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Churchill, Macmillan, and the Reactivation of “Force X”
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 July 2014
Extract
Harold Macmillan, the future Prime Minister who was Resident Minister and political adviser at Algiers during 1943, devotes a chapter in his autobiographical volume dealing with World War II to the reactivation of the French naval squadron known as “Force X.” Although brief, impressionistic and lacking balance (students would be better advised to consult Sir Llewellyn Woodward's scholarly treatment), his account makes it evident that he had serious differences with Winston Churchill. The explanation he offers is that the Prime Minister resented his warning against the use of “bullying tactics.” Churchill, in his great war history, devotes only a brief paragraph to this curious episode and omits any reference to the important part Macmillan played. But a recent investigation of unpublished correspondence in the Prime Minister's Operational Papers, and of other pertinent materials, casts considerable light on the nature of their disagreement. These sources also provide valuable insights into the Force X problem generally, notably with respect to its linkage by Macmillan with the larger and much more important issue of French political unity. Actually minor in global war perspective, the Force X problem became a symbol of British difficulties in dealing with a defeated and divided France.
Force X was the French eastern Mediterranean squadron, commanded by Vice-Admiral René Godfroy, which was blocked in the port of Alexandria by a more powerful British fleet at the time of the Franco-German armistice in June, 1940. It consisted of one battleship, four cruisers, three destroyers, a half-dozen torpedo boats, and one submarine. The Force X commander, although claiming to be an Anglophile, believed that the French government had no option at that critical juncture but to abandon its ally and to accept Hitler's cease-fire terms.
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References
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12 Churchill to Foreign Office, March 15, 1943, Ibid. The Algiers authorities, so Macmillan notified the Foreign Office on February 18, were uncertain of the value of encouraging such desertions. “General Giraud will certainly welcome with affection any Frenchmen from Admiral Godefroy's [sic] squadron who rally to him but he wants the ships and men in preference to the men alone. …” Ibid.
13 Churchill to Eden, March 5,1943, Ibid.
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15 Missoffe to Michelier, March 5, 1943. PREM. 3/179/5. Missoffe, concerned that Godfroy might scuttle his ships, recommended that no drastic action, such as the cutting off of supplies, be taken against Force X. Further pressures on Godfroy “would entail the risk of irreparable consequences contrary to the common interests of the United Nations.” Cf. Woodward, , British Foreign Policy, 2: 316.Google Scholar
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19 Churchill offered, in return for this cooperation, to reimburse the North African French authorities for the accumulated arrears after Godfroy's “submission to your command.” Churchill to Giraud, March 11, 1943, Ibid.
20 Macmillan to Foreign Office, March 13, 1943, Ibid.
21 Ibid.
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23 Casey to Macmillan, March 21, 1943, PREM. 3/179/5.
24 Casey to Macmillan, March 24, 25,1943; Macmillan to Foreign Office, March 25, 1943, Ibid.
25 Macmillan to Foreign Office, April 7,1943, Ibid.
26 Churchill to Eden, April 9,1943; Churchill to Macmillan, April 11, 1943, Ibid.
27 Macmillan to Foreign Office, April 13, 20, 1943, Ibid.
28 Churchill to Macmillan, April 25, 1943, Ibid.
29 Casey to Churchill, April 28, 1943, Ibid.
30 Macmillan to Foreign Office, April 29, 1943, Ibid.
31 Churchill to Eden, April 30,1943, Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Casey to Foreign Office, May 5, 1943, Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Churchill to Macmillan, May 12, 1943, Ibid.
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