¹ Jan. 6, 1912, p. 5; under the same title identical or similar wording was repeated in annual articles: April 17, 1909, p. 433; March 26, 1910, p. 339; Dececember 21, 1912, p. 717; January 17, 1914, p. 109.

² See the following publications of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce: Lough, William H., Banking Opportunities in South America (Washington, 1915), pp. 64, 69–70Google Scholar; Hurley, Edward N., Banking and Credit in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru (Washington, 1914), pp. 23–25Google Scholar; Wolfe, Archibald J., Foreign Credits (Washington, 1913), pp. 56–59Google Scholar.

³ Phelps, Clyde W., The Foreign Expansion of American Banks (New York, 1927), pp. 85–86, 131–166, 211Google Scholar.

⁴ The historiography on this topic is considerable; among others see Hoffman, Ross S.J., Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry, 1875–1914 (Philadelphia, 1933; reprinted 1964)Google Scholar; Steiner, Zara, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (New York, 1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kennedy, Paul M., The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914 (London, 1980)Google Scholar; Schädlich, Karlheinz, “Politische und ökonomische Aspekte der britisch-deutschen Handelsrivalität am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts,” Jahrbuch für Geschichte 15 (1977): 67–84Google Scholar; Feldenkirchen, Wilfried, “Die wirtschaftliche Rivalität zwischen Deutschland und England im 19. Jahrhundert,” Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte 25 (1980): 77–107CrossRefGoogle Scholar; cf. also Kindleberger, Charles P., “Germany's Overtaking of England, 1806–1964,” in Economic Response (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), pp. 185–236CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Neuberger, Hugh M. and Stokes, Houston H., “The Anglo-German Trade Rivalry, 1893–1913: a Counterfactual Outcome and its Complications,” Social Science History 3 (1979): 187–201CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ Glade, William, “Latin America and the International Economy, 1870–1914,” in The Cambridge History of Latin America, ed. Bethell, Leslie, vol. 4 (Cambridge, 1986), p. 4Google Scholar.

⁶ Roberto Cortés Conde, “The Growth of the Argentine Economy, c. 1870–1914,” ibid., vol. 5 (Cambridge, 1986), p. 345; and Mitchell, B. R., ed., International Historical Statistics: the Americas and Australasia (Detroit, 1983), pp. 545–562CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Pre-war exchange rates were quite stable; Argentina: 1 gold peso equaled $1 U.S. equaled 4 marks equaled 4 shillings; Brazil: 1 milreis equaled ca. $0.25 U.S. equaled ca. 1 mark equaled ca. 1 shilling; Chile: 1 gold peso equaled $0,375 U.S. equaled 1 1/2 marks equaled 1 1/2 shillings; Mexico: 1 gold peso equaled $0.50 U.S. equaled 2 marks equaled 2 shillings.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 576–616.

⁸ A similar paradigm likewise emerges from the statistics on British and German investment in Latin America, though here the figures are much less certain than with trade, especially so with regard to German investment. While British investment in securities (as opposed to direct investment) rose from £425.7 million in 1890 to £540.0 million in 1900 to £999.4 million in 1913, German investment, which only began in the late 1880s, reached approximately £193 million (3,865 million marks) in 1904 and possibly £224 million (4,480 million marks) in 1914; France's investment in securities, by way of comparison, rose from ca. £217 million (5,420 million francs) in 1890 to ca. £326 million (8,151 million francs) in 1913; see United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, El financiamiento externo de América Latina (New York, 1964), pp. 4, 9, 11Google Scholar; and Young, George F. W., “German Capital Investment in Latin America in World War I,” Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas 25 (1988): 224–226, 234Google Scholar.

⁹ Lough, William H., Financial Developments in South American Countries (Washington, 1915), pp. 8–9, 22–24, 29–30, 35–36Google Scholar.

¹⁰ In this paper I have used the original German names of these banks; in Latin America, of course, they operated under Spanish/Portuguese names; Deutsche Überseeische Bank: Banco Alemán Transátlantico); Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland: Banco Brasileiro Alemão; Bank für Chile und Deutschland: Banco de Chile y Alemania; Deutsch-Südamerikanische Bank: Banco Germánico de la América del Sud; Deutsche Antióquia Bank: Banco Alemán Antioqueño.

¹¹ Calculated from consolidated banking table in Hurley, , Banking and Credit, p. 26Google Scholar.

¹² CalcuIated from consolidated banking table facing p. 52, ibid.

¹³ Calculated from consolidated banking table in Redfield, Arthur H., Brazil, a Study of Economic Conditions since 1913 (Washington, 1920), pp. 95–97Google Scholar.

¹⁴ In Peru, the Banco del Perú y Londres, which had been formed by a merger of the Lima branch of the London Bank of Mexico and South America and a local bank and in which the former retained an interest, ranked first by a wide margin as the most important bank in the country, but the Deutsche Überseeische Bank, which ranked second, was the only really foreign bank in business there in 1913; Hurley, , Banking and Credit, pp. 59–60Google Scholar. In Mexico, the Banco de Londres y México held second place behind the Banco Nacional, while the two German banks held more modest positions as of 1910; only the Deutsch-Südamerikanische Bank was truly a foreign bank, however, for the Banco de Londres y México and the Banco de Comercio e Industria (Bank für Handel und Industrie) were respectively owned only partly by British and German banks; Mewes, Friedrich W., “Die Entwicklung des mexikanischen Bankwesens” (Ph.D. diss., University of Hamburg, 1920), pp. 127–145Google Scholar. Cf. also Wells, William C., “Germany's Past Economic Position in Latin America,” Bulletin of the Pan American Union 51, 1 (July 1920): 30–31Google Scholar; although Wells (chief staff statistician at the Pan American Union) is at pains in this article to minimize the German and maximize the U.S. position, he still is forced to allow that “among foreign banks the German ranked second in importance to the British.”

¹⁵ Nevin, Edward and Davis, E. W., The London Clearing Banks (London, 1970), pp. 70–73Google Scholar.

¹⁶ This bank, before 1911 known as the Conés Commercial & Banking Company, evolved out of the merger in 1904 of the Colombian coffee trading firm of Enrique Cortés & Company, registered in London in 1884, and the London Bank of Central America, registered in London in 1893, after having first been the Banco de Nicaragua (1888); Joslin, David, A Century of Banking in Latin America (London, 1963), pp. 202–206Google Scholar.

¹⁷ The most thoroughgoing account of the history of the British banks in Latin America is in Joslin, A Century of Banking, with the limitation that he is concerned only with the several pre-war banks that merged into the Bank of London & South America after 1923; a more general but much less detailed account of all foreign banks can be found in Baster, Albert S. J., The International Banks (London, 1935), ch. 5Google Scholar; see also Lück, Karlheinz, “Die Entwicklung der englischen, deutschen und nordamerikanischen Bankinteressen in Südamerika” (Ph.D. diss., Wirtschaftshochschule Berlin, 1939), pp. 8–39Google Scholar; Jones, Charles, “Commercial Banks and Mortgage Companies,” in Business Imperialism, 1840–1930, ed. Platt, D. C. M. (Oxford, 1977), ch. 1Google Scholar; for Argentina alone see Ferns, Henry S., Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1960), pp. 357–363Google Scholar and passim. On the Overend Gurney and Baring crises see Emden, Paul H., Money Powers of Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London, 1938), pp. 196–199, 278–286Google Scholar; cf. also Ziegler, Dieter, “Zwischen Gurney und Baring — die Geschäftspolitik der Bank of England 1867–1890,” Bankhistorisches Archiv 12, 2 (December 1986): 67–95Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Ferns, , Britain and Argentina, pp. 333, 335, 358, 361Google Scholar; also Joslin, , Century of Banking, pp. 16–30, 64–66, 79–81, 85–87Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Baster, , International Banks, pp. 1–3Google Scholar; and Wolfe, , Foreign Credits, pp. 7–9, 12–55Google Scholar; cf. also Jones, Charles, “‘Business Imperialism’ and Argentina, 1875–1900: a Theoretical Note,” Journal of Latin American Studies 12, 2 (November 1980): 437–444CrossRefGoogle Scholar, wherein the author argues that many of the mid-19th century merchanl houses were forced to invest in these banks or be pushed out of business by the latter's greater efficiency; his argument is more fully developed in his International Business in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1987)Google Scholar.

²⁰ Baster, , International Banks, pp. 3–9 and chs. 3–4Google Scholar; for a comprehensive list of the British foreign and colonial banks in 1910 see Bloem, A. W., “Die Foreign and Colonial Banks in London,” Bank-Archiv 9 (1910): 186–188Google Scholar; also Wolfe, , Foreign Credits, pp. 46–47Google Scholar.

²¹ Joslin, , Century of Banking, pp. 19, 55Google Scholar; Baster, , International Banks, pp. 129–137, 141, 147Google Scholar.

²² Joslin, , Century of Banking, pp. 29, 65, 80, 87Google Scholar; Baster, , International Banks, pp. 130, 138, 141Google Scholar. By way of comparison, the average paid-in capital of fifty-one joint-stock banks in London in 1865 was £513,000; Chapman, Stanley, The Rise of Merchant Banking (London, 1984), p. 151Google Scholar.

²³ Joslin, , Century of Banking, pp. 26, 43, 108, 136Google Scholar; Baster, , International Banks, p. 147Google Scholar; Ferns, , Britain and Argentina, pp. 361–362, 381Google Scholar.

²⁴ Joslin, , Century of Banking, pp. 182–183, 191–205, 211–214Google Scholar.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 19–20 and passim; Ferns, , Britain and Argentina, pp. 335, 358Google Scholar.

²⁶ Joslin, , Century of Banking, p. 25Google Scholar; Wolfe, , Foreign Credits, pp. 44, 55Google Scholar; Jones, , “Commerical Banks,” pp. 36–43Google Scholar; for discussion and commentary on the reputed principles of British banking see Jones, Charles, “The Transfer of Banking Techniques from Britain to Argentina, 1862–1914,” Revue Internationale d'Histoire de la Banque 26–27 (1983): 252–261Google Scholar. In a letter from Head Office to the manager of the recently opened branch of the London & River Plate Bank in Valparaiso (No. 45/2, January 13, 1907), the General Manager wrote in regard to a request for a substantial mortgage loan: “We are adverse to this kind of overdraft, and to the amount [$150,000 or ca. £3,000] in one name, as well as the possibility of its becoming known that we had inaugurated our business with this sort of advance. For they [the Board] wish to see the business extended in a purely commercial direction [emphasis mine]. Moreover, if no deposits become available at your branch on which to found a Banking business, the raison d'etre of your Branch would cease to exist, unless there were a sufficiently remunerative Exchange, and Collections, or Credit business, by which we mean that it is not the intention of the Board to maintain a Branch in Chili solely for the purpose of putting out money” (Archive of the Bank of London & South America, University College, London, D58/1 [hereafter cited as BOLSA]).

²⁷ It was finally wound up in 1881; Ferns, , Britain and Argentina, p. 362Google Scholar; Jones, , “Commercial Banks,” p. 41Google Scholar; the Mercantile Bank's Anglo-Argentine promoters were regarded as “financial reprobates” by the management of the London & River Plate Bank (ibid., p. 39), whom Ferns characterizes as “merchants turned bankers” (pp. 361–362). Indeed, as exemplar of all British banks, the London & River Plate Bank is blamed by Latin American economic nationalists for using local deposit monies to further distort the local economy towards dependence on foreign trade; in this view the policy of the Mercantile Bank, insofar as it promoted “economic development,” is looked upon with approbation; see Jones, , “The Transfer of Banking Techniques,” pp. 252, 257Google Scholar; and idem, International Business in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 130–133, 171–173.

²⁸ Joslin, , Century of Banking, pp. 132, 168, 171–173Google Scholar.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 124–125, 131, 142–143, 165, 213–214; see also Orbell, John, Baring Brothers & Co., Limited. A History to 1939 (London, 1985), pp. 66–68Google Scholar; and Stone, Irving, The Composition and Distribution of British Investment in Latin America, 1865 to 1913 (New York, 1987), pp. 336, 339, 405, 409–410Google Scholar; the Anglo-South American Bank also issued loans for El Salvador in 1908, the municipality of Lima in 1911, and that of Conception (Chile) in 1912 and 1913 (ibid., pp. 412, 416). Cf. also Young, George F. W., “Anglo-German Banking Syndicates and the Issue of South American Government Loans in the Era of High Imperialism, 1885–1914,” Bankhistorisches Archiv, 16, 1 (June 1990): 3–38Google Scholar.

³⁰ Lough, , Banking Opportunities, pp. 44“45Google Scholar; Hurley, , Banking and Credit, pp. 12, 18Google Scholar; Wolfe, , Foreign Credits, p. 39Google Scholar; Riesser, Jacob, The German Great Banks and their Concentration (Washington, 1911; reprinted, New York, 1977), pp. 420–432Google Scholar; Strasser, Karl, “Die deutschen Banken im Ausland” (Ph.D. diss., University of Lausanne, 1924), pp. 24–28Google Scholar; cf. also Whale, Philip Barrett, Joint Stock Banking in Germany (London, 1930), ch. 3Google Scholar.

³¹ Born, Karl Erich, International Banking in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York, 1983), pp. 125–126Google Scholar; Baster, , International Banks, pp. 44–45Google Scholar; Seidenzahl, Fritz, 100 Jahre Deutsche Bank, 1870–1970 (Frankfurt a.M., 1970), pp. 34–35, 38–39Google Scholar; Klein, Ernst, “The Deutsche Bank's South American Business before the First World War,” in Studies on Economic and Monetary Problems and on Banking History, No. 1—No. 22 (Mainz, 1988), pp. 471–472Google Scholar; Pohl, Manfred, Deutsche Bank Buenos Aires, 1887–1987 (Mainz, 1987), pp. 18/19Google Scholar (this is a bilingual German/Spanish publication); Otto, Walter, “Anleiheübernahme-, Gründungs- und Beteiligungsgeschichte der deutschen Grossbanken in Übersee” (Ph.D. diss., University of Würzburg, 1910), p. 106Google Scholar.

³² The Deutsche Bank in its initial intent to expand foreign trade had opened branches in Shanghai and Yokohama in 1872, but these had to be closed in 1875; Born, , International Banking, p. 125Google Scholar; Seidenzahl, , 100 Jahre Deutsche Bank, pp. 35–38Google Scholar.

³³ Pohl, , Deutsche Bank, pp. 18/19–20/21Google Scholar.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 24/25–26/27; Strasser, , Die deutschen Banken, pp. 130–131Google Scholar; also Benfey, Fritz, Die neuere Entwicklung des deutschen Auslandsbankwesens 1914–1925 (Berlin, 1925), pp. 39–41Google Scholar.

³⁵ Pohl, , Deutsche Bank, pp. 28/29–30/31Google Scholar.

³⁶ Strasser, , Die deutschen Banken, pp. 145–147Google Scholar; Benfey, , Die neuere Entwicklung, pp. 63–65Google Scholar; Otto, , Anleiheübernahme, p. 110Google Scholar.

³⁷ Pohl, , Deutsche Bank, pp. 40/41–44/45Google Scholar.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 40/41; Strasser, , Die deutschen Banken, p. 129Google Scholar.

³⁹ Pohl, , Deutsche Bank, pp. 48/49–52/53Google Scholar; Strasser, , Die deutschen Banken, pp. 154–155Google Scholar; Benfey, , Die neuere Entwicklung, p. 71Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Strasser, , Die deutschen Banken, pp. 162–163Google Scholar; Benfey, , Die neuere Entwicklung, pp. 54–55Google Scholar; cf. also 75 Jahre Deutsch-Südamerikanische Bank (Hamburg, 1981), pp. [2–3]Google Scholar.

⁴¹ The small Deutsche Antióquia Bank was organized in October 1912 by a group of Bremen merchant houses importing coffee from Columbia; it was capitalized at three million marks (£150,000), had its head office in Bremen, and only branch in Medellín; Strasser, , Die deutschen Banken, pp. 165–166Google Scholar; Benfey, , Die neuere Enlwicklung, pp. 79–80Google Scholar.

⁴² Pohl, , Deutsche Bank, pp. 46/47Google Scholar; Klein, , “Deutsche Bank's South American Business,” p. 475Google Scholar.

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 476–478, 479–481; Strasser, , Die deutschen Banken, pp. 138–139Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 169–172; Pohl, , Deutsche Bank, pp. 52/53–54/55Google Scholar; Klein, , “Deutsche Bank's South American Business,” pp. 478–479Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Strasser, , Die deutschen Banken, pp. 148, 155–157Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 162–163; cf. also 75 Jahre Deutsch-Südamerikanische Bank, pp. [4–7].

⁴⁷ Born, , International Banking, pp. 168–175Google Scholar; for a succinct description of the “Functions and Structure of British Banking,” see Pressnell, L. S. and Orbell, John, A Guide to the Historical Records of British Banking (Aldershot, 1985), pp. xii–xxGoogle Scholar; cf. also “German versus British Banking,” Sperlings Journal 1, 4 (December 1917): 30–38Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ The three being the Deutsche Überseeische Bank, Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland, and Deutsch-Südamerikanische Bank; Pohl, , Deutsche Bank, pp. 24/25Google Scholar; Otto, , Anleiheübernahme, p. 106Google Scholar; 75 Jahre Deutsch-Südamerikanische Bank, p. [4]; Young, , “Anglo-German Banking Syndicates,” pp. 4, 8–11Google Scholar, passim; cf. also Staab, Rudolf, “Die Unternehmertätigkeit deutscher Banken im Auslande” (Ph.D. diss., University of Freiburg, 1912), pp. 29–30, 67–68Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Otto, , Anleiheübernahme, pp. 69–127, 222–227Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 76–77, 112–114, 222–224, 230–231; cf. also Herwig, Holger, Germany's Vision of Empire in Venezuela, 1871–1914 (Princeton, 1986), ch. 1 and passimGoogle Scholar.

⁵¹ Otto, , Anleiheüberhahme, pp. 100–106, 114–115, 121–123, 242–243Google Scholar.

⁵² On Latin America's aggregate foreign trade see “Latin American Foreign Trade in 1918 — General Survey,” Bulletin of the Pan American Union 49, 5 (November 1919), p. 552Google Scholar: in the four years 1910–1913 the total trade of Latin America with the United States was $3,053 million, with Britain $2,383 million, with Germany $1,473 million, and with France $874 million.

⁵³ Besides the five Latin American banks, there were, as of 1914, also three other overseas banks for the Middle and Far East — Deutsch-Asiatische Bank (1889), Deutsche Palästina-Bank (1899), Deutsche Orientbank (1906) — plus four colonial banks — Deutsch-Westafrikanische Bank (1904), Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Bank (1905), Deutsche Afrika-Bank (1906), and the Handelsbank für Ostafrika (1911); Otto, , Anleiheübernahme, p. 228Google Scholar; Whale, Barrett, Joint Stock Banking in Germany, pp. 72–79Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ BOLSA, D35/11. fols. 813–814.

⁵⁵ BOLSA, D35/12, fol. 405. The building came into the possession of the London & River Plate Bank in March 1891 when the Banco Carabassa, a private banking firm, sold out to the former; Joslin, , Century of Banking, p. 127Google Scholar; Pohl, , Deutsche Bank, pp. 48/49Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ BOLSA, C1/3, fol. 261.

⁵⁷ BOLSA, D35/15, fol. 305.

⁵⁸ BOLSA, D68/9, fol. 989.

⁵⁹ BOLSA, D35/16, fol. 296.

⁶⁰ BOLSA, C1/2, fols. 449–450.

⁶¹ BOLSA, D58/1, fol. 315.

⁶² BOLSA, D35/13, letters no. 35/8 (December 24, 1896) and no. 35/13 (February 26, 1897).

⁶³ BOLSA, C1/3, fol. 267.

⁶⁴ BOLSA, C1/3, fol. 285.

⁶⁵ BOLSA, C1/3, fols. 288–289.

⁶⁶ BOLSA, D58/1, fol. 12.

⁶⁷ For examples of local legislation against foreign banks see Jones, , “Commerical Banks,” pp. 43–46, 50–51Google Scholar; and idem, “‘Business Imperialism’ and Argentina,” pp. 441–444. The debate in the Chilean Senate on the Report of the Minister of Finance (November 14, 1907) brought forth “obnoxious” attacks on the foreign banks alleging, inter alia, that they used deposit monies to buy bills of exchange to force down the exchange rate, and that they operated without any capital of their own; a majority in Congress also wanted to establish a state bank and remodel the banking laws after the style of the Canadian or U.S. laws: “There is strong sympathy for the latter. But we think there is a great lack of capacity to appreciate these matters intelligently in high quarters” (BOLSA, D58/1: London & River Plate Bank, confidential letters from the manager of the Valparaiso branch to Head Office, no. 51 [November 20, 1907], fols. 274–275, and no. 52 [November 25, 1907], fols. 282–283).

⁶⁸ Cf. “Memorandum respecting the Policy of enforcement of Enemy Trade Restrictions against South American Firms,” undated, but after the Armistice and before the peace negotiations, probably November/December 1918: “Our enemy trade restrictions were not immediately effective in producing the desired result, viz: A Destruction of traders in South America with enemy affiliations and the substitution therefor of American traders….There has been an increasing injury to German traders due to the curtailing of their business, which injury has not, however, resulted in greatly impairing their capital resources and has not as yet forced them into a position from which they may not reasonably be expected to recover” (U.S. National Archives, Suitland, Md., War Trade Board, Bureau of War Trade Intelligence, RG 182, box 746, file 713–621.)

⁶⁹ See n. 1; also quoted in Hurley, , Banking and Credit, p. 15Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ Neuberger and Stokes (see n. 4) project German export trade overtaking British export trade between 1926 and 1933 had there been no war.