): 520–21.Google Scholar
11 Sessional Papers, C. 8030, July 14, 1873, “Correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and Baron de Reuter ….”
12 Ibid., Enfield to Reuter, October 15, 1872.
13 PRO, FO 60/405, Telegram, W. T. Thomson to Granville, April 7, 1873, April 17, 1873.
14 Marten, Bradford G., German-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 1873–1912 (Gravenhage, 1959), p. 24.Google Scholar
15 These were the words of the Grand Vizier as quoted by the British Minister, W. Taylor Thomson to Granville, Nov. 8, 1873, PRO, FO 60/405
16 PRO, FO 248/288, W. T. Thomson to Granville, Dec. 4, 1873.
17 Frechtling, Louis E., “The Reuter Concession in Persia,” pp. 520–21.Google Scholar
18 BL, Add. MSS 39164, Lytton to Salisbury, July 16, 1877, Layard Papers.
19 PRO, FO 60/407, Telegram, W. T. Thomson to F.O., May 5, 1875.
20 PRO, FO 60/495, Telegram, Wolff to Salisbury, April 26, 1888.
21 Curzon, George N., Persia and the Persian Question, 2 vols. (London, 1892), 2: 617.Google Scholar
22 There is an extensive correspondence on this subject in PRO, FO 60/551.
23 See Keddie, Nikki R., Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892 (London, 1966).Google Scholar
24 Winston's proposal, dated May 28, 1886, is contained in enclosure, Nicolson to Rosebery, May 31, 1886, L/P&S/3/275, India Office Library [hereafter cited as IOL]. The names of the capitalists he professed to represent are not given.
25 IOL, L/P&S/3/275, Nicolson to Rosebery, May 31, 1886.
26 IOL, ibid., Nicolson to Rosebery, Confidential, May 20, 1886.
27 IOL, Memo, Shah to Nicolson, May 28, 1886.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., Nicolson to Rosebery, June 5, 1886.
30 Melkinov to Giers, May 17/29, 1886, quoted in Kazemzadeh, F., Russia and Britain in Persia (New Haven, 1968), p. 174.Google Scholar
31 Morning Post, Sept. 13, 1886.
32 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Persia, (Washington, 1887), p. 913Google Scholar, Pratt to Bayard, Nov. 29, 1886
33 Ibid. (1889), Part II, p. 1359, Pratt to Bayard, Jan. 10, 1888.
34 Ibid, p. 1360, Pratt to Bayard, Feb. 6, 1888.
35 PRO, FO 248/464, Nicolson to Salisbury, April 25, 1888.
36 Ibid. PRO, FO 60/494, Salisbury to Wolff, May 10, 1888.
37 PRO, FO 248/461, Salisbury to Wolff, May 10, 1888.
38 PRO, FO 248/495, Telegram, Wolff to Salisbury, July 2, 1888.
39 PRO, FO 248/468, Telegram, Salisbury to Wolff, July 14, 1888.
40 PRO, FO 248/677, Telegram, Salisbury to Wolff, Very Secret, Jan. 24, 1889.
41 Bishop, John B., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, 2 vols. (New York, 1920), 1: 8.Google Scholar
42 Russell, Charles E., Blaine of Maine (New York, 1931), pp. 413–14.Google Scholar
43 PRO, FO 248/480, Clergue to Wolff, Jan. 11, 1889.
44 Ibid., Telegram, Very Secret, Wolff to Salisbury, Jan. 12, 1889.
45 Ibid., Telegram, Wolff to Salisbury, Confidential, Jan. 13, 1889.
46 Ibid., Pratt to Wolff, Jan. 18, 1889.
47 Ibid., Wolff to Pratt, Jan. 18, 1889.
48 PRO, FO 248/477, Telegram, Wolff to Salisbury, Most Confidential, Jan. 19, 1889.
49 Ibid., Telegram, Salisbury to Wolff, Very Secret, Jan. 21, 24, 1889.
50 PRO, FO 248/480, Wolff to Salisbury, Feb. 3, 1889.
51 PRO, FO 248/477, Michael Herbert, Washington, to Salisbury, Feb. 12, 1889.
52 Boston Sunday Post, Feb. 12, 1889.
53 Ibid.
54 PRO, FO 248/480, Wolff to Salisbury, Feb. 21, 1889.
55 Ibid., Wolff to Salisbury, Feb. 15, 1889.
56 Ibid., Telegram, Very Secret, Wolff to Salisbury, Feb. 24, 1889.
57 New York Times, Jan. 16, 1890. Secretary of State Blaine had interests in railways in Mexico and South America, but his primary involvement was with American lines. Walker Blaine, closest to his father in business operations, and a member of the Clergue group, did not visit Persia. The explanation for James G. Blaine's lack of support seems to be his preoccupation with American railways. His son Emmons was vice-president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at the time of his death in 1892 at the age of 35. See Library of Congress, Blaine Papers, Reel 12.
58 PRO, FO 248/481, Telegram, Very Secret, Wolff to Salisbury, March 3, 1889.
59 New York Times, Sept. 30, 1889.
60 Ibid.